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McCLELLAN'S MILITARY CAREER

REVIEWED AND EXPOSED:

THE

MILITARY POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION

SET FORTH AND VINDICATED.

by William Swinton

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The following Chapters are a condensation and revision of the series of twelve articles in review of McClellan's Report, by WILLIAM SWINTON, published in the New York *Times*, during the months of February, March, and April, 1864. In the preparation of this criticism the author has to acknowledge the use of a large mass of unpublished official documents.

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McCLELLAN'S MILITARY CAREER

REVIEWED AND EXPOSED.

I.

McCLELLAN AS A POLITICAL STRATEGIST.

It is a fact singularly characteristic of General McClellan that having won whatever reputation he enjoys in the field of *war*, he is now running on this reputation as the Presidential candidate of a party whose creed is *peace* and whose platform casts contumely on the very war of which their nominee had for upwards of a year the chief conduct. When we consider, however, that all his fame is founded on defeats, it is not wonderful that his hopes should still be bound up in defeats. General McClellan's Presidental prospects brighten just in proportion as our soldiers suffer disaster, and he will only be certain of being President of our country when it is certain we have no country at all.

There is no object more calculated to claim the sympathy of a generous people than a defeated general; and unless his failure has been associated with circumstances of personal turpitude he is pretty sure, sooner or later, to receive that sympathy. Machiavelli, that subtle observer, points out that the Romans never blamed their unsuccessful commanders, esteeming that to a high-minded man the mortification of defeat was of itself punishment enough. Sertorius, Mithridates and William of Orange were habitually unsuccessful generals, and yet history has not chosen to cast contumely on their names: on the contrary, the memory of their failures is covered up by the remembrance of qualities of mind that deserved, if they could not command, success.

It has been left for General McClellan, however, to claim not merely the sympathy of his countrymen (which would have been accorded him had his conduct been marked by the modesty of a soldier) but their admiration and highest rewards for a series of exploits in which the country suffered only disaster.

General McClellan's candidacy for the Presidency does not begin with the nomination at Chicago. While his soldiers were being struck down by thousands with the fevers of the Chickahominy, the fever of the White House struck him. There are a thousand things both in his military career and in his subsequent conduct that can only be explained on this theory. No doubt he would have been glad to have founded his Presidential pretensions on success; but as this was not possible he early conceived a characteristic change of base: he determined to found them on defeat. He could not make failures triumphs, but he would adventure a flanking movement in the field of politics more bold than any he ever essayed on the field of war: he would throw the burden of all his failures upon an Administration which thwarted all his brilliant plans and ensured defeat where he had organized victory! This desperate enterprise he has attempted to carry though in a document published a few months ago, which, under the guise of a "Report," is really an elaborate political manifesto.

Had General McClellan not been a prospective candidate for the Presidency, it would be difficult to bring his so-called "Report" into any known category. If it is less than a Report it is also more than a Report. It is less than a Report because numerous dispatches of the time are omitted from this collection. It is also more than a strictly military Report, because its basis is an elaborate historical, and argumentative recital, in which such dispatches as are used by General McClellan are *inlaid*. Military Reports in the sense in which any soldier understands the

term, are written either from the battle-field itself, or, in the impossibility of that, as speedily after the action as it is possible for the staff to collect the requisite data. There have been Generals who have seen fit at the close of their career to publish their dispatches in collected form. Such a legacy was left to military history by the great Iron Duke. But what is peculiar in Wellington's publication of his dispatches is that he has left these memorials of his career in their strict chronological order, in their exact original state: he has not suppressed a line, nor added a word of commentary, nor a word of argument, nor a word of accusation, nor a word of justification.

Not so General McClellan's Report. The labor of a whole twelvemonth, composed in the leisure of retiracy, and after the publication of most of the material likely to bear on his fame, its purpose seems less to record a series of military transactions than to vindicate his conduct and arraign the Administration. No charge is too great, none too small, to draw out from him a replication: and he is equally ready, whether to bring railing accusations against his military superiors, to bowl down the Committee on the Conduct of the War, or to blow up the newspapers.

In this state of facts, a critical analysis of this so-called "Report" becomes a matter which concerns the welfare of the country not less than the truth of history. It is to this task I propose addressing myself. It will be our duty to pierce to the historical truth underlying the veneer which General McClellan has spread over events, to endeavor to seize by the guiding-clue of unpublished dispatches how much here set down as original motive is really *afterthought*, and to examine the foundation of the charges which he heaps upon the Administration. If I do not succeed in proving by documentary evidence that every one of General McClellan's failures was the result of his own conduct and character,—if I do not prove his career as a whole to have been a failure unmatched in military history, and if I do not fasten upon him conduct which in any other country in the world would have caused him to be court-martialed and dismissed the service,—I shall ask the reader to accept his plea in abatement of judgment and accord him the patent of distinguished generalship. But if I make good all I have said, I shall ask the reader to characterize in fitting terms the conduct of a man who, receiving the heartiest support of the Government, the lavish confidence of the people, and the unstinted resources of the nation, achieves nothing but defeat, and terminates a career of unexampled failure by charging the blame upon an Administration whose only fault was not to have sooner to discovered his incapacity.

II.

THE "YOUNG NAPOLEON."

It was the good fortune of General McClellan to come into command while the public mind was in a peculiar mood. The disastrous upshot of a forward movement in which the nation was conscious of having used too great urgency had given rise to complete abnegation of all criticism on the part of the people and the press. Bull Run had educated us, and, in a fit of patriotic remorse, men renounced everything that might appear like pressure on the Government or the commanders of our armies.

The nation did more: it literally threw open its arms to receive the young chief chosen to lead its foremost army. He came in with no cold suspicion, but with a warm and generous welcome. It will always remain one of the most extraordinary phenomena of our extraordinary times that a young man without military experience, leaping from a captaincy to the highest grade in our military hierarchy, and bringing with him only the prestige of a series of small operations which another than he planned and executed,* should have been at one received into the nation's confidence and credited in advance with every military quality and capacity. It may not be very flattering to our common sense to look back at the time when this hero of unfought fields was taken on trust as a "young Napoleon;" but it remains, nevertheless, a piece of history; and when a few weeks after assuming command, he told his soldiers, "We have had our last retreat, we have seen our last defeat—you stand by me and I'll stand by you," a too-confiding people applauded the bombast as having the true Napoleonic ring!

Beyond a doubt these things showed the military juvenility of America; but they were none the less the manifestations of a mood of mind which an able Commander

* I mean of course General Rosecrans. The Report of that general, including his operations in Western Virginia, will, it is hoped, soon be published.

could have turned to immense account. General McClellan had but to ask, and it was given him—indeed it came without asking. Every energy of the Government, and all the resources of a generous and patriotic people, were lavishly placed at his disposal, to enable him to gather together an army and put it in the most complete state of efficiency, so that offensive movements might be resumed at the earliest possible moment. The *time* of that movement was, however, with a scrupulous delicacy left in the hands of the Commander himself. General McClellan complains of the "vehemence with which an *immediate advance* upon the enemy's works directly in our front was urged by a patriotic people." I am very sure that not only was no "immediate advance" urged, but that no advance at all was expected during any portion of the period in which General McClellan says he was engaged in organizing the army. "It was necessary," says he,* "to create a new army for active operations and to expedite its organization, equipment, and the accumulation of the material of war, and to this not inconsiderable labor all my energies for the next *three months* were exerted." As General McClellan assumed command of the army in the latter part of July (27th), the "three months" spoken of would bring us to the 1st of November. Now it would not be difficult to show that during no part of that period did the public show anything like "vehemence" for an advance. The country understood that a new army had to be organized; indeed there was if anything, a disposition to exaggerate both the time required for this work and its inherent difficulties; and as a large share of the fame of General McClellan rests on the theory of his having "organized" the army, it may be worth while making a brief diversion to penetrate into the interior of this awful mystery of organization.

One would suppose from the tone of General McClellan that when he came to the Army of the Potomac there was no army to command. "I found," says he (page 44), "no army to command—*a mere collection of regiments*, cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat." Now, the facts of the case are that he came into command of fifty thousand men, and they were very far from being "a mere collection of *regiments*." The brigade and divisional organization existed and *had* existed, having been established by General McDowell. The organization of modern armies is a matter long ago fixed, and is not an affair which admits either of invention or of innovation. The hierarchy by the battalion, brigade, division, and corps, first formulated in the *Ordonnance du Roi*, is the military system of every European nation; and our own military code is, in fact, a translation of it. It is not clear, therefore, how there was room for the exercise of any such mysterious powers of organization as have been attributed to General McClellan, and he certainly put forth none. He found the framework of brigades and divisions, and he continued it, simply piling up *more* brigades and *more* divisions.† There only remained to push the organization one step higher, and that step he did not take. Our regular army having always been very small, no higher unit of organization than the *division* had existed or had been required. What became absolutely necessary as soon as the needs of the war created great armies of one or two hundred thousand men was to establish the higher fighting unit—the *corps d'armée*—without which no large army can effectively enter upon an active campaign. *General McClellan would never consent to the establishment of corps.* The only novelty of organization, therefore, which it was possible for him to institute, he would not and did not. He left the army an acephalous agglomeration of thirteen divisions, without correlation, unity or cohesion; and it became necessary for the President, months afterwards, and in opposition to General McClellan, to constitute corps just as the army was on the point of setting out on an active campaign.

The period of three months, during which General McClellan, according to his own statement, was engaged in reorganizing the army, having passed,—the Government and the nation became naturally anxious that the splendid army of over a hundred and fifty thousand men, which had by this time grown up on the banks of the Potomac, should be turned to account. Our foreign relations, our domestic interests, our national honor—every consideration conspired to urge an attack on the insolent foe who held the Capital in siege. But during no period of the six months succeeding the 1st of November—and during all of which period the motives for an

* Report, p. 6.

† Whatever credit is claimed for the *practical* organization of the army belongs to Brigadier-General (now Major-General) Silas Casey, a painstaking tactician, who labored with tireless assiduity at the task of brigading the newly arrived regiments. The assumption of the credit of this work by General McClellan is a flagrant instance of *sic vos non vobis:*

"The knight slew the boar,
The king had the glorie."

advance became progressively more and more imperative—did or would General McClellan consent to move his army. If there are any considerations that go to justify this delay, it is only fair to General McClellan that he shall have the benefit of their full weight, and this subject is worth examining with some fulness, because there is a close logical connexion between that long inaction and all the subsequent ill fortune of the Army of the Potomac.

III.

A HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND MEN "IN BUCKRAM."

There is one characteristic of General McClellan which displays itself so persistently, both in his Report and in his conduct, that it must belong to the very structure of his intellect. What I mean is a certain inequality of vision which puts facts out of all just relations, gives him one standard of judgment for himself and another for others, and leads him to a prodigious over-estimate of immediate, and a prodigious under-estimate of remote difficulties. "The first qualification in a general," says Napoleon, "is a cool head—that is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and objects at their real value. Some men are so constituted as to see everything through a high-colored medium. Whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage, or other good qualities such men may possess, nature has not formed them for the command of armies, or the direction of great military operations." This key will aid us in the interpretation of that extraordinary tendency to exaggerate the force of the enemy which we find him displaying at the very outset of his career, and which continued to grow upon him throughout its whole course.

The first instance in which we have a distinct utterance from General McClellan on the point of the relative strength of his own and the enemy's force is in a letter addressed by him to the Secretary of War in the latter part of October, 1861.* In this communication he uses the following language:

"So much time has passed, and the winter is approaching so rapidly, that but two courses are left to the Government, viz.: to go into winter quarters, or to assume the offensive *with force greatly inferior in numbers to the army I regarded as desirable and necessary.*

Now, the first question is, what number he regarded as not only "desirable" but "*necessary*," in order to enable him to assume the offensive. Happily, on this point we have from himself precise information, for in a subsequent part of the same communication he gives what he calls an "estimate of the requisite force for an advance movement by the Army of the Potomac." It is as as follows:

"Column of active operations	150,000 men,	400 guns.
Garrison of the city of Washington	35,000 "	40 "
To guard the Potomac to Harper's Ferry	5,000 "	12 "
To guard the Lower Potomac	8,000 "	24 "
Garrison for Baltimore and Annapolis	10,000 "	12 "
Total effective force required	208,000 men,	488 guns,

or an aggregate, present and absent, of about 240,000 men, should the losses by sickness, &c., not rise to a higher per centage than at present."

As the strength of an army, like any other means for the accomplishment of a certain end, is necessarily controlled by the object to be accomplished and the resistance to be overcome, we must seek the rationale of the extraordinary estimate put forth by General McClellan of the military force required as an indispensable condition precedent to any offensive operations, in his calculation of the strength of the army which the rebels were able to confront him withal. Fortunately on this point, also, we are not left in the dark, for he goes on to state that all his information showed that in November, 1861, "the enemy had a force *on the Potomac, not less than* 150,000 *strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded, and strongly entrenched.*"

If it be true that at any period during the fall or winter of 1861--2, the rebels had "*on the Potomac*" an army of the strength claimed by General McClellan—an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men—then we must concede that his estimate of the army he himself needed—namely, an effecting fighting column of the same strength—was not excessive, and that his reiterated demands for more men, even at this early period, were the result of a wise appreciation of the necessities of the case. But if it can be shown that this rebel colossus of a hundred and fifty thousand men was a monstrous delusion, the figment of a "heat-oppressed brain," we shall require to find other terms in which to characterize his conduct and his clamor.

* Report, p. 8.

Now, I think I can show that the rebel army on the Potomac, so far from being of the force of 150,000 men, was never more than *one-third* that number. The battle of Bull Run was fought on the part of the rebels with a force of less than thirty thousand men. General Beauregard, in his official report, says: "The effective force of all arms of the (Confederate) Army of the Potomac on that eventful morning, including the garrison of Camp Pickens, did not exceed 21,833 men, and 29 guns. The Army of the Shenandoah, (Johnston's,) ready for action in the field, may be set down at 6,000 men and 20 guns, and its total strength at 8,334"

We are then to believe that the rebel army in the interval of three months, between the end of July and the end of October, leaped from thirty thousand men to a hundred and fifty thousand! *Credat Judæus!* It is too monstrous to believe. It would take double the time even to brigade such a herd of men. It would indeed be difficult to say what the precise strength of the rebel force was during the period referred to, especially as it varied greatly, having attained a certain maximum, then declined by the expiration of the term of service, and then commenced to ascend once more when the first conscription came into force. I do not, therefore, attempt to do this. I merely desire to show that the swelling figures that affrighted the soul of the then head of the Army of the Potomac existed only in his imagination, and to fix a maximum beyond which it is certain the rebel army did *not* go.

During the autumn of 1861, while the rebel army was still at Centerville, a letter written from that place fell into the hands of the military authorities. The writer, referring to the flutter that existed in the ranks of their army in regard to the creation of a certain number of Major Generals, tells how the Confederate Army was organized into brigades of four divisions each, like ours, but that they only put two brigades into a division—that is, they put eight regiments or battalions instead of twelve, as we have. "Now," says the writer, "this makes quite a stir as to the appointment of the twelve Major Generals." This would give them twenty-four brigades, or ninety-six regiments. The average strength of their regiments at that time certainly did not exceed that of our own at the same period, 600 men; and this would give them a total of 57,600 men.*

Now, it is worthy of note that General McClellan himself, six months after the date of his estimate of the rebel force "on the Potomac," at 150,000 men, gives another estimate made by his chief of the secret service corps on the 8th of March, in which the rebel troops at Manassas, Centreville, Bull Run, Upper Occoquan, and vicinity are put down at 80,000. Note that this was after the rebel conscription had gone into force and had swelled the Confederate ranks with its harvesting; and that, notwithstanding all this, it gives a result *less by seventy thousand* than the figure made out by General McClellan in the month of November. At one stroke the rebel hundred and fifty thousand in buckram had dwindled by a half!

From all these data, I believe I am authorized in concluding that Johnston at no time had on the Potomac an army of over 50,000 men. And it was before this contemptible force that our magnificent army of three times its strength—no, not the *army*, but its *commander*—stood paralyzed for eight months! Such a spectacle the history of the world never before presented.

Whether General McClellan ever really *believed* that he had in front of him an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men, or anything like that figure, is a point which I do not pretend to determine.† But certain it is that having fixed upon this number, all his subsequent efforts seem to have been directed, not to the task of destroying the enemy before him, but of forcing the Government to give him a command which he could never have brought into action in any battle-field Vir-

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*There are those, indeed, who put the rebel force on the Potomac at an even lower figure. Mr. Hurlbert, who at this time was within the rebel lines and had access to good sources of information, says in the notes to his translation of the pamphlet of the Prince de Joinville on the Army of the Potomac.

"I have reason to believe that when the history of the present war shall come to be written fairly and in full, it will be found that General Johnston never intended to hold Manassas and Centreville against any serious attack; that his army at those points had suffered greatly during the autumn and winter of 1861-2, and that from October to March *he never had an effective force of more than* 40,000 *men* under his orders"

†It is possible he did, for it is astonishing the tricks which the fears and the fancies of a man thus unhappily organized will play him; and I am willing to believe that General McClellan was quite as much deceived as deceiving. It is possible General McClellan really *believed* the rebels had 150 000 men on the Potomac, when they never had a third of that number, just as it is possible he believed they had one hundred thousand, then two hundred thousand, then two hundred and fifty thousand men on the Peninsula, when the truth was they never had over 70,000 men—or as he believed they invaded Maryland with a hundred and eighty thousand men, when their total force was fifty-five thousand. All this, I say, is possible; but alas for the hapless nation whose fate was committed to the keeping of *such* a leader!

ginia furnishes. From this time forth begins a series of whinings and whimperings for troops, the most extraordinary ever put on record. "I have not the force I asked for;" "send me more troops," became the perpetual cry. These, with the occasional expression of his determination to "do the best he can" with what pitiful force he had, and to "share its fate," form the staple of every communication.

Now, when General McClellan was forming this heroic resolve, will any one imagine how much of a force he had? He had asked for 240,000 men, from which to take a fighting column of 150,000. It is true, he was never able to get this number, but it is perhaps worth while determining what he *did* get.

It appears from the official reports that on the morning of the 27th October, the aggregate strength of the Army of the Potomac was 168,318 men—present for duty, 169,452. On January 1, 1862, it was 219,707—present for duty, 191,480. On February 1, it was 222,196—present for duty, 193,142. Such was the pitiful bagatelle of a force he had under his command! He had asked for 240,000; he could never get over 222,196; and one can sympathize with his sense of ill treatment in consequence.

We think, however, that we have read of brilliant campaigns and splendid victories achieved with something less than two hundred and forty thousand men. If we recollect aright Napoleon made his first great Italian campaign with under forty thousand men; fought Austerlitz with forty-five thousand and Marengo with thirty-five thousand; and we think we have heard that Wellington, in the whole Peninsular war, never had over thirty thousand; that Turenne more frequently commanded ten thousand than fifty thousand; that Marlborough won Blenheim with fifty six thousand, and Ramillies with sixty thousand troops; and that Frederick the Great conducted the Seven Years' War, against a coalition of more than half of Europe, with an army never exceeding a hundred thousand men. But they were old fogies in those days, and it was left for the "*Young* Napoleon," who had never handled ten thousand troops in his life, to require *double* a hundred thousand to fill up the measure of his swelling ambition.

In fact, the trouble was not that General McClellan had too small a force; he had too *large* a force. He had fashioned a Frankenstein which all his power could not control—a sword was put into his hand which not only he was unable to wield, but which dragged him to the ground.

IV.

THE MODERN FABIUS AND HIS FALSE PRETENCES.

Were it true that the army put into the hands of General McClellan, instead of being twice or thrice the strength of the rebel force on the Potomac, as I have shown, was in reality doubly outnumbered by an enemy "not less than 150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded, and strongly entrenched;" the fact might well give us cause before passing censure on an inactivity which, however deplorable, would still have had much to warrant it. But you have seen how this pretence has been swept away by a scrutiny of facts; and I now proceed to show that the only remaining excuses he offers are equally without foundation. These are summed up in the following paragraph:*

"The records of the War Department show my anxiety and efforts to assume active offensive operations in the fall and early winter. It is only just to say, however, that *the unprecedented condition of the roads and Virginia soil* would have delayed an advance till February, had the discipline, organization, and equipment of the army been as complete at the close of the fall as was necessary, and as I desired and labored *against every impediment* to make them."

The first element enumerated is the roads and the weather, the condition of which General McClellan tells us was "unprecedented." If there be any inference to be drawn from this expression and its context, it is that they were "unprecedentedly" bad, for this reason is given in excuse for not moving. Now it is true that the condition of roads of Virginia during the fall and winter of 1861–2 was "unprecedented," but unprecedently *good*—and this, happily, is not a matter in regard to which we are left to the unsure testimony of memory. We have cotemporary evidence which establishes the fact by an accumulation perfectly irrefragable. General Franklin,† testifying under oath to this specific point, on the 26th of December, 1861, says: "The condition of the roads is good." General Wadsworth,‡ on the same day says: "The roads are remarkably good—*perhaps not once in twenty years have the roads at Christmas been in as good condition as they are now. Having had*

*Report, p. 35.
†Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 28.
‡Ibid, p. 146.

this long period of dry weather, the roads are very good." So General Fitz John Porter,* in reply to a query as to the condition of the roads, says: "As far as I know they are in excellent condition, excellent travelling condition." In like manner testified a score of officers; I need not cite their evidence, but will limit myself to the testimony of a rebel witness. Pollard,† in a passage, the sting of which is sharpened by its justice, says: "A long, lingering, Indian summer, with roads more hard, and skies more beautiful, than Virginia had seen for many a year, invited the enemy to advance. He steadily refused the invitation to a general action. The advance of our lines was tolerated to Munson's Hill, within a few miles of Alexandria, and opportunities were sought in vain by the Confederates, in heavy skirmishing, to engage the lines of the two armies."

Precisely the same tendency characterizes General McClellan's estimate of the comparative *condition* as of the comparative *strength* of his own and the enemy's army. His communications of the period referred to make frequent mention of the superior discipline, drill and equipment of the rebels, and the inferiority in these respects of his own force. Now it is difficult to conjecture on what basis General McClellan constantly makes this assertion of the superior fighting powers of the rebels, unless—with a credulity insulting to the manhood of the loyal States—the rebel rhodomontade on this head had been swallowed entire by him. Abstractly considered, they ought to have been not better soldiers but worse; for though their habits of life and social training had been of a kind to make them *ultimately* very excellent soldiers, they were calculated to make them very inferior soldiers at the outset.‡ And this view of it is fortified by historical testimony; the evidence of all observers goes to show that previously to the organization of the permanent Confederate Army in April and May, 1852, and while the provisional army was still in existence and officers were elected by the men, nothing could exceed the laxity of discipline, the demoralization of temper, and the inferiority in arms, equipment, and transportation, that marked the rebel force in Virginia. If that force afterward became an army whose formidable valor and superb discipline we have too often found out to our cost, it is to be attributed in great part to the *time* General McClellan gave them for consolidation, and the prestige they gained by their victories over *him*.

But all comparison is superfluous; what I say is that General McClellan's claim that there was anything in the discipline of his army to prevent his dealing a blow at the enemy before him, is a shallow makeshift that will no longer serve. If it had been designed to make a Prussian or an English army—a thing of pipeclay and pedantry, of the rattan and red tape—there might be some force in the call for months or for years, in which to perfect this painful and useless education. But for modern armies there is but one way; it is, after the rudiments of tactics are acquired, to put the men promptly into the field and let them be *made* soldiers by the hard realities of war. It was in this way, and not by the pedantry of the martinet that the armies of the Thirty Years' War, of the American Revolution, and of the great French Revolution, were formed. In 1813 rough German levies fought almost before they were drilled, and at Bautzen French recruits were victorious over the elaborately trained machines that formed the armies of Austria, Prussia and Russia. Disastrous as Bull Run was in its military results, it, beyond a doubt, did more to make our men *soldiers* than all the reviews, parades, and sham fights, with which General McClellan amused a country whose life and national honor were all the while ebbing away.

I have now exhausted the several reasons alleged by General McClellan in excuse for his long delay, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. I have shown that there is nothing in these excuses, whether drawn from the condition of the roads and the season, or from the strength and discipline of our own army, or that of the rebels, to justify it. No, no! Not all the shallow devices which a year of afterthought can bring to the extenuation of military incapacity can either explain or exculpate that fatal delay which gave the rebels their best ally, Time; which made the timid among us despair, and the proudest hang their heads with shame; and which almost authorized foreign recognition of the rebellion by our seeming inability to put it down.

V.

"MY PLAN AND YOUR PLAN."

Whether General McClellan *ever* would have been ready to advance on the enemy, is a problem the solution of which is known only to Omniscience; but the spell

*Ibid. p. 171.
†First year of the War, p. 178.
‡Prince de Joinville on the Army of the Potomac, p. 101.

was at length broken, not by the motion of McClellan, but by a word of initiative uttered by the President. On the 27th of January, 1862, Mr. Lincoln issued "General War Order No. 1," directing "that the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces."

As the reason for ordering a "*general* movement" on the day indicated may not be universally intelligible and has frequently been made a matter of wonderment by General McClellan's partisans, a word on that head will not be out of place. Shortly after coming into command of the Army of the Potomac, General McClellan began to urge that all the armies of the Union should be put under the direction of a "single will." In his letter of October, 1861, addressed to the Secretary of War, we find him urging this with the utmost emphasis, and even making it *an indispensable condition of any advance by the Army of the Potomac.**

Action, on *any* terms, being the supreme desire of the Government, General McClellan was, on the 1st of November, invested with the control of the armies of the United States as General-in Chief. Bewildering though one finds the retrospect of such impotence of ambition as inspired this man to take on his pigmy shoulders a burden which a colossus like Napoleon never attempted to bear—the task of at once personally directing the operation of an army of two hundred thousand men in an active campaign, and superintending the advance of half a dozen other armies arrayed along a front of five or six thousand miles—it remains, nevertheless, a fact of history.

Having been vested with the control of all the armies of the Republic, General McClellan conceived the plan of a *simultaneous advance* of all these forces—a plan, which considering that the several armies were, as I have said, distributed along a front of five or six thousand miles, with lines of operation running through different climates and varying weather, was as impossible as it was puerile. At the wave of the baton of the mighty maestro the whole vast orchestra was to strike up. Until then, let all men hold there peace! In a word, we have here the first draft of that famous "anaconda" strategy, which planted a dozen different armies on as many lines of operation, all on the exterior circumference of the rebellion, leaving the rebels the enormous advantage of their interior position and giving them ample time to fortify at every point.

And it was in view of this favorite plan of General McClellan for a *simultaneous advance* along the whole line that the above Executive order directing a "general movement" on the 22d of February was issued.†

An *advance* having at length been decided on, it remained to determine the *line* by which this advance should be made, being in mind the double objective of—1st, the rebel army at Manassas, and 2d, the rebel capital, Richmond.

It is quite certain that up to November General McClellan held no other view of a forward movement than a direct advance on the enemy before him. At what time and by what counsels he altered his mind in this regard are points on which we have no information. But a change of purpose had meantime taken place, and when the President, four days after the promulgation of this General Order for an advance, issued Special War Order No. 1, directing a flanking movement on the rebel position at Manassas, it immediately appeared that he and General McClellan had different views in regard to the line of operations to be taken up.

Against this proposition General McClellan set his face with a determination much stouter than the logic which he employed to support that determination. Having obtained permission to submit his objections to the plan, we find a long letter from him addressed to the Secretary of War, under date of February 3,‡ in which the question of the comparative advantages of a movement on the enemy at Manassas, or a transfer of his army to a base on the lower Chesapeake, is elaborately discussed. This is a problem of capital importance, and so I shall enter with some fulness into the analysis of his reasoning—endeavoring not to omit a single point of any weight or value.

At the outset of his discussion of a movement on the enemy at Manassas, by the rebel right flank, General McClellan makes certain admissions as to the advantages of such an attack, to which I call the particular attention of the reaper, for I regard them as decisive of the whole question as to the comparative advantage of an attack on Manassas, or a transfer of base to any point on the lower Chesapeake. He admits that an attack on the rebel right flank by the line of the Occoquan would

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* Report, page 67.

† General McClellen had promised, if made General-in-Chief, to assume the offensive before the 25th of November. I need hardly say that this promise was as little kept as all his others.

‡ Report, pages 43–48.

"prevent the junction of the enemy's right with his centre," affording the opportunity of destroying the former; would "remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac;" would "reduce the lenghth of wagon transportation," and would "*strike directly at his main railway communication.*"

Assuming the successful execution of this plan what would have been the result? Let General McClellan answer himself:

"Assuming the success of this operation, and the defeat of the enemy as certain, the question at once arises as to the importance of the results gained. I think these results would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory; important results, it is true, but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's main army, for he could fall back upon other positions, and fight us again and again, should the condition of his troops permit."

A tactical victory in the field, the compulsory retreat of the enemy from his cherished position, the relief the blockade of the Potomac, and the "*moral effect of the victory,*" with the losses, disasters, and demoralization that would have been inflicted on them—all of which General McClellan admits were within his grasp, by the movement indicated—were surely well worth the effort. Why, considering what a priceless boon such a result would have been at that time, the whole nation would have called him blessed! But it would not have been "decisive of the war"—such was the wildly puerile ambition that possessed him; and in order to end the war, he resolved to seek a theatre where it was perfectly evident beforehand and became a sad matter of fact afterward, that he would find all the obstacles there were at Manassas with none of its advantages.

This theatre of war was some point on the lower Chesapeake bay, either Urbana on the Rappahannock or Fort Monroe. The advantages of this base, according to Mc'Clellan's reasoning, is that "it affords the shortest possible land route to Richmond, striking directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the East," and that "*the roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year.*"

It is on this enormous assumption that he bases the whole plan of campaign! He proposes to embark his troops at Alexandria, go down the Chesapeake bay, and up the Rappahannock to Urbana, or down to Fortress Monroe, with the view of there finding a passage to Richmond, where the roads would be "passable at all seasons." It is hard to tell where to begin answering a statement like that. How did he know the roads there were "passable at all seasons?" It would certainly be natural to conclude, from the mere physical geography of the region, that the roads are *not* "passable at all seasons." We have there precisely the physical conditions to make impassable roads—a region on the drainage and "divides" of rivers, where the streams, losing their force, spread out in swamps and bogs. But if, going beyond theoretical considerations, General McClellan had taken the trouble to look at the map, he would have noticed, on the march of fifty miles from Urbana to Richmond, the "Dragon Swamp," and half dozen other swamps, besides the Pamunky the Matapony, and the Chickahominy. On the Peninsula we need not say he *would* have found; we know what he *did* find. It is melancholy to think that the fate of a campaign should be intrusted to a mind capable of such stupendous assumptions.

The fact of the matter is, *McClellan's mind had already broken down before the problem given him to solve, his courage had oozed out, and in this mood he was willing to look anywhere, anywhere away from the task before him.* But it was not long before he practically demonstrated that, in transferring his base from Washington to the lower Chesapeake, he merely shifted, but did not remove the difficulty. *Cœlum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt.* In running "across the sea," indeed, he changed his "sky," but not the task imposed upon him. It still met him in the face as knotty and more knotty than before. It was with a quite prophetic consciousness of this fact that President Lincoln, on the same day as that on which General McClellan's letter is dated, sent to him the following note:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, *February* 3, 1862.

MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac. Yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York river; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas.

If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

1. Does not your plan invole a greatly larger expenditure of *time* and *money* than mine?
2. Wherein is a victory *more certain* by your plan than mine?
3. Wherein is a victory *more valuable* by your plan than mine?

In fact, would it not be *less* valuable in this: that it would break no great line of the enemy's communication, while mine would?

5. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

Yours, truly, ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The sagacity of these queries is not less conspicuous than the compendious com-

pletemess with which they cover the whole ground. They were never answered simply because they were and are unanswerable. But President Lincoln, feeling the weight of the maxim, that a general will do better following an inferior plan which is his *own* than a superior one which is the conception of another, and, above all, desirous that *some* move should be made, and willing to sacrifice any minor consideration to that end, allowed General McClellan to have his own way.

That general and his partisans have a great deal to say about the supposed interference on the part of the authorities at Washington with his plans and purposes, and no opportunity is lost to give currency to the notion that it was the intermeddling of a species of "Aulic Council" at Washington which caused those failures which a juster criticism is compelled to lay at the door of his own military incapacity. This subterfuge will no longer serve, for the evidence of his own report, when carefully collated, utterly explodes this claim. It is a fact worthy of note that the investigations of modern German historians have conclusively proved, that the vituperation which an intense partisanship cast upon the Austrian Aulic Council, and which has passed into and long held a place in the acceptance of history, is itself utterly without foundation, and some degree of historical justice is now done a body which bade fair to enjoy a maligned immortality. But it needs no nice historical criticism to show that the shallow claims of the same sort, put forth to extenuate McClellan's blunders, are even more baseless. If the President, as the Constitutional head of the army, is blameable in any aspect of his dealings with that general, it is because he abnegated himself too much—surrendered too much of his own authority, and gave into the hands of an untried man a power little short of the despotic. While history will recognize that the actuating motive in this was an unselfish and patriotic desire to leave General McClellan untrammeled liberty of action, it is questionable whether it will not at the same time condemn the President's surrender of his own convictions.

But while General McClellan was making his preparations for the withdrawal of his army to Annapolis, he was saved all further trouble on this head by a movement on the part of the Confederates, no less startling than their retirement from their fortified position at Manassas and on the Potomac.

The withdrawal of the rebels from the line of Manassas, Centreville, and the lower Potomac began in February, was completed on the 8th of March, and became known to General McClellan and the Cabinet on the following day. The action taken by McClellan on this event was most extraordinary. In place of sending a light movable column to take up a prompt pursuit of the rebels, with the view of harassing their rear, he waited till *two days* after their definite withdrawal, and then instituted a general movement of the whole army, not with any adequate military view, and with no purpose of attempting to make up with the rebels, but, as he says, for the purpose of giving the troops "an opportunity to gain some experience on the march and bivouac *preparatory* to the campaign"—a kind of education of which, truly, they stood in great need.*

To any commander not hopelessly wedded to a preconceived idea, the withdrawal of the rebels from Manassas behind the Rapidan, before a single man had been shipped for the new base, would have suggested the wisdom and even the *necessity* of a change of plan. All the conditions under which the purpose of a transfer of the army to Urbana or the Peninsula was formed were changed by that event. The cardinal conception in making a flank movement by water was the hope which General McClellan entertained of being able to reach a point on the line of retreat of the rebels or to reach the front of Richmond before they could*—circumstances under which they would doubtless have given battle with great disadvantage.

The move of the enemy ought to have suggested to General McClellan that, whatever their purpose was, it was next to certain that they would be in force to meet him at whatever point of the coast he might choose to land. It should have suggested to him that all opportunity of making an offensive *manœuvre* was now at end, and that all he could now hope to do was to make a *transfer* of base. It suggested to him none of these things. It simply suggested to him to change the proposed coast expedition. To make Urbana, on the Rappahannock, after the rebels had retired behind that river, was out of the question, for if he might hope, under cover of the navy, to effect a landing, it would certainly not be possible for him to debouch from his point of debarkation. Under these circumstances the line

* The Prince de Joinville calls this movement to Manassas and back again "a promenade"—a good name for it, but the most senseless and aimless "promenade" ever conceived by a general in the midst of actual war. The "promenade" gave the soldiers an opportunity of seeing for themselves the pitiful obstacles of quaker guns and one-horse unarmed earthworks that had so long affrighted the soul of their general, though the experience we are sure, did not come home to those brave men without profound mortification and disgust.

of the Peninsula—which he had before spoken of as one promising "less celerity and brilliancy of result," and only to be adopted in case "the worst came to the worst"—remained; and this he immediately chose.

But I shall show that this decision was made under circumstances that brought him into direct conflict with the President's most explicit orders touching the safety of Washington, and in palpable and most inexplicable violation of the conditions which the council of corps commanders adjudged essential to any movement by the line of the Peninsula. I shall further show that this decision forms the initial point of all his subsequent disasters in that hapless campaign.

VI.

McCLELLAN'S GRIEVANCE—THE DETACHMENT OF McDOWELL'S CORPS.

While Mr. Lincoln was disposed to waive his judgment with regard to the strategic merits of the two plans of advance on the enemy, he by no means felt at liberty to permit General McClellan to proceed in the execution of his movement by water without placing him under such conditions as should remove as much as possible the danger of an assault upon the capital by the enemy. And yet even here he did not undertake to decide as a military man, upon the force which might be necessary for the safety of Washington, but referred that question to the concurrent opinion of General McClellan and the four Generals in command of the four army corps into which the Army of the Potomac had been divided, simply stipulating that no change of base of the Army of the Potomac should be made without leaving such a force in and about Washington as should leave the Capital entirely secure, not merely in the opinion of General McClellan himself, *but in the opinion also of all the four Generals in command of the four army corps constituting the army.** This obliged him to hold a conference with these commanders, in the course of which they consented to the proposed movement by the Peninsula *on certain specific conditions*, to which I invite the particular attention of the reader. They are as follows—to wit:

1st. That the enemy's vessel *Merrimac* can be neutralized.

2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and

3. That a naval auxillary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on York River.

9th. That the force be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.)

II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment, and the means for constructing bridges, repairing railroads and stocking them with materials sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and Aquia and Richmond Railroads. (Unanimous.)

N. B. That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force, in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defence of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)

In the interpretation of these opinions of the corps commanders, it must necessarily be supposed that the three Generals who concurred in opinion, intended that all the fortifications around Washington should be "manned" or "occupied," and that, over and above this, there should be a distinct unit of force capable of being moved, of twenty-five thousand men. As three of the Generals concurred in this opinion the opinion of the fourth may be thrown out of view, although it is not certain whether his opinion was intended to apply to a movable force over and above the garrisons, or to include the garrisons in his estimates of forty thousand men.

It is evident that the opinion of the three agreeing Generals was for McClellan the regulating opinion, with which he was bound to comply in carrying out the order of the President.

Now it is remarkable that, in October, when he contemplated a forward movement, he estimated the force necessary to be left in and about Washington, at thirty-five thousand men; and this, be it observed, when the proposed movement contemplated the presence of the main body of the army in front of the Capital, available in its protection and defence. If this force of thirty-five thousand men was deemed necessary by General McClellan, as the proper garrison of Washington, when the whole army was expected to be engaged in front of the Capital, much more would this force be necessary when the proposed movement looked to the removal of the main body of the army to the Peninsula, far beyond the possibility of being imme-

* President's General War No. 3, Report, p. 53.

diately available for the defence of Washington, should the movements of the enemy endanger the Capital.

The conclusion is irresistible, therefore, that General McClellan was bound by the President's order to leave, as the garrison of the forts around Washington, not less than thirty-five thousand men; and over and above this a movable unit of force, or, in other words, an army of twenty-five thousand men, without taking into consideration the troops necessary for the defence of Baltimore or Harper's Ferry, or the guards along the Potomac, both above and below Washington; for the garrisons necessary for these places were all estimated for separately in his report of October, 1861.

It is plain from this statement, the verity of which is matter of official record, that when General McClellan received the order of the 8th of March, and had obtained the opinion of the four Generals, as just stated, *his first duty was to comply with the President's order as a condition prior to issuing any order himself in furtherance of his plan of a campaign on the Peninsula.* He should first have designated the troops necessary for the security of Washington, not according to his own individual judgment, but in conformity with the opinions of the four Generals, or of the three which concurred in opinion. His next point of duty was to consider whether his remaining force, after deducting the force designated for the security of Washington, would be such as to justify him in undertaking a campaign by his proposed line: and if he thought it was not, *it was his plain duty to represent the case to the President before giving any orders, having in view his proposed campaign.*

If General McClellan had taken this course, which both candor and duty required, he would have been spared the painful position of being in the wrong in the conflict which ensued, consequent on the necessity which his conduct had devolved upon the President, of making good his own orders, after General McClellan left Washington for the Peninsula, for it was not until *after* his departure that the President became acquainted with the fact that, should McClellan's orders be carried out, his own express orders would be disobeyed: that is, Washington, or the fortifications around it, would not be manned as required, in the opinion of the three Generals, nor would there be a covering army of twenty-five thousand men, as required by the same opinion. On the contrary, it was discovered that the amount of force left in and about Washington, and in front of it, at Warrenton and at other points, *fell short of twenty thousand men,* most of them being new troops, and though not disorganized, they were by no means organized, as was clearly set forth in official statements, and the force fell short numerically of that which he was required to leave by some forty thousand men!*

Not, as I have said, till after General McClellan's departure did the consequence of his disingenuous conduct, which left the Capital of the nation in a condition almost to be taken by a single *coup de main,* become apparent. It then became the President's imperative duty to take measures to secure the end which General McClellan had so grossly neglected, and he did so in the following order:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, April 4, 1862.

By direction of the President, General McDowell's army corps has been detached from the force under your immediate command, and the General is ordered to report to the Secretary of War. Letter by mail.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

General McClellan.

If the exposition already given has the force and the truth, and the force of truth which I think belong to it, it will have been made apparent that it was General McClellan's own neglect of the command of the President, embodying the opinions of the Corps Commanders, that drew upon him the consequences, whatever they were, of the above order for the detention of McDowell's Corps—an order which was issued for no other reason than because General McClellan had failed in his duty, and thereby, in the judgment of all men, the facts being known, was precluded from all right of comment upon the President's order, and he himself must be held responsible for whatever consequences resulted from that order.

I state this simply to establish the principle in the case; but I shall, in the sequel, demonstrate that the consequences of McDowell's detention were by no means as important as General McClellan is disposed to allege, because, of the three divisions of McDowell's Corps Franklin's was sent to him immediately, and McCall's

* If General McClellan made the full and fair report of all the transactions of this period which a decent respect for the truth of history demands, he would have inserted at this point the report the General Wadsworth, Military Governor of Washington, on the strength and condition of the force left for the defence of the Capital—a document which was certainly accessible to him. It will be found at p. 316 (Vol. 1) of the Report on the Conduct of the War.

in ample time to participate in the battles before Richmond; I shall demonstrate that, had McDowel's entire Corps been sent to him at the time that Franklin's division was forwarded, General McClellan could have made no use of it, for reasons which will appear at the proper time; and I shall demonstrate that McDowell's force at Fredericksburgh was quite as useful to General McClellan as it would have been if sent to him, since its presence threatening Richmond called off an equal portion of the enemy's force, which he would otherwise have had in his front.

Another point must here be explained, having some connection in General McClellan's mind, with the action of the President in the detention of McDowell's Corps, and it is this: There was among the troops in front of Washington, constituting a portion of the Army of the Potomac, a dvision of about eleven thousand men, under the command of General Blenker. Shortly before the departure of General McClellan for the Peninsula, the President had a personal interview with him, in which he expressed his desire to send that division to what was called the Mountain Department, in Middle Virginia, with the view of enabling General Fremont to move a co-operating column in conjunction with the advance of the army of the Potomac. General McClellan was opposed to the movement of that division, but finally acquiesced in it. In his allusion to this interview with the President, General McClellan states that the President assured him no further reduction of his army destined for the Peninsula should be made; and he then refers to the order detaining McDowell's Corps as a violation of the expressed promise made by the President.

"The President," says he, "having promised, in an interview following his order of March 81, withdrawing Blenker's division of 10,000 men from my command, that nothing of the sort should be repeated—that I might rest assured that the campaign should proceed, with no further deductions from the force upon which its operations had been planned, *I may confess to having been shocked at this order*," etc.*

In this "fine frenzy" there is a sad want of ingenuous statement; for General McClellan knew, he could not but have known, that the promise referred to must have been made by the President, *with the implicit understanding that his own orders touching the security of Washington would be carried out.* The President placed too much reliance upon General McClellan's sense of duty and propriety to intimate a doubt as to his faithful obedience to his very pointed and written orders, looking to the security of the capital. Under these circumstances General McClellan had no right to appeal to the promise of the President, except in terms of humility for the attempt to practice a deception upon the high functionary who made it, whose relations to the Commander of the Army of the Potomac was necessarily of so confidential a character as to make the utmost candor on the part of the subordinate a duty of the first importance; for it cannot be expected of the Chief Magistrate of a great people to watch with jealous suspicion the chief officers in command of his armies, lest they should deal covertly with him in their execution of his proper orders. If an evasion of duty is an offence of the most shameful character in any subordinate towards his superior, utterly subversive of all discipline in an army, and destructive of its efficiency, much more is this a crime of the first magnitude in a general officer, on whose unity of action with the purposes of his superior the success of an army almost entirely depends.

I now proceed to the consideration of the other condition, the fulfillment of which was, in the opinion of the Corps Commanders, an essential prior to any movement by the line of the Peninsula. It is the following terms, to wit: "That the enemy's vessel, the *Merrimac*, can be nutralized." On this point the opinion of the Corps Commanders was *unanimous.*

It is hardly conceivable how General McClellan could disregard the warning of his four Generals on this point, and undertake his expedition in spite of the knowledge which he must himself have had of the power of the *Merrimac* †. It is true that General McClellan drew from Commodore Goldsborough a declaration that he could *neutralize* the *Merrimac.* But this opinion went no further, as General McClellan ought to have known, that an assurance that, with the aid of the *Monitor*, and of his other naval vessels, he could prevent the *Merrimac* from leaving Elizabeth River, or, at all events, prevent her passing by Fortress Monroe into Chesapeake Bay.

But in order to do this, that is, in order to "neutralize" the *Merrimac*, General McClellan must have known *that the power of Commodore Goldsborough was itself neutralized by the Merrimac*; so that it was impossible for the navy at Fortress Mon-

* Report p. 56.

† The written instructions of the confederate navy department to the commanders of the Merrimac show that he was under orders to pass out beyond Fortress Monroe and destroy McClellan's water transportation in Chesapeake Bay.

roe to give General McClellan any effectual aid, either on the James or York rivers, the presence of the navy, as just intimated, being necessary to watch the *Merrimac*. It is important to understand fully this state of things, because General McClellan complains, in his Report, of the want of assistance from the navy, when, in point of fact, he had no right to count upon it, and would have had no right even if his four Generals had not warned him of the dangerous power of the *Merrimac*. The navy was doing all it possibly could do in covering his water line of communications, and had no force left with which to perform any other work. This he ought to have known and no doubt he did know it, and hence I say his complaints on this head are not ingenous. They are the resort and the after-thought of a defeated General, whose failure was due to himself; but who has sought in this so-called "Report" to throw the responsibility upon others.

The result of this reasoning is, I think, to show that not one of the conditions defined by the council of Corps Commanders as essentials, prior to the adoption of the Peninsula route, was complied with by General McClellan. He neither left Washington secure, nor secured the neutralization of the *Merrimac*, nor secured the co-operation of the navy. In absence of these requirements, his plain duty was the adoption of the other alternative agreed upon by the Corps Commanders in the following terms: "If the foregoing cannot be, *the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment.*" But this General McClellan did not do. He had *determined* to move the army to the Peninsula, and in doing so, he took upon himself the responsibility of all the results that grew out of his disobedience of orders.

Yet you will presently see him turning round and with incredible effrontery charging bad faith and the blame of his failures on those he had thus grossly deceived. And from that day to this he and his following have made the withholding of McDowell's corps his great grievance—the *gravamen* of all their charges against the Administration—the convenient pack-horse on which to place that burden of defeat that will bear him down to a historic infamy!

VII.

"A PICKAXE AND A SPADE, A SPADE!"

There is now, I suppose, not the shadow of a doubt that had the Army of the Potomac been simply allowed to *walk* on up the Peninsula, it would have been able to walk *over* all the force which General Magruder had to oppose it. It is now *known* how contemptible that force was. General Magruder's official report* of his operations on the Peninsula shows that his whole army consisted of eleven thousand men; of these, six thousand were useless to him, being placed in garrison at Gloucester Point, Mulberry Island, etc. "So that it will be seen," adds he, "that the balance of the line, embracing a length of thirteen miles, was defended by about *five thousand men.*" What is now a matter of certainty was then a matter of shrewd conjecture. General Wool, whose position at Fortress Monroe gave him every possible information regarding the enemy, repeatedly represented to General McClellan how trifling the rebel force was and begged him to push on before the rebels should have time to concentrate. Disposing his feeble force with admirable skill, moving it about from point to point, and putting forth the wiles and strategems of war he succeeded in so frightening General McClellan that, after a single reconnoissance, he sat down to—*dig*. "To my utter surprise," says General Magruder, "he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault. In a few days the object of his delay was apparent. In every direction, in front of our lines, through the intervening woods, and along the open fields, *earthworks began to appear.*" Of similar tenor is the conversation reported by Col. Fremantle, of the Coldstream Guards, who met General Magruder in Texas last sumner.† "He (Magruder) told me," he says, "the different dodges he had resorted to, to blind and deceive McClellan as to his strength; and he spoke of the intense relief and amusement with which he at length saw that General, with his magnificent army, *begin to break ground before miserable earthworks defended only by* 8,000 *men.*"

Grimly amusing though the retrospect of such a spectacle is, it involves a great deal that is much too humiliating to permit our entirely appreciating it. Shirking the duty of moving on the rebels at Manassas, General McClellan sought the Peninsula with the express view of making a "rapid and brilliant" campaign. His first measure in execution of this campaign is to sit down before the

* Confederate Reports of Battles, page 557. † Three Months in the Southern States.

five thousand rebels present to dispute his progress. All that can possibly save this from being hereafter esteemed a bit of monstrous burlesque, is that it is vouched for by the irrefragable evidence of history!

If the defensive line which the rebels had constructed across the Isthmus, from Yorktown along the line of the Warwick, was really a position of the enormous strength claimed by General McClellan, I can only say that he should have taken this element into account when he determined on his plan of campaign. It is a lame and impotant excuse for him to put forth that he did not know the rebels had a fortified position on the Peninsula, that he was wholly ignorant of the nature of the topography, that he was not aware that the Warwick river ran in the direction it does, and that he found the roads in a horrible condition. He was repeatedly forewarned that he would find fortifications on the Peninsula just as well as at Manassas; but with that extraordinary levity of mind that characterizes him, he insisted on seeing all rose-colored in the distance, and, exemplifying perfectly the Latin saying, *Omne ignotum pro magnifico*, the less he knew of the nature of the theatre of war he was about to seek (and he after confessed it was an unknown region to him) the more allurements it had for him.

But without denying that the position which the rebels held across the Isthmus was one *naturally* strong, I deny utterly and altogether that that it presented anything which need have been any considerable obstacle to the advance of the overwhelming numbers of the Army of the Potomac. The line held by the rebels —the general line of the Warwick, which heads within a mile of Yorktown—was defended by a series of detached redoubts connected by rifle-pits, and it was not less than thirteen miles in extent. Now, all experience proves that a line so extended is only formidable when the works are fully manned, and there is present, beside, a moveable force, capable of rapid concentration at any point the enemy may assail. The very length of such a line becomes its weakness; there must be some point at which it can be forced; and this, once done, the works become a disadvantage, rather than a defence.*

On the point of the absolute necessity devolving upon McClellan to assault the works at Yorktown, the moment he reached and reconnoitered them, there is, indeed, no room for argument. Any one who will inspect the map will see the readiness with which the line of the Warwick might have been forced, and, this once done, Yorktown was *turned*. And this is the proper place to mention an incident touching the true details of which General McClellan is as reticent as he always is touching anything which in the smallest degree tells against himself. One of the division commanders occupying a point where he knew he could force the enemy's line, sent a portion of his command, chiefly Vermont troops, to cross a dam which the rebels had constructed, and assault their position. This they did, and gallantly advancing under heavy fire, actually took possession of the rebel works. But this was all contrary to General McClellan's favorite system of regular approaches, and would have proved that the President's recommendation to pierce the enemy's line, instead of being "simple folly," as McClellan pronounced it, was the highest wisdom. It must have been for this reason—for there is no other to be found—that the brave fellows who had been guilty of this brilliant irregularity, were left utterly without support, and were finally forced to fall back with serious loss! I suppose there is but one man in the world who will not now admit that the "folly" in the siege of Yorktown rested, as it so often does, exclusively where the timidity belonged—and that man is General McClellan. And if it will add anything to the completeness of this demonstration to say that the rebels never *expected* to hold Yorktown, we have their own testimony to that effect. Mugruder rightly describes the impression General McClellan's conduct produced when he speaks of the "intense amusement and delight with which he at length saw that general begin to break ground before miserable earthworks defended by a feeble force of eight thousand men."

But if the rebel force was feeble at the outset and not in condition to offer any serious resistance to an even moderately vigorous attack, it was quite certain that it would not long be allowed to remain so. The enemy, finding unexpectedly that they could hold the Army of the Potomac in check until a secondary defensive line nearer Richmond could be prepared, would have shown an inbecility which they have never displayed, had they not done so. The high probability that they

* Military history presents no more formidable fortified lines than those of Mehaigne and Bouchain, and yet Marlborough forced these, though defended by a superior force; and if this could be done in the case of positions held by a superior force, what shall we say of a line held by five thousand against over a hundred thousand. The comparison, in fact, is as ludicrous as it would be to compare the one general with the other—I mean, of course, a Marlborough with a McClellan.

would both reason and act in this way seems to have been duly appreciated by the President, who communicated this impression to General McClellan in numerous dispatches, of which the following of April 6th, is a sample: "You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independently of General Wool's command. I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick river at once. They will probably use time as advantageously you can." So again, three days afterward: "By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements, than you can by reinforcements alone" Never was utterance more prophetic; for, says General Magruder, in his official report: "Through the energetic action of the (Confederate) government, *reinforcements* began to pour in, and each hour the Army of the Peninsula *grew stronger and stronger until anxiety passed from my mind as to the result of an attack upon us.*" With these facts, it is submitted to the reader whether we are not justified in connecting by the closest logical bond of antecedent and consequent this fatal delay and all the disastrous results of the campaign on the Peninsula?

At length, after a month of delay, the rebels, whether ashamed of themselves at putting the grand Army of the Potomac to such unnecessary trouble, or because the position of McDowell'corps at Fredericksburg became too serious a menace to Richmond, withdrew from Yorktown as secretly as they had withdrawn from Manassas. General McClellan had comsumed many weeks, including the whole month of April, in preparing to breach the fort at Yorktown. It is impossible to say how many weeks more he would have gone on digging and hauling, and it is a matter of record that he had just sent a request that the heavy siege guns in the fortifications for the defence of Washington *should be taken out of their works and shipped to him*, when, at length, the day after the withdrawal of the rebels, he "discovered" they had gone! Coming into possession of the deserted position, he immediately asked if he might inscribe "Yorktown" on his banners, and telegraphed a dispatch which he has forgotten to reproduce, to the effect that he would "push the enemy to the wall" I need hardly remark that this "wall" was never found; and we were left to exclaim with Pyramus:

> "Thou wall! O, wall! O, sweet and lovely wall,
> Show me thy chink to blink through with mine eyne."

We shall presently follow General McClellan in his subsequent movements on the Peninsula; but before dismissing the consideration of the siege of Yorktown, we must remark, in a word, that we find ourselves unable to accord to that siege the admiration which General McClellan challenges for it. We are requested to admire the thirty or forty miles of corduroy road constructed by his army, the miles of trenches and rifle pits opened, and the huge batteries placed none of which, by the way, was ever allowed to open its fire. But we could admire the corduroy road more, were it not, according to General McClellan's own statement, a mere piece of supererogation—the roads in that region being "*passable at all seasons of the year.*" We could admire the colossal digging and delving more, could we shut out the ghastly vision of the thousands of lives lost by the epidemics of the region into which our army had been led and the useless servitude to which it had been condemned, or push aside the spectacle of those brave fellows digging at once a double ditch—a grave as well as a trench. We could admire more the profiles of his bastions and his batteries, did they not irresistibly present themselves to our imagination as huge monuments of the folly of a man who, seeking the Peninsula to execute a strategically offensive campaign, sat down, at the first show of resistance, to a feeble tactical defensive.

VIII.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

It now stands historically determined that at the time the Army of the Potomac landed upon the Peninsula, the rebel cause had reached its lowest ebb The splendid victories won by the Union armies in the West—armies whose ardor even the McClellan policy, while it ruled, had not been able to restrain, and which, when once freed from that incubus, sprang forth into glorious activity—had carried discomfiture and demoralization to the rebel ranks, terror and dismay to the whole population, and fearful forebodings to the souls of the guilty leaders.

And while this was true of the rebel cause and the rebel armies generally, these influences were also powerfully felt by the rebel army in Virginia. It must be remembered that this was before the passage even of the first Conscription Act, and while the rebel army was suffering from the excessively defective military sys-

tem under which the "Provisional Army" was organized. Its Winter at Manassas had greatly reduced it by disease and expiration of the term of service of the one year troops, and there is the best evidence to show that it effected its withdrawal from Manassas and Centreville in a condition of very great demoralization. Under these circumstances, there is hardly the shadow of a doubt that, had the rebels been promptly followed up after their retreat behind the Rappahannock, our army would have entered Richmond on the heels of a routed and dissolving mob, and taken possession of the Capital which the rebel leaders then expected to abandon.

In this state of facts, the historian finds himself brought face to face with the puzzling problem of determining how it happens that, in the words of Gen. BARNARD, (see Report of Engineer Operations,) "the date of the iniation of the campaign of this magnificent Army of the Potomac was the date of the resuscitation of the rebel cause, which seemed to grow strong *pari passu* with the slow progress of its operations!"

What the first favoring influence was, we need be at no loss to determine. The unexpected delay of the whole month of April before Yorktown—the military strength of which was so ludicrously inadequate to have arrested the march of our army, that it was long before the rebels would believe the evidence of their own eyes that McCLELLAN had actually called a halt—gave the rebels ample time to look about them, to form their plans and to set on foot their execution. The first fruit of this was the Conscription Law, which, let it be observed, was passed by the Confederate Congress at Richmond on the 16th day of April, in the midst of McCLELLAN's tragi-comedy of the spade before Yorktown; and this was immediately followed by the re organization of the Confederate army. Moreover the bitter manner in which the defeats of the West brought home to the leaders the military maxim that in attempting to cover everything one covers nothing, had taught them the policy of *concentration*, and they speedily began its application in Virginia.

The effect of these measures was, of course, not immediate; but Gen. McCLELLAN delayed long enough at various points to permit their full development. Faulty in strategy though the transfer of the army to the Peninsula must be considered —faulty as involving a necessary division of force and an enormous waste of time, without eliminating or diminishing any of the difficulties of the direct advance, but, on the contrary exaggerating them all—nevertheless, considering the low ebb to which the rebel fortunes had sunk, and the weak and demoralized condition of the rebel army in Virginia, at the initiation of the campaign on the Peninsula, we are warranted by the facts in saying that a vigorous advance fron Fortress Monroe would have brought the Union army into position to fight a battle for the possession of Richmond, with the chances of success decidedly on our side. This might again have been possible, a month later, after the battle of Williamsburg. It might still have been possible another month later on the heels of Fair Oaks. But it was reserved for Gen. McCLELLAN, by a display of timidity and indisposition to act amounting absolutely to disease, to weary and wear out the patience of Fortune till at length she ceased to present any more golden opportunities. What was possible to us in April, was no longer possible in August, and the force which, *as we now know*, had abandoned Yorktown without plans of future action, and which was *driven* out of Williamsburg, was able three months afterwards—thanks to McCLELLAN's considerate delays—to assume the offensive and throw his army pell-mell back in disastrous retreat on the James.

But I anticipate. On the "discovery" of the withdrawal of the rebels on the morning of the 6th of May, Gen. STONEMAN, with his cavalry Corps and four batteries of horse artillery, was sent in pursuit. He was followed by HOOKER's Division of HEINTZELMAN's Corps. Subsequently the divisions of KEARNEY, COUCH, and CASEY (of SUMNER's Corps) were sent forward. STONEMAN came up with the enemy's rear-guard at Williamsburg, where a defensive line had been thrown up, which, however, it is evident, JOHNSTON was not minded to hold, since his whole army had passed *beyond* Williamsburg. It was therefore, simply for the purpose of securing the safe withdrawal of the trains that the rebel rear turned sharply on STONEMAN at Williamsburg; and, it being found that Union infantry supports were coming up, LONGSTREET's division was actually ordered *back* to that point. It was between his command and the divisions of SUMNER's and HEINTZELMAN's corps that, on the following day, the crude, ill-planned, unnecessary, but, for us, bloody encounter, which figures in history as the battle of Williamsburg, took place.

Gen. McCLELLAN, in his Report, skims this affair in a few vague touches—a fact that might be accounted for from the circumstances that, not having been person-

ally present at this his first battle. he could know nothing of it from his own knowledge, were it not for the other circumstance, that there are on record dispatches revealing, on the part of Gen. McClellan, motives and moods of mind totally at variance with the representations of his Report. I do not affirm that the fact of their being extremely damaging to his military pretensions could have anothing to do with their omission. I simply submit to the consideration of candid minds to determine what *is* the real motive of a historical deficit otherwise so unaccountable.

Gen. McClellan does not mention, when speaking of the column he "immediately" sent in pursuit of the enemy, that, had he been left to the motions of his own hesitating and cautious spirit, no column ever would had been sent in pursuit at all. It was only after the repeated and united solicitations of several of the commanders had at length succeeded in elevating his mettle up to the point of action, that the consented to a force being sent in pursuit, the battle of Williamsburg.

When, too, it was sent, it was under circumstances that made the horrible confusion and disorder that reigned at Williamsburg perfectly inevitable.

While Gen. McClellan had remained behind at Yorktown, for the purpose, as he says, of "completing the preparations forthe departure of Gen. Franklin's and other troops to West Point by water"—a task which, under the circumstances, that is, considering that Gen. Franlin's Division had remained on shipboard ever since it arrived, for the very good reason that, spite of Gen. McClellan's calls for reinforcements, *he could not find room on the Peninsula to place what he had*, and that Franklin's movement was a mere diversion and not the main business on hand, might surely have been entrusted to the General who was to command it. About noon of Monday the Prince de Joinville and Gen. Sprague went down to Yorktown, to induce Gen. McClellan to come up and take charge of operations which were going so badly for us. When told the condition of affairs in front, Gen. McClellan remarked that he had supposed "those in front could attend to that little matter." After some time, however, he started from Yorktown, reached the vicinity of Williamsburg, just at the close of the battle, and for the first time came face to face with the actual aspect of tha problem there presented.

Now, if one looks into Gen. McClellan's so called "Report," with a view to discover what purpose he then and there formed in face of the state of facts at Williamsburg, he will look in vain. But it happens that there *are* dispatches in existence which *do* photograph Gen. McClellan's mind at this period, and as it is my aim to pierce to the historical truth underlying the veneer which he has spread over these transactions, I will tax the patience of the reader so far as to follow with some minuteness the dissection of one of Gen. McClellan's *unpublished* telegrams.

When, toward nightfall, Gen. McClellan arrived before Williamsburg, the enemy still held his position there. The troops in the front had been fighting within hearing of McClellan during the entire day, but not within his personal supervision, and he was, for the most part, ignorant of the true state of affairs. He thought that the enemy had a securely intrenched position at Williamsburg, and had thus opposed his further advance at that time *and he determined to lose time before Williamsburg, just as he had done at Yorktown.* This is sufficiently apparent from the following telegram of May 5, which, notwithstanding its great historical importance, Gen. McClellan has *not* seen fit to re-produce:

Bivouac in Front of Williamsburgh,
May 5—10 P. M.

After arranging for movement up York river, I was urgently sent for here. I find Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force—*probably greater, a good deal, than my own*, and very strongly intrenched. Hancock has taken two redoubts, and repulsed Early's brigade by a real charge of the bayonet, taking 1 colonel and 150 prisoners, killing at least two colonels and as many lieutenant-colonels, and many privates. His conduct was brilliant in the extreme I do not know our exact loss, but fear Hooker has lost considerably on our left. *I learn from prisoners that they intend disputing every step to Richmond. I shall run the risk of at least holding them in check here, while I resume the original plan. My entire force is, undoubtedly, considerably inferior to that of the rebels, who still fight well; but I will do all I can with the force at my disposal.*

G. B. McCLELLAN,
Major General Commanding.

Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, *Secretary of War.*

This telegram certainly contains some very extraordinary features, remarkably illustrative of the peculiar genius of General McClellan.

He had been "urgently sent for" as if heavy firing in his front during the day had not been urgently calling him forward from the moment he heard it, without waiting for a summons by special messengers.

Hancock had made a "real charge with the bayonet," as if to charge the enemy with the bayonet was something surprising to the last degree, and not to be looked for from any portion of his army.

He "fears that Hooker has lost considerably," because he knew, but knew very little more, that Hooker had been under heavy fire during several hours of the day, while he was superintending the movement of Franklin's division (of McDowell's corps) up York river.

Having found his advance checked at Williamsburg, he very gravely informs the Secretary of War that he "*will run the risk of at least holding them in check*," while what? Why, being checked himself, he will run the risk of holding the enemy in check "while he resumes his original plan"—an indefinite expression, which may refer to either of two plans, that of turning Gloucester, or that of employing regular siege operations, such as he had employed before Yorktown.*

His entire force he represents as "undoubtedly considerably inferior to that of the rebels—a second allusion in the same telegram to an opinion which all the circumstances, even at the time, showed to be unfounded, the enemy having just then precipitately fled from Yorktown, and having been driven immediately afterward by "a real charge with the bayonet"—certainly no signs of superiority on their part.

He says that the enemy "still fight well, although the fighting at Williamsburgh, that very day, was the first that his army had seriously encountered since General McClellan had been in command of it.

And, finally, he concludes the telegram by an evident allusion to the McDowell subject of complaint, assuring the Secretary of War that he "will do all he can with the force at his disposal"—language indicating very great, if not extreme, despondency, fearfully foreboding the disasters of a campaign just commenced.

This telegram was written at 10 o'clock on the evening of the 5th of May, in which we see, as just intimated, that General McClellan speaks of holding the enemy in check at Williamsburgh; while, in fact, the enemy, as he then thought, had not only checked *his* advance, but was in position behind "strong intrenchments," as he calls them, to hold him in check; and he deliberately reports his purpose of resuming his original plan, the execution of which would have required time, instead of breaking through the enemy's lines.

But what was the true state of the case? This may be seen by the telegram of the next morning, dated at Williamsburgh, and addressed to the Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,
WILLIAMSBURG, Va, May 6.

I have the pleasure to announce the occupation of this place as the result of the hard-fought action of yesterday. The effect of Hancock's brilliant engagement yesterday afternoon was to turn the left of their line of works He was strongly reinforced, and the enemy abandoned the entire position during the night, leaving all his sick and wounded in our hands. The victory is complete. * * * Am I authorized to follow the example of other generals, and direct the names of battles to be placed on the colors of regiments? We have other battles to fight before reaching Richmond.

G. B. McCLELLAN,
Major General Commanding.

At ten o'clock during the night of the 5th of May, General McClellan formally reports that he will hold the enemy in check, when, in fact, his real opinion was that the enemy held him in check; and he quite distinctly declares his purpose of resorting to measures requiring time to obtain possession of Williamsburgh, when at the moment of writing that dispatch General Hancock, by acting in the spirit of the President's recommendation to break the enemy's lines, but without specific instructions from General McClellan, had turned their position, and had actually compassed what General McClellan despaired of accomplishing, except by slow operations. On the morning of the 6th of May General McClellan, passing suddenly from a state of extreme despondency, reports exultingly that the victory of the 5th of May "is complete."

In the state of despondency he exaggerates the strength of the enemy, plainly an excuse for his delay before Yorktown, and sets it down as "considerably greater than his own;" but says he will do all he can with the force at his disposal—when the facts show that the enemy abandoned Yorktown without waiting for an attack, and were driven out of Williamsburgh by a brilliant assault made by troops acting under an inspiration, which General McClellan's extreme "caution" could not altogether restrain.

It is by precisely such manipulation as this—that is, by constantly putting as

*And here it may be observed, that while he was employed before Yorktown, the enemy constructed his line of defence six or eight miles in the rear, where General McClellan proposed to consume more time, giving the enemy leisure for the construction of another line still further in the rear, as if he intended to aid the enemy in disputing "every step to Richmond;" the purpose of the enemy, according to information received from "prisoners."

original motives what were really *afterthoaghts*, and by an adroit use of the *suppressio veri*—that General McClellan endeavors to give a false coloring to actions and events. But unfortunately for the success of this operation, there are too many "damned spots" that will not "out" for all his washing.

Of these there is now another that must be set forth.

When General McClellan, after the battle of Williamsburgh took up his march by the line of the York river, and thence along the railroad to the Chickahominy, instead of striking across obliquely to the James, and using that river as his line of supplies—a course rendered possible by the destruction of the *Merrimac*—we are, according to his Report, to believe that it was with extreme reluctance that he adopted this plan, to which he attempts to make it appear that he was *reduced* by the intermeddling of the authorities at Washington.

In response to General McClellan's constant calls for reinforcements it was determined that McDowell's corps, at Fredericksburgh, should move overland to make a junction either north or south of the Pamunkey, with the right of the Army of the Potomac, and co operate in the reduction of Richmond.

Informed of this determination by a dispatch from the Secretary of War, under date of May 18, General McClellan goes off in a fit of well simulated rage, and declares that this determination, and the necessity it imposed of taking the line of the York river, destroyed all his plans. "This order," he says, "rendered it *impossible* for me to use the James river as a line of operations, and *forced* me to establish our depots on the Pamunkey and to approach Richmond from the north. * * * The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to secure the junction; and as the order for General McDowell's march was soon countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage *and frustrated the plan of campaign.*"

Now, is General McClellan so short of memory, or is he purposely guilty of so shameless an inconsistency, that he dares to make such an assertion as this, *when he is himself on record, under solemn oath, in a sense directly the reverse?*

In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General McClellan in reply to the specific questions—"Could not the advance on Richmond from Williamsburgh have been made with better prospect of success *by the James river than by the route pursued*, and what were the reasons for taking the route adopted?"—stated as follows:

"I do not think that the navy at that time was in a condition to make the line of the James river perfectly secure for our supplies. *The line of the Pamunkey offered greater advantages in that respect. The place was in a better position to effect a junction with any troops that might move from Washington on the Fredericksburgh line. I remember that the idea of moving on the James river was seriously discussed at that time. But the conclusion was arrived at that, under the circumstances then existing, the route actually followed was the best.*"

I leave to others the task of harmonizing these "points of mighty opposites," and of determining which is original motive and which afterthought. If they cannot be harmonized, I leave the reader to stamp with its fitting characterization this assertion of General McClellan's.

But the truth of history requires me to go farther, and to point out that it was not at Williamsburgh but at Roper's church, where the army was, *ten days previously*, that it was necessary to decide whether he would there cross the Chickahominy (undefended) and approach the James river, (then open to us by the destruction of the *Merrimac*,) or continue on the Williamsburgh road toward Richmond. The decision was made then and there, and the decision was to move by the York and Pamunkey. So that so far from its being true, as claimed by General McClellan—that the dispatch of the Secretary of War "*ordering*" him to connect by land with McDowell, obliged him to renounce a route by which, as he would now lead us to believe, he could have taken Richmond, the truth is that the choice of route was voluntarily made by General McClellan *ten days before this order he quotes was given*; and yet he has in his report the astounding assurance to complain of the order in question as subjecting him to "great risks," of which the enemy finally "took advantage" and "frustrated "the plan of campaign!"

What the enemy took advantage of—and what he would have been a fool had he *not* taken advantage of—was Gen. McClellan's own ill judged scheme of operations, by which he *gave* the Rebels an interior position between himself and the force covering Washington. Just as Gen. McDowell was about to start from Fredericksburg, with a reinforcement of forty thousand men, came the news of Jackson's raid up the Shenandoah Valley, and Gen. McDowell was ordered by the President to send first one division, then another, and then his whole force, to follow Jackson—a request which is evident from Gen. McDowell's dispatches, he complied with with

extreme reluctance, as it, for the time being, diverted him from his proposed march to join McClellan, which he had extremely at heart.

Thus early was the order detaining McDowell's corps to cover Washington fully justified! This, as well as all the circumstances of the case, are fully set forth in a dispatch from the President, under date of May 25, in which, after giving the details of Jackson's movement and the dispositions that had been made in consequence, he concludes as follows:

"If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be utterly helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's force from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the force you have."

I submit if this language does not display, on the part of the President, a temper worthy the name of sublime, especially when we consider it was addressed to the man who, of all others, had most tried his patience—the man whose conduct, on numberless occasions, had deserved his severest displeasure—the man to whom the President had conceded unlimited means for preparing one of the most powerful armies ever raised in any country—the man who, after all, evaded by an attempted artifice, the orders of his constitutional chief, thereby exposing the capital of the nation to be sacked by the enemy, and exposing also his really grand army to defeat and danger of imminent destruction?

The countermanding of the order given to McDowell, gave McClellan what was far more valuable to him than the actual reinforcements which that General would have brought—to wit, an excuse, or the semblance of an excuse for further delays. For a long time he and his friends were able to saddle on that detention all the blame of his failures; but this shallow trick has ceased to be possible since the publication of the documents in the case; and I may add that it has ceased to be possible since the publication of Gen. McClellan's own report.

Gen. McClellan states that "the information that McDowell's corps would march from Fredricksburgh on the following Monday, (the 26th,) and that he would be under my command, *was cheering news, and I now felt that we would on his arrival be sufficiently strong to overpower the large army confronting us.*" This is simulated joy and had no being in the bosom of Gen. McClellan at the time. The fact is Gen. McClellan did not wish Gen. McDowell to join him by an overland march; he wished him to come by water on his rear, and stated at the time that *he would rather not have him at all than have him come overland!* This fact is abundantly proven by numerous dispatches, published and unpublished. Thus, under date of May 21, he writes: "I fear there is little hope McDowell can join me overland *in time for the coming battle.*" (One would suppose from this that he was going to fight a battle in ten minutes.) But if he did not think McDowell would be able to join him "in time" by an overland march of fifty miles, (an easy three or four days' march,) how could he expect him to join him in time by the water route, when, according to his experience, the transit could not have been accomplished short of a fortnight? This is iterated and reiterated day after day, and finally, in a dispatch, under date of June 14, he says, with still greater emphasis:

"It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegraph from him requesting that McCall's Division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival. That request does not breathe the proper spirit.—Whatever troops come to me must be so disposed of as to do the most good. I do not feel that, in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, Gen. McDowell should wish the general interest to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command. *If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results.*"

Now, speaking of what does and what does not "breathe the proper spirit," I would like to ask whether this astounding declaration of Gen. McClellan "breathes" exactly the "proper spirit?" According to his own repeated declarations, he was in a position in which reinforcements were absolutely essential, *and yet he prefers not to have them at all, unless he can have them by a route, coming by which they would have required thrice the length of time, and by which they would also have been put out of the possibility of offering any protection to the threatened Capital of the nation.* The only advantage his plan presented is that it would have enabled him to break up McDowell's divisions as they arrived, and assign them to the commands of his own favorites, and rid him of the man whom he had come to regard with the green eye of jealousy. I submit to the candid reader to determine whether Gen. McClellan is in a situation to throw himself back on his injured innocence, and claim for himself and his conduct such pure and elevated and unselfish and patriotic motives, or whether all these claims are not the most hollow and unmitigated pretence.

Of events on the Chickahominy, so damning to McClellan, so humiliating to the whole country, there is neither the space nor the patience here to speak.*—Two decisive battles were fought on the Chickahominy—Fair Oaks and Gaines' Mill. They were not battles of McClellan's seeking—they were brought on by the rebels, and we are thus presented with the odd spectacle of a General seeking a special theatre of war for the purpose of making not only an offensive, but a "rapid" and "brilliant" movement, compelled each time he met the enemy to fight on the *defensive*. We have the further spectacle of a man who was constantly clamoring for reinforcements, *fighting his two chief battles, the first with one-half, the second with less than one-third his force!*

To the last we find him persisting in the demand for more troops—to the last we find him the man who was ready to

"Drink up Esile, eat a crocodile,"

doing *nothing* with what he had. "If at this instant," says he, the day after the battle of Gaines' Mill, "I could dispose of *ten thousand* fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow"—a statement to which we might reply that, had he not allowed Porter's corps to be slaughtered the day before, he would have had the ten thousand he there lost. But it is very remarkable that, with an enemy "two hundred thousand" strong, and behind "strong entrenchments," he should have deemed himself capable of "gaining the victory" with a feeble reinforcement of ten thousand men, which would have been no more than he had during all the time he did not "gain a victory." In fact, his victories on paper and in hypothesis, are part of the wonderful phenomena of Gen. McClellan's character.

Having lost his base, and the enemy being planted across his communications, it only remained for Gen. McClellan to beat a retreat to the James River. This act he dignified at the time by the euphenism of "change of base"—a phrase which has since then acquired a ludicrous meaning it will long to lose.

The retreat to the James, considering the bulk of the enemy was on the left bank of the Chickahominy and a long march off, was not difficult. But, notwithstanding this fact, and that the troops were put in the most obvious positions, and that in no case was Gen. McClellan present at any of the engagements of the "seven days' fight," this movement has been claimed as a master-piece of strategy—comparable, say his admirers, only to Moreau's retreat through the Black Forest. And I dare say that the credit in the one case is about as just as in the other; for Napoleon proclaims that Moreau's retreat was "the greatest blunder he ever committed."—"As the Directory," adds he, "could not give Moreau credit for a victory, *they did for a retreat, which they caused to be extolled in the highest terms;* but, instead of credit, Moreau merited the greatest censure and disgrace for it." I leave the parallel to the reader's own apprehension.

In all the battles during this retrograde movement, we have the same utter want of head—Gen. McClellan in each case being absent getting a fresh position to fall back upon. This is the first time that we have known that it is the *first* and highest duty of a Commanding General to reconnoitre positions for a retreat. "The Corps Commanders," says Gen. Heintzleman, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, "*fought their troops according to their own ideas.* We helped each other. If anybody asked for reinforcements, I sent them? if I wanted reinforcements, I sent to others. He [McClellan] was the most extraordinary man I ever saw. *I do not see how any man could leave so much to others, and be so confident that everything would go just right.*" Even at the last of the series of battles, when a defeat would have thrown his army into the James River, at Malvern, we find him, with the exception of a brief period *previous* to and at the *end* of the fight, away "on board a gunboat," and this, notwithstanding the admitted fact that the innate valor of our troops gave the enemy so decided a repulse that, if vigorously followed up, they might even then have been followed up into Richmond.

So ends the story of the strange, eventful campaign on the Peninsula—a campaign which, though ill-planned, was worse executed, and in which the utter incapacity of the Commanding General to take advantage of even such opportunities as fortune threw in his way, was most signally demonstrated. Gen. McClellan did not bring back with him such an army as he had taken away. He brought back an army demoralized, worn down by useless toil, reduced by sickness, almost unmatched in the annals of war. He found the rebel cause at the lowest ebb, and the rebel army

* A full criticism of the whole of McClellan's military conduct on the peninsula will be found in the series of articles in the N. Y. Times, reviewing McClellan's Report, by the present writer.

demoralized and dispirited. He left one in the flood-tide of success, the morale of the other restored by the prestige of great victories.

IX.

HOW POPE GOT OUT OF HIS "SCRAPE."

If the army had sustained itself nobly throughout the sad campaign on the Peninsula, it cannot be denied that so much fruitless toil and so much disaster had impaired its *morale*, while the losses in battle and the epidemics of the region had greatly thinned its ranks. It therefore became a serious question when the army arrived at Harrison's Landing whether it should be allowed to remain or be brought away.* At first there seems to have been no other intention than to reinforce McClellan and let him try it once again. He had promised if furnished with twenty thousand men to assume the offensive and attempt a fresh advance towards Richmond. Accordingly Shield's division was sent him and other troops were about to be forwarded when he put up his request to 50,000 men, and finally demanded reinforcements "*rather much over than under* 100,000 strong." It was utterly *impossible* to furnish this number, and this reason, joined to the fact that a majority of the highest officers of the army of the Potomac counseled a withdrawal, and that a movement to effect a junction with the forces in front of Washington, now under General Pope, was essential to cover the Capital against the attack which the rebels were absolutely certain to make, and for which they were at this very time actually preparing, determined the Administration to recall the army from the Peninsula.

The order for the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula was given by General Halleck, on the 3d of August. The point to which it was ordered was Aquia Creek, for the purpose of making a junction with the forces under Pope on the Rappahannock. It is hardly necessary to say that after this course was determined upon the utmost possible promptitude in execution of the design was absolutely necessary, for there could be no doubt that the purpose of the rebels looking toward a movement on Washington would receive the most powerful stimulus by the knowledge of the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula.

But instead of this, we find General McClellan sitting down to expostulation, and after he had exhausted this, we see him throwing every practical obstacle in the way of getting the army back. He urges "*the terribly depressing effect on the North* and the strong probability that it would induce foreign powers to recognize our adversaries," whereas the fact is, there was hardly an intelligent man in the North who was not looking with the most intense anxiety to the removal of the army to a position where it could be interposed between the enemy and the menaced Capital of the nation. He promises, however, if his counsel does not prevail, to "obey the order with a sad heart."

This "sadness" of his *heart* seems to have so enfeebled his *hand*, that though he was ordered to commence the removal of the army on the 3d of August, day after day passed before anything was done toward it. "It is believed," writes General Halleck to him under date of the 5th, "that it [the removal] can be done now without serious danger. *This may dot be so should there be any delay.*"

Finally, on the 10th, he received dispatches which should have stirred the most sluggish nature to activity: "*They are fighting General Pope to-day*—there must be no further delay in your movements; *that which has already occurred was nnexpected and must be satisfactorily explained.*" This only gives McClellan an opportunity to show the enormous "inherent difficulties of the movement"—difficulties which were pointed out to him before he started to take the army to the Peninsula, *but which he then made light of*—and he ends by adding: "It is not possible for any one to place this army where you wish it *in less than a month;* if Washington is in danger now *this army can scarcely arrive in time to save it!*" What a cheering person General McClellan is!

Without following these transactions through all their maddening details, suffice it ta say that it was the 20th of the month—*seventeen days* after the order for withdrawal was given—before the army was ready to embark at Yorktown, Fortress

* There is connected with this portion of McClellan's career one curious piece of history that merits a passing notice here. Readers of the Report will not have failed to have noted an extraordinary letter addressed by General McClellan to the President, from Harrison's Bar, under date of July 7, giving his "views" on the political situation. This document opens with this statement that the "*rebellion has assumed the character of a war*"—a discovery which, perhaps, explains the peace principles on which General McClellan had been operating, but which it is a misfortune he did not make at an earlier date. It then proceeds to indicate a politico-military programme of the moral suasion stamp, stating that "a declaration of radical views, especially

Monroe and Newport's News. And with this I leave it, to find it turning up again at Alexandria, where I shall have to review a series of events, the most extraordinary, perhaps, in General McClellan's extraordinary career.

The whole rebel army was now rapidly marching northward to overwhelm Pope and precipitate itself on Washington. If Gen. McClellan's own estimate of the rebel force, at 200 000, was correct, Pope had upon him a force six times his strength, and, as it was, he certainly had upon him a force *three* or *four* times his strength. His instructions were to "stand fast" on the Rappahannock—to "fight like the devil and contest every inch of ground." In this task, he was cheered by the announcement that from Alexandria he would speedily receive heavy reinforcements, among which was the corps of Franklin, which he designed to move to Gainesville, a position which covered Manassas Junction, and watched the gaps in the Piedmont Ridge.

With the view of giving effect to this purpose, Gen. Halleck, on the morning of the 27th of August, telegraphed to McClellan, who had arrived in Alexandria the day before, and through whom all reinforcements to Pope must pass, that "Franklin's corps should march in the direction of Manassas as soon as possible." Had this order been obeyed, Jackson's forces, defeated and driven by Pope on the 27th, would have been met near Centreville the next afternoon and crushed.

Now I ask of the reader to bring all the attention and patience he can command, while I show with what fertility of device, and what prodigality of ingenuity, Gen. McClellan contrived so to arrange things that Pope should not get a man of these reinforcements; but should be left with his feeble force of less than forty thousand men to a death-grapple with the enemy that had lately defeated McClellan's once splendid army of one hundred and fifty thousand men: in other words, should be left to—I use Gen. McClellan's own choice phraseology—"*get out of his scrape.*" And I shall show that so completely successful was he that *not a single man ever reached Pope after McClellan arrived at Alexandria.*

In this *exposé* I shall take up events in their chronological order, beginning with the date of the first dispatch to McClellan with reference to the forwarding of reinforcements. I shall show what was the state of facts in front, what were the necessities of the occasion, what orders Gen. McClellan received, and how he carried them out. Let me add that I shall not draw from the testimony of Gen. Pope, nor from the overwhelming array of facts developed by the Committee on the Conduct of the War. I shall confine myself to the simple setting forth of the text of the series of telegrams that passed between headquarters and Gen. McClellan, though I shall be forced to draw from many dispatches which Gen. McClellan, for reasons best known to himself, has not seen fit to reproduce in his so-called "Report."

The 27th of August.—At 10 A. M., Gen. Halleck telegraphs McClellan:

"Franklins Corps should march in that direction [Manassas] as soon as possible."

At 10 20 Gen. McClellan replies:

"I have sent orders to Franklin to *prepare* to march, *and to repair here* [Alexandria] *in person, to inform me as to his means of transportation.*"

At noon Gen. Halleck reiterates, with emphasis, his order to Franklin to march.

"Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days provision." &c.

To this Gen. McClellan replies at 1 15 P. M.:

"Franklin's artillery have no horses, except for four guns;" and adds: "*I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know.*"

Is it not very strange that in order that Franklin shou d march with his corps, Gen. McClellan should begin by calling him away *from* it? If Franklin's artillery lacked horses, why did he not *take* horses which were in abundance in Alexandria? That this was so, I shall presently establish conclusively; and I shall also show that *neither McClellan, nor Franklin, ever applied for transportation to the Quartermaster's Department, which was ready instantly to furnish it.*

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upon Slavery, *will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.*" Now, what is notable in this paper is, that *it was written in Washington before he left for his Peninsular campaign, and was intended to be issued in Richmond.* He fancied he would there be in a position to dictate terms and indicate the public policy. Not finding his expected opportunity to fire off the shot he had prepared, he took the best occasion he could find; and so, putting on a "tag" at the beginning and the end, he brought it out at Harrison's Landing. Its ineffable impudence, the haggard and untimely look it wears, and the inherent absurdity of the proposition to deal leniently with those at whose hands he had just suffered disastrous defeat, are sufficiently accounted for by the circumstances detailed.

The 28th of August.—On the morning of the 28th, Halleck telegraphs directly *to Franklin :*

"On parting with Gen. McClellan. about 2 o'clock this morning, it was understood that you were to move with your corps to-day toward Manassas Junction, to drive the enemy from the railroad. I have just learned that the general has not returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his order, *act on this.*"

To this, at 1 P. M., McClellan, *not Franklin,* replies:

"Your dispatch to Franklin received. I have been doing all possible to hurry artillery and cavalry. The moment that Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery he shall go * * * * * * Please see Barnard, and be sure the works toward the Chain Bridge are perfectly secure. I look upon those works, Ethan Allen and Marcy, as of the first importance."

At 3 30 P. M., Halleck impatiently telegraphs McClellan:

"*Not a moment must be lost* in pursuing as large a focce as possible toward Manasses, so as to communicate with Pope *before the enemy is reinforced.*"

To this McClellan repliel at 4 40 P. M.:

"*Gen Franklin is with me here.* I will know In a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not yet in a condition to move—*may be by to-morrow morning.*"

At 8 40 P. M., Halleck still more imperatively telegraphs:

"There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps toward Manassas; *they must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready.* If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no necessity to go at all *for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid.* If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief."

To which Gen. McClellan replies at 10 P. M.:

"Your dispatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here."

These dispatches give the history of the 28th of August. *Not one of these is published by Gen. McClellan in his Report.* They show the reiterated orders Gen. McClellan received to send reinforcements to Pope, and the imminence of the crisis that was upon that General. They show on the part of McClellan the shallow subterfuges he employed to avoid obeying these orders. In this whole series of excuses, there is but one that presents even the *show* of sebstantiallity—namely the supposed lack of transportation; but the utter baselessness of this pretence is made manifest by a dispatch of Gen. Halleck a day or two afterward, in which he says: "I learned last night (29th) that the Quartermasters Department would have given him (Franklin) plenty of transportation *if he had applied for it any time since his arrival at Alexandria.*"

The 29th of August.—At length, two whole days after the imperative order was given to Gen. McClellan to have Franklin "move out by forced marches," he is able to say, "Franklin's corps is in motion." To be sure, Gen. McClellan confesses that his repeated promises throughout the two previous days to send Franklin forward were all sham, for he says; "I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders of last night." Still he is at length under way, and there is yet a possibility that he will reach Pope in time. Vain hope! He halts Franklin at Anandale and coolly telegraphs to Halleck:

"*Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue?* He is without reserve ammunition and without transportation."

Gen. Halleck must be a very mild mannered man, for he simply replies:

"*I want Franklin's corps to move far enough to find out something about the enemy.* Perhaps he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going further; otherwise, he will push on toward Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegrams or through Franklin's scouts. *Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is.* I am tired of guesses."

Gen. McClellan had now exhausted all the resources of a diabolical ingenuity in order to keep Pope from receiving reinforcements. He had by this means gained two days and a half; that is, from 10 A. M. of the 27th until 3 P. M. of the 29th. He *knew* that Pope had by this time the whole rebel army upon him. He *knew* that a great battle was that very morning and afternoon going on, for the roar of the artillery came to his ears at Alexandria, where he held thirty thousand loyal Americans in the leash, while their brothers in arms were being overwhelmed. It was a crisis with McClellan, and he must either let the troops go forward to Pope or devise a new system of tactics. He could no longer pretend that he did not know where Pope was—he could no longer pretend that he did not know how far Gen. Halleck wished Franklin to advance. He was brought to the wall by Gen. Halleck's emphatic order. "*Our people must find out where the enemy is!*"

Gen. McClellan was equal to the emergency. He drops the correspondence with Halleck, and coolly indites to the President of the United States the following dis-

patch, the most extraordinary ever penned by any man wearing a soldier's uniform. I pause for a moment to ask the reader to take in a full realizing sense of the import of the following amazing words:

"'The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centerville and retiring towards Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted. *First*—To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope. *Second*—*To leave Pope to get out of his scrape*, and at once to use all means to make the Capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do and I will do all in my power to accomolish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer."

Expressive silence is the only possible comment on this astounding proposition, for the profound horror and contempt such words inspire take away all power of cool dissection. It is said that when Mr. Lincoln read this dispatch he fell back in his chair in a half fainting fit, and even at this distance of time it is hardly possible to read it without a sinking of the heart.

General McClellan in the above proposition suggests two courses. I need not say that they are substantially one and the same. *He knew that Lee's junction with Jackson was now certain*—Fitz John Porter had attended to that. In either case, therefore, Pope was perfectly certain to be left to "*get out of his scrape.*"

But what was the "scrape" out of which Pope was to get? Into what horrible indiscretion—so unwarranted that to leave him to "get out" of it was only just punishment on him—had he rushed? Will it be believed that he got into "the scrape" at the urgent instance of General McClellan, who begged Pope to make a diversion in his favor? Will it be believed that, with the loyal alacrity of a true soldier, he had, in obedience to this request, thrown himself down on the Rapidan to compel the enemy to loose his hold on the Army of the Potomac—that he received the whole weight of the rebel force precipitated upon him—that with masterly generalship he kept back that force for seventeen days, fighting in that time several large battles, in which, repeatedly successful, he gave the rebels their first taste of true punishment—that by this means he succeeded in gaining time sufficient for General McClellan to bring back his army to the defence of the Capital? Yet such are the facts which history records. Now we understand. This was the "scrape" Pope was to get out of!

The 30th of August.—I have exhausted the main action in this strange drama, but there remains an episode that should take its place in this recital. So far as the keeping back of reinforcements goes, General McClellan had done his best that Pope should not "get out of his scrape." But there remains a touch beyond this. Pope's ammunition, rations and forage were now exhausted, and he sent to Washington to procure supplies. General McClellan was to fill the orders. You shall now see how he did it.

To the request for ammmunition, General McClellan telegraphs at 1 : 10 p. m.: "*I know nothing of the calibre of Pope's artillery.*" Yet he was within two minutes telegraphic communication with the Ordnance Bureau at Washington, where he might have had full information on this point.

To the request for rations, General Franklin replies:

"I have been instructed by General McClellan to inform you that he will have all the available wagons at Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, and all of the cars also, *as soon as you will send in a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the train.*

I cannot better set forth this matter in its true bearings than by giving the following passage from General Pope's official report:

"About daylight of the 30th, I received a note from General Franklin, written by direction of General McClellan, informing me that rations and forage *would* be loaded into all the available wagons and cars at Alexaddria, as soon as I would send back a cavalry escort to guard the trains. Such a letter, when we were fighting the enemy, and Alexandria was swarming with troops, needs no comment. Bad as was the condition of our cavalry, I was in no situation to spare troops from the front, *nor could they have gone to Alexandria and returned within the time by which we must have had provisions or have fallen back in the direction of Washington; nor do I see what service cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad trains.*"

I must let this close this exposition of the extraordinary series of transactions at Alexandria, in which I have done little else than allow official dispatches to tell their own story. I leave the reader to form his own judgment and pronounce his own verdict. But one remark remains. I have hitherto had occasion to call in question General McClellan's *capacity*. The conduct here set forth invites a question of his *loyalty*. I cannot enter General McClellan's private thought, and pluck out the "heart of his mystery." It is possible that his conduct at Alexandria was nothing more than the effect of heartless selfishness and ambition, which can lead

up to the very door of treason without passing within. It is now certain that it was the avowed purpose of McClellan and his friends so to arrange matters as that the army should, to use their expression, "fall back into his arms" at Washington. For this end it was essential that Pope should not obtain reinforcements, for had he received the thirty thousand troops that lay idle at Alexandria, he would beyond a doubt *have beaten the rebel army.* That he should do so was manifestly not at all in General McClellan's programme.

Looking at General McClellan's conduct as it stands revealed in his own dispatches, I can only say to him, "if this be *loyalty*, make the most of it."

X.

CLOSING SCENES IN McCLELLAN'S CAREER.

If, now, after the *exposé* I have made of the conduct of General McClellan in the extraordinary series of transactions recorded in the preceeding chapter, the question be asked, why it was that, after behavior which in any other country in the world would have caused him to be court-martialed, we find that general not only NOT called to account, but presently restored to the full command of the Army of the Potomac, I frankly reply that this question must be left to history to answer. History will not fail to ask the question, but the answer will be given both with a fuller knowledge of all the facts in the case than we now possess, and under circumstances when those considerations of the public good that now put a check on our venturing on even such revelations as it is in our power to make, will no longer be in force. We can, however, anticipate the verdict in so far as to say that history will recognize that, in his action in this matter, Mr. Lincoln was moved only by the purest and most patriotic motives, and if his yielding of intellectual convictions which he must even then have formed, indicated a blameable weakness, he erred only from the excess of his unselfish anxiety for the public good, at a time when things and the thoughts of men were plunged into utter chaos and collapse.

Pope had now "got out of his scrape"—as best he could, and the army had fallen back to Washington, where the arrangements of McClellan's friends to have it "fall into his arms" were crowned with all the success they could have desired. Pope fell back to the works in front of Washington on the 2d of September; on the same, McClellan took command, and Lee, filing off the left, proceeded to do what General McClellan, in his first memorandum, had staked his military sagacity "no capable general" would do—that is, he crossed the Potomac to make his first invasion of the loyal States.

It is not my purpose to review the Maryland campaign with that fullness of detail that has characterized the analysis of the previous portion of General McClellan's career, for my aim is not so much to dissect the historical facts themselves as to dissect General McClellan's character and conduct as revealed in these facts. Now, in this regard, what remains funishes really nothing essentially new. We are presented with the same characteristics of genius and generalship which we have already discovered—the same unreadiness to move promptly and act vigorously; the same clamoring for "more troops" before advancing; the same reference to the great superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy. It is, after all, a dismal story, and has probably already tested the human stomach to its utmost limits.

In the Maryland invasion, the intentions of Lee, after striking Frederick, appear to have aimed exclusively at the capture of Harper's Ferry. His combinations for this end are now fully revealed by an order of Lee's found at Frederick, and which discloses the whole programme of operations. By this it appears that the commands of Jackson, Longstreet, McLaws, and Walker—that is, in fact, the whole rebel army with the exception of the division of D. H. Hill—were assigned parts in the capture of Harper's Ferry. The single division of D. H. Hill and part of Stuart's cavalry formed the rear guard destined to check any pursuit of McClellan, while the whole rebel force should move to the accomplishment of the end proposed.

In a military point of view this was a bold operation, and the rebel general should have been made to pay dearly for venturing upon it. And yet, if we consider that the combinations of a commander are necessarily largely influenced by his knowledge of the character of his opponent, we must admit that Lee, aware of the tardy genius of McClellan, was authorized in taking a step which, against a vigorous opponent, ought to have secured his destruction. At any rate, the event fully justified his action. McClellan, intrusted with the duty of meeting and crushing the invading army, moved out by slow and easy stages—*at an average of six miles a day*—and accommodated Lee with all the time he needed. Of course, he was able to

accomplish his designed object—the capture of Harper's Ferry, its garrisons and stores; but connected with this, and General McClellan's responsibility for it, there are one or two circumstances that deserve more detailed examination.

There is no doubt that the moment Lee crossed the Potomac, the forces at Harper's Ferry were placed in a false position and should have been promptly withdrawn. But we find no recommendation to this effect by General McClellan during the period in which it was possible to carry it out. His first utterance on the subject is in a dispatch to General Halleck, dated "Camp near Rockville, Sept. 10," in the following terms:

"Colonel Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, as I understand, with nine thousand troops. He can do nothing where he is, but could be of great service if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered to join me by the most practicable route."

Now let us consider what the result of the execution of this order would have been. Lee's instructions to Jackson, Longstreet, &c., to move to the capture of Harper's Ferry, *are dated the day previous, Sept.* 9. An order to Colonel Miles "to join him by the most practicable route," as recommended by McClellan, would, therefore, have simply brought his force into the arms of the rebel army, and Jackson would have been saved the trouble of even the semblance of investment he thought proper to make of Harper's Ferry. In this state of facts General Halleck's reply of the same day to the dispatch of McClellan is as sensible as could possibly have been given:

"There is no way for Colonel Miles to join you at present; his only chance is to defend his works till you can open communication with him."

"Till you can open communication with him;" but with a "pursuit" at the rate of six miles a day against an enemy moving at the rate of twenty, was there much chance to "open communication?" Moreover, McClellan lost the opportunity offered him of moving by the direct route to Harper's Ferry. Lee calculated that by threatening with his rear guard the passage into Pennsylvania he would draw McClellan off from the flank march which was open to him to Harper's Ferry. In this calculation he was correct, and while he was engaged with a feeble detachment of the rebel force at South Mountain, the garrison at Harper's Ferry, 12,000 strong, with all its vast military stores, on the 14th fell into the hands of Jackson. As a military tribunal has pronounced judgment on this sad affair, there is no need of going into it here; it is proper, however, to cite the conclusion of its finding, which is in the following terms:

"The commission has freely remarked on Colonel Miles, an old officer, who has been killed in the service of his country, and it cannot from any motives of delicacy refrain from censuring those in high command, when it thinks such censure deserved. The General in-Chief has testified that General McClellan, after having received orders to repel the enemy invading the State of Maryland, marched only six miles per day, on an average, when pursuing this invading army. The General-in-Chief also testifies that in his opinion General McClellan *could and should have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry, and in this opinion the commission fully concur.*"

General McClellan's dispatches of this period, carefully suppressed by him from his "Report," show that from the first step he took out of Washington in pursuit of Lee, he was haunted by those horrible visions of the fabulous legions of the enemy that we have seen constantly oppressing him. While still at Rockville, under date of the 9th September, we find him writing: "From such information as can be obtained, Jackson and Longstreet have about a hundred and ten thousand, (110,000) men of all arms near Frederick, with some cavalry this side."

The monstrosity of this estimate is readily apparent from the fact that even had the Corps of Jackson and Longstreet been at the full (40,000 men each) their united commands could only have numbered eighty thousand; but it is perfectly well known that, after the series of severe actions through which they had gone, their corps did not count one-half their complement. But General McClellan was destined to go several thousand better on this estimate. Reversing the usual maxim that

"'Tis *distance* lends enchantment to the view,"

the *nearer* McClellan approached the enemy, the vaster his proportions grew. On the 11th we find him stating that "almost the entire rebel army in Virginia, amounting to not less than 120,000 men, is in the vicinity of Frederick city;" and a day or two afterward that army had resumed its old Chickahominy proportions of "180,000 men!" Now with regard to Lee's army in Maryland, we have information more than usually precise respecting its strength. It all passed through Frederick city, where it was carefully counted, and where it was found to number, how many do you suppose? It was found to number precisely *fifty five thousand effective men!* Remember, now, that McClellan's old Peninsular army, swelled in

Washington by a great part of the command of Pope, numbered at this time over a *hundred and twenty thousand men*—that is, that McClellan's force outnumbered the enemy's more than two to one—and you will have the proper test by which to judge of his generalship in the actions which followed.

The rear guard left by Lee at South Mountain fully succeeded in delaying the advance of McClellan until such time as Jackson and Hill had compelled the surrender of Harper's Ferry and the capitulation of the garrison. But even after arriving before Antietam Creek he had still an opportunity on the 16th of September—the day before the battle—to strike Lee before Jackson returned. This opportunity, also, he threw away. Says an English military critic, who always deals tenderly with McClellan: "Examining the proceedings of the 16th of September, by the account most favorable to the Federal leader, there can be no doubt that the extreme caution which he then displayed caused him to throw away the opportunity of crushing the enemy, which the resistance of Harper's Ferry, brief though it was, placed before him."

During that night Jackson arrived with his corps, and the next day, September 17th, when the movement of Hooker *drove* McClellan into battle, Lee had his whole force massed at Antietam. But his whole force was *doubly* outnumbered by that of McClellan. The battle was delivered without order or *ensemble*—the attacks being made feebly and in driblets. Says General Sumner, in regard to the manner of conducting the battle of Antietam:

"I have always believed that, instead of sending these troops into that action in driblets as they were sent, if General McClellan had authorized me to march these 40,000 men on the left flank o the enemy, we could not have failed to throw them right back in front of the other divisions o our army on our left—Burnside's, Franklin's, and Porter's corps. As it was, we went in. division after division, until even one of my own divisions was forced out, the other two drove the enemy and held their positions. My intention was to have proceeded entirely on by their left and move down, bringing them right in front of Burnside, Franklin and Porter.

Question. And all escape for the enemy would have been impossible?

Answer. I think so."*

On the night of the 18th the enemy, abandoned their position, *their ammunition being exhausted*, and returned across the Potomac into Virginia, without molestation. McClellan slowly followed and took up a position along the Potomac, on the Maryland side. Lee established himself at the mouth of the valley, just south of Harper's Ferry.

If any combination of circumstances can be conceived calculated to prompt a general to energetic preparations to retrieve his tarnished laurels, it was such an experience as General McClellen had passed through. The campaign toward Richmond, undertaken on his favorite line and began with loud promises of the speedy annihilation of the enemy, had ended in that enemy's assuming the initiative, invading the territory of the loyal States and compelling McClellan's hasty retreat to cover the capital. The country, which had lavished its resources to furnish that General with an incomparable army, felt the profoundest humiliation and mortification at the disastrous disappointment of its just expectations, and after Lee's retreat began to look anxiously for a blow to be struck that would retrieve the national honor. Antietam having been fought about the middle of September, there was a prospect of a season of a couple of months, during which the state of the roads and the weather would favor military operations, and one would suppose that he would eagerly avail himself of this opportunity to strike a blow. As usual with him he was during this period constantly promising to do so. On the 27th he wrote to General Halleck: "When the river rises so that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry and then moving," etc. Well, shortly after, this condition was fulfilled, and still he remained inactive. The burden of all his communications of this period was for more men, and still more men, though he had now under his command an army 150,000 strong. On the 6th of October he was peremptorily ordered to "cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him South. Your army *must* move now while the roads are good." Week after week passed without the order being obeyed.—To cover up his disobedience he has much to say in his Report of the deficiency of the army in shoes, clothing, etc.; but the hollowness of this pretense is fully displayed in the letters of General Meigs and Halleck, and even by his own chief quartermaster, General Ingalls. Besides, even if there were slight deficiencies in this respect, as there will be in every army, (though no army in the world was ever supplied as McClellan's was,) it would still have been better for him to have moved with this drawback than, by waiting to supply the deficit, to throw the time of moving over to the bad season. Said a corps commander in his army to the writer,

* Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 863.

on the rainy November morning when the movement finally began, "We could better have advanced in September or October with the army *barefoot* than we can now perfectly supplied!"

After nearly two months delay, General McClellan was *pried* from his base by an imperative order, just as he had been *pried* out of Washington by the like means in the preceding April, and he began his forward movement by the inner line, east of the Blue Ridge. But it soon became evident from the slowness of his movements, the spirit in which he acted, and the complications into which he had plunged himself with the military authorities at Washington, that no good results could be expected from his campaign. He was accordingly ordered to resign command of the army at Warrenton, on the 5th of November.

Thus closes a career certainly among the most extraordinary on record, and not less extraordinary from the record General McClellan has given of it to the world in the Report which has formed the subject-matter of this critique. But it is not yet possible for any man to follow out in the complex web of historic cause and effect all the results that have come, and may yet come, from that career. These results are more and other than military, and they did not cease when his military career closed. If, having failed as a military commander, he had left us merely the legacy of disaster we inherited from him, if we had been only destined to find that the man we had chosen for a leader in the dread ordeal into which the nation was plunged by the war was a mere blunderer and incompetent, we might curse our folly and thank heaven for having raised up other men to fight our battles. But he left us another heritage than that of military calamities. He darkened men's minds, and paralyzed their arms, with doubts and fears. The nation had put forth its strength lavishly only to see it wasted; but we could have borne this, had not the very springs of confidence been sapped by the charge that all this waste, these disasters, were due to the incompetence and malevolence of the Administration. While still in command, McClellan lent the weight of his endorsement to the rising spirit of faction which sought to throw all the blame of his failures upon an Administration which the people were taught to believe had by its influence baulked all his brilliant plans, and withheld the material needed to their execution. On being removed from command, McClellan put these slanders formally on record in his so-called Report. He has ended by becoming the leader of a party which, going on the effect produced by these vilifications of the Administration, seeks to obtain control of the destinies of this nation. I have attempted to expose the falsity of these charges, if not with the expectation of silencing the clamor of men seeking their greatness in their country's ruin, at least with the hope of disabusing honest men of mistaken notions long assiduously inculcated, and anticipating for the military conduct of Mr. Lincoln's Administration a part of that justice which history will accord it.

GEORGE H. PENDLETON,

THE COPPERHEAD CANDIDATE

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT.

Republican congressional committee, 1863-1865

His hostility to the American Republic illustrated by his record as a Representative in the Congress of the United States from the State of Ohio.

WASHINGTON, D. C.:
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1864.

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THE COPPERHEAD CANDIDATE FOR VICE-PRESIDENT.

GEORGE H. PENDLETON, now the candidate, of a party in full sympathy with existing rebellion, for the second office in the gift of the American people, has persistently pursued in Congress that course most calculated to encourage the armed enemies of the country, and to foster secession and treason of all kinds and grades.

We therefore accuse him upon the face of his record as a public man,

Who has consented to a division of the country.

Who has opposed the raising of armies to suppress the rebellion.

Who has opposed the raising of revenues and loans to support our armies, to pay the interest on the public debt, and maintain the public credit.

Who has opposed the punishment of armed traitors and defended their property and other interests.

Who has endeavored to shield the unarmed traitors and spies in the loyal States from the consequences of their crimes, by preventing the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, which suspension is provided by the Constitution to meet the case of such criminals.

Who has endeavored in all his public acts to prevent any injury to the institution of slavery, which is the cause of all the expense, suffering, and bloodshed that has befallen the country during the last three years.

Who has been crying Peace! when he well knew that peace could only come by compelling the rebels to yield to lawful authority or by a division of the country.

Who has invited the intervention of the Monarchs of Europe in our domestic troubles by opposing every declaration of Congress against it.

Who has opposed legislation to maintain the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government to States whose recognized governments had been overthrown by a powerful and unlawful organization.

Who has in many ways endeavored to embarrass and hinder the constituted authorities in their efforts to vindicate the Union and Constitution from the attacks of rebels and traitors.

And for the truth of this accusation, we appeal to the record of his public acts.

Mr. Vallandigham, in 1861, introduced in Congress a resolution to amend the Constitution, which might more justly be called a resolution to encourage and legalize secession, from which the follwing are extracts:

ARTICLE XIII.

SECTION 1. The United States are divided into four sections as follows:

The States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and all new States annexed and admitted into the Union, or formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any of said States, or by the junction of two or more of the same or of parts thereof, or out of territory acquired north of said States, shall constitute one section, to be known as the NORTH.

The States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Kansas, and all new States annexed or admitted into the Union, or erected within the jurisdiction of any of said States, or by the junction of two or more of the same or of parts thereof or out of territory now held or hereafter acquired north of latitude thirty-six degrees thirty minutes and east of the crest of the Rocky mountains, shall constitute another section, to be known as the WEST.

The States of Oregon and California, and all new States annexed and admitted into the Union, or formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any of said States, or by the junction of two or more of the same or of parts thereof, or out of territory now held or hereafter acquired west of the crest of the Rocky mountains and of the Rio Grande, shall constitute another section, to be known as the PACIFIC.

The States of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Car-

olina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri, and all new States annexed and admitted into the Union, or formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any of said States, or by the junction of two or more of the same or of parts thereof, or out of territory acquired east of the Rio Grande and south of latitude thirty-six degrees thirty minutes, shall constitute another section, to be known as the SOUTH.

ARTICLE XIV.

No State shall secede without the consent of the Legislatures of all the States of the section to which the State proposing to secede belongs. The President shall have power to adjust with seceding States all questions arising by reason of their secession; but the terms of adjustment shall be submitted to the Congress for their approval before the same shall be valid.

Mr. Pendleton could see nothing wrong in these propositions, and as late as January, 1863, defended them in the House.

At the session of Congress beginning in December, 1862, he opposed, in all its stages, the bill "to raise additional soldiers for the service of the Government."

He, with other Copperheads, in the House of Representatives, on the 28th of January, 1863, succeeded, by motions "to adjourn," "to lay on the table," for "a call of the House," "to excuse members for not voting," &c., &c., in preventing the House from coming to a vote on that bill, until, having sat all night, it adjourned at half past five on the morning of the 29th. The vote on the final passage of the bill, was reached February 2, 1863, when he voted against the bill.

At the same session he opposed, in all its stages, the bill "for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes," and voted against the bill on its final passage, February 25, 1863.

And at the last session of Congress, he opposed, in all its stages, the bill to amend the act, calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion, and pursued the same course on all bills relating to the same subject.

January 11, 1864, he voted against the following:

Whereas the burden of government should be made to fall as nearly equally as possible upon all parts of the country; and whereas the southern portion of the country has for several years contributed little, either in men or money, toward the support of the Government; and whereas almost the only way to get men from that portion is to take black men; and whereas for every black man enlisted in the South some man in the overburdened North may be exempted from the draft.

It is therefore hereby declared to be the sense of this house that the Government should use its most strenuous efforts to procure the voluntary enlistment of persons claimed as slaves in the rebel territory, by giving them the full bounty and pay of other soldiers, and by guaranteeing their freedom, at once, upon enlistment.

And during the last session, by many other votes, endeavored to prevent the filling up of our armies.

He has opposed, in every way known to legislative fillibusters, the passage of bills for raising a revenue sufficient to pay the army and navy, and provide them with the means necessary to prosecute the war.

July 10, 1861, in company with Vallandigham, Voorhees, Wood, and six others of like stripe, he voted against the bill further to provide for the collection of duties, imports, and other purposes.

July 29, 1861, he voted against the bill to provide additional revenues for defraying the expenses of Government, and maintaining public credit.

August 2, 1861, he voted against the bill reported by a committee of conference of the two Houses to provide increased revenues from imports to pay the interest on the public debt, and for other purposes.

February 7, 1862, he voted against the bill to authorize the issue of United States notes, and for the redemption and funding thereof, and for funding the floating debt of the United States.

April 8, 1862, with Vallandigham, Voorhees, and twelve others, he voted against the passage of the bill to provide internal revenue to support the Government and pay the interest on the public debt.

June 24, 1862, he voted against the bill "to authorize the issue of demand Treasury notes."

July 14, 1862, he voted against the bill "to impose an additional duty on sugars produced in the United States."

He has opposed all propositions to confiscate property of rebels, whether used for insurrectionary purposes or not.

August 2, 1861, he voted to lay on the table the bill to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes.

August 3, again voted to lay the bill on the table, and on the same day voted against the bill on its final passage.

At the session beginning December, 1861, he voted, May 20, 1862, against the House bill 471, to confiscate the property of rebels for the payment of the expenses of the present rebellion, and for other purposes.

July 15, 1862, he opposed Mr. Maynard's resolution explanatory of "An act to suppress rebellion, to punish treason and insurrection, to

seize and confisate property of rebels, and for other purposes."

June 4th, 1862, he voted against the bill declaring disloyal persons ineligible to office.

June 9th, 1862, he voted against the following resolution:

Resolved, That, in the judgment of this House, the Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States should instruct all of his officers, holding command in districts of country in rebellion against the Government, to make proclamation that henceforth the armies of the Republic shall be subsisted, so far as practicable, upon the property of all those who are in rebellion, or are giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States.

January 12th, 1863, he voted against the following resolution:

Resolved, That the Committee on Military Affairs be, and are hereby, instructed to inquire into the expediency, and necessity of granting a bounty land warrant of 160 acres of land to every soldier now serving in our army, or who may hereafter enlist in any of the old regiments, the land warrants to be located on any confiscated rebel plantation which the holder of the warrant may select, as soon as the war is ended and the rebellion crushed, and report by bill or otherwise.

He opposed the bill to provide for the collection of abandoned property, and for the prevention of frauds in insurrectionary districts within the United States. He moved, March 3d, 1863, to lay the bill on the table; and by a multitude of other votes has opposed any punishment of the rebels now in arms against the Government.

He opposed the bill "to indemnify the President and other persons for suspending the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*," and voted against the bill on its passage in the House, December 8th, 1863.

He opposed all efforts of the two Houses to agree on the details of the bill, and finally voted against agreeing to the report of the committee of conference, March 2d, 1863, and has opposed every proposition for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* in the cases which, if any, the constitutional provision was intended to cover.

January 17th, 1862, he voted against the following proposition:

"*That from and after the passage of this act there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the Territories of the United States now existing, or which may at any time hereafter be formed or acquired by the United States, otherwise than in punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.*"

He voted, February 26, 1862, against establishing the following Article of War:

ARTICLE —. All officers or persons in the military and naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor, who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due. Any officer who shall be found guilty by court-martail of violating this article, shall be dismissed from the service.

He voted, April 11th, 1862, against the bill for the release of certain persons held to service or labor in the District of Columbia.

He voted, May 26th, 1862, against the bill to free from servitude the slaves of rebels engaged in abetting the existing rebellion against the Government of the United States.

June 9th, 1862, he voted against the following resolution:

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to report a bill modifying the fugitive slave law so as to require a jury trial in all cases where the party claimed denies, under oath, that he is a slave, and also requiring any claimant under such act to prove that he has been loyal to the Government during the present rebellion.

And by many other votes of like character sustained the institution of slavery—the cause of this cruel rebellion which has drenched our country in blood.

He opposed the passage of the following resolutions:

Resolved by the House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled: 1. That the rebellion, on the part of the seceding States against the Government and laws of this Union was deliberately wicked and without reasonable cause; the compact of the Union being perpetual, no State has the constitutional power to forcibly secede, and that there was no grievance, real or imaginary, upon the part of the seceding States, for the redress of which the Constitution does not furnish ample remedies.

2. That the rebellion, being in contravention of the Constitution and laws, it is the duty of the Government to put it down, without regard to cost, or the consequences that may befall those engaged in it, and all necessary constitutional means for this purpose, and this alone should be furnished by the people. That inasmuch as the great and wicked crime invoked the power of the sword, the war should be prosecuted with all the vigor and strength and means of the Federal Government till rebellion be subdued, and no longer.

3. That an honorable peace is desirable; but no peace while armed opposition menaces the capital, and threatens the overthrow of the Union; nor that peace which would be established upon the dismembered fragments of a mighty and prosperous nation; and that man who would entertain peace upon these conditions is a traitor to his country, and unworthy the protection of its laws.

4. That the war was inaugurated *solely* for the suppression of the rebellion and the restoration of the Union as it was; that any and all attempts to change or divert this line of policy is a fraud upon the nation, a fraud upon the memory of the gallant men who have sacrificed their lives, and a fraud upon the living soldiers who now stand up as a wall between their loved country and its wicked invaders.

5. That the value of dollars and cents does not enter into the momentous question of the maintenance of popular liberty, or the preservation of a free Government, any more than the lives and comfort of the traitors who have conspired or leagued together for their destruction.

6. That the Union restored, the war should cease, and the seceding States be received back into the Union with all the privileges and immunities to which they were originally entitled.

He voted December 17, 1863, against the following resolutions:

Resolved, That our country, and the very existence of the best Government ever instituted by man, are imperilled by the most causeless and wicked rebellion that the world has ever seen; and believing, as we do, that the only hope of saving this county and preserving this Government is by the power of the sword, we are for the most vigorous prosecution of the war, until the Constitution and laws shall be enforced and obeyed in all parts of the United States; and to that end we oppose any armistice, or intervention, or mediation, or proposition for peace from any quarter, so long as there shall be found a rebel in arms against the

Government; and we ignore all party names, lines, and issues, and recognize but two parties in this war—patriots and traitors.

Resolved, That we hold it to be the duty of Congress to pass all necessary bills to supply men and money, and the duty of the people to render every aid in their power to the constituted authorities of the Government in the crushing out of the rebellion, and in bringing the leaders thereof to condign punishment.

This resolution was adopted by a vote of yeas 153, nays 1. The nay was Mr. Pendleton's particular friend, Benjamin G. Harris, of Maryland. *Mr. Pendleton dodged.*

December 21, 1863, when a joint resolution, providing for deficiencies in former appropriations for the army, was under consideration, Mr. Harding, of Kentucky, moved the following amendment:

Provided, That no part of the money aforesaid shall be applied to the raising, arming, equipping, or paying of negro soldiers.

The amendment was rejected by a vote of yeas 41, nays 105—Mr. Pendleton voting with the minority. The negro troops were then in actual service, so that the object of the amendment was to cheat them out of their pay, and to violate the plighted faith of the Government. Even Fernando Wood voted against this mean attempt at repudiation; but it met the approbation of Mr. Pendleton.

January 18, 1864, Mr. Smith, of Kentucky, submitted a preamble and resolution, as follows:

Whereas a most desperate, wicked, and bloody rebellion exists within the jurisdiction of the United States, and the safety and security of personal and national liberty depend upon its absolute and utter extinction: Therefore,

Resolved, That it is the political, civil, moral, and sacred duty of the people to meet it, fight it, crush it, and forever destroy it.

Mr. James C. Allen moved to lay the preamble and resolution on the table, but it failed, though Mr. Pendleton voted with him—yeas 26, nays 102.

The resolution was then adopted—yeas 112, nays 16; Mr. Pendleton voting in the negative, with Wood, Voorhees, James C. Allen, Long, Harris, of Maryland, Ancona, and other Copperheads.

February 15, 1864, Mr. Arnold submitted the following resolution:

Resolved, That the Constitution should be so amended as to abolish slavery in the United States wherever it now exists, and to prohibit its existence in any part thereof forever.

Mr. Pendleton in the negative.

Feb. 29, 1864, Mr. Schenck submitted the following resolutions:

Resolved, That the present war, which this Government is carrying on against armed insurrectionists and others, banded together under the name of "Southern Confederacy," was brought on by a wicked and wholly unjustifiable rebellion, and all those engaged in, or aiding, or encouraging it are public enemies, and should be treated as such.

Resolved, That this rebellion shall be effectually put down; and that, to prevent the recurrence of such rebellions in future, the causes which led to this one must be permanently removed.

Resolved, That in this struggle which is going on for the saving of our country and free government, there is no middle ground on which any good citizen or true patriot can stand; neutrality, or indifference, or anything short of a hearty support of the Government, being a crime where the question is between loyalty and treason.

The first resolution was agreed to without a count. On the second, a division was called for, and the first part adopted. The latter portion, declaring that "to prevent the recurrence of such rebellions in future, the causes which led to this one must be permanently removed," was voted upon. The yeas were 124; the nays were none. Mr. Pendleton *dodged*.

The vote was then taken upon the last resolution, which simply declares that in this struggle there is no neutral ground for an honest man to stand upon, and that every loyal citizen must stand by the Government. It was adopted, yeas, 109; nays, none. But Mr. Pendleton could not go it. He *dodged*. Even Cox voted for this and the preceding resolutions, but Mr. Pendleton, more candid and consistent in his adherence to the South, stood aloof. Too proud to vote a sentiment which was abhorrent to him, yet lacking firmness to vote against it, he *dodged*, while the facile little Cox swallowed the bitter pill. That Mr. Pendleton was present, is apparent from the fact that immediately following the vote he took the floor, and offered a resolution protesting against the arrest and punishment of his friend Vallandigham.

March 28, 1864, Mr. Stevens introduced a joint resolution submitting two amendments to the Constitution of the United States, to be acted upon by the States. The proposed amendments are as follows:

ARTICLE 1. Slavery and involuntary servitude, except for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, is forever prohibited in the United States and all its Territories.

ART. 2. So much of article four, section two, as refers to the delivery up of persons held to service or labor escaping into another State, is annulled.

A motion was made to lay the proposition on the table, but it was rejected—yeas 45, nays 75. Mr. Pendleton voted to lay on the table; and, on May 31, voted against the joint resolution.

On April 9, a resolution was offered to expel Benjamin G. Harris, a Representative from the State of Maryland, for uttering the following treasonable language in that body:

The South asked you to let them live in peace. But no you said you would bring them into subjection. That is not done yet; and God Almighty grant that it never may be. I hope that you will never subjugate the South.

On the vote to expel, the yeas were 84, nays 58, Mr. Pendleton voting in the negative.

On the 14th of April, he gave a similar vote against the censure of his colleague, Mr. Long.

June 13, 1864, Mr. Pendleton voted against the army appropriation bill, as finally agreed upon by committees of conference of the two Houses.

On the same day, Mr. Pendleton voted against the repeal of the fugitive slave acts. The vote stood—yeas 90, nays 62.

June 15, 1864, Mr. Pendleton voted against the joint resolution of the Senate proposing to the States changes of the Constitution so as to prohibit slavery.

July 7, 1864, he voted against the following:

Whereas the organized treason having its headquarters at Richmond exists in defiant violation of the national Constitution, and has no claim to be treated otherwise than as an outlaw; and whereas this Richmond combination of conspirators and traitors can have no rightful authority over the people of any portion of the national Union, and no warrant for assuming control of the political destiny of the people of any State or section of this Union, and no apology but that of conspiracy and treason for any assumption of authority whatever: Therefore,

Resolved, That any proposition to negotiate with the rebel leaders at Richmond (sometimes called "the authorities at Richmond") for a restoration of loyalty and order in those portions of the Republic which have been disorganized by the rebellion is, in effect, a proposition to recognize the ringleaders of the rebellion as entitled to represent and bind the loyal citizens of the United States whom they oppress, and to give countenance and support to the pretensions of conspiracy and treason; and therefore every such proposition should be rejected without hesitation and delay.

March 3, 1864—He voted against the Senate resolutions against foreign intervention in the existing rebellion, of which resolutions the following is one:

Resolved, That the United States are now grappling with an unprovoked and wicked rebellion, which is seeking the destruction of the Republic that it may build a new Power, whose corner-stone, according to the confession of its chiefs, shall be slavery; that for the suppression of this rebellion, and thus to save the Republic and to prevent the establishment of such a Power, the national Government is now employing armies and fleets, in full faith that through these efforts all the purposes of conspirators and rebels will be crushed; that while engaged in this struggle, on which so much depends, any proposition from a foreign Power, whatever form it may take, having for its object the arrest of these efforts, is, just in proportion to its influence, an encouragement to the rebellion and to its declared pretensions, and, on this account, is calculated to prolong and imbitter the conflict, to cause increased expenditure of blood and treasure, and to postpone the much desired day of peace; that, with these convictions, and not doubting that every such proposition, although made with good intent, is injurious to the national interests, Congress will be obliged to look upon any further attempt in the same direction as an unfriendly act, which it earnestly deprecates, to the end that nothing may occur abroad to strengthen the rebellion or to weaken those relations of good will with foreign Powers which the United States are happy to cultivate.

January 29, 1862, he voted against the bill to authorize the President of the United States, in certain cases, to take possession of railroads and telegraph lines, in order more effectually to carry on the war against the rebels.

December 28, 1862, he voted for the postponement of the bill making appropriations for the support of the army for the year ending 30th June, 1864, and on the same day dodged the vote on the passage of the bill.

He opposed the passage of the following resolution:

Strike out all after the word "*Resolved*," and insert "*That this House approve of the constant, statesmanlike, and humane efforts of the Administration to secure an exchange of our prisoners now in the hands of the rebels, and that it is hereby recommended that such efforts be continued to secure an exchange of all our prisoners now in southern prisons.*"

And by more than a hundred votes of like character has endeavored to hinder the Government in the suppression of the rebellion.

HIS SPEECHES.

He says in a speech in the House of Representatives, January 18, 1861:

To-day, sir, four States of the Union have, as far as their power extends, seceded from it. Four States, as far as they are able, have annulled the grants of power made to the Federal Government; they have resumed the powers delegated by the Constitution; they have canceled, as far as they could, every limitation upon the full exercise of all their sovereign rights: they do not claim our protection, they ask no benefit from our laws; they seek none of the advantages of the confederation. On the other hand, they renounce their allegiance; they repudiate our authority over them; and they assert that they have assumed, some of them that they have resumed, their position among the family of sovereignties, among the nations.

Sir, I deal in no harsh epithets. I will denounce no State no body of men. I will not pause to inquire whether they have done all this legally or wisely, or upon sufficient cause. *They have done it, and I recognize the fact.* They have done it with a unanimity of sentiment, with a coincidence of opinion among the people, which is without parallel in the history of revolutions; and the simple question presented to us to-day is this: whether, throughout the limits of those States, which have thus formally, thus orderly, thus by the enactments of representative bodies of highest capacity known to the civilized nations—conventions duly authorized and properly elected to consider this very question—have declared themselves independent of us, we are prepared, by force of arms, to maintain our supremacy and enforce our laws?

Next we have Mr. Pendleton's theory of a Government with no power to enforce the laws. He recites the obligations of the Constitution in order to show that they are utterly without sanction, and that they must always remain null and void when resistance is made to them. Mr. Webster was wont to say of Mr. Calhoun's constitutional theories, that they made of the Government a "rope of sand;" but Calhoun never pushed his theory of a compact of sovereign States to quite the extreme which Mr. Pendleton has reached, as we will proceed to show. In the same speech he said:

Now, sir, what force of arms can compel a State to do that which she has agreed to do? What force of arms can compel a State to refrain from doing that which her State government, supported by the sentiment of her people, is determined to persist in doing? It is provided in the Constitution that the citizens of every State shall have all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States. What force of this Federal Government can compel the observance of that clause, if a State is determined to

pass and execute laws whereby citizens of other States shall not have, within its limits, the same privilege as its own citizens.

"Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts and judicial proceedings of every other State." How will the Federal Government, by armies and arms, enforce the observance of that clause in the Constitution, if the judiciary and the executive authorities of a State, supported by the laws refuse such faith and credit?

"No State, without the consent of Congress, shall lay any impost or duties on imports." Suppose a State should pass such a law, and the citizens were willing to execute the law, what army could prevent it?

"No State, shall, without the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with a foreign Power." I wish to know from gentlemen what number of men it would require to annul such an agreement once made. The General Government is invested with certain powers necessary to be executed, in order to keep the machinery of the Government in motion. Can any number of troops, or the use of any armed force on the part of the States, compel the General Government to execute those powers if the agents appointed for that purpose deliberately, persistently refuse to execute them? *Sir, the whole scheme of coercion is impracticable. It is contrary to the genius and spirit of the Constitution.*

Mr. Pendleton again says:

Sir, the enforcement of your laws, within a seceding State, in opposition to its will, is coercion of that State, and coercion by armed force is war. These terms, "collecting the revenue," "enforcing the law," "maintaining the Union," captivate our people. They smack of law and order, to which our people are very much attached. They are not unknown in American history. Our fathers heard them used in the same tone and spirit, and for the same purpose, as we hear them now. In 1768, when the colonies were rejoicing at the repeal of the stamp act, Charles Townsend, then a member of Lord Chatham's cabinet, pledged to conciliation and peace, rose in the House of Commons, and declared that it was expedient to collect revenues from America, and that he would himself bring in a bill to accomplish that result. His declaration was received with tumultuous shouts of applause, &c.

Mr. Pendleton says further:

My voice to-day is for conciliation; my voice is for compromise; and it is but the echo of the voice of my constituents. I beg you, gentlemen, who with me represent the northwest; you who with me represent the State of Ohio; you who with me represent the city of Cincinnati—I beg you gentlemen to hear that voice. If you will not; if you find conciliation impossible; if your differences are so great that you cannot or will not reconcile them, *then, gentlemen, let the seceding States depart in peace; let them establish their government and empire, and work out their destiny according to the wisdom which God has given them.*

But we resume our extracts from Mr. Pendleton's speech. He continues:

My colleague (Mr. Stanton) said the other day that war seemed inevitable. He said the end of that war was dissolution and disunion. If he said truly, if he judged wisely, in God's name let us leap over the intervening agony of war, and come to the end and conclusion at once.

If George III had conciliated his colonies, how much wiser a man would history have proclaimed him! If, failing to conciliate, he had allowed the separation without the disgrace and defeat of the Revolutionary war, how much wiser a man still would he have been!

Mr. STANTON. I would be glad to know of my colleague if he holds that there is any power in any department of this Government to recognize the secession of a State under the Constitution. As to the matter of conciliation and compromise, the people of the seceding States say they want none, and will accept none; and, therefore, it is useless to talk of it. I again ask my colleague whether there is any power, under the Constitution, to recognize the secession of a State, and recognize it as a foreign nation.

Mr. PENDLETON. What may be the constitutional power of this Government to recognize the secession of a State, I decline to discuss at present. But this I say, if we should become engaged in war with a foreign enemy, and a portion of our territory should be captured and reduced to possession by the enemy, and we should be obliged to make a treaty of peace on the basis of retaining what each party had acquired—*uti possidetis*—acknowledging the sovereignty of that territory to have passed away from us, certainly the Federal Government would have the power to conform to our restricted limits, and to confine its jurisdiction to our admitted boundaries. If war be dismemberment, as my colleague declares, has not the Federal Government as much power to treat that question now as at the end of a war? Will a conflict of arms confer constitutional power upon the Federal Government?

With this, as a part only of a long record of a similar character, we present to the American people this accusation of a man who now asks their suffrages to exalt him to the second position in their gift.

NOTE.—The above record has been carefully made up from the Journals of the House of Representatives and the *Congressional Globe*, which is the official organ of Congress; and every statement made in this pamphlet can be fully verified by a reference to them.

PRINTED AND STEREOTYPED BY McGILL & WITHEROW.

THE CHICAGO

COPPERHEAD CONVENTION.

THE

TREASONABLE AND REVOLUTIONARY UTTERANCES

OF THE MEN WHO COMPOSED IT.

Extracts from all the Notable Speeches delivered in and out of the National "Democratic" Convention.

A SURRENDER TO THE REBELS ADVOCATED—A DISGRACEFUL AND PUSILLANIMOUS PEACE DEMANDED—THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHAMEFULLY VILLIFIED, AND NOT A WORD SAID AGAINST THE CRIME OF TREASON AND REBELLION.

Republican congressional committee, 1862-

WASHINGTON, D. C.
PUBLISHED BY THE CONGRESSIONAL UNION COMMITTEE.
1864.

THE CHICAGO COPPERHEAD CONVENTION.

This pamphlet contains the spirit of the Chicago "Democratic" Convention. If it contains no statements that if the proposed "Armistice and National Convention" expedients should fail, the Democratic party would put down the rebellion, it is because, from first to last, no such statements were made. They would have been firebrands in the camp, and if uttered in the Convention, would have exploded the "Democracy" into two conflicting factions. They uttered no word of approval of Abraham Lincoln, or disapproval of Jefferson Davis The blood and crimes, the hardships and deprivations, the infringements on personal liberty which we all endure, were not, during the entire sitting of the Convention, once charged to the rebellion or its leaders, but were by every speaker charged wholly, fiercely and relentlessly to the President of the United States, his officers and armies. Had the Convention been held in Richmond, Virginia, not a word need have been expunged.

Further, the general spirit and tone of the Convention, so far from looking to a suppression of the present rebellion, was in favor of a new rebellion against the Government in the imagined contingency of "interference with the freedom of the ballot," at the coming election. Very few of the speakers closed without an exhortation to prepare for a fight this fall. As nothing had occurred to indicate such an interference, and as it is in the power of those who met in this Convention to compel the Government to put forth its armed force, by themselves inciting disturbance, it is to be presumed, that as in the case of the rebel prophecies of disunion four years ago, so now, what these prophets so unanimously foresee they have determined to bring to pass. Such a rebellion would reunite them for the time in aim and purpose with their ancient party allies, Jefferson Davis and the Southern rebels. It would remove the seat of war from Atlanta, Mobile, and Richmond, to Chicago, New York, and Boston. It would set the people of the Northern States to cutting each other's throats, to send August Belmont's Confederate stock up to par, and to establish the independence of the Rebellion.

Such was the tone and spirit of this so-called "Peace Convention." Vallandigham, the forerunner in the crime of Northern Rebellion, was the demi-god of the occasion. It was the tone and spirit of the New York anti-draft riots, where there was prodigious cheering for McClellan—so here—and from the same class, imported in large numbers for the occasion. They were not the peaceful citizens of this nation—not the class from which a genuine cry for peace could ever come. They were for peace with the rebels only because they were for the rebels, for the slavery in behalf of which they rebelled, for the secessionism of Calhoun which led them into the rebellion, and for that gilded sham of this day—the name Democracy, which has thus far helped the rebellion on its way Sympathizing thus with the rebels, they demanded peace as a service to their friends --peace with the country's enemies, and war against its defenders. In one breath they chaunted the evils of our present war, and in the next threatened a new rebellion. One moment they talked dolorously of the wounded and dying, and the next, threatened a free fight against us in our own streets, which would fill every American heart with shame and dye every American threshold with blood. They have done the rebels good service. Had they met, and on behalf of the Democracy of the North, authoritatively informed the country that the seceders must submit to the Government or be crushed, the rebels would have been more discouraged and their return to the Union more hastened, than by the most sanguinary defeat on the battle-field As it is, the emissaries of the rebellion in Canada telegraph, "*Platform and Vice-President satisfactory*—SPEECHES VERY SATISFACTORY."

Republicans and Democrats who are not yet willing to surrender the Union, or to bring about another rebellion at the North to complicate a thousand fold the settlement of our present difficulties, are these men whose speeches are so *very satisfactory* to the rebels, worthy to be entrusted with the destinies of the country?

☞ That there might be no dispute about the correctness of the extracts of speeches in the following pages, they were all copied from the columns of the Chicago *Times*, except a few passages taken from the Chicago *Tribune's* reports, which are credited to it.

The Chicago *Times*, of Aug. 25th, stated the object of those attending the Convention to be, to make it

The occasion of a demonstration of democratic power and earnestness which will strike terror to the hearts of our enemies.

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We also learn from the same paper that

The most distinguished Democrats of the nation will address the people, and open the campaign in the Democratic city of the West.

DR. N. S. DAVIS'S SPEECH.

Dr. N. S. Davis, of Chicago, delegate for the State at large of Illinois, delivered one of the most moderate addresses made during the gathering and session of the Convention, before the Invincible Club, Friday evening, Aug. 26th. He began by denying that slavery had caused the war, and attributed it to the pride, self-righteousness and Pharisaism of the Christian churches of the North. These, he said, had

Corrupted the pure religion of the heart and substituted for it a bigoted fanaticism that stands ready to wrap itself in the mantle of self-righteousness and arrogantly exclaim to all who do not obey its dictates, "I am holier than thou." [Much applause.]

In this view Dr. Davis agrees with every rebel in the South. He further said:

Fellow-citizens, from the commencement of this conflict I have, for one, entirely eschewed this word loyal as having no place in the vocabulary of a republican people. [Continued applause.] * * * * *

There is one sense, and only one, in which the word loyal has any legitimate place whatever among a republican people. It is the last and most insignificant definition that is given to it by that old lexicographer, Noah Webster, which is, "obedience to law; faithfulness to law." In that meaning of the term it may be used by a republican people. But, if you attach that meaning to the term, who are the loyal party? With that meaning to it, of the American people, who are those who have been faithful to the Constitution and to the laws of the Republic? Who and what party, in spirit, in temper, and in acts, have trampled, not only the law of the land, but the Constitution itself, under their feet? Who are the men that have thus trampled law and the Constitution under their feet? Are they in the Democratic party? Are they in the great conservative portion of the American people?

Dr. Davis seemed to have forgotten the fact that the Democratic party carried every Democratic State in the Union into the rebellion, or else he is not aware that to secede from the Union and make war upon it with half a million of men, as the Democrats of the South have done, is unconstitutional. With these facts before his mind he could hardly ask the question, "Who are the men that have thus trampled law and the Constitution under their feet? Are they in the Democratic party?

VALLANDIGHAM'S FIRST SPEECH.

The Chicago *Times*, of Aug. 27th, in its prelude to Vallandigham's speech, alluding to the crowd gathered in the Court House Square, says:

No wonder, then, that thousands of people were anxious, in the midst of the great crisis that is now passing, to hear the sound truths and immaculate teachings of the old Democracy.

Vallandigham said:

There are two principal forms of government in the world. Governments founded on the idea of coercion, and governments founded on consent. The Declaration of Independence to which we owe our national existence—the charter in which is laid down the principles on which our Government is founded—declares that all just governments rest on the consent of the governed. Other governments, in other ages and in other countries, have been founded on the idea of coercion, and look to bayonets, cannon, the sword, to enforce the edicts of the rulers as against the people, to maintain themselves against the wishes and sentiments of the people who are called their subjects. Governments founded on consent, on the other hand, rely on the instrumentalities of freedom, free speech, free press, free assemblages of the people, a free ballot-box under which executive officers and legislators are elected to make laws and execute the laws so made, and those only.

Such governments repudiate the idea of coercion and arms, relying only on the coercion of law and of public opinion. This is the only coercion rightfully to be exercised in a government founded like ours on the consent of the governed.

Vallandigham here propounds the Fourierite and Utopian idea of a government based on moral suasion without the use of force. Because our Government is founded on the consent of the governed, he infers that it must govern only with the consent of the disobedient. But while our written constitutions and our universal suffrage and free elections attest that our Government derives all its powers from the consent of the governed, our penal laws, criminal courts, jails, penitentiaries, prisons and gallows equally show that one of the very powers which the Government derives from the consent of the governed, is the power to coerce the disobedient and rebellious.

WENTWORTH'S REPLY TO VALLANDIGHAM.

Hon. John Wentworth, widely known as an olden-time Democrat of the days of Jackson, now a supporter of the Administration, at the close of Vallandigham's speech, addressed the following triumphant refutation of his heresies to the same audience. We quote from the *Tribune* report:

But Vallandigham told you that the Government could never be held together by coercive force, that power brought to apply on the unruly could never reduce them to obedience. Was there ever a greater heresy uttered by the mouth of man? No coercion! Why, gentlemen, the coercive power of Government is the only safety and salvation of society. No government, no community can exist an hour without it. It was the weakness of the Articles of the Old Confederation that they conferred no coercive power, and the statesmen of that day saw the pressing necessity of the new Constitution. Take to-day from municipal and governmental organization the power of coercion, and society goes at once into anarchy and chaos. The weak would become the immediate prey of the strong, and might would indeed become right. I have been told that there are those who would disturb the quiet of the gathering in this city. We, the authorities of the city, coerce them into respect for law. Surely you would not denounce coercion. That glorious old war-horse of Democracy, General Jackson, from whose lips I inhaled the pure inspiration of Democracy, and at whose feet I received the first lessons of political and governmental duty, was gloriously free from this modern heresy. His celebrated proclamation

against the nullifiers, in which "coercion" gleamed and glistened in every line, will give him a name and an immortality in history, when the maligners and denunciators of his policy shall have been forgotten. I therefore stand for General Jackson and against Vallandigham. Will you stand for Vallandigham and against General Jackson?

Compare Vallandigham's language with Art. 1, Sec. 8, of the Constitution of the United States, authorizing the Government "to raise and support armies," and "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." Would he suppress a rebellion by an opinion?

Vallandigham continues:

Much more is this true of a federative system. States leagued and united together to make one common government made by independent sovereignties who have delegated certain portions of their power to their common agent for the purpose of their common good. For three fourths of a century such a Government existed in the United States, and still survives on parchment, but not in reality. Three years ago a party whose distinctive motto was free speech, a free press, and free men, obtained power in this land. Soon after a civil war broke out, and they began immediately to depart from the idea of a coercion of opinion or coercion of law, and resorted to a coercion of force; first, as against States, contrary to the very idea upon which our Federal Union was founded, and in derogation of the fundamental principles of all free government. Next—and naturally as a legitimate consequence of the first violation—those who obtained power through your suffrages began the coercion of force against those who still adhered to the Government and recognized them as agents of it.

Vallandigham here says the war broke out after Mr. Lincoln obtained power. Compare with this the following statement from the southern history of the war, written by Pollard, editor of the Richmond *Examiner*, a good "Democratic" authority:

On the inbeming of the Administration of Abraham Lincoln on the 4th of March, the rival Government of the South had perfected its organization; Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney had been captured by the South Carolina troops; Fort Pulaski, the defense of Savannah, had been taken; the arsenal at Mount Vernon, Alabama, with 20,000 stand of arms, had been seized by the Alabama troops; Fort Morgan, in Mobile Bay, had been taken; Forts Jackson, St. Philip, and Pike, New Orleans, had been captured by the Louisiana troops; the Pensacola navy-yard and Forts Barrancas and McRea had been taken, and the seige of Fort Pickens commenced; the Baton Rouge Arsenal had been surrendered to the Louisiana troops; the New Orleans Mint and custom-house had been taken; the Little Rock Arsenal had been seized by the Arkansas troops; and on the 16th of February, General Twiggs had transferred the public property in Texas to the State authorities.

Vallandigham asks:

What was the condition of the country in the beginning of his (Lincoln's) Administration. Contrast it with the condition of things now. Then we had peace, now cruel war; then Union with all its blessings, now disunion with all its horrors; then the Constitution maintained which our fathers pronounced, and we in our day and generation, too, as the consummation of human wisdom; that Constitution now lies prostrate under the heels of despotic power.

Yes, "What was the condition of the country" when committed to the Administration of Mr. Lincoln? It was rent in twain by the party to which Vallandigham belongs.

Mr. Lincoln found two governments in full blast; Buchanan at the head of one and Davis at the head of the other. He found two Constitutions in force, the Federal and Confederate. He found eight States fully seceded, three more almost out, and two more preparing to follow the eleven elopers. He found half the territory of the United States in the hands of the Confederates, with their Capital established at Montgomery. He found this insurgent Government busy organizing an army and a navy, building forts, drilling troops, and collecting taxes. He found the armories and arsenals of the Federal Government plundered of their contents, and the Treasury robbed of its last dollar. When Mr. Lincoln took the oath of office, the "Democratic party" had scuttled and plundered the ship of State. The Union was dissolved as far as it was in the power of that party to dissolve it. When he entered the White House he found awaiting him three plenipotentiaries from Jeff. Davis to negotiate a commercial treaty in behalf of the "Southern Confederacy!" They did not deign to ask for recognition of rebel independence. They considered that already settled. Such was the *Union* work of this "glorious Democratic" party; and now the leaders of the Northern wing ask to be restored to power, in order that they may complete their scheme of disunion by establishing a Northwestern Confederacy on the ruins of the old Union.

Vallandigham, with sublime impudence, actually arraigns the President for not having, against this most active resistance, restored the Union:

I speak freely of the President as one who asks me for my vote. I tell him no, you have not discharged the duty for which you were elected. You have not so administered the Government as to advance its prosperity. You have not, as you promised us, restored the Union of these States, preserved the Constitution given into your hands for keeping. Whose fault is it?

It is the fault of James Buchanan and the "Democratic party" who during the first five months of the rebellion assisted it by every means in their power, stripping the North of 120,000 stand of arms to send to the rebels, and denying that the Government had any right but to submit to be coerced by rebels into its own dissolution and destruction.

Vallandigham wants the war stopped:

If you would have peace, abandon that idea of coercion, come back again to compromise and conciliation; instead of war let us have reason, argument, deliberation; let us have the assemblage of a convention of the States to consider this great question. Instead of the experiment of war let us have the experiment of peace. From military appliances let us look to the arts of peace, and the acquirements of statesmanship. Through these alone will you reach the highway of public prosperity.

How is peace to be secured except by conquering the rebellion? Before a convention

there must be an armistice. But Vallandigham did not inform his audience how the armistice is to be brought about, nor how a convention is to be legally constituted without the concurrence of the States in rebellion. Does he propose to withdraw all our forces from the field now that, after a hard and exhausting campaign, they stand on the very margin of final success? Does he propose that we shall abandon Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, Northern Arkansas, Louisiana, West Virginia, Maryland, Delaware? Must we surrender back to the hands of the very men from whose bloody gripe they have just been rescued, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, Port Royal, Norfolk, Fortress Monroe, Forts St. Philip, Morgan, Gaines, Roanoke, Donelson, Island No. 10, Memphis, St. Louis, Louisville, Wheeling, New Orleans, Baltimore, Nashville, Atlanta, and Washington—in short, all places and territory south of Mason and Dixon's line? Must our fleets be withdrawn and the blockade raised in order that the rebels may sell their cotton and prepare themselves for a renewal of the war?

Must Sherman retrace the five hundred miles of his advance, and thus admit that a campaign as arduous and brilliant as any on record has been after all but a fool's errand? Must Grant, after losing fifty thousand men in winning his hold of Richmond, send his noble soldiers back to Washington, in order to have it all to do over again in the course of a few months? Yet this is what an armistice implies; this is what the rebel writers with one accord demand; this is what their authorities make the single condition. Jeff. Davis declared, in the most emphatic manner, to Colonel Jacques, that he would not consent to negotiate until the independence of the Confederacy had been recognized.

VALLANDIGHAM'S PLAN FOR RESTORING THE UNION.

I believe it possible to rebuild the edifice so that it shall be grander, more glorious, and more powerful than even as our fathers erected it. [Cheers.]

What Vallandigham regarded as a grander and more glorious Union than that which our fathers erected, we may infer from his plan proposed in 1860, of dividing the Union into four sections: the States east of and including Pennsylvania to form one section, "The North;" the States thence west to the Rocky Mountains to form another, "The West;" the slave States to form "The South," and the Pacific States to form the Pacific section. Each of these sections should vote separately, and the vote of all should be necessary to any act or election. This would be a practical dissolution of the Union into four confederacies. It was Calhoun's plan for enabling the minority to rule the majority.

SENATOR RICHARDSON'S SLANDERS.

Senator Richardson, of Illinois, spoke at Bryan Hall on Friday evening, August 26th. We extract from the *Times* the following:

To re-elect Mr. Lincoln is to accept four years more of war, four years more of trouble, of disaster, of woe, of lamentations, of ruin to the country. [Applause.] To defeat Mr. Lincoln, to accept the nominee of the Chicago Convention [cheers] is to bring peace and harmony and concord and union to these States. [Loud applause.]

But these Republicans say they would be very much disgraced if they were to propose terms of settlement with rebels with arms in their hands. **These people with arms in their hands are the very people I want to settle with. I am not afraid of a man if he has no arms.**

RICHARDSON CALLS OUR SOLDIERS HIRELING HESSIANS.

Fellow-citizens, I ask you to turn back in history and tell me where it was that ever hired soldiers conquered a peace. When the Goth and Vandal overran Rome, and the people turned out from motives of patriotism and love of country, they drove them back. For a hundred years the Goth and Vandal attempted to overrun Rome. But after a while the people became enervated, and they hired, as we are hiring now, the soldier to fight their battles, and they were conquered. I might run this parallel through history, but I will give but one other example. During the American Revolution, when the people of England desired to prevent this country from separating from them, and when they turned out their own people into the army they took Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, the Chesapeake, and in fact the entire coast. But when the feeling changed towards us, and the King of England was compelled to hire Hessians to come here and fight us, we whipped them. You cannot win victories with hired soldiers. They must be moved by a higher motive and purer patriotism than the mere love of the dollar they receive for their services.

The gallant and patriotic soldiers of the Union are here defamed as "hireling Hessians;" their defeat predicted and desired, and the triumph of the rebels taken for granted. "Out of the fullness of the heart the mouth speaketh." At the very moment this old rebel sympathizer was proc aiming that the rebellion could not be subdued, one-half of it had been crushed, and the residue was tottering, notwithstanding the aid and comfort given to the insurgents by such men as the speaker.

DEWITT, OF NEW YORK, STIGMATISES THE BRAVE POTOMAC ARMY.

Mr. Dewitt, of New York, addressed a crowd from the balcony of the Sherman House:

Speaking of the achievements of our armies, the speaker said, when that grand army that had crossed the Rapidan under Gen. Grant had failed, what could be expected of an army of conscripts, hirelings and negroes? [Cheers and cries of "Nothing."] Men taken from new emigrants just arrived upon our soil; men torn unwillingly from their homes and forced into the ranks, and untutored Africans—these were the men before Richmond and Petersburg, and what could be expected of them, when a grand army of chosen men had failed to accomplish good.

A HISSING REPTILE.

S. S. Cox, who is known to be the most intimate and confidential friend of Geo. B.

McClellan, among political men, and next to Belmont, the leading wire-puller for his nomination, made the following speech, as reported in the Chicago *Times:*

Senator Cox being introduced, said he did not want to use any harsh language towards Old Abe. [Cries of "give it to him."] He had attempted in his own city, a few weeks since, to show, in a very quiet way, that Abraham Lincoln had deluged the country with blood, created a debt of four thousand millions of dollars, sacrificed two millions of human lives, and filled the land with grief and mourning.

A pious man, who had listened attentively to his remarks, sang out, "G—d d——n him."

He did not agree with his pious friend. He hoped God would have mercy on Abraham Lincoln, but at the November election the people would damn him to immortal infamy. [Immense cheering.]

One of our friends, Judge Hall, had been arrested in Missouri a short time since, because he happened to say that Jefferson Davis was no greater enemy to the Constitution than Lincoln. He (the speaker) would say it boldly; let them arrest him. [Cheers and cries, "they dare not."]

The speaker concluded by recapitulating the infamous actions of the President; showed how he had exercised fraud to overpower and defeat the purposes of loyal people, and said Republicans, Wade and Davis, not Democrats, were his accusers. He exhorted the people to join in the grand determination to remove the despot from the place which he was unfit to fill.

The report of the Chicago *Tribune* adds the following:

For less offenses than Mr. Lincoln had been guilty of, the English people had chopped off the head of the first Charles. In his opinion, Lincoln and Davis ought to be brought to the same block together. The other day they arrested a friend of his, a member of Congress from Missouri, for saying, in private conversation, that Lincoln was no better than Jeff. Davis. He was ready to say the same now here in Chicago. Let the minions of the Administration object if they dare.

He asked, did they want the whole country mortgaged for the freedom of the negro?

He would be entirely willing to mortgage the whole country to pay Jeff. Davis's debt incurred in securing the slavery of the negro.

If this war was to continue four years longer, where would we bring up?

He might have asked, if this war should continue one year longer, where would the Rebels bring up?

STAMBAUGH PREFERS DISUNION TO THE FREEDOM OF SLAVES.

Mr. Stambaugh, a delegate from Ohio, said, "that if he was called upon to elect between the freedom of the nigger and disunion and separation, he should choose the latter. [Cheers.] Bayonets and cannon, and above all, negro emancipation, cannot conquer a permanent peace." His plan for the solution of these difficulties was an armistice, and an arrangement for a joint convention, in which to talk over and arrange all family grievances. He was certain that in Ohio the entire community were in favor of peace.

HE ADVOCATES REPUDIATION.

One reason why the Democrats should support the candidate of the Convention, whoever he might be, was, that they might search hell over and they could not find a worse President than Abraham Lincoln. When this war is over, he would not give a pinch of snuff for the 5.20s and the 10.40s now hoarded by the rich.

JUDGE ALEXANDER WANTS AN ARMISTICE.

Judge Alexander, of Kentucky, was then introduced. After a few introductory remarks, he said, "was the Constitution to be restored by the party in power? [Cries of 'No, no.'] Was it to be restored by a continuance of the war? [Cries of 'No.'] Since they could not do it by shedding blood, he would ask, how were they to obtain peace? They had tried the bayonet and failed, and they would now try the ballot, because with it they would drive out Lincoln and his minions. In order to stop the war they must have an armistice, to be followed by a convention of all the States. No war had ever been settled except by compromise, from the time which Moses fought the Amalekites down to the present day. If they did not believe this, then they must believe that the physical powers were superior to the mental powers, and if such were the case, then they had better leave the abode of civilization and go forth to the wild prairies to live. [Cheers.] He could tell them that Kentucky would stand by the nominee of the Convention. [Loud and prolonged cheering.] He felt assured that the proper platform would be submitted, and would contain a plan for an armistice and a convention of States. Then their grief and sorrows would pass away, and the people would cry 'Let us have peace.'" [Cheers.] He concluded by relating a couple of anecdotes which created much laughter. One of them had reference to the opinion of a Kentucky gentleman who thought that as Mr. Lincoln was so fond of the negro, he should have one of the slain ones skinned and made into a pair of moccasins for his daily wear.

COL. CARR ON BUCHANAN AND LINCOLN.

Col. Carr was then introduced. He said he considered this one of the proudest days in American history. Between three and four years ago the Republican party had met to nominate a person for President, and selected a citizen of Illinois. It was not the first time a king had been deposed and a fool put in his place. In former times, kings had kept fools to keep from wearying, but this was the first country that had elected a fool to reign over it. [Cheers and laughter.]

SATURDAY, *August* 27.

The Chicago *Times* says, of the meetings held on Saturday evening, which were largely attended as well by the peace sympathizers and "plug uglies" of the whole country, as by those curious to hear what the friends of peace with the rebels, and war with the Government, had to say:

The demonstration last night was not a meeting merely; it was a whole constellation of meetings. The grand centre of the city—Randolph, Clark, Washington, and La Salle streets, in the vicinity of the Court House—and the Court House Square, presented one solid mass of human beings. And these were independent of the crowds that had assembled in other parts of the city—in the Democratic Invincible Club Hall, in Bryan Hall, and in the remote streets. From 7 until 10 o'clock, there were continual, unbroken columns pouring from all directions towards the Court House, and the adjacent thoroughfares.

During the entire evening there were, at all times, five speakers holding forth to thousands of assembled citizens, and almost within the sound of each other's voices. The number of people composing the grand nucleus of the entire assemblage, was at no time during the evening estimated at less than forty thousand, even by the most scrupulous.

THE OLD THREAT.

Hon. H. S. Orton, of Wisconsin, repeats the old Southern threat—"Elect us or we'll split you:"

The fanaticism of the North conjoined with the fanaticism of the South has run its course, and it is for us, the conservative masses of the United States, to say whether it shall longer prevail, or whether the Government, the Constitution and the Union shall be preserved and resume their sway. On this Convention and the one to follow it, hangs the fate of this great Republic. Bear it in mind and recollect it well and solemnly that on these Conventions rests the fate of this Union. And what is involved in that? To an American everything—life, property, all the endearments of home and society—everything that Americans hold dear.

In Wisconsin Lincoln has no party left, except himself and his officers and satraps—that is all there is left of them. I pledge you my word it is all that is left in the State of Wisconsin—the collectors of the revenue, the assessors and their dependents, are all the strength that Abe Lincoln has in these free States. And they are to rule over us. Are you going to submit to it? [Cries of "No."]

Like Mark Antony over the dead body of Cæsar he "would not stir up their minds and hearts to sudden mutiny:"

I do not countenance forcible resistance to any law. I am an advocate of law. In 1860, I did not have the honor to vote for that great and good man whose spirit now rests in God, Mr. Douglas [Cheers]; but I voted for Bell and Everett, and to-day I don't know which of them is the best off. Bell has gone over to the secessionists, and Everett has gone over to the abolitionists, and I am without candidates to-day, and I don't know which of them has gone into the worst company. [Laughter and cheers.]

Neither he nor the South will return to the old Union if slavery is destroyed:

You want the Constitution, the rights of the States, and a return of the old Union. Where is the old Union? A schoolboy's tale, the wonder of an hour! We want a return to it with the Constitution, but not otherwise. After every right established by our fathers was broken down and destroyed would I return to it? Or would the South return to it?

Resistance to the draft will save slavery—save the South—and set the sun, moon and stars back to the firmament once more.

Now is the time to return to the right path. Under the pressure of the draft—and God bless the draft, it is the best argument that has ever been addressed to the American people. It proves that we have touched bottom, we have got a realizing sense that we have got nearly to the last ditch, the last man, and the last dollar. Under the pressure of the time stop and save your Government; for if it is gone now it is gone forever, and there is a future of darkness and gloom. The stars of heaven are blotted out, the moon will refuse to shine, the sun will rise no more in the fair firmament of the American Republic!

WHAT YOUNG MORRIS KETCHUM SAID.

Young Ketchum of New York, son of the pro-slavery banker, had no confidence in Democratic principles or professions, and said:

Now, gentlemen, we want our man for two reasons. In the first place the people of the city of New York are sick of platforms. We have not had a platform for eight years given to us by either side which has been maintained after its adoption. And though we approve of the motto, "principles, not men," yet we feel that we have been so often deceived that we now want a man who shall be a principle in himself, and whose principles we are willing to support. We want to elect a man who will say to the South, "Come back, we will restore to you every Constitutional privilege, every guarantee that you ever possessed; your rights shall no longer be invaded; we will wipe out the emancipation proclamation; we will sweep away this confiscation act; all that we ask of you is to come back and live with us on the old terms. We are both tired and weary, and want to live together again."

But suppose the rebels refuse to come back on any terms—they have a million times declared they never would voluntarily return. What then? Has all the fighting to be done over again? Young Ketchum was candid enough to state the consequence of allowing the Union to be divided. He said:

"This Union must and shall be preserved." God Almighty set the seal of Union on this land when he poured the mighty waters of that great river through this valley of the Mississippi down to the Gulf of Mexico. This was his seal that the land should never be divided. You may separate to-morrow and recognize them as an independent nation, but let me tell you that before five or ten years have rolled over your heads, you would have the same war, bloody, bitter, and everlasting as now.

This is what Ketchum said. Now listen to what Jeff. Davis says. In his late conversation with Col. Jacques and James R. Gilmore, he said:

I tried all in my power to avert this war. I saw it coming, and for twelve years [it was not Lincoln then, that caused the war,] I worked night and day to prevent it, but I could not. The North was mad and blind; it would not let us govern ourselves, and so the war came, and now it must go on, till the last man of this generation falls in his track, and his children seize his musket and fight his battles, unless you acknowledge our rights of self-government. We are not fighting for slavery. We are fighting for independence—and that or extermination we will have.

What good will "wiping out the emancipation proclamation," and "sweeping away the confiscation act" effect towards a restoration of the Union?

But tell me, said Davis, are the terms you have named—emancipation, no confiscation, and universal amnesty—the terms which Mr. Lincoln authorized you to offer us?

No, sir; replied Col. Jacques, Mr. Lincoln did not authorize me to offer you any terms. But I think both he and the Northern people, for the sake of peace, would assent to some such conditions.

But, replied Mr. Davis, amnesty, sir, applies to criminals. We have committed no crime. Confiscation is of no account unless you can enforce it. And emancipation! You have already emancipated nearly a million of our slaves—and if you will take care of them, you may emancipate the rest. I had a few when the war began. I was of some use to them; they never were of any to me. Against their will you emancipated them, and you may emancipate every negro in the Confederacy, but we will be free! We will govern ourselves. We will do it if we have to see every Southern plantation sacked, and every Southern city in flames.

Well, sir, said Col. Jacques, be that as it may, if I understand you, the dispute between your Government and ours is narrowed down to this: Union or disunion.

Yes; or to put it otherwise: independence or subjugation.
Then the two Governments are irreconcilably apart. They have no alternative but to fight it out.

BITTER DENUNCIATION OF THE PRESIDENT—ENCOURAGEMENT TO REBELS.

Mr. Romeyn, of New York, said:

Mr. Lincoln has violated the rights of the States and the sacred rights of man. He proposes to liberate the slaves of the South and turn them upon the North to live in idleness and vagrancy, and become paupers and burdens to society. He refuses to allow the Southern States their constitutional rights even if they returned to the Union. The South will never submit to such terms, nor would the North under similar circumstances.

What constitutional right did the "South" not enjoy before secession? Is it a violation of the rights of the States for the President to enforce the Constitution and the laws?

REED OPPOSES THE DRAFT.

Hon. James H. Reed, of Indiana, opposes the draft:

He advocates the policy of making an immediate call upon the President to withhold the order for this draft. If a refusal came to such an appeal, then would the President be damned to eternal infamy, and, if the draft should be so suspended, then the people voting upon it would, by ten to one, declare against it. The will of the people is declared for peace, and, in this declaration there is nothing tending to folly, inasmuch as in the coming election they intend to oust the incumbents of office, and to inaugurate a rule which will bring peace and prosperity once more to this land.

Reed says the rebels are not rebels, but have already established their independence:

No longer could we term the war a war of rebellion. Treated as belligerents, with the courtesies of a public enemy, the people of the South have ceased to be in arms as rebels, and have established themselves as a government. To maintain the power thus established, unless a course of conciliation were opened to them, they would exert every effort.

The Chicago *Times* thus introduces its report of Rynders' speech:

THE INVINCIBLE CLUB.

At an early hour in the evening the hall of the Democratic Invincible Club, corner of Clark and Monroe streets, was filled with a most enthusiastic audience to listen to an address on the great questions of the day by Captain Isaiah Rynders, the well-known President of the Empire Democratic Club of New York.

This Club, composed of the New York fighting men and "shoulder-hitters," was organized to decide who should speak and vote. Before the Metropolitan Police existed in New York, its business was to bully moderate citizens away from the polls, to enable paid voters to "vote early and often," to send reinforcements of voters to weak points of the Democratic line, whether in Maine, Connecticut, or Pennsylvania. It not only prevented Garrison and Phillips from speaking in New York city, but shut the mouths of bolting Democrats, and exercised a general mob censorship over free speech. For these services Buchanan made him United States Marshal, or slave catcher, for the Southern District of New York. He performed the duties of his office to the satisfaction of the Administration, by conniving at if not personally assisting in the very active slave trade then being carried on by "Democratic" slave merchants in the city of New York, between the African coast and Charleston.

The chairman of the Invincible Club introduced him in the following terms;

He had now much pleasure in introducing to the meeting Captain Isaiah Rynders, [cheers]—a gentleman who had done such good service in the cause of Democracy. [Loud Applause.]

Captain Rynders, forgetting his old trade of driving public speakers from their platforms, now favors free speech:

A great crisis existed, and the Democratic party had been called once more to save the country from the impending danger that now threatened it, and they would do it. [Loud cheers.] He had heard at that meeting an allusion to the people of the South, and he would take the opportunity of stating that it was his intention to make a free speech this evening, for he was in the land of Douglas. [Great applause.]

DENIES THAT THE REBELS ARE TRAITORS.

After three years of despotism he stood before them a free man—before a free people. With reference to the remark which he had just referred to, he would now speak after the digression he had just made. It was a remark he did not approve of. He had heard one of the speakers state that the people of the South were traitors, which were harsh words, as the people of the South were as brave and chivalrous a people as were ever put on this earth. [Cheers.] He had regretted that they took the step they did for the settlement of their grievances, for they had great grievances. He was sorry they took these steps, and his advice was to stay in the Democratic party, and they would right their grievances. They, however, seemed to think differently, and he was sorry for it. Never had one word come from his lips against them, and he hoped his lips would be sealed when he did injustice to a brave, noble, and chivalrous people. [Applause.]

SUFFERING BRETHREN IN CAMP DOUGLAS.

The abolitionists now thought more of the colored man than the free white man of the East. They could not see the white man suffering from want and destitution, but they have to look to the colored man of Alabama and Louisiana. They could see them, but not the misery of the white man. They could not look to Camp Douglas nor to Fort Lafayette, and see white men languishing in bondage. [Cheers.] They have no sympathies for these men, because, in the celebrated language of the clergyman at Beaufort, "he invariably has a white skin."

He next alluded in withering terms to Lincoln's apology to the Emperor Napoleon relative to the resolution which passed the House of Representatives regarding the carrying out of the Monroe doctrine.

Rynders was not then aware that the Democracy had already been passed over to Belmont, the Rothschilds, and the other holders, not only of Jeff. Davis's debt, but of Maximilian's, and that their platform would repudiate the Monroe doctrine altogether.

MONDAY, AUGUST 29.

The Convention was called to order by August Belmont, Chairman of the National Democratic Committee, financial agent of the Rothschilds, and the representative, in that capacity, of the Confederate debt. He represents the money that pays the rebel armies. He said:

In your hands rests, under the ruling of an all-wise Providence, the future of this Republic. Four years of misrule, by a sectional, fanatical, and corrupt party have brought our country to the very verge of ruin.

Where he says "country," the people will of course read "rebellion and Confederate bonds:"

The past and present are sufficient warning of the disastrous consequences which would befall us if Mr. Lincoln's re-election should be made possible by our want of patriotism and unity. The inevitable results of such a calamity must be the utter disintegration of our whole political and social system, amidst bloodshed and anarchy, with the great problems of liberal progress and self-government jeopardized for generations to come.

He thinks the cause of the rebellion was the failure of the northern Democrats to agree with their southern brethren.

Let us at the very outset of our proceedings bear in mind that the dissentions of the last Democratic Convention was one of the principal causes which gave the reins of government into the hands of our opponents, and let us beware not to fall again into the same fatal error.

He tells them to sacrifice all their honest convictions, if they have any, but says nothing about "Confederate bonds."

We must bring at the altar of our country the sacrifice of our prejudices, opinions, and convictions, however dear and long cherished they may be, from the moment they threaten the harmony and unity of action so indispensable to our success.

He nominated for temporary chairman, Mr. Buchanan's shadow, and the defender of the rights of the rebellion and anti-coercionism in the Senate of 1860—Hon. William Bigler, of Pennsylvania.

He said:

The termination of Democratic rule in this country was the end of peaceful relations between the States and the people.

In other words, when the Democratic party, though grown so sectional that it could hardly carry a single free State, still carried the general election, the Republican party submitted. But when the Democratic party was beaten, it rebelled, and went in for a free fight in every State which it controlled. Well may Democrats boast that with the end of their power ended peace, if they themselves made the overthrow of their power a cause of rebellion.

LONG'S ANTI-DRAFT RESOLUTION.

Mr. Long, of Ohio, offered the following resolution:

Resolved, That a committee composed of one member from each State represented in this Convention, to be selected by the respective delegations thereof, be appointed for the purpose of proceeding forthwith to the city of Washington, and, on behalf of this Convention and the people, to ask Mr. Lincoln to suspend the operation of the pending draft for 500,000 more men until the people shall have an opportunity, through the ballot-box in a free election—uninfluenced in any manner by military orders or military interference—of deciding the question, now fairly presented to them, of war or peace, at the approaching election in November; and that said committee be and they are hereby instructed to urge upon Mr. Lincoln, by whatever argument they can employ, to stay the flow of fraternal blood, at least so far as the pending draft will continue to augment it, until the people, the source of all power, shall have an opportunity of expressing their will for or against the further prosecution of the war in the choice of candidates for the Presidency.

Which was referred to the Committee on Resolutions.

The Convention having previously determined to nominate Gen. McClellan for President, who is the father to the idea of filling our armies by conscription, dared not say anything in their platform on the subject. The above resolution was therefore smothered, and the question dodged.

The following extract feebly shows how exclusively Vallandigham was the hero of the Convention. He could not even rise in his seat without being greeted by the shouts of his peace worshippers.

Mr. Vallandigham rose, and was greeted with loud and prolonged cheering, and cries "Take the platform." He finally stepped to the platform, and merely gave notice that the Committee on Resolutions would meet in the evening at 8 o'clock, at the rooms of the New York delegation in the Sherman House. [Immense cheering.]

The Convention then adjourned until 10 o'clock following morning.

We quote from the addresses delivered during the evening in front of the Sherman House. Hon. W. W. O'Brien, of Peoria, proposes to try Lincoln and hang him.

Mr. O'Brien accused the administration of attempting to gag the press, putting down trial by jury, and suspending the writ of *habeas corpus*. But when Abraham Lincoln retired from the Presidential chair they would renew trial by jury, and try him for the offences he had committed against the laws and the Constitution. He would be provided with counsel, and protected by good democratic lawyers. [Cheers.] They would try him as Charles I was tried in England, and the verdict of the jury might be the same, that he had been found guilty of being a tyrant and a traitor. Whatever they would do would be under the law, and if they found him guilty they would find men to carry out the law. [Cheers.]

To-morrow they were going down to the Convention to nominate a true Democrat, who, on the 4th of March, would apply his boot to "Old Abe's posterior" and kick him out of the Presidential chair. [Great laughter.] They were going to make a platform, and if George B. McClellan—[enthusiastic cheering, again and again resumed]—or any other gentleman was ready to stand on it, he would be nominated and elected, for they were

to be all united. The South would then join hands, and the glorious Union would again be restored. [Cheers.] [Loud cries for Mr. Vallandigham and Governor Seymour were only silenced by the statement that those gentlemen were both engaged in constructing the platform.]

Mr. Van Allen would not fight to put down the rebellion, but is ready to fight the Government.

Mr. John J. Van Allen, of Yew York, next gave voice for peace. As for the peace sentiment, he proclaimed, Let her run. War is disunion. War could never produce peace. It was impossible to subjugate eight millions of people, and it ought not to be done if it could be done. It would require another Government to do it. Let us have a platform clear on this issue. It is the only one we can all stand upon—it is the only one that can take us out of the difficulties that surround us. But it will require something more than talking. He would not fight in this war, but if necessary to assert the principles of the Constitution, he was a fighting man. It seemed to his mind, that the people of this country had been mad the last four years. The great mistake was that the Democracy did not resist the war from the beginning. She would retrace her steps, and finally triumph. He would not have a candidate WITH THE SMELL OF WAR ON HIS GARMENTS.

MR. ALLEN'S ADMISSION.

Another report contains the following:

I do not want a man nominated whose nomination will oblige me when I make a two hour's speech, to spend one hour and a half in explanations. We propose to go to the country on definite charges against the party in power. One of these is "arbitrary arrests." George B. McClellan ordered the most high-handed one that has been made since the war began. We propose to go to the country on the charge of suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*. This was recommended by George B. McClellan. We propose to go into the campaign bearing the olive branch of peace. George B. McClellan recommended drafting soldiers, and still wears Abe Lincoln's shoulder straps, and since being relieved from active service to which he would gladly return, he said at West Point, that too much blood had been shed, too much treasure expended, to stop the war now. With him we can make no point on the disturbance of the social relations of the country. With him we must drop the doctrine of State sovereignty. For two years he labored to coerce States. IN FACT, GENTLEMEN, THE NOMINATION OF GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, QUASHES THE ENTIRE INDICTMENT WHICH WE HAVE DRAWN AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION. [Great cheering.]

Hon. Mr. Curtis, of New York, said:

I trust the day will never come when the scenes witnessed in the Commonwealth of Kentucky—a State rendered glorious by the associations of the past—will be enacted on this soil—when the Administration will endeavor by force of arms to interfere with the free sentiment and free will of the people. But if that day should come, before God and in sight of Heaven, I would invoke the aid of counter revolution. [Loud cheering.] A people who would submit to that degree of outrage and tyranny which destroys the charter of their liberties—(to wit, to be required to swear allegiance to the United States before voting in a State claimed to belong to the confederacy)—are not fitted to live and stand up as men but should lie down and die as slaves. [Cheers, and cries of "Good."] I warn the Government now in power not to trample too far upon the liberties which are left to us; for if they do, they will be swept before a storm as a ship is swept from the sea in a storm. [Cheers.]

John Fuller, of Michigan, characterizes the war for the Union as

This unholy, cruel, and abominable struggle. [Loud cheers.] Gentlemen, are you willing longer to submit to this state of things? [Cries of "No."] Our land is already wet with fraternal blood. Our press have been shackled, the liberty of speech has been suppressed, the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended, and he who dared to raise his voice against these arbitrary and unconstitutional acts has been arrested by the minions of the Government, and incarcerated in dungeons or banished from his native land. [Cheers.] Are you willing, I again ask, to bear these hardships and to submit to this tyranny and oppression? [Renew cries of "No, no!"] Are you willing to follow in the footsteps of Abraham Lincoln, the perjured wretch who has violated the oath he took before high heaven to support the Constitution and preserve the liberties of the people? [Cheers.]

Mr. G. C. Sanderson says, the Union cannot be restored by war.

Fellow-citizens, what say you? Is it not time that this infernal war should stop? [Voices—"Yes."] Has not there been blood enough shed? Has there not been property enough destroyed? Have we not all been bound, hand and foot, to the abolition car, that is rolling over our necks like the wheels of another Juggernaut? We all love our country. There is nothing would rejoice us more than to see the stars and stripes, the glorious emblem of our Union, re-established all over this country, but it ought to be done by concession and compromise. [Applause. A voice—"That is the doctrine."] It must not be by a further shedding of blood. It cannot be. [A voice—"It will never be done by blood."] We must have peace. Peace is our motive; nothing but peace. If the Southern Confederacy, by any possibility, be subjugated by the abolition administration, the next thing they would turn their bayonets on the free men of the North and trample you in the dust.

Hon. James H. Birch, of Missouri, thinks re-union may be impossible even by peace measures.

His hopes and prayers were that such a union might even yet be practicable, but if it be found to be otherwise—if the conflict of interest or of passion has been rendered really "irrepressible" by the iniquities of the party in power, and it shall be so adjudged by the same competent authority which ordained our present Constitution, let not the blame of it be attached to the Democratic party. But if the country is doomed to become permanently divided, it will be recorded in history that it was not the fault of the Democracy, whether in the inception or the prosecution of the measures which have led and are yet leading to so saddening an alternative.

That's cool, after the Democracy have permanently destroyed the Union, they are not to be held responsible for it, but rather to be glorified for the deed!

C. Chauncey Burr, a prominent New York Democrat, editor of "*The Old Guard*," prayed God that the rebels might never be subdued.

In addressing the audience Mr. Burr spoke substantially as follows: He did not expect to make a speech as the time for speech-making was past. Argument was useless, and the time for action had come. He would speak with that freedom which had been the wont of the people of American for the last three years. During that time, spies and informers had been on the track of the people, and, in point of fact, we had lived under a despotism worse than that of Austria. The people had submitted to that despotism, not because of a want of courage, bravery, or pluck, but because they were a law-and-order people. They had patiently waited for a change in the policies of Lincoln's administration, but it had been denied them; and for nearly four years they had submitted to these acts of despotism. And it was a wonder that they had a Cabinet and men who carried out the infamous orders of the gorilla tyrant that usurped the Presidential chair. In New Jersey they had shifted

the responsibility of these despotic acts to the shoulders of the Abolitionists, and more than one Provost Marshal had a hole made through his head. In that State, it was a difficult matter at one time to find an Abolitionist who would accept such a position, and the Administration had tried to bribe Democrats, but, thank God, they had failed. But they had well nigh reached the end of their reign of despotism. They could and should not go any further. They were about to be swept from the land by an indignant people. They talked about a rebellion down South, but a greater rebellion had been in progress in the North.

The question as to what should be done with those States had been asked a hundred times since he came to Chicago. He could not answer the question. Those States did not belong to him. They did not belong to Lincoln. We had no right to burn their wheat fields, steal their pianoes, spoons or jewelry. Mr. Lincoln had stolen a good many thousand negroes, but for every negro he had thus stolen, he had stolen ten thousand spoons. It had been said that if the South would lay down their arms, they would be received again into the Union. The South could not honorably lay down her arms, for she was fighting for her honor.

Two millions of men had been sent down to the slaughter pens of the South, and the army of Lincoln could not again be filled, neither by enlistments or conscription. If he ever uttered a prayer, it was that no one of the States of the Union should be conquered and subjugated. They had tried for three years to whip the seceding States back into the Union, but from the way the war had been conducted, they were more like to whip us.

We were told that we would conquer the rebellious States. They could not be conquered, and he prayed God that they never might be. The Democratic party was for peace. Their Representatives had came to Chicago to nominate a candidate for the Presidency. He would be nominated on a peace platform, and they could not succeed on any other. If any other platform was adopted they deserved to be defeated.

The eloquent speaker was frequently and vociferously applauded during his speech of half an hour or more.

The Chicago *Times* says of the following speech of Henry Clay Dean :

His speech was one of peculiar bitterness, abounding with stubborn, irresistible, incontrovertible facts. It imparted enthusiasm to the audience, and blistered the souls of the republicans who had the courage to listen to it to the end.

REMARKS BY HENRY CLAY DEAN.

He said in the presence of the face of Camp Douglas and all the satraps of Lincoln, that the American people were ruled by felons. Lincoln had never turned a dishonest man out of office or kept an honest one in. [A voice—"What have you to say of Jeff Davis?"] I have nothing to say about him. Lincoln is engaged in a controversy with him, and I never interfere between black dogs. [At this point in the speaker's remarks, an Abolition rowdy shouted "Dry up, you old tory," when there was a cry to put him out.] Mr. Dean resumed: For over three years Lincoln had been calling for men, and they had been given. But with all the vast armies placed at his command, he had *failed! failed!!* FAILED!!! FAILED!!! Such a failure had never been known. Such destruction of human life had never been known since the destruction of Sennacherib by the breath of the Almighty. And still the monster usurper wanted more men for his slaughter pens. [Loud cries of "he shan't have more."] The careful husbandman, in deadening the forest was always careful in preserving the young growth of timber, and in selecting his swine for the slaughter pen, he preserves the younger ones for future use. But the tyrant and despot who ruled this people to destruction paid no regard to age or condition. He desired to double the widowhood and duplicate the orphans. He blushed that such a felon should occupy the highest gift of the people. Perjury and larceny were written over him as often as was "one dollar" on the one dollar bill of the Bank of the State of Indiana. [Cries of the "Old villian."] The Democracy were for peace. The people were for peace, but the contractors, and army officers and satraps of the Administration wanted it not. [Great applause.] Ever since the usurper, traitor, and tyrant had occupied the Presidential chair, the Republican party had shouted war to the knife, and the knife to the hilt. Blood had flown in torrents, and yet the thirst of the old monster was not quenched. His cry was for more blood.

TUESDAY, *August* 30.

Horatio Seymour having taken his seat as permanent chairman, addressed the Convention in language more guarded than that of many of the street speakers, but agreeing with them in venomous hate of the North, laying the blame of the war upon Northern Christianity, under the slang term, "fanaticism," and upon Mr. Lincoln as the representative of the Northern people, and having no word of fault to find with secession, rebellion, the rebel army, or the Confederate Government. He said :

They did not intend to destroy our country—they did not mean to break down its institutions. But unhappily they were influenced by sectional prejudices, by fanaticism, by bigotry, and by intolerance, and we have found in the course of the last four years that their animating sentiments have overruled their declarations and their promises, and swept them on, step by step, until they have been carried on to actions from which at the outset they would have shrunk away with horror. Even now, when war has desolated our land, has laid its heavy burdens upon labor, when bankruptcy and ruin overhang us, they will not have Union except upon conditions unknown to our Constitution; they will not let the shedding of blood cease, even for a little time, to see if Christian charity or the wisdom of statesmanship may not work out a method to save our country. Nay, more than this, they will not listen to a proposal for peace which does not offer that which this Government has no right to ask.

Gov. Seymour, in his last remark, indicated that rebellion was no crime, involves no forfeiture of life or property, and that the "rights" of rebels are, to slaughter the defenders of the Union as long as they can, and when whipped, to resume their places by the side of faithful, loyal men, without loss or punishment.

COWARDLY SURRENDER TO THE REBELS.

The following is the chief plank in the platform adopted. It is a demand for a cowardly and dishonorable surrender to the rebels. It is a false and shameful admission that the "North" is whipped; that the struggle to save the Union is a failure; that all the bloodshed, and money spent, must go for nought, and that the rebels shall dictate their own terms of peace. Here is the tory plank:

Resolved, That this Convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that after four years [not till May next,] of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretence of a military necessity, or war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, [a lie,] and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, [another lie,] and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired—justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that IMMEDIATE EFFORTS BE MADE FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, with a view to an

ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to the end, that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal States.

On this pusillanimous platform Gen. George B. McClellan was placed as the Presidential standard-bearer of the "peace sneaks."

SPEECH OF HARRIS, OF MARYLAND.

The name of General McClellan having been placed in nomination before the Convention, and before the vote was taken, Mr. Harris, member of Congress from Maryland, and a delegate to the Convention, arose and said: (Quoted from the Chicago *Times*.)

We Democrats of Maryland have been oppressed, as you know. All our rights have been trampled upon, and the strong arm of the military has been over us as it rests upon us now, as it was instituted by your nominee, General McClellan. [Confusion, applause and hisses, mainly from the galleries.] Admit the fact that all our liberties and rights have been destroyed, and I ask you, in the name of common sense, in the name of justice, in the name of honor, will you reward the man who struck the first blow? [Applause and hisses.] From the indications I see here to-day, I have reason to fear that the man who has been in the front of this usurpation, [Gen. McClellan] will be the successful candidate.

GEN. M'CLELLAN THE FIRST USURPER.

I claim it as a right to state that one of the men whom you have nominated, is a tyrant. [Hisses and cheers.] General McClellan was the very first man who inaugurated the system of usurping State rights. [Uproar.] This I can prove, and I pledge myself, if you will hear me, to prove every charge in the indictment. And it is the duty of a jury, when a charge is made which is proven, to convict and not reward the offender. Maryland has been cruelly trampled upon by this man, and I cannot consent, as a delegate from that State, to allow his nomination to go unopposed. What you ask me to do is, in reality, to support the man who stabbed, my own mother; and I for one—and I believe I speak for the whole delegation from Maryland—will never do it. We will never, never consent that the State of Maryland shall be so dishonored. What, is it a fact that you care nothing for the dishonor of a sovereign State? Is it really the case that you can consent that the man who overthrew liberty and crushed under foot the free institutions of a State, shall receive reward instead of punishment for his tyranny? In old times, it was the doctrine that an injury done to one State, was an injury inflicted on all; and instead of rewarding the perpetrator of the injury, each State should come forward to resent it. Now you propose a reward in the shape of Presidential honors to the man who first set the iron heel of despotism upon my State.—*Chicago Times Report.*

Mr. Harris then read from a newspaper, the following order of General McClellan, dated Sept. 12, 1861, for the

ARREST OF THE MARYLAND LEGISLATURE.

Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks, U. S. A.

General—After a full consultation with the President, Secretaries of State, War, &c., it has been decided to effect the operation proposed for the 17th. Arrangements have been made to have a Government steamer at Annapolis to receive the prisoners and carry them to their destination.

Some four or five of the chief men in the affair are to be arrested to-day. When they meet on the 17th, you will have everything prepared to arrest the whole party, and be sure that none escape.

It is understood that you will arrange with Gen. Dix and Gov. Seward, the modus operandi. It has been intimated to me that the meeting might take place on the 14th; please be prepared. I would be glad to have you advise me frequently of your arrangements in regard to this very important matter.

If it is successfully carried out, it will go far towards breaking the back-bone of the rebellion. It will probably be well to have a special train quietly prepared to take the prisoners to Annapolis.

I leave this exceedingly important affair to your tact and discretion—the absolute necessity of secrecy and success.

With the highest regard, I am, my dear General, your sincere friend,

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, *Maj. Gen. U. S. A.*

Again Mr. Harris spoke: (Chicago *Tribune* Report)

I am here for the purpose of presenting to the Convention, the character of the man whom you have nominated, and I wish you to hear his character and to know him as well as I do. [Cheers.] [Three cheers for Mac, being called for, they were given amidst a whirlwind of hisses.] Well, sir, that is a document by which George B. McClellan took up and arrested the Legislature of Maryland, a sovereign State, met in order to thwart the tyranny and oppression of Abraham Lincoln, [Cries of "Show him up, show him up," "Go on, go on,"] to subvert and overturn those things that are the foundation and basis of our country. Where is the man who sympathizes with Maryland, who could go to the polls and vote for such a man? Why, Mr. President, how long do you suppose that these sons and representatives of Maryland were imprisoned in the bastiles of the United States? For sixteen months they were separated from their families, torn from their homes, kept from their business, and when at last their bars and bonds were loose, it was in spite of the acts of him by whom they were placed there, of him, that devil McClellan [Great sensation, hisses and considerable cheering.] Well, sir, I look upon it that it not only struck at the liberties of Maryland and the freedom of the people, but at the existence of the Legislature of our State, and all the charges I can make against Lincoln and his Administration, I can make against this man McClellan. [Cheers.]

Another count in the indictment, there is the letter of October 29, 1861.

The speaker was here interrupted by so much disorder and rowdyism, that he was forced to suspend the reading of the letter for several minutes, the breach of order being so manifestly beyond reason.

Although the Convention had just adopted a platform claiming "freedom of speech" as one of its principles, the effort to suppress what Mr. Harris had to say, was so fierce and boisterous, that it was not until he had knocked down one of the delegates from New York, and given distinct indications that he was armed and ready for a "free fight," after the manner of the chivalry, that he could secure a hearing. He proceeded:

GEN. M'CLELLAN INTERFERES WITH ELECTIONS IN MARYLAND, AND SUSPENDS THE HABEAS CORPUS.

I now proceed to another count in the indictment. On October 29, 1861, he thus wrote to General Banks:

"General: There is an apprehension amongst Union citizens in many parts of Maryland of attempted interference in the election to take place on the 6th of November next. In order to prevent this, the Major General commanding—(and who, gentlemen, was the Major General commanding but George B. McClellan?) The Major

General commanding directs you to send a sufficient detachment to protect Union voters, and to see that nothing is allowed to interfere with their rights as voters."

[Here the speaker was interrupted with cries of "That's right." "Good! good!" while vociferous cheers were given for General McClellan.]

Mr. HARRIS: I would have concluded long ago, Mr. President, except for interruptions that have been made by this assembly itself; and, certainly, you cannot take advantage of your own wrong, and prevent me proceeding. [The Speaker then read the remainder of the letter, which authorized General Banks, in order to prevent these alleged treasonable designs, to SUSPEND THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.] Now, sir, who feared the disunionists of Maryland would ever interfere with the Unionists? With the power in the hands of the Administration, with the power in the hands of the Governor of Maryland, where in the name of God was it to be supposed, except in the mind of some hypocrite, that it was necessary for some military force to come into the State and suspend that great writ, the *Habeas Corpus*. [Cheers.] And why were these disunionists allowed to go at large till the day of election; said he, you must arrest them before going to the polls and you may discharge them after the election [Cheers.] Why was this done? Why, if there was danger to the country in allowing these men to remain at large, were they not arrested till the day of election in the State by order of this Gen. McClellan? Those things that we have charged so frequently against Abraham Lincoln, HE, GEORGE B. McCLELLAN HAS BEEN GUILTY OF HIMSELF. [Cheers and hisses.] Sir, he declares that, under the plea of military necessity—that tyrant's plea of military necessity—Abraham Lincoln has the power of abolishing one of the institutions of Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky; THE POWER OF ABOLISHING THE INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY—a great right that you consider yourselves bound to protect, and to protect Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky, in protecting. [See his Harrison's Landing letter to the President.] Now, what have you to say to this charge against George B. McClellan. [Cheers and hisses.]

You have to meet them one way or another, for they will be made by our opponents, and it is better to hear them from a Democrat before the canvass commences. [Cheers.] What then have you to say in his favor? Why, as a military man. HAS HE BEEN DEFEATED EVERYWHERE? [Cries of "No, no," "yes, yes," and cheers.] The siege of Richmond was not, I think, a success; (ironically,) the battle of Antietam was not a success, and in him as a military leader you have NOTHING WHATEVER TO BRAG OF, while you have combined with MILITARY INCAPACITY THE FACT THAT HE HAS INTERFERED WITH AND DESTROYED THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE. If Gen. McClellan, when Abraham Lincoln told him to arrest the Legislature of Maryland, had said to him, "I have received a commission as commander at your hands—you can take it back before I become a tyrant," he would have stood before the world as a MAN; but inasmuch as he received and acted upon instructions which struck a blow at civil liberty, he became the mere tool of Abraham Lincoln.

A McClellanite defends McClellan upon precisely the same grounds upon which every alleged arbitrary arrest made by the President may be defended, viz: suspected complicity with rebels. He proclaims that the Maryland Legislature were guilty of high treason in lending aid and comfort to the enemy, which is precisely the charge the Union masses of the North with equal grounds, make against the Chicago Convention.

Gen. G. W. Morgan, of Ohio, said:

At the time these arrests were ordered, the Maryland Legislature was in session at Annapolis, General Joseph Johnson was in command of the rebel army at Winchester. There was a conspiracy on foot, and the four or five persons here were the conspirators between Gen. Johnston and this Legislature to accomplish the invasion of Maryland. This Legislature was in communication with Gen. Joe Johnston, one of the best and most distinguished Generals of the Confederate army. The Legislature was to have passed an ordinance of secession—the gentleman knows the meaning of that term—they were to have withdrawn to the town of Frederick and there issued the ordinance of secession, and in direct and immediate concert with this ordinance, Johnston was to invade Maryland with an overwhelming force; and certain men in Maryland—the gentleman can state best, were to have aroused the people of Maryland in arms against the sovereignty of the United States. George B. McClellan, then the Commander-in-Chief of our armies, had he acted otherwise than he did, would have been guilty of treason himself.

A Democrat in defense of McClellan, is compelled to defend the right of the Government to prevent disunionists by military force from voting, which is the whole of the "grievances" against which the third resolution of their platform relative to military interference with elections in the United States is directed. What Morgan defends as right, the platform declares to be "revolutionary, and will be resisted with all the means and power under the control" of the Democratic party. G. W. Morgan says:

The gentleman talks of troops being sent by George B. McClellan to suppress the liberty of the ballot. Why, the very order itself states in distinct words that the object of the troops sent there was to protect the Union citizens who, it was feared, would be deprived of their right of a free vote by intimidation at the ballot-box.

In accordance with the laws of war these people who were guilty of direct communication with the enemy, and who invited the invasion of Maryland, by the laws of war, instead of being arrested would have been executed as spies; for such they were. They were communicating information to the enemy. They were guilty of high treason in furnishing the enemy with information, and against these men and the intended intimidation at the polls this order was given.

The same charge lies with equal force against the Chicago Convention. Extra Billy Smith, of Virginia, and other rebels from the rebel States, were present in communication with it on behalf of the enemy, and a motion was made to give them seats on the floor, which was only overruled because they had come without credentials.

ALEXANDER LONG, OF OHIO, DENOUNCES M'CLELLAN

As a coercionist, a usurper, and an emancipationist, unworthy the support of the Democratic party. He says:

I have but a few words to say, and I propose to say them; and I am not afraid to speak what I think, even in the face of gentlemen who don't want to hear. I have faced the music before, and I am willing to do it here.

Now, gentlemen of the convention, what have we complained of for the last three or four years? What has been the burden of our complaint against Mr. Lincoln and his Administration? He has abridged the freedom of speech; he has arbitrarily arrested citizens and confined them in Bastiles, and he has interfered with the freedom of elections. What have you proposed in these resolutions? You have, to a certain extent, vindicated the freedom of speech; you have condemned arbitrary arrests and denounced interference with the freedom of elections; and yet you propose in George B. McClellan to place upon that platform ONE WHO HAS GONE FURTHER IN ALL THREE OF THESE MEASURES THAN HAS ABRAHAM LINCOLN HIMSELF. [Hisses and applause.] George B. McClellan has not contented himself with the arrest of a citizen here and

there, and incarcerating him in a Bastile, but has arrested an entire Legislature at one order. HE HAS ALSO SUSPENDED THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS of which you have complained. He has acquiesced in the emancipation proclamation of which you have complained of Mr. Lincoln; and yet you propose, in the very face of the denunciations you have heaped upon the head of Mr. Lincoln, to stultify yourselves by taking up a man who has been a supple instrument of Mr. Lincoln for carrying out the very acts you denounce.

Then, gentlemen, is this what the people are to expect from a Democratic convention. [Voices—"No, no."] I trust not. Give us a candidate for President—ANY ONE EXCEPT GEORGE B. McCLELLAN—ANY MAN, I CARE NOT WHO HE IS—[applause and hisses]—ANY ONE WHOSE HANDS ARE CLEAN, whose skirts are clear—any one who has not been instrumental in making arbitrary arrests; in violating the freedom of elections and the rights of citizens in every possible manner in which he could carry out the wishes of Abraham Lincoln.

In conclusion, I beg of you not to nominate McClellan. Having laid upon the table the time-honored principles of the Democratic party, as expressed in the resolution of 1798-99—having ignored them by laying the resolution on the table—and, WEAK AS YOUR PLATFORM IS, looking in some degree to peace, as it does, in God's name don't place upon it a man WHO IS PLEDGED TO EVERY ACT AGAINST WHICH YOUR PLATFORM DECLARES.

SPEECHES OUTSIDE THE CONVENTION.

Mr. Mahoney, a Northern rebel, recommends rebellion, and says:

WE MUST GO TO THE SOUTH, IF SHE WILL NOT COME TO US.

Mr. Mahoney, of Iowa, having lately represented that State in the Old Capitol Prison, was now introduced:

When rulers aggressed on popular rights he saw the remedy in opposing force to usurpation—the people themselves to be judge of the occasion, time, and manner of its application. He was in favor of peace: but few Democrats had the courage to so declare themselves. The war affected all classes of people injuriously, except capitalists and placemen. He would have peace by all means. If the South would not come to us for peace, we should go to the South. We should not be discouraged by denials and failures; the Constitution of the United States was not all made at once. It had been amended in twelve particulars. He WOULD STILL FURTHER AMEND IT, to re-establish peace and union in permanency. He had enjoyed three months' reflection on these things under the heel of Abraham Lincoln, and he would have all join him in the unswerving resolve to submit to no new encroachments of tyranny.

Mr. Snow, of Washington city:

He (Mr. S.) predicted that, in view of the action of this convention, Lincoln would instantly become a peace man, to enable him to withdraw the armies from the field and employ them at the polls.

Hon. Mr. Early, of Nebraska:

He invoked his countrymen of the green island to use their power in this Government, and the shillalah, if necessary, against any invasion of the freedom of the ballot-box.

Hon. Wm. Weltz, of Pennsylvania, said:

In the present aspect of "the situation" the great question with us was, not so much what shall be done with southern rebels, but what shall be done for freemen of the North? [Much cheering.]

Capt. Isaiah Rynders, of New York, said, referring to those who had attacked McClellan in the Convention:

He wished he had these men in the Eighth Ward, New York, where he had a little influence. [Cheers.] He (Capt. Rynders) was a man of force, and he was what some people in New York called a Copperhead. He was proud of the name. [Cheers and laughter.] He could go anybody before Abraham Lincoln. They could get no peace from him, and he was for a free fight to turn him out, and they would do it. [Cheers and laughter.]

IN CONVENTION, WEDNESDAY, *August* 31.

A PLAN TO ASSEMBLE THE DEMOCRACY FOR THE "FREE FIGHT," OR NORTHERN REBELLION.

Gov. Wickliffe, leader of the rebel wing of the Kentucky Copperheads, the largest slaveholder in Kentucky, and having three sons in the rebel army, said:

The delegations from the West, including that State to which I am attached, are of opinion that circumstances may occur between this and the 4th of March, that will make it necessary for the great mass of the Democracy of this country to be reassembled. To get up a new convention is a work of delay and much difficulty, and my object is, that the dissolution of this convention shall not be affected by its adjournment, after it finishes its labors to-day, but to leave it to the Executive Committee, and at the instance of the Democracy, if any occasion shall require, to convene us at such time and place that the Executive National Committee shall designate.

Resolved, That the convention shall not be dissolved by the adjournment at the close of its business, but shall remain as organized, subject to be called together at any time and place that the Executive National Committee shall designate.

Which resolution was received with much applause, and carried unanimously.

The convention having nominated McClellan, Clement L. Vallandigham moved to make the nomination unanimous. He was seconded by John McKean, of New York, who gave notice that there was danger of a "revolution, a bloody revolution," which, of course, would be averted if the Copperheads should be allowed their own way. The threat sounded like those we heard from the present rebels in the canvass of 1860.

Pendleton, of Ohio, having been nominated for Vice President we will let him describe his own position in relation to the rebels. He made a speech in Congress on the 18th of January, 1861. He afterwards carefully revised it, and had it published in the Appendix to the *Globe* We quote from it the following passages:

My voice to-day is for conciliation; my voice is for compromise, and it is but the echo of the voice of my constituents. I beg you, gentlemen, who with me represent the Northwest; you who, with me, represent the State of Ohio; you who, with me, represent the city of Cincinnati, I beg you, gentlemen, to hear that voice. If you will not; IF YOU FIND CONCILIATION IMPOSSIBLE; IF YOUR DIFFERENCES ARE SO GREAT THAT

YOU CANNOT OR WILL NOT RECONCILE THEM, THEN, GENTLEMEN, LET THE SECEDING STATES DEPART IN PEACE; LET THEM ESTABLISH THEIR GOVERNMENT AND EMPIRE, AND WORK OUT THEIR DESTINY ACCORDING TO THE WISDOM WHICH GOD HAS GIVEN THEM.

HE IS SOLICITOUS FOR A FREE FIGHT.

I will tell you, my Republican friends, I know you have been pretty supercilious, you have been defiant, you have been outrageous; but I know I speak the heart and voice of the old war-worn Democracy when I say that next fall we intend to have a free election, free ballot, free assemblage together, or the freest fight that ever took place in this country. [Tremendous cheering.]

THE ESSENCE OF DEMOCRACY.

The following are specimen chips of the speechifying "hove in" at the ratification meeting held on Wednesday:

Mr. Sanderson said:

If Abe Lincoln was re-elected, he would free the negroes of the South, and then enslave the people. We must maintain STATE RIGHTS.

Judge Miller, of Ohio, said:

A bloody war has been waged to elevate the negro to an equality with the white man. There is no difference between a WAR DEMOCRAT AND AN ABOLITIONIST. THEY ARE BOTH LINKS IN THE SAME SAUSAGE, MADE FROM THE SAME DOG.

Mr. Rollins, of Missouri, said:

I love our southern friends. They are a noble, a brave and chivalrous people, although they are trying to break up the Government.

Mr. Hanna, of Indiana, was heavy on Ben Butler, and poured over his devoted head such venomous slime as this:

By whom was Lincoln supported? Prominent among his supporters is Butler, half devil, one-quarter beast and less than one-fourth human, begotten by the Prince of Hell, spewed from the rotten womb of crime, and thrown into the lap of civilization, a deformed, unfinished wretch. He was sent before his time into this breathing world, less than half made up, and is so hateful looking that the dogs bark at him as he passes by.

By G—d, we must have McClellan nominated. We must put a stop to this d—d war.—*Dean Richmond, of New York.*

The war is an unholy fight. Soon the net is to be drawn that will gather in its half million more to feed the insatiable thirst for blood of the Negro God. Let us demand a cessation of the sacrifice until the people shall pronounce their great and emphatic verdict for peace, and let the tyrant understand that the demand comes from earnest men and must be respected.—*McMasters, of New York.*

Mr. Johnson, claiming to be a Gospel monger from Missouri, hinted strongly at a Western Confederacy. He said.

If it shall be necessary in the settlement of our difficulties to allow a few stars to form a constellation by themselves, I think we can be just as safe, just as well protected, and just as free and happy under a Union of Republics as we have been under a Union of States. I want to see this whole continent bound together by a grand union of Republics. And we will have it, and will have peace and harmony, and self-government with it.

Let us hurl that usurper from power. Never till that day comes when the usurper and his victim meet at the judgment seat can he be punished for his wrongs, for his conspiracy against American liberty.—*Baker, of Michigan.*

What is this war for? The nigger. It is for the nigger against the white man. I think we don't want our bosoms stuffed so much with damned niggers this warm weather. I don't believe the negro is equal to the white man. Is it not high time that this infernal war was stopped? If the South could be subjugated by this infernal war, the bayonets would be turned against the North. Come weal or woe, we will be for the sovereignty of the States and individual rights.—*Mr. Sanderson, of Pa.*

I advise peace and harmony, but if in the struggle it reaches the point that the ballot-box is ever touched with sacrilegious hands, I say, then and there, come what will, let the lives and honor of all be pledged to the biggest fight the world ever saw.—*Bishop, of Michigan.*

No more arbitrary arrests will be permitted with impunity. No more Vallandighams will be dragged from the bosoms of their families, and spirited away to a foreign land or a dungeon, unless the attempt costs blood.—*Warren, of Rhode Island.*

Capt. Kuntz, of Pittsburgh, said:

Mr. Lincoln is a d—d thief and leader of thieves. Lincoln was now played out; the opposition to him was going to be bold and powerful; there must be no underhand work, and if Democrats catch any of Lincoln's b—y satrap spies among them, they must cut their d—d throats, that's all. I should like to see the noble George B. McClellan as President, [cheers] and that great Democrat, Horatio Seymour, should occupy the position of Secretary of State. In the Cabinet, I would see the name of Voorhees, and the brilliant galaxy of gentlemen statesmen who cluster round the Democratic banner.

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THE GREAT SURRENDER

TO THE REBELS IN ARMS.

THE ARMISTICE.

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."—*Peace and Disunion Platform of the Chicago Copperhead Convention.*

For more than three years our beloved country has been engaged in a bloody and desolating war to restore the Union and uphold and maintain our Constitution. This war, the most causeless and wanton that history has ever recorded, was commenced by bold, bad, and ambitious men to throw off the salutary restraints of a good Government, and establish a republic which should have for its corner-stone the institution of human bondage. A few base and infamous men in the North have sometimes undertaken the ignoble task of excusing the traitors who have taken up arms against the Government by attempting to show that the rights of the slaveholding States had been invaded. There can be no better answer to these men who have been so swift to apologize for rebels, than that made by the Hon. ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, of Georgia, (now the Vice President of the bogus Confederacy,) in the Convention in Georgia, in 1861, which passed the secession ordinance. The candid reader is requested to carefully peruse what Mr. Stephens says, and see how completely he answers the miserable lickspittles and Southern sympathizers in the North, who palliate and excuse the great crime of secession. Mr. Stephens said:

This step (Secession) once taken, can never be recalled; and all the baneful consequences that must follow must rest on the convention for all coming time. When we and our posterity shall see our lovely South desolated by the demon of war, which this act of yours will inevitably invite and call forth; when our green fields of waving harvests shall be trodden down by the murderous soldiery and the fiery car of war sweeping over our land, our temples of justice laid in ashes, all the horrors and desolations of war upon us, who but this convention will be held responsible for it, and who but he that shall give his vote for this unwise and ill-timed measure shall be held to strict account for this suicidal act by the present generation, and probably cursed and execrated by posterity in all coming time, for the wide and desolating ruin that will inevitably follow this act you now propose to perpetrate?

Pause, I entreat you, and consider for a moment what reasons you can give that will even satisfy yourselves in calmer moments, what reasons you can give to your fellow sufferers in the calamity that it will bring. What reasons can you give to the nations of the earth to justify it? They will be the calm and deliberate judges in the case; and to what cause, or one overt act, can you point on which to rest the plea of justification? What right has the North assailed? What interest of the South has been invaded? What justice has been denied, or what claim founded in justice and right has been withheld? Can any of you to-day name one governmental act of wrong deliberately and purposely

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done by the Government at Washington, of which the South has a right to complain? I challenge the answer.

On the other hand, let me show the facts of which I wish you to judge; I will only state facts which are clear and undeniable, and which now stand as records authentic in the history of our country. When we of the South demanded the slave trade, or the importation of Africans for the cultivation of our lands, did they not yield the right for twenty years? When we asked for a three-fifths representation in Congress for our slaves, was it not granted? When we demanded the return of any fugitive from justice, or the recovery of those persons owing labor or allegiance, was it not incorporated in the Constitution, and again ratified and strengthened in the fugitive slave law of 1850? When we asked that more territory should be added that we might spread the institution of slavery, have they not yielded to our demands, in giving Louisiana, Florida, and Texas, out of which four States might have been carved, and ample territory for four more to be added in due time, if you, by this unwise and impolitic act, do not destroy this hope, and by it lose all, and have your last slave wrenched from you by stern military rule, as South America and Mexico were, or by the vindictive decree of universal emancipation, which may reasonably be expected to follow?

But what have we to gain by this proposed change of our relation to the General Government? We have always had the control of it, and can yet if we remain in it, and are united as we have been. We have had a majority of the Presidents chosen from the South, as well as the control and management of most of those chosen from the North, We have had sixty years of Southern Presidents to their twenty-four, thus controlling the Executive department. So of the judges of the Supreme Court, we have had eighteen from the South, and but eleven from the North. Although nearly four-fifths of the judicial business has arisen in the free States, yet a majority of the court has always been from the South. This we have required, so as to guard against any interpretation of the Constitution unfavorable to us. In like manner, we have been equally watchful to guard our interests in the legislative branch of government. In choosing the presiding Presidents (pro tem.) of the Senate, we have had twenty-four to their eleven. Speakers of the House, we have had twenty-three and they twelve. While the majority of Representatives, from their greater population, have always been from the North, yet we have so generally secured the Speaker, because he, to a great extent, shapes and controls the legislation of the country.

Nor have we had less control in every other department of the General Government. Of Attorney Generals we have had fourteen, while the North has had but five. Of foreign Ministers we have had eighty-six, and they had but fifty-four. While three-fourths of the business which demands diplomatic agents abroad is clearly from the free States, from their greater commercial interest, yet we have had the principal embassies, so as to secure the world's markets for our cotton, tobacco, and sugar, on the best possible terms. We have had a vast majority of the higher officers of both army and navy, while a larger proportion of the soldiers and sailors were drawn from the North. Equally so of clerks, auditors, and comptrollers filling the Executive departments. The record shows for the last fifty years, that of the three thousand thus employed, we have had more than two-thirds of the same, while we have but one-third of the white population of the Republic. Again, look at another item, in which we have a great and vital interest, that of revenue, or means of supporting Government. From official documents we learn that a fraction over three-fourths of the revenue collected for the support of Government, has uniformly been raised from the North.

Pause now, while you can, and contemplate carefully and candidly these important items. Leaving out of view for the present the countless millions of dollars you must expend in war with the North, with tens of thousands of your sons and brothers slain in battle and offered up as sacrifices upon the alter of your ambition—and for what? Is it for the overthrow of the American Government, established by our common ancestry, cemented and built up by their sweat and blood, and founded on the broad principles of right, justice, and humanity? And as such, I must declare here, as I have often done before, and which has been repeated by the greatest and wisest of statesmen and patriots in this and other lands, that it is the best and freest government, the most equal in its rights, the most just in its decisions, the most lenient in its measures, and the most inspiring in its principles to elevate the race of men, that the sun of heaven ever shone upon. Now, for you to attempt to overthrow such a Government as this, unassailed, is the heighth of madness, folly, and wickedness.

No language can measure the awful consequences that have followed, since the rebels made war upon our Government, by firing on our flag at Fort Sum-

ter. It will be left for the weeping voice of history to record how much blood has been shed, how many precious lives have been sacrificed, how great have been the mourning and anguish throughout all the land, what oceans of treasure have been expended to put down this rebellion, and restore the Union and Constitution of our fathers. But this same history will record on its brightest page, and in letters of living light, the achievements and the glories of our countrymen in arms. Posterity to the latest ages, will read with gratitude and pride of the "battles fought and victories won" by the noble men who have gone out from among us, to sustain our Government and vindicate the honor of our insulted flag. The magnificent fighting that has been done by our troops, illustrating on so many fields their heroism and their valor, the splendid record of what they have accomplished in their great work, shall stand out as the marvel of all coming time. *To-day*, the power of the rebellion reels and totters to its final and complete overthrow. The old sea-dog, FARRAGUT, whose naval achievements are without parallel in the history of naval warfare, has, by unheard of skill and gallantry, captured all the approaches to Mobile harbor, taking Forts Gaines and Morgan (the two strongest forts on this continent) with their garrison and armament, and sealing up that port against British blockade runners. The invincible and heroic SHERMAN, advancing over half an empire, fighting a succession of victorious battles and challenging the admiration and gratitude of his countrymen, with his battle-scared and war-worn veterans, has pierced the very heart of rebeldom in the Southwest. Atlanta, the very key-stone of the rebel arch of the best half of their bogus Confederacy, falls before his marvellous skill and the unrelenting energy of his unconquerable legions. GRANT, the "Hero of the Mississippi," whose unequaled achievement in the capture of Vicksburg, opened the "Father of Waters" so that the commerce of the northwest now floats "unvexed to the sea." He fought a battle above the clouds at Chattanooga, snatching victory from the jaws of defeat, and opened the gateway to Georgia. Taking command of the Army of the Potomac, with unparalleled audacity and courage, he attacks Lee with his chosen army in his works on the Rapid Ann, and by a series of the most bloody battles ever fought, drives the rebel chieftain through sixty miles of his intrenchments to the defences of Richmond. There, by a masterly maneuver, he plants himself on the south side of James river, obtains and holds possession of the Weldon railroad, the great artery into the capital of the rebel government. He has fixed his bull-dog grasp on the very throat of the rebellion, and that grasp will never be relaxed until the success of a disloyal party shall demand it, or until the American flag shall float in triumph and glory from the dome of the rebel capitol.

Who cannot see that the rebellion is at its last gasp. A great part of the rebellious territory has been recovered. The "Star Spangled Banner" now floats *in every State of the Union*. There are now only two or three States where the rebel power pretends to maintain itself even partially intact.

Lieutenant General GRANT, in the following letter written to a friend, gives his ideas of the present military and political situation. Such words coming from that great chieftain, who knows and judges so well, should sink deep into every loyal heart:

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, Virginia, August 16, 1864.

Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE:

DEAR SIR: I state to all citizens who visit me that all we want now to insure an early restoration of the Union is *a determined unity of sentiment in the North.* The rebels have now in their ranks their last man. The little boys and old men are guarding prisoners, guarding railroads and bridges, and forming a good part of their garrisons for intrenched

positions. A man lost by them cannot be replaced. *They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force.* Besides what they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles, they are now losing from desertion and other causes at least one regiment per day. With this drain upon them the end is not far distant, *if we will only be true to ourselves.* Their only hope now is in a divided North. This might give them reinforcement from Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland and Missouri, while it would weaken us. With the draft quietly enforced, the enemy would become despondent, and would make but little resistance. I have no doubt but the enemy are exceedingly anxious to hold out until after the Presidential election. They have many hopes from its effects. They hope a counter revolution. They hope the election of the peace candidate; in fact, like Micawber, they hope for "something to turn up." *Our peace friends, if they expect peace from separation are much mistaken. It would be but the beginning of war,* with thousands of Northern men joining the South, because of our disgrace in allowing separation. To have peace on any terms, the South would demand the restoration of their slaves already freed. They would demand indemnity for losses sustained, *and they would demand a treaty which would make the North slave hunters for the South.* They would demand pay, or the restoration of every slave escaping to the North. Yours, truly, U. S. GRANT.

The view expressed by Gen. Grant in his letter in relation to what the rebels expect from the Presidential election is sustained by the best rebel authority. Senator Semmes, of Mississippi, delivered a speech at Jackson, Miss., on the 15th ult., in which he said:

Our hopes for an early peace were dependant entirely on the success of the Democratic party at the North in the approaching Presidential election. The whole population of the North, the rich as well as the poor, were now called to face the war with all its horrors; and he believed *that they would not submit to the draft ordered for the 5th of September next; that they would resist by force of arms first; that the Peace party would continue to grow and be successful in the approaching canvass.*

The honorable rebel gentleman gave his views of military affairs as follows:

He said he did not desire to excite any undue expectations or alarm, *that everything depended upon Sherman being routed from Atlanta. That Richmond was safe, and Atlanta would be the great battle-field of this war.* Everything indicated that the enemy were concentrating all their available forces there; *our Government was doing the same. Mississippi would have to take care of herself for the present, for the fall of Atlanta would establish a trans-Chattahoochee department, cut us off from Richmond, and entail upon us the same difficulties which now existed with regard to the trans-Mississippi department; it would enable Lincoln to enforce his draft upon the 5th of September next, secure the re-election of that black-hearted monster, and prolong the war to an indefinite period of time.*

Such is the condition of things. After the most terrific military struggle the world has ever seen, the war approaches its triumphant termination with a restored Union, with the Constitution vindicated, and with a strength and a power and a glory that makes us the first nation on the globe. But we now have to contemplate an appalling fact. A great party in the North, prostituting the name of "Democracy" to its base and disloyal purposes, and acting in sympathy and in concert with traitors in arms, have recently held a Convention at Chicago, which was in open sympathy with the rebels. The New York *Herald*, a paper that is independent of all parties, in speaking of this Convention, utters the following important truths:

We have not the slightest doubt that there is a mutual understanding between the Seymours, the Woods, Vallandigham, and the rebels. This understanding is shown in the secession platform adopted by the Chicago Convention, and in the nomination of Mr. Pendleton, of Ohio—who is a practical secessionist—for Vice-President. We have now driven the rebels completely to the wall. General Grant has the best of them at Richmond, and General Sherman has succeeded in capturing Atlanta. This is not the time, then, that any reasonable man would be talking about "an immediate cessation of hostilities." We are in favor of an armistice, like that between Prussia and Denmark, where both sides hold their ground, and are ready to begin the conflict at any moment. But there is a vast deal of difference between such an armistice and the "immediate cessation of hostilities" which the Chicago platform requires. Nothing can explain such a platform,

except the hypothesis that it was dictated by Jeff. Davis to the Peace Democrats, and that these peace men foisted it upon the Chicago Convention, as the price of their endorsement of General McClellan's nomination.

This Convention made a declaration of the principles which should govern the party in case of its advent to power. Such a declaration of principles is more familiarly called a "platform." The architect of that platform was Clement L. Vallandigham, of Ohio, who, a little more than one year ago, was arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced to transportation beyond our lines, for his notorious and admitted disloyalty to our Government. This platform was adopted by the Convention with only four dissenting votes. It is a platform of PEACE AND DISUNION, and must forever remain a monument of infamy to the party that adopted it. It is not only an unpardonable insult to the country, and a foul libel upon our soldiers and sailors, in declaring that we have failed in the experiment of war, but in its atrocious demand for a "cessation of hostilities," it virtually demands that our armies shall ground their arms—that the veterans who have borne the victorious eagles of Grant and Sherman in a hundred battles, shall surrender as prisoners of war. It means the recognition of the rebel Confederacy. It means that Farragut shall withdraw his fleet from Mobile harbor, and Dahlgren his iron-clads from Charleston, that our blockading squadrons shall everywhere abandon the blockade, and let the rebels send out all their cotton to replenish their exhausted treasury. It means that our navy shall be left to rot at our wharves, and that rebel pirates may roam unmolested over the ean destroying our commerce, which so lately dotted over all the seas with iiteness.

THE ARMISTICE.

"A cessation of hostilities" in the language of the Copperhead platform of peace and disunion, is what is technically called by all military authorities, "*an armistice*," and it is well to consider what an armistice is. *It is a complete suspension of all military and naval power as between belligerents.* Before the first step could be taken for this "cessation of hostilities" demanded by the Copperhead platform, it would be necessary to acknowledge the rebel government, and that would be but a preparatory step towards treating with it as if enjoying all the powers of an independent sovereignty. With such a step once taken, it would be the merest infatuation to suppose that the government thus recognized would *deny itself*, either in a preliminary convention, or a subsequent treaty. "An armistice," such as the Copperheads demand, must be between two nations, because it is the mutual acknowledgment of two independent powers. It points to nothing less than an abandonment of the war by the Government of the United States, with a corresponding acknowledgment of the complete success of the rebellion. It is thus shown beyond all cavil what the Copperhead convention meant when it demanded this "cessation of hostilities." It meant the recognition of the so-called "Confederate States of America," as an independent sovereign power; and it therefore meant DISUNION, to be followed by consequences so terrible as to appal the stoutest heart in contemplating them. This view as to what the Copperhead convention meant by this demand for an armistice, is made clear by their nomination of an open disunionist as their candidate for Vice President, George H. Pendleton. This man boldly stood up in the House of Representatives on the 18th day of January, 1861, and proclaimed as follows:

My voice to-day is for conciliation; my voice is for compromise, and it is but the echo of the voice of my constituents. I beg you, gentlemen, who with me represent the Northwest; you who, with me, represent the State of Ohio; you who, with me, represent the city of Cincinnati, I beg you, gentlemen, to hear that voice. If you will not; *if you*

find conciliation impossible; if your differences are so great that you cannot or will not reconcile them, then, GENTLEMEN, LET THE SECEDING STATES DEPART IN PEACE; LET THEM ESTABLISH THEIR GOVERNMENT AND EMPIRE, AND WORK OUT THEIR DESTINY ACCORDING TO THE WISDOM WHICH GOD HAS GIVEN THEM.

Further along in the same speech he says:

If these Southern States cannot be reconciled, and if you, gentlemen, cannot find it in your hearts to grant their demands; if they must leave the family mansion, *I would signalize their departure by tokens of love: I would bid them farewell so tenderly that they would forever be touched by the recollection of it; and if in the vicissitudes of their separate existence, they should desire to come together again in our common Government, there should be no pride to be humiliated, there should be no wound inflicted from any hand to be healed. They should come and be welcome to the place they now occupy.*

Further extracts from Pendleton's speeches of a like character might be adduced, but it is unnecessary, for his whole record in Congress proves his intense hostility to our Government and his sympathy with the traitors in arms.

The Chicago Copperhead Convention which nominated McClellan and the above-named Pendleton upon their platform of peace and disunion, was controlled by the most notoriously disloyal men in the country; men who have never failed to express their sympathy for the rebels and their hatred for the good old constitutional Government of our fathers. The following extracts from speeches made there prove the base purposes of the Copperhead leaders to betray the country into the hands of the blood-stained and barbarous foe.

Hon. W. A. Richardson, the Copperhead United States Senator from Illinois, spoke as follows, as reported in the Chicago rebel organ, the *Times:*

To re-elect Mr. Lincoln is to accept four years more of war, four years more of trouble, of disaster, of woe, of lamentations, of ruin to the country. [Applause.] To defeat Mr. Lincoln, to accept the nominee of the Chicago Convention, [cheers,] is to bring peace and harmony and concord and union to these States. [Loud applause.]

But these Republicans say they would be very much disgraced if they were to propose terms of settlement with rebels with arms in their hands. **These people with arms in their hands are the very people I want to settle with. I am not afraid of a man if he has no arms.**

Mr. Stambaugh, a delegate from Ohio, said:

That if he was called upon to elect between the freedom of the nigger and disunion and separation, **he should choose the latter.** [Cheers.] Bayonets and cannon, and above all, negro emancipation, cannot conquer a permanent peace. His plan for the solution of these difficulties, was an armistice, and an arrangement for a joint Convention, in which to talk over and arrange all family grievances. He was certain that in Ohio the entire community were in favor of peace.

The notorious Captain Rynders, of New York city, spoke as follows:

After three years of despotism he stood before them a free man—before a free people. With reference to the remark which he had referred to, he would now speak after the digression he had just made. It was a remark he did not approve of. He had heard one of the speakers state that the people of the South were traitors, which were harsh words, as the people of the South were as brave and chivalrous a people as were ever put on this earth. [Cheers.] He had regretted that they took the step they did for the settlement of their grievances, for they had great grievances. He was sorry they took these steps, and his advice was to stay in the Democratic party, and they would right their grievances. They, however, seemed to think differently, and he was sorry for it. Never had one word come from his lips against them, and he hoped his lips would be sealed when he did injustice to a brave, noble, and chivalrous people. [Applause.]

Hon. Mr. Curtis, of New York, said:

I trust the day will never come when the scenes witnessed in the Commonwealth of Kentucky—a State rendered glorious by the associations of the past—will be enacted on this soil; when the Administration will endeavor by force of arms to interfere with the

free sentiment and free will of the people. But, if that day should come, before God and in sight of Heaven, I would invoke the aid of counter revolution. [Loud cheering.] A people who would submit to that degree of outrage and tyranny which destroys the charter of their liberties—(to wit, to be required to swear allegiance to the United States before voting in a State claimed to belong to the confederacy)—are not fitted to live and stand up as men, but should lie down and die as slaves. [Cheers, and cries of 'good.'] I warn the Government now in power not to trample too far upon the liberties which are left to us; for if they do, they will be swept before a storm as a ship is swept from the sea in a storm. [Cheers.]

John Fuller, of Michigan, characterized the war for the Union as—

This unholy, cruel, and abominable struggle. [Loud cheers.] Gentlemen, are you willing longer to submit to this state of things? [Cries of "No."] Our land is already wet with fraternal blood. Our press has been shackled, the liberty of speech has been suppressed, the writ of *habeas corpus* has been suspended, and he who dared to raise his voice against these arbitrary and unconstitutional acts has been arrested by the minions of the Government, and incarcerated in dungeons or banished from his native land. [Cheers.] Are you willing, I again ask, to bear these hardships and to submit to this tyranny and oppression? [Renewed cries of "No, no!"] Are you willing to follow in the footsteps of Abraham Lincoln, the perjured wretch who has violated the oath he took before high Heaven to support the Constitution and preserve the liberties of the people? [Cheers.]

Mr. G. C. Sanderson said the Union must not be restored by war.

Fellow-citizens, what say you? Is it not time that this infernal war should stop? [Voices, "Yes."] Has not there been blood enough shed? Has there not been property enough destroyed? Have we not all been bound, hand and foot, to the abolition car that is rolling over our necks like the wheels of another Juggernaut? We all love our country. There is nothing would rejoice us more than to see the stars and stripes, the glorious emblem of our Union, re-established all over this country, but it ought to be done by concession and compromise. [Applause. A voice, "That is the doctrine."] It must not be by a further shedding of blood. It cannot be. [A voice, "It will never be done by blood."] We must have peace. Peace is our motive; nothing but peace. If the Southern Confederacy, by any possibility, be subjugated by this abolition Administration, the next thing they would turn their bayonets on the free men of the North and trample you in the dust.

In the face of this record here presented to the consideration of the honest and loyal people of this country, it is demanded, if the proof is not overwhelming, that the Copperheads of the country, speaking through their Chicago Convention and elsewhere, have virtually proposed to surrender the country to the rebels in arms against it, and at the very moment that the rebellion is about to be finally crushed out by our brave soldiers in the field, and the Union restored and the Constitution vindicated.

"Oh! for a tongue to curse the slave,
Whose treason, like a deadly blight,
Comes o'er the counsels of the brave,
And blasts them in the hour of might."

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN FOR 1864.

UNION EXECUTIVE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

Hon. E. D. MORGAN, of New York.
" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.
" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
(*Senate.*)

Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois.
" R. B. VAN VALKENBURG, N. Y.
" J. A. GARFIELD, of Ohio.
" J. G. BLAINE, of Maine.
(*House of Representatives.*)

E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman.* JAMES HARLAN, *Treasurer.* D. N. COOLEY, *Secretary.*

COMMITTEE ROOMS, Washington, D. C., Sept. 2, 1864.

DEAR SIR: The Union Congressional Committee, in addition to the documents already published, propose to issue immediately the following documents for distribution among the people:

1. McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed.
2. George H. Pendleton, his Disloyal Record and Antecedents.
3. The Chicago Copperhead Convention, the men who composed and controlled it.
4. Base surrender of the Copperheads to the Rebels in Arms.
5. The Military and Naval Situation, and the Glorious Achievements of our Soldiers and Sailors.
6. A Few Plain Words with the Private Soldier.
7. What Lincoln's Administration has done.
8. The History of McClellan's "Arbitrary Arrest" of the Maryland Legislature.
9. Can the Country Pay the Expenses of the War?
10. Doctrines of the Copperheads North identical with those of the Rebels South.
11. The Constitution Upheld and Maintained.
12. Rebel Terms of Peace.
13. Peace, to be Enduring, must be Conquered.
14. A History of Cruelties and Atrocities of the Rebellion.
15. Evidencies of a Copperhead Conspiracy in the Northwest.

The above documents will be printed in English and German in eight or sixteen page pamphlets, and sent, postage free, according to directions, at the rate of one or two dollars per hundred copies. The plans and purposes of the Copperheads having been disclosed by the action of the Chicago Convention, they should at once be laid before the loyal people of the country. There is but two months between this and the election, and leagues, clubs and individuals should lose no time in sending in their orders. Remittances should be made in greenbacks or drafts on New York City, payable to the order of James Harlan.

Address: Free. Hon. JAMES HARLAN, *Washington, D. C.*

Very respectfully, yours, &c., D. N. COOLEY, *Secretary.*

PRINTED AND STEREOTYPED BY McGILL & WITHEROW, WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE

MILITARY AND NAVAL SITUATION,

AND THE

GLORIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS

OF OUR

SOLDIERS AND SAILORS.

WASHINGTON:
PUBLISHED BY THE UNION CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.
1864.

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THE MILITARY AND NAVAL SITUATION, AND THE GLORIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS OF OUR SOLDIERS AND SAILORS.

I.

THE COURSE AND CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

A wise maxim of the greatest general of antiquity prescribes that we should esteem nothing done till all is done; but it is probable that its intent is rather to point out the danger of that indolent dwelling on the deeds of the past which shuts out of view the duties and demands of the present, than to discourage (especially when a great task is laid upon a nation) such a retrospect of what has already been accomplished as will inspire courage for carrying it through to the end.

The country has lately passed through that trying experience which history shows is sure to come upon a people plunged into a great war, a period when the first popular enthusiasm having died out, the burdens and the bereavements of the war are brought keenly home to all, and a reaction of general despondency results. In this mood of the public mind men forget that while they have suffered the *enemy* also has suffered in an equal or even greater degree, and that too, perhaps, without the same ability to sustain his losses; they forget while dwelling on their own defeats, that every victory they have won has been an equally sore defeat to the enemy. When this time comes then comes the test of the mettle of a people. If weak they sink under it; but the great-minded rise up stronger for the ordeal.

The feeling of depression which but lately prevailed regarding the seemingly indefinite prolongation of the war, and which is still felt by some, is a singular repetition of an experience which has frequently been felt by other nations conducting a long war. It has often happened that men on the very eve of the conclusion of a war have looked upon it as promising the longest duration; and it will be in the memory of many that just previous to the termination of the Crimean war, even as sagacious an observer as Mr. Cobden had just concluded proving in a pamphlet that it was certain to be prolonged for many years. It thus frequently happens that war, which in its practical execution deals so largely in deception, is itself the greatest of deceptions. When after years, perhaps, of strife, great armies still confront each other, it is hard to penetrate its outlet or issue; but some sudden turn of affairs precipitates the catastrophe long preparing and in the flames of a Waterloo, a Cannæ, or a Pultowa, fabrics and systems seemingly firm-rooted and imperishable [illegible] in ashes and nothingness.

At the outbreak of the rebellion the public mind became possessed with illusive anticipations that the war would be a short one—that our victorious columns sweeping the rebels before them in their tri-

umphant path would, in a few months at most, end by precipitating them into the Gulf of Mexico. This was a great delusion no doubt; but it was not more so than that other sentiment which has arisen as the natural reaction after the rude shock this hope received—the error as to the indefinite prolongation of the war. The one fallacy is as pernicious as the other; for if the first was a great bar to the efficient execution of the duty of putting down the rebellion (and there is no doubt that our illusions as to the ease and speediness with which the work would be accomplished was a serious hinderance to the very preparations needed to *make* it short,) the other is an error equally fatal; *for the paralysis of effort produced by the sentiment of the probable longness of the war is sure to make it much longer than it would otherwise be.* There is no higher duty, therefore, than for patriotic men to fortify themselves and others by the consideration of all the elements of hope and confidence which a retrospect of past progress and a survey of the present situation inspire.

Such a survey justifies the conclusion that the end of the war—the crushing of the armed forces of the rebellion—is not only not far off; but that it is near at hand, and that is in our power to bring it about almost at a blow.

It will show the outlines of a war continental in its proportions, waged on a theatre equal to the size of all Europe.

It will show armies the greatest the world ever saw, raised and sustained by the spontaneous patriotism of a free people.

It will show how, by the progress of our arms, the area of the rebellion has, step by step, been shorn of three-fourths of its proportions.

It will show the insurgent territory cut off from communication with the outside world by a blockade which dwarfs any on record, and at the same time the most perfect of any on record.

It will show how every stronghold on the coast has either been captured or is now closely invested.

It will show the interior of this territory cut up by our great lines of conquest, bisected latterally and longitudinally, and the dominion of the confederacy left a kingdom of shreds and patches.

It will show a succession of battles of colossal magnitude, in three fourths of which the Union arms have triumphed, and all of which, whether victories or reverses, in a purely military point of view, have redounded to the advance of the great cause.

It will show the manhood of a population defending free institutions, vindicating itself against years of the gibes and insolence born of the plantation.

It will show the fighting population of the insurgent States *reduced, by battle, by disease, and by captures, from three fourths of a million to between a hundred and a hundred and fifty thousand men.*

It will show this force—the forlarn hope of the rebellion—separated by an interval of a thousand miles, divided into two armies, the one of which driven from Chattanooga to Atlanta, has at length been compelled to give up that point, the material capital of the confederacy, while the other is shut up in Richmond, the political capital of the confederacy.

It will show that the annihilation of both these armies is a mathematical certainty, if we put forth the strength at our command.

It will reveal, finally, as the result of all this, the radiant figure of PEACE hovering not afar off, and plainly visible through the cloud of war that still overspreads the land.

If this be the magnificent result which we have to show for the three years of war for the Union, it will give the people of the loyal States a criterion of action in the great issue now before the country—an issue that will determine whether by the maintenance of the Administration under which the war has been conducted to these results, *and which can alone carry it through*, we are willing to crown and justify all that has been done by a Peace that will vindicate and establish forever the unity and integrity of the nation; or whether we shall surrender our destinies into the hands of a party committed to a peace which makes the war for the Union a mockery—a party whose creed throws to the winds all that has been achieved by the toil and blood, the faith and the self-sacrifice of this nation, in the most terrible war in the world's history, whose creed casts disgrace on every soldier under the sod, makes the heroic bones that on a hundred battle fields render the continent sacred the monuments of folly, which makes every sailor that has gone down at his guns for the love of the old flag a fool, and every man who wears the insignia of a glorious wound a poor simpleton; a creed, finally, the delusive peace resulting from which can only be the beginning of unending war.

II.

THE TASK LAID UPON THE ADMINISTRATION BY THE WAR.

When overt war, begun by the firing on Fort Sumter in April, 1861, and brought to a head in the battle of Bull Run in the July following, had fairly inaugurated the rebellion against the constituted authorities of the United States, the Administration found itself committed to a struggle continental in its proportions. The task imposed upon it, as described in President Lincoln's inaugural, was to "*repossess the forts, places and property which had been seized from the Union.*" But to do this it was needed that the embodied power of the Government should sweep armed resistance from the whole territory of the insurgent States. It is the nature of war like that of a conflagration to involve and swallow up everything within its reach. The Southern heart "fired" by a few powerful leaders, plunged into the war with a recklessness akin to madness, and from the Ohio to the gulf, from the Potomac to the Mexican border was all aglow with red-hot rebellion. The Government accepted the task put upon it, for the people willed it, and it was the people's war. Conscious of its strength, arousing itself as a giant from slumber, the nation accepted the gage of war for the Union.

There are, however, certain considerations which, little thought of at the time, entered so deeply into the militaty problem then presented, have so influenced the course of war and count for so much in a proper estimate of what has been accomplished as to demand immediate statement here. They all go to show that the task of quelling the rebellion was much more difficult than was conceived at the time or than is commonly apprehended even now.

It is common fallacy in estimating the amount of force the Gov-

ernment could bring to bear on the revolted States to state it merely in the ratio of the population of the two sections—twenty millions in the loyal States against eight in the revolting States. But it is proper to consider that the rebels had within themselves a slave population of over four millions, and that this population was able to carry on all their simple industries, which it required more than double that number to carry on the much more complicated industries of northern civilization. It is thus apparent that the whole fighting white population of the South was vailable for service in the field, while nearly half of our own population was necessarily neutralized in the way just mentioned. It is not wonderful, therefore, that the rebel leaders were able to put into the field, at the very start, armies nearly equal to our own, though our own levies were unparalleled in history.

To this must be added the astonishing ascendancy which a small minority of leading men had required over the southern population, and by which, when they had once usurped power, they were able to wield an absolutely despotic control over all the resources of men and material in the South. These men, in fact, had long been preparing for this war, as many of them publicly confessed after the inauguration of the rebellion. "We have," said Mr. Barnwell Rhett in a speech in the convention which took South Carolina out of the Union, "we have been engaged in this war for more than thirty years. *It is no consequence of Lincoln's election or the failure to execute the fugitive slave law, but we have been engaged in this war for more than thirty years.*" It is a thread-bare story how Buchanan's infamous secretary had, for the last twelve months of that administration, bent all his energies to furnish forth the rebels with all they needed for their premeditated treason. It is a matter of official record that by the robbery of forts and arsenals, and by purchase from abroad, Floyd had distributed at various convenient points throughout the South 707,000 stands of arms and 200,000 revolvers. Even before Mr. Lincoln's inauguration there were thirty thousand men under arms in the South; and two days after that inauguration the Confederate Congress passed a bill to raise an army of a hundred thousand men. And this, bear in mind, was at a time when the United States Government had not under its control an organized force of five thousand men.

To enhance the difficulty of the task imposed on the administration, the theory of the war into which it was driven by the very nature of the contest was that of the *offensive*. Now military history is replete with illustrations of the enormous advantage which a people has when able to stand at bay (covering its own communications and holding interior lines) and await in chosen positions the attacks of the enemy.

The career of Frederick the Great affords an eminent example of a small nation, never able to raise an army of over a hundred thousand men, conducting a defensive war, (with offensive returns,) and successfully resisting for seven years the attempts of a collision of five of the leading Powers of Europe. But offensive operations against a people holding such defensive attitude becomes ten fold more difficult when the war becomes what is called a "national war," the nature of which is thus depicted by the greatest modern writer on the theory of war, General Jomini:

The difficulties in the path of an army in national wars are very great and render the mission of the general conducting them very arduous. The invader has only an army; his adversaries have an army and a people wholly or almost wholly in arms, and making means of resistance out of everything. Each individual conspires against the common enemy—even the non-combatants have an interest in his ruin, and accelerate it by every means in their power. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and connections—he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; the commanders also know the country, and learning immediately the slightest movement on the part of the invader can adopt the best measures to defeat his projects."

These embarrassments, enormously increased by the prodigious extent of the theatre of war, the topography of which is all against the offensive and in favor of the defensive (as witness the immense depth of the lines of communicationsin any great aggressive movements, the impossibility of supplying our armies from the country as is done in Europe, etc.,) entered into the portentous problemwhich the administration had to solve; and yet, in face of this accumulation of difficulties, forming a task the gravest that ever met an Executive, the war has been pushed successfully through to the splendid results we witness—the armies of the rebellion have been driven from the vast extent of territory the rebels claimed till now the one is shut up in the States bordering on the Gulf, and the other is besieged without hope of escape to Richmond.

III.

THE UPRISING OF THE NATION.

The response of the people to the call of President Lincoln for men with which to execute the authority of the Government will always remain one of the grandest manifestations of the spontaneous energy of a free people in the vindication of free institutions. It was then we saw that sublime "uprising" of the people, when all party differencies were merged in enthusiastic devotion to the Union—or rather when armed loyalty cowed and quelled secret traitors who, driven to their lurking places, saw the prudence of awaiting some other opportunity to show their hands.

After Bull Run had shown that an arduous and protracted war was before us, Mr. Lincoln issued his proclamation for 300,000 men. The response of the North to the call was without a parallel in the history of the world, and it was soon evident that more troops would be in the field than the act of Congress authorized. Within fifteen days it is estimated that 350,000 volunteers offered themselves in defense of our national flag. And from first to last, under the different calls, more than a MILLION AND A HALF of men have been under arms in the war for the Union. There is in history but one example of a similar uprising of the people in defense of its nationality, and that is the rushing to arms of the French during the great revolution when threatened by the coalition. And yet the comparison only serves to show how far even that fell short of what we have witnessed; for modern historians have proved that, notwithstanding all the exaggerations in regard to the number of men raised by France at that epoch, the figure never exceeded 500,000 men. Yet we have trebled that number.

The task now before the Government was herculean, and such as might have made even Napoleon stand aghast. To raise and fit for

the field an army of six hundred thousand men, to be supplied with all the needs of a modern army, and that too without even the skeleton of a veteran force on which to build, was indeed a work of frightful magnitude. And yet this was accomplished in the space of three months—an achievement that has extorted the wonder and admiration of military men throughout the world.

IV.

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.

As the chief force of the rebellion—the head and front of the offending—was collected in Virginia, it became a necessity to place here an army of proportions fitting it to foil the purpose of the enemy touching the capture of our capital, at the same time to drive the opposing force out of Virginia.

With this view a grand army of over 200,000 men was collected at Washington and placed under command of Major General G. B. McClellan, whose name, from a series of successful minor operations in Western Virginia, which another than he had planned and executed, had acquired a halo that did not properly belong to it. It was not until sometime afterwards that that constitutional *inactivity*, which seems to be a part of General McClellan's nature, and that secret sympathy with treason that has always made him tender of hurting traitors, began to be appreciated, and hence it was that for many months our armies were kept at a dead-lock, thus giving the rebels the opportunity to prepare their plans, and the rebellion its best ally, *time*, and we put in a position of humiliation before the world.

There was one result springing from the presence of our army in Virginia, however, which even the generalship of McClellan could not prevent; it thwarted the realization of those dreams of invasion that had fired the southern imagination. A powerful party of red-hot belligerents had made the carrying of the war into northern soil their rallying cry. Washington was in particular the object of their chief desires, and their direst hate. The rebel Secretary of War boasted at Montgomery, on the 12th of April, that "the flag which now flaunts the breeze here will float over the dome of the old Capitol at Washington before the 1st of July."

After Bull Run the same ambition fired these men. Said the Richmond *Examiner*: "From the mountain tops and valleys to the shores of the sea there is one wild shout of fierce resolve to capture Washington city at all and every human effort." But this "wild shout of fierce resolve" was vain against the 200,000 bayonets present to defend the capital; and though the early history of our army in Virginia was not of the character the people justly expected and the army eagerly desired, it was at least something, in view of these desperate projects of the rebels, that Washington, by its presence, was rendered *safe*.

But outside of the immediate influence of the McClellan strategy, a series of operations in the western theatre of war had been inaugurated, which laid the foundation of the splendid victories of the Union arms in that quarter. While McClellan during the winter of 1861–2, kept his magnificent army of two hundred thousand men in inaction, maturing plans which were never matured, the early rages of the his-

tory of the war were lit up by a succession of brilliant victories on the Atlantic seaboard and west of the Mississippi river. Christmas of 1861 saw the powerful force of rebels, which had overrun Missouri, insolently proclaiming their purpose of seizing St. Louis, driven down to the Arkansas border. General Grant had begun on a small scale the operations on the Mississippi, destined to swell into campaigns of colossal proportions. The first of our series of coast victories had been gained at Hatteras inlet, (August 27,) giving us two forts, thirty-six guns, six hundred and nineteen prisoners, and the key to Albemarle sound. This was followed up, at the end of October, by Dupont's exploit at Port Royal, one of the most memorable triumphs on record of ships over forts. The spoils of this victory included not less than fifty cannon.

V.

THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR.

The opening of the second year of the war was gilded by two other victorieson the coast—the capture of Roanoke Island by a combined attack of our land and naval forces, giving us six forts, 2,500 prisoners and 42 guns, followed up promptly by the capture of Newbern which added six other forts and 34 heavy guns. These conquests restored the sovereignty of the flag over all the inland waters of North Carolina, which, up to this time, had been the main resort of the whole crew of blockade-runners. Another brilliant point in the chain of coast victories was added by the reduction and capitulation of Fort Pulaski following. With the fort were surrendered 47 guns and 360 prisoners. This gave us the control of the mouth of the Savannah river.

Turning to the great theatre of war between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, the spring of 1862 saw there the inauguration of a combination of magnificent operations by several distinct columns drawn out from the Ohio to the mouth of the Mississippi and destined to carry their conquests into the very heart of the confederacy and reclaim the valley of the Mississippi to the soveignty of the Union.

The rebel line of defense on this frontier extended from Columbus a powerfully intrenched camp on the Mississippi, eastward to the Alleghany mountains. About midway was Bowling Green, another entrenched camp, where Albert Sidney Johnson commanded in person. East towards themountains was Zollicoffer with a large force, where early in the winter he had taken up a fortified position on the Cumberland river near Mill Spring.

Against this line defense Grant and the gunboats under Foote were preparing to move on the west; Buell was advancing on Bowling Green in the centre, while Thomas was in motion on the east near the mountains. Thomas struck the first blow and gave the country the firstlings of victory in the west. On the 19th of January he engaged the rebels at Mill Spring defeated and routed them with the loss of their artillery, their intrenched position, and their general, Zollicoffer, killed. The effect of this victory was to expose the whole rebel right flank by way of East Tennessee.

On the left flank Grant and Foote were moving to break the rebel lines of defence by the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. It was

clearly seen that could these rivers be forced, the great rebel strong holds at Columbus and Bowling Green would be taken in reverse and their evacuation made a matter of absolute compulsion. But these rivers was barred by two strong works—Fort Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. The former fell a prey to the gallantry of Foote's naval attack, surreudering on the 6th of February, with its armament of sixty guns.

A week after the surrender of Fort Henry, General Grant drew his lines of investment aronnd Fort Donelson, and after a conflict running through four days and nights, and rendered memorable by the hardest fighting that yet occurred in the war, the rebels were forced to accede to General Grant's demands for that "unconditional surrender" which has become so inseparably associated with his name. The surrender included fifteen thousand prisoners and forty pieces of artillery.

The fall of Forts Donelson and Henry promptly produced its anticipated effect. Columbus, which the rebels had styled the "Gibraltar of Americ ," was immediately abandoned. At the same time Johnston evacuated his intrenched position at Bowling Green and falling back to Nashville, or rather *through* Nashville, (for the opening of the Cumberland to our gunboats which resulted from the fall of the fort made Nashville untenable;) General Buell, whose army had been threatening the rebel force at Bowling Green, immediately followed up and took possession of that city. Thus it was that by the magnificent series of successes that illustrated the spring of 1862, the rebel line on a stretch of over five hundred miles was pushed back from the Ohio to the Cumberland and the whole state of Kentucky and a third of Tennessee were recovered to the dominions of the Union.

Simultaneous with these operations the waters of the Mississippi were lit up by the splendors of Farragut's astonishing combat below New Orleans with the forts, gunboats, steam rams, floating batteries, fire rafts, obstructions, booms and chains which the rebels had prepared for the defense of the great metropolis of the gulf, ending in the fall of that city, whose capture the London *Times*, doubting, with its usual cynicism its possibility, had declared would be "putting the tournequet on the main artery of the confederacy."

After their retreat from Columbus the rebels under Polk took up a new position on the Mississippi at Island No. Ten. This stronghold was able for many weeks able to hold out against all the operations directed against it, till finally the gunboats run the gauntlet of the batteries and the stronghold with a hundred heavy guns fell into our hands. From this point they fell back to Memphis only to be compelled to abandon that city which in June following came under control of the Union forces.

After the retreat of the central army of the rebellion from Nashville, it took up a strongly fortified position at Corinth, under Beauregard. There he was beseiged by the Union army under Halleck, whose siege operations, pushed on to such a point as to make the capture of the whole force a matter of high probability, compelled the evacuation of this position also.

The result of the victories of 1862 was thus to leave the situation in this gratifying position: Butler was at New Orleans, Curtis was pushing his way to Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, the chief points on the coast was in our hands, Halleck was at Corinth, the Union

flag waved over Memphis and Nashville, while Mitchell in Alabama was advancing from victory to victory.

This was glory enough for one year, for if we turn our eye to the theatre of war in the East, we are presented with the spectacle of a campaign towards Richmond, in which the finest qualities of heroism in the army, gaining victories wherever it met the armed enemy, and driving him back to his capital were neutralized and rendered fruitless by the imbecility of its head. Turning upon McClellan, Lee terminated the offensive campaign by himself assuming the initiative, and carrying his army for the first time into the territory of the loyal States. The issue was at length tried out at Antietem, where the absence of directing generalship could not prevent our soldiers from winning a victory of which their commander had not the capacity to take advantage. Nevertheless, the first invasion of the rebels ended disastrously by their retreat into Virginia.

VI.

THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR—THE BATTLE SUMMER.

The first day of the third year of the war (1863) was signalized by the battle of Stone River or Murfreesboro, fought by General Rosecrans on the Union side and by Bragg on the part of the rebels. The most desperate battle of the war up to that period, it inaugurated the year of great actions by an engagement which resulted in placing our army in Murfreesboro, with the prodigious loss to the enemy of 14,560 men. This was to be followed up from this base by a brilliant campaign in Tennessee, destined to culminate in the possession of Chattanooga, which had long been recognized by military heads as the key to the whole theatre of war in the West.

In the meanwhile General Grant was drawing his lines of investment around the last great stronghold of the rebels on the Mississippi, at Vicksburg. After many attempts against this point, he finally, by an audacious stroke of strategy, unparalleled save by Napoleon's passage of the Splugen, crossed his army over the Mississippi at Grand Gulf, and, dividing the army of Johnston from the possibility of reinforcing the garrison at Vicksburg, beat the rebels in half a dozen battles, and ended by throwing his army as a besieging force around this position. The siege of Vicksburg will take its place in history as among the most wonderful engineering operations on record. It was crowned by its unconditional surrender on the 4th of July, with 31,720 prisoners and 234 guns. At the same time the garrison at Port Hudson surrendered to General Banks, thus adding 7,000 prisoners and 40 pieces of artillery to the account. The effect of these two victories was to restore the national authority along the whole vast stretch of the Mississippi, and that great continental highway was thrown open to its embouchure in the Gulf of Mexico.

At the very time that the right wing of our immense line of battle, stretching from the Potomac to the Mississippi, was thus engaged, its left wing, the army of the Potomac, was manoeuvering to meet Lee's second invasion of the loyal States. The rebel army was brought to bay at length at Gettysburg where a three days battle, the most colossal of the war was fought ending in the utter defeat of Lee, who

was fain again to make good his retreat into Virginia with a loss of 23,000 in killed and wounded and 6,000 prisoners.

The centre of our great line, held by General Rosecrans, was at the same time on the advance. By a beautiful series of flanking movements, that commander drove Bragg from his two powerfully entrenched positions at Shelbyville and Tulahoma, and advancing from this point, planted his army, at one splendid stroke, in the central citadel of the South—Chattanooga.

On the coast, the operations were being pushed on with equal vigor. General Gillmore had effected a landing on Morris Island, whence, with his long range seige-guns, he was able to batter down Fort Sumter, leaving that memorable stronghold, whose reduction by the rebels was the first overt act of the war, a mass of ruins. Assisted by the co-operation of the iron-clad fleet, the works on Morris Island—Forts Wagner and Gregg—were also reduced, and they with their armament fell into our hands. The possession of Morris Island has enabled our fleet ever since to keep up a blockade of Charleston which hermetically seals that place.

Leaving out of view the single exception of that brief period during which the Napoleonic war involved all Europe in its conflagration, you will search all history in vain for a parallel of that great battle summer, whether as respects the vastness of the theatre of war, the proportions of the contending forces, or the substantial greatness of the results. During a single period of thirty days embraced in this titanic epoch, not less than sixty thousand prisoners were captured. The losses to the enemy in this respect, added to his prodigious sacrifices in killed and wounded, left the Confederacy at the close of the year bleeding, prostrate, and exhausted.

VII.

THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

The opening of the fourth year of the war saw the forces of the rebellion driven from the whole circumference of the Confederacy, and brought to definite points in two armies—the army of Bragg on the mountain ridges south of Chattanooga, and the army of Lee on the Rapidan. The former assailed by General Grant in his mountain fastnesses, saw himself driven from his stronghold, and his army broken and routed in the most disastrous defeat since Waterloo. He left in our hands 10,000 prisoners and 60 guns, suffered a loss of 8,000 in killed and wounded, and sought shelter for his shattered force by a disordered retreat to Dalton.

This review brings the catalogue of Union victories up to the time of the commencement of the great campaign of this summer, the events of which are too fresh in the memory of all to require any detailed recital.

During the early days of May the two grand armies of the Union, under the supreme control of the Lieutenant General commanding all the armies of the United States, began their advance—the one from Chattanooga the other from the Rapidan.

General Sherman's army an advance from Chattanooga, over a hundred miles, marked by a series of brilliant manœuvres and actions,

in which the enemy's force was driven from a succession of strongholds looked upon as impregnable, at length planted his army in front of Atlanta. Here he was thrice assailed by an enemy willing to lavish everything in the desperate effort to drive him back.

The enemy thrice met a bloody repulse. Sherman now began working slowly but surely round on the rebel communications, not with a view to take Atlanta simply, but for the purpose of capturing the rebel army—a result from which Hood has only been saved by a precipitate flight from Atlanta—thus abandoning the foremost city of the Southwest, and the important communications it commands. In the engagement which resulted in this brilliant success, the rebels lost two thousand prisoners and very heavily in killed and wounded. It may now be safely said that Hood's force, as an *army*, no longer exists.

In this great campaign General Sherman has put *hors du combat* over forty thousand men, that is, more than half the army opposed to him, besides affecting great captures in men and *material*.

General Grant has planted his army before Petersburg and on the communications of Richmond, after a campaign of even greater magnitude, marked by the most terrible and continuous fighting on record. During its progress he has gained a dozen victories, any one of which would have sealed the fate of any European war. Its course has been marked by the constant use of those double instruments of war—strategy and what Wellington called "hard pounding;" by the former he has driven the enemy, by bloodless victories on our part, from six chosen lines of defense; by the latter he has put out of the way between fifty and sixty thousand of the fighting veterans of the South. In addition he has taken over twenty-five thousand prisoners, and a prodigious number of guns. He is certain, ere long, to crown his work by the capture of the rebel capital and the destruction of the main rebel army.

Finally, while the situation is as thus presented at the main points of war, the progress of our arms by land and sea shows equal lustre wherever they meet the foe. It is but the other day that Admiral Farragut capped the climax of his great achievements by the capture of the forts guarding the entrance to Mobile bay, the destruction or capture of the enemy's powerful fleet in those waters—thus sweeping away, it is believed, the last vestige of rebel naval power on the coast of the Atlantic and the Gulf. From the high seas, too, the rebel naval power has been swept. It is but the other day that its most formidable embodiment, the *Alabama*, was sent to the bottom by the *Kearsage*, affording a significant lesson both to the rebels and to the British allies who have furnished them with that and other proofs of their material support.

VIII.

GROUNDS OF COURAGE AND CONFIDENCE.

After such a retrospect of the glorious achievements of our army and navy, have we not a right to ask, with some emphasis, of those who complain of the slow progress of the war, and fear its indefinite prolongation, what substantial ground they have for their repining? It is true the course of the war has not been an uninterrupted succession

of victories; it has presented the checquered aspect of successes and reverses which all wars present. But we ask any dispassionate observer, looking at the war by the map, and in the fiery characters in which it is writ all over the continent—contrasting the rebellion at the start with the rebellion where it now stands—surveying this great struggle for the Union in its solid and substantial *results*—we ask such an observer to point out in the annals of war where *more* has been done in the same period. He will find it hard to point out where *as much* has been done! It is the common practice we know in war of popular Governments for men to belittle what has been done, to criticise and complain; but we ask in all seriousness is it the part of dignity or of patriotism, in this crisis of our nation's struggle, to depreciate its grand and providential achievements?

There is to a people battling in any cause a force, purely metaphysical in its character, which is yet stronger than the sinews of war—stronger than the sinews of men's arms. It is *courage*. Never has it been more needed than of late, when a fatal paralysis has benumbed the public sense, and in the eclipse of faith, "the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with those that love the twilight, flutter about, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sects and schisms."

I believe we have already touched the nadir of our fears and our despondency, and that a breath of patriotism and hope is now vivifying the national pulse. But each man can swell the rising tide. To diffuse the inspiration of courage is the duty of every patriot. And happily we need draw this inspiration from no illusive fountains; for the more earnestly and honestly we look at the situation, the more grounds of hope we find. Some of these grounds can be briefly set down:

1. The body of the rebellion is moribund. Gen. T. Seymour, whose critical habit of thought and conservative temper, add a prodigious weight to any declarations he makes on this head, states as the result of his three months' observation in the interior of the South, that "*the rebel cause is fast failing from exhaustion.*" This is profoundly true, whether it has regard to the material resources in the South, or to the still more vital resources in men, of which the field is now reaped and bare. Every man and every boy is now in the field; there is nothing behind. In a private letter lately written by General Grant, he used the pungent expression that the rebels have "*robbed the cradle and the grave to reinforce their armies.*"

2. It is true, in inflicting on the rebels the immense damage they have received in the great campaigns of Grant and Sherman, we also have lost quite as severely—perhaps even more so; but (if it is lawful to speak thus of so grave a matter) *we can afford it.* We can stand to lose man for man, till every man in the armies of the rebellion is put *hors du combat*, and leave behind untouched a force equal to all we have lost in the war.

3. But I do not believe it will be needful to wade through such an ocean of blood as this. All that is needed is a blow that will disrupt the two main rebel armies. It is worthy of note, that the merciless conscriptions that have swept over the South have even simplified the problem for us. The war has no longer those thousand-fold embarrassments that attend a *national* war, or war on populations. There is

...n population. Our task is confined to beating the armies at Richmond and Atlanta. For the rest, the southern people are tired of the war, and are sighing for peace.

4. In a military point of view, such is the situation held by Gen. Grant and Gen. Sherman, toward the insurgent forces opposed to them, that the reinforcements they are receiving, will certainly enable them soon to complete their work. Gen. Seymour on this head, says:

"There is but one course consistent with safety or honor. Let the people awake to a sense of their dignity and strength, and a few months of comparatively trifling exertion—of such effort as alone is worthy of the great work—and the rebellion will crumble before us. Fill this draft promptly and willingly with good and true men; send a few spare thousands over rather than under the call, and the *summer sun of* 1865 *will shine upon a regenerated land*"

5. The war is really near its close. The present front of the rebellion, menacing though it be, is really nothing more than a mask, concealing the hollowness and rottenness within. The South is literally exhausted—exhausted of that without which it is impossible to carry on war—exhausted of men. The field, in the impressive expression of Napoleon regarding France after her three conscriptions, is reaped down to the stubble. Out of an available fighting population of upwards of three-quarters of a million with which the war was inaugurated, they have saved an effective force of one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand men. The rest are in their graves, in the hospitals, disabled, or prisoners in our hands. These are the forlorn hope of the rebellion.

6. Our territorial conquests have reclaimed three-fourths of the area originally claimed in the limits of the Confederacy. The Confederacy stands now thrice bisected—its great lines of communication cut or in our hands. Besides, its resources of all kinds are all but exhausted. The desperate men at its head may continue the struggle for some time longer—they may for a while oppose a formidable front to our blows—but the rebellion is doomed. Its struggles will be the frantic final efforts of the gladiator before he falls down exhausted and exanimate.

7. The leaders of the rebellion have ceased to see any hope for their cause in the arena of war. *They are looking now to the arena of politics.* A party has been set up whose creed and aims have their entire sympathy and moral support. The platform of that party has nothing but expressions of contumely for the sacred war, the recital of which has been made; for Jeff. Davis and his crew it has nothing but expressions of sympathy and respect. The people of the North have now before them the momentous question of determining by their action whether they will justify all the precious blood shed in this war by carrying it triumphantly through and crowning it with a glorious and honorable peace, or whether by a base surrender they will project it into history as the monument of a nation's folly.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

UNION EXECUTIVE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

Hon. E. D. MORGAN, of New York.
" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.
" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
(*Senate.*)

Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois.
" R. B. VAN VALKENBURG, N. Y.
" J. A. GARFIELD, of Ohio.
" J. G. BLAINE, of Maine.
House of Representatives.

E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman.* JAS. HARLAN, *Treasurer.* D. N. COOLEY, *Sec'y*

COMMITTEE ROOMS, *Washington, D. C., Sept.*, 2, 1864.

DEAR SIR: The Union Congressional Committee, in addition to the documents already published, propose to issue immediately the following documents for distribution among the people.

1. McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed.
2. George H. Pendleton, his Disloyal Record and Antecedents.
3. The Chicago Copperhead Convention, the men who composed and controlled it.
4. Base surrender of the Copperheads to the Rebels in arms.
5. The Military and Naval Situation, and the Glorious Achievements of our Soldiers and Sailors.
6. A Few Plain Words with the Private Soldier.
7. What Lincoln's Administration has done.
8. The History of McClellan's "Arbitrary Arrest" of the Maryland Legislature.
9. Can the Country Pay the Expenses of the War?
10. Doctrines of the Copperheads North identical with those of the Rebels South.
11. The Constitution Upheld and Maintained.
12. Rebel Terms of Peace.
13. Peace, to be Enduring, must be Conquered.
14. A History of Cruelties and Atrocities of the Rebellion.
15. Evidences of a Copperhead Conspiracy in the Northwest.

The above documents will be printed in English and German in eight or sixteen page pamphlets, and sent, postage free, according to directions at the rate of one or two dollars per hundred copies. The plans and purposes of the Copperheads having been disclosed by the action of the Chicago Convention, they should at once be laid before the loyal people of the country. There is but two months between this and the election, and leagues, clubs, and individuals should loose no time in sending in their orders. Remittances should be made in Greenbacks or drafts on New York City, payable to the order of James Harlan.

Address— Free.

Hon. JAMES HARLAN,
Washington, D. C.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,
D. N. COOLEY, *Secretary.*

Printed by Lemuel Towers, for the Union Congressional Committee.

THE

MILITARY AND NAVAL SITUATION,

AND THE

GLORIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS

OF OUR

SOLDIERS AND SAILORS,

BY

WILLIAM SWINTON,

Washington Editor N. Y. Times.

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THE MILITARY AND NAVAL SITUATION, AND THE GLORIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS OF OUR SOLDIERS AND SAILORS.

I.

THE COURSE AND CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

A wise maxim of the greatest general of antiquity prescribes that we should esteem nothing done till all is done; but it is probable that its intent is rather to point out the danger of that indolent dwelling on the deeds of the past which shuts out of view the duties and demands of the present, than to discourage (especially when a great task is laid upon a nation) such a retrospect of what has already been accomplished as will inspire courage for carrying it through to the end.

The country has lately passed through that trying experience which history shows is sure to come upon a people plunged into a great war, a period when the first popular enthusiasm having died out, the burdens and the bereavements of the war are brought keenly home to all, and a reaction of general despondency results. In this mood of the public mind men forget that while they have suffered the *enemy* also has suffered in an equal or even greater degree, and that too, perhaps, without the same ability to sustain his losses; they forget while dwelling on their own defeats, that every victory they have won has been an equally sore defeat to the enemy. When this time comes then comes the test of the mettle of a people. If weak they sink under it; but the great-minded rise up stronger for the ordeal.

The feeling of depression which but lately prevailed regarding the seemingly indefinite prolongation of the war, and which is still felt by some, is a singular repetition of an experience which has frequently been felt by other nations conducting a long war. It has often happened that men on the very eve of the conclusion of a war have looked upon it as promising the longest duration; and it will be in the memory of many that just previous to the termination of the Crimean war, even as sagacious an observer as Mr. Cobden had just concluded proving in a pamphlet that it was certain to be prolonged for many years. It thus frequently happens that war, which in its practical execution deals so largely in deception, is itself the greatest of deceptions. When after years, perhaps, of strife, great armies still confront each other, it is hard to penetrate its outlet or issue; but some sudden turn of affairs precipitates the catastrophe long preparing and in the flames of a Waterloo, a Cannæ, or a Pultowa, fabrics and systems seemingly firm-rooted and imperishable go out in ashes and nothingness.

At the outbreak of the rebellion the public mind became possessed with illusive anticipations that the war would be a short one—that our victorious columns sweeping the rebels before them in their tri-

umphant path would, in a few months at most, end by precipitating them into the Gulf of Mexico. This was a great delusion no doubt; but it was not more so than that other sentiment which has arisen as the natural reaction after the rude shock this hope received—the error as to the indefinite prolongation of the war. The one fallacy is as pernicious as the other; for if the first was a great bar to the efficient execution of the duty of putting down the rebellion (and there is no doubt that our illusions as to the ease and speediness with which the work would be accomplished was a serious hinderance to the very preparations needed to *make* it short,) the other is an error equally fatal; *for the paralysis of effort produced by the sentiment of the probable longness of the war is sure to make it much longer than it would otherwise be.* There is no higher duty, therefore, than for patriotic men to fortify themselves and others by the consideration of all the elements of hope and confidence which a retrospect of past progress and a survey of the present situation inspire.

Such a survey justifies the conclusion that the end of the war—the crushing of the armed forces of the rebellion—is not only not far off; but that it is near at hand, and that is in our power to bring it about almost at a blow.

It will show the outlines of a war continental in its proportions, waged on a theatre equal to the size of all Europe.

It will show armies the greatest the world ever saw, raised and sustained by the spontaneous patriotism of a free people.

It will show how, by the progress of our arms, the area of the rebellion has, step by step, been shorn of three-fourths of its proportions.

It will show the insurgent territory cut off from communication with the outside world by a blockade which dwarfs any on record, and at the same time the most perfect of any on record.

It will show how every stronghold on the coast has either been captured or is now closely invested.

It will show the interior of this territory cut up by our great lines of conquest, bisected latterally and longitudinally, and the dominion of the confederacy left a kingdom of shreds and patches.

It will show a succession of battles of colossal magnitude, in three fourths of which the Union arms have triumphed, and all of which, whether victories or reverses, in a purely military point of view, have redounded to the advance of the great cause.

It will show the manhood of a population defending free institutions, vindicating itself against years of the gibes and insolence born of the plantation.

It will show the fighting population of the insurgent States *reduced, by battle, by disease, and by captures, from three fourths of a million to between a hundred and a hundred and fifty thousand men.*

It will show this force—the forlarn hope of the rebellion—separated by an interval of a thousand miles, divided into two armies, the one of which driven from Chattanooga to Atlanta, has at length been compelled to give up that point, the material capital of the confederacy, while the other is shut up in Richmond, the political capital of the confederacy.

It will show that the annihilation of both these armies is a mathematical certainty, if we put forth the strength at our command.

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It will reveal, finally, as the result of all this, the radiant figure of PEACE hovering not afar off, and plainly visible through the cloud of war that still overspreads the land.

If this be the magnificent result which we have to show for the three years of war for the Union, it will give the people of the loyal States a criterion of action in the great issue now before the country—an issue that will determine whether by the maintenance of the Administration under which the war has been conducted to these results, *and which can alone carry it through*, we are willing to crown and justify all that has been done by a Peace that will vindicate and establish forever the unity and integrity of the nation; or whether we shall surrender our destinies into the hands of a party committed to a peace which makes the war for the Union a mockery—a party whose creed throws to the winds all that has been achieved by the toil and blood, the faith and the self-sacrifice of this nation, in the most terrible war in the world's history, whose creed casts disgrace on every soldier under the sod, makes the heroic bones that on a hundred battle fields render the continent sacred the monuments of folly, which makes every sailor that has gone down at his guns for the love of the old flag a fool, and every man who wears the insignia of a glorious wound a poor simpleton; a creed, finally, the delusive peace resulting from which can only be the beginning of unending war.

II.

THE TASK LAID UPON THE ADMINISTRATION BY THE WAR.

When overt war, begun by the firing on Fort Sumter in April, 1861, and brought to a head in the battle of Bull Run in the July following, had fairly inaugurated the rebellion against the constituted authorities of the United States, the Administration found itself committed to a struggle continental in its proportions. The task imposed upon it, as described in President Lincoln's inaugural, was to "*repossess the forts, places and property which had been seized from the Union.*" But to do this it was needed that the embodied power of the Government should sweep armed resistance from the whole territory of the insurgent States. It is the nature of war like that of a conflagration to involve and swallow up everything within its reach. The Southern heart "fired" by a few powerful leaders, plunged into the war with a recklessness akin to madness, and from the Ohio to the gulf, from the Potomac to the Mexican border was all aglow with red-hot rebellion. The Government accepted the task put upon it, for the people willed it, and it was the people's war. Conscious of its strength, arousing itself as a giant from slumber, the nation accepted the gage of war for the Union.

There are, however, certain considerations which, little thought of at the time, entered so deeply into the militaty problem then presented, have so influenced the course of war and count for so much in a proper estimate of what has been accomplished as to demand immediate statement here. They all go to show that the task of quelling the rebellion was much more difficult than was conceived at the time or than is commonly apprehended even now.

It is a common fallacy in estimating the amount of force the Gov-

ernment could bring to bear on the revolted States to state it merely in the ratio of the population of the two sections—twenty millions in the loyal States against eight in the revolting States. But it is proper to consider that the rebels had within themselves a slave population of over four millions, and that this population was able to carry on all their simple industries, which it required more than double that number to carry on the much more complicated industries of northern civilization. It is thus apparent that the whole fighting white population of the South was available for service in the field, while nearly half of our own population was necessarily neutralized in the way just mentioned. It is not wonderful, therefore, that the rebel leaders were able to put into the field, at the very start, armies nearly equal to our own, though our own levies were unparalleled in history.

To this must be added the astonishing ascendancy which a small minority of leading men had required over the southern population, and by which, when they had once usurped power, they were able to wield an absolutely despotic control over all the resources of men and material in the South. These men, in fact, had long been preparing for this war, as many of them publicly confessed after the inauguration of the rebellion. "We have," said Mr. Barnwell Rhett in a speech in the convention which took South Carolina out of the Union, "we have been engaged in this war for more than thirty years. *It is no consequence of Lincoln's election or the failure to execute the fugitive slave law, but we have been engaged in this war for more than thirty years.*" It is a thread-bare story how Buchanan's infamous secretary had, for the last twelve months of that administration, bent all his energies to furnish forth the rebels with all they needed for their premeditated treason. It is a matter of official record that by the robbery of forts and arsenals, and by purchase from abroad, Floyd had distributed at various convenient points throughout the South 707,000 stands of arms and 200,000 revolvers. Even before Mr. Lincoln's inauguration there were thirty thousand men under arms in the South; and two days after that inauguration the Confederate Congress passed a bill to raise an army of a hundred thousand men. And this, bear in mind, was at a time when the United States Government had not under its control an organized force of five thousand men.

To enhance the difficulty of the task imposed on the administration, the theory of the war into which it was driven by the very nature of the contest was that of the *offensive*. Now military history is replete with illustrations of the enormous advantage which a people has when able to stand at bay (covering its own communications and holding interior lines) and await in chosen positions the attacks of the enemy.

The career of Frederick the Great affords an eminent example of a small nation, never able to raise an army of over a hundred thousand men, conducting a defensive war, (with offensive returns,) and successfully resisting for seven years the attempts of a collision of five of the leading Powers of Europe. But offensive operations against a people holding such defensive attitude becomes ten fold more difficult when the war becomes what is called a "national war," the nature of which is thus depicted by the greatest modern writer on the theory of war, General Jomini:

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"The difficulties in the path of an army in national wars are very great, and render the mission of the general conducting them very arduous. The invader has only an army; his adversaries have an army and a people wholly or almost wholly in arms, and making means of resistance out of everything. Each individual conspires against the common enemy—even the non-combatants have an interest in his ruin, and accelerate it by every means in their power. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and connections—he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; the commanders also know the country, and learning immediately the slightest movement on the part of the invader can adopt the best measures to defeat his projects."

These embarrassments, enormously increased by the prodigious extent of the theatre of war, the topography of which is all against the offensive and in favor of the defensive (as witness the immense depth of the lines of communicationsin any great aggressive movements, the impossibility of supplying our armies from the country as is done in Europe, etc.,) entered into the portentous problemwhich the administration had to solve; and yet, in face of this accumulation of difficulties, forming a task the gravest that ever met an Executive, the war has been pushed successfully through to the splendid results we witness —the armies of the rebellion have been driven from the vast extent of territory the rebels claimed till now the one is shut up in the States bordering on the Gulf, and the other is besieged without hope of escape to Richmond.

III.

THE UPRISING OF THE NATION.

The response of the people to the call of President Lincoln for men with which to execute the authority of the Government will always remain one of the grandest manifestations of the spontaneous energy of a free people in the vindication of free institutions. It was then we saw that sublime "uprising" of the people, when all party differencies were merged in enthusiastic devotion to the Union—or rather when armed loyalty cowed and quelled secret traitors who, driven to their lurking places, saw the prudence of awaiting some other opportunity to show their hands.

After Bull Run had shown that an arduous and protracted war was before us, Mr. Lincoln issued his proclamation for 300,000 men. The response of the North to the call was without a parallel in the history of the world, and it was soon evident that more troops would be in the field than the act of Congress authorized. Within fifteen days it is estimated that 350,000 volunteers offered themselves in defense of our national flag. And from first to last, under the different calls, more than a MILLION AND A HALF of men have been under arms in the war for the Union. There is in history but one example of a similar uprising of the people in defense of its nationality, and that is the rushing to arms of the French during the great revolution when threatened by the coalition. And yet the comparison only serves to show how far even that fell short of what we have witnessed; for modern historians have proved that, notwithstanding all the exaggerations in regard to the number of men raised by France at that epoch, the figure never exceeded 500,000 men. Yet we have trebled that number.

The task now before the Government was herculean, and such as might have made even Napoleon stand aghast. To raise and fit for

the field an army of six hundred thousand men, to be supplied with all the needs of a modern army, and that too without even the skeleton of a veteran force on which to build, was indeed a work of frightful magnitude. And yet this was accomplished in the space of three months—an achievement that has extorted the wonder and admiration of military men throughout the world.

IV.

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.

As the chief force of the rebellion—the head and front of the offending—was collected in Virginia, it became a necessity to place here an army of proportions fitting it to foil the purpose of the enemy touching the capture of our capital, at the same time to drive the opposing force out of Virginia.

With this view a grand army of over 200,000 men was collected at Washington and placed under command of Major General G. B. McClellan, whose name, from a series of successful minor operations in Western Virginia, which another than he had planned and executed, had acquired a halo that did not properly belong to it. It was not until sometime afterwards that that constitutional *inactivity*, which seems to be a part of General McClellan's nature, and that secret sympathy with treason that has always made him tender of hurting traitors, began to be appreciated, and hence it was that for many months our armies were kept at a dead-lock, thus giving the rebels the opportunity to prepare their plans, and the rebellion its best ally, *time*, and we put in a position of humiliation before the world.

There was one result springing from the presence of our army in Virginia, however, which even the generalship of McClellan could not prevent; it thwarted the realization of those dreams of invasion that had fired the southern imagination. A powerful party of red-hot belligerents had made the carrying of the war into northern soil their rallying cry. Washington was in particular the object of their chief desires, and their direst hate. The rebel Secretary of War boasted at Montgomery, on the 12th of April, that "the flag which now flaunts the breeze here will float over the dome of the old Capitol at Washington before the 1st of July."

After Bull Run the same ambition fired these men. Said the Richmond *Examiner:* "From the mountain tops and valleys to the shores of the sea there is one wild shout of fierce resolve to capture Washington city at all and every human effort." But this "wild shout of fierce resolve" was vain against the 200,000 bayonets present to defend the capital; and though the early history of our army in Virginia was not of the character the people justly expected and the army eagerly desired, it was at least something, in view of these desperate projects of the rebels, that Washington, by its presence, was rendered *safe*.

But outside of the immediate influence of the McClellan strategy, a series of operations in the western theatre of war had been inaugurated, which laid the foundation of the splendid victories of the Union arms in that quarter. While McClellan during the winter of 1861--2, kept his magnificent army of two hundred thousand men in inaction, maturing plans which were never matured, the early pages of the his-

tory of the war were lit up by a succession of brilliant victories on the Atlantic seaboard and west of the Mississippi river. Christmas of 1861 saw the powerful force of rebels, which had overrun Missouri, insolently proclaiming their purpose of seizing St. Louis, driven down to the Arkansas border. General Grant had begun on a small scale the operations on the Mississippi, destined to swell into campaigns of colossal proportions. The first of our series of coast victories had been gained at Hatteras inlet, (August 27,) giving us two forts, thirty-six guns, six hundred and nineteen prisoners, and the key to Albemarle sound. This was followed up, at the end of October, by Dupont's exploit at Port Royal, one of the most memorable triumphs on record of ships over forts. The spoils of this victory included not less than fifty cannon.

V.

THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR.

The opening of the second year of the war was gilded by two other victorieson the coast—the capture of Roanoke Island by a combined attack of our land and naval forces, giving us six forts, 2,500 prisoners and 42 guns, followed up promptly by the capture of Newbern which added six other forts and 34 heavy guns. These conquests restored the sovereignty of the flag over all the inland waters of North Carolina, which, up to this time, had been the main resort of the whole crew of blockade runners. Another brilliant point in the chain of coast victories was added by the reduction and capitulation of Fort Pulaski following. With the fort were surrendered 47 guns and 360 prisoners. This gave us the control of the mouth of the Savannah river.

Turning to the great theatre of war between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, the spring of 1862 saw there the inauguration of a combination of magnificent operations by several distinct columns drawn out from the Ohio to the mouth of the Mississippi and destined to carry their conquests into the very heart of the confederacy and reclaim the valley of the Mississippi to the soveignty of the Union.

The rebel line of defense on this frontier extended from Columbus, a powerfully intrenched camp on the Mississippi, eastward to the Alleghany mountains. About midway was Bowling Green, another entrenched camp, where Albert Sidney Johnson commanded in person. East towards themountains was Zollicoffer with a large force, where early in the winter he had taken up a fortified position on the Cumberland river near Mill Spring.

Against this line defense Grant and the gunboats under Foote were preparing to move on the west; Buell was advancing on Bowling Green in the centre, while Thomas was in motion on the east near the mountains. Thomas struck the first blow and gave the country the firstlings of victory in the west. On the 19th of January he engaged the rebels at Mill Spring defeated and routed them with the loss of their artillery, their intrenched position, and their general, Zollicoffer, killed. The effect of this victory was to expose the whole rebel right flank by way of East Tennessee.

On the left flank Grant and Foote were moving to break the rebel lines of defense by the Cumberland and Tennessee river. It was

clearly seen that could these rivers be forced, the great rebel strongholds at Columbus and Bowling Green would be taken in reverse and their evacuation made a matter of absolute compulsion. But these rivers was barred by two strong works—Fort Henry on the Tennesee and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. The former fell a prey to the gallantry of Foote's naval attack, surrendering on the 6th of February, with its armament of sixty guns.

A week after the surrender of Fort Henry, General Grant drew his lines of investment around Fort Donelson, and after a conflict running through four days and nights, and rendered memorable by the hardest fighting that yet occurred in the war, the rebels were forced to accede to General Grant's demands for that "unconditional surrender" which has become so inseparably associated with his name. The surrender included fifteen thousand prisoners and forty pieces of artillery.

The fall of Forts Donelson and Henry promptly produced its anticipated effect. Columbus, which the rebels had styled the "Gibraltar of America," was immediately abandoned. At the same time Johnston evacuated his intrenched position at Bowling Green and falling back to Nashville, or rather *through* Nashville, (for the opening of the Cumberland to our gunboats which resulted from the fall of the fort made Nashville untenable;) General Buell, whose army had been threatening the rebel force at Bowling Green, immediately followed up and took possession of that city. Thus it was that by the magnificent series of successes that illustrated the spring of 1862, the rebel line on a stretch of over five hundred miles was pushed back from the Ohio to the Cumberland and the whole state of Kentucky and a third of Tennessee were recovered to the dominions of the Union.

Simultaneous with these operations the waters of the Mississippi were lit up by the splendors of Farragut's astonishing combat below New Orleans with the forts, gunboats, steam rams, floating batteries, fire rafts, obstructions, booms and chains which the rebels had prepared for the defense of the great metropolis of the gulf, ending in the fall of that city, whose capture the London *Times*, doubting, with its usual cynicism, its possibility, had declared would be "putting the tournequet on the main artery of the confederacy."

After their retreat from Columbus the rebels under Polk took up a new position on the Mississippi at Island No. Ten. This stronghold was able for many weeks able to hold out against all the operations directed against it, till finally the gunboats run the gauntlet of the batteries and the stronghold with a hundred heavy guns fell into our hands. From this point they fell back to Memphis only to be compelled to abandon that city which in June following came under control of the Union forces.

After the retreat of the central army of the rebellion from Nashville, it took up a strongly fortified position at Corinth, under Beauregard. There he was beseiged by the Union army under Halleck, whose siege operations, pushed on to such a point as to make the capture of the whole force a matter of high probability, compelled the evacuation of this position also.

The result of the victories of 1862 was thus to leave the situation in this gratifying position: Butler was at New Orleans, Curtis was pushing his way to Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, the chief points on the coast was in our hands, Halleck was at Corinth, the Union

flag waved over Memphis and Nashville, while Mitchell in Alabama was advancing from victory to victory.

This was glory enough for one year, for if we turn our eye to the theatre of war in the East, we are presented with the spectacle of a campaign towards Richmond, in which the finest qualities of heroism in the army, gaining victories wherever it met the armed enemy, and driving him back to his capital were neutralized and rendered fruitless by the imbecility of its head. Turning upon McClellan, Lee terminated the offensive campaign by himself assuming the initiative, and carrying his army for the first time into the territory of the loyal States. The issue was at length tried out at Antietem, where the absence of directing generalship could not prevent our soldiers from winning a victory of which their commander had not the capacity to take advantage. Nevertheless, the first invasion of the rebels ended disastrously by their retreat into Virginia.

VI.

THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR—THE BATTLE SUMMER.

The first day of the third year of the war (1863) was signalized by the battle of Stone River or Murfreesboro, fought by General Rosecrans on the Union side and by Bragg on the part of the rebels. The most desperate battle of the war up to that period, it inaugurated the year of great actions by an engagement which resulted in placing our army in Murfreesboro, with the prodigious loss to the enemy of 14,560 men. This was to be followed up from this base by a brilliant campaign in Tennessee, destined to culminate in the possession of Chattanooga, which had long been recognized by military heads as the key to the whole theatre of war in the West.

In the meanwhile General Grant was drawing his lines of investment around the last great stronghold of the rebels on the Mississippi, at Vicksburg. After many attempts against this point, he finally, by an audacious stroke of strategy, unparalleled save by Napoleon's passage of the Splugen, crossed his army over the Mississippi at Grand Gulf, and, dividing the army of Johnston from the possibility of reinforcing the garrison at Vicksburg, beat the rebels in half a dozen battles, and ended by throwing his army as a besieging force around this position. The siege of Vicksburg will take its place in history as among the most wonderful engineering operations on record. It was crowned by its unconditional surrender on the 4th of July, with 31,720 prisoners and 234 guns. At the same time the garrison at Port Hudson surrendered to General Banks, thus adding 7,000 prisoners and 40 pieces of artillery to the account. The effect of these two victories was to restore the national authority along the whole vast stretch of the Mississippi, and that great continental highway was thrown open to its embouchure in the Gulf of Mexico.

At the very time that the right wing of our immense line of battle, stretching from the Potomac to the Mississippi, was thus engaged, its left wing, the army of the Potomac, was manoeuvering to meet Lee's second invasion of the loyal States. The rebel army was brought to bay at length at Gettysburg where a three days battle, the most colossal of the war was fought, ending in the utter defeat of Lee, who

was fain again to make good his retreat into Virginia with a loss of 23,000 in killed and wounded and 6,000 prisoners.

The centre of our great line, held by General Rosecrans, was at the same time on the advance. By a beautiful series of flanking movements, that commander drove Bragg from his two powerfully entrenched positions at Shelbyville and Tulahoma, and advancing from this point, planted his army, at one splendid stroke, in the central citadel of the South—Chattanooga.

On the coast, the operations were being pushed on with equal vigor. General Gillmore had effected a landing on Morris Island, whence, with his long range seige-guns, he was able to batter down Fort Sumter, leaving that memorable stronghold, whose reduction by the rebels was the first overt act of the war, a mass of ruins. Assisted by the co-operation of the iron-clad fleet, the works on Morris Island—Forts Wagner and Gregg—were also reduced, and they with their armament fell into our hands. The possession of Morris Island has enabled our fleet ever since to keep up a blockade of Charleston which hermetically seals that place.

Leaving out of view the single exception of that brief period during which the Napoleonic war involved all Europe in its conflagration, you will search all history in vain for a parallel of that great battle summer, whether as respects the vastness of the theatre of war, the proportions of the contending forces, or the substantial greatness of the results. During a single period of thirty days embraced in this titanic epoch, not less than sixty thousand prisoners were captured. The losses to the enemy in this respect, added to his prodigious sacrifices in killed and wounded, left the Confederacy at the close of the year bleeding, prostrate, and exhausted.

VII.

THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

The opening of the fourth year of the war saw the forces of the rebellion driven from the whole circumference of the Confederacy, and brought to definite points in two armies—the army of Bragg on the mountain ridges south of Chattanooga, and the army of Lee on the Rapidan. The former assailed by General Grant in his mountain fastnesses, saw himself driven from his stronghold, and his army broken and routed in the most disastrous defeat since Waterloo. He left in our hands 10,000 prisoners and 60 guns, suffered a loss of 8,000 in killed and wounded, and sought shelter for his shattered force by a disordered retreat to Dalton.

This review brings the catalogue of Union victories up to the time of the commencement of the great campaign of this summer, the events of which are too fresh in the memory of all to require any detailed recital.

During the early days of May the two grand armies of the Union, under the supreme control of the Lieutenant General commanding all the armies of the United States, began their advance—the one from Chattanooga the other from the Rapidan.

General Sherman after an advance from Chattanooga, over a hundred miles, marked by a series of brilliant manœuvres and actions,

in which the enemy's force was driven from a succession of strongholds looked upon as impregnable, at length planted his army in front of Atlanta. Here he was thrice assailed byan enemy willing to lavish everything in the desperate effort to drive him back.

The enemy thrice met a bloody repulse. Sherman now began working slowly but surely round on the rebel communications, not with a view to take Atlanta simply, but for the purpose of capturing the rebel army—a result from which Hood has only been saved by a precipitate flight from Atlanta—thus abandoning the foremost city of the Southwest, and the important communications it commands. In the engagement which resulted in this brilliant success, the rebels lost two thousand prisoners and very heavily in killed and wounded. It may now be safely said that Hood's force, as an *army*, no longer exists.

In this great campaign General Sherman has put *hors du combat* over forty thousand men, that is, more than half the army opposed to him, besides affecting great captures in men and *material*.

General Grant has planted his army before Petersburg and on the communications of Richmond, after a campaign of even greater magnitude, marked by the most terrible and continuous fighting on record. During its progress he has gained a dozen victories, any one of which would have sealed the fate of any European war. Its course has been marked by the constant use of those double instruments of war—strategy and what Wellington called "hard pounding;" by the former he has driven the enemy, by bloodless victories on our part, from six chosen lines of defense; by the latter he has put out of the way between fifty and sixty thousand of the fighting veterans of the South. In addition he has taken over twenty-five thousand prisoners, and a prodigious number of guns. He is certain, ere long, to crown his work by the capture of the rebel capital and the destruction of the main rebel army.

Finally, while the situation is as thus presented at the main points of war, the progress of our arms by land and sea shows equal lustre wherever they meet the foe. It is but the other day that Admiral Farragut capped the climax of his great achievements by the capture of the forts guarding the entrance to Mobile bay, the destruction or capture of the enemy's powerful fleet in those waters—thus sweeping away, it is believed, the last vestige of rebel naval power on the coast of the Atlantic and the Gulf. From the high seas, too, the rebel naval power has been swept. It is but the other day that its most formidable embodiment, the *Alabama*, was sent to the bottom by the *Kearsage*, affording a significant lesson both to the rebels and to the British allies who have furnished them with that and other proofs of their material support.

VIII.

GROUNDS OF COURAGE AND CONFIDENCE.

After such a retrospect of the glorious achievements of our army and navy, have we not a right to ask, with some emphasis, of those who complain of the slow progress of the war, and fear its indefinite prolongation, what substantial ground they have for their repining? It is true the course of the war has not been an uninterrupted succession

of victories; it has presented the checquered aspect of successes and reverses which all wars present. But we ask any dispassionate observer, looking at the war by the map, and in the fiery characters in which it is writ all over the continent—contrasting the rebellion at the start with the rebellion where it now stands—surveying this great struggle for the Union in its solid and substantial *results*—we ask such an observer to point out in the annals of war where *more* has been done in the same period. He will find it hard to point out where *as much* has been done! It is the common practice we know in war of popular Governments for men to belittle what has been done, to criticise and complain; but we ask in all seriousness is it the part of dignity or of patriotism, in this crisis of our nation's struggle, to depreciate its grand and providential achievements?

There is to a people battling in any cause a force, purely metaphysical in its character, which is yet stronger than the sinews of war—stronger than the sinews of men's arms. It is *courage*. Never has it been more needed than of late, when a fatal paralysis has benumbed the public sense, and in the eclipse of faith, "the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with those that love the twilight, flutter about, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sects and schisms."

I believe we have already touched the nadir of our fears and our despondency, and that a breath of patriotism and hope is now vivifying the national pulse. But each man can swell the rising tide. To diffuse the inspiration of courage is the duty of every patriot. And happily we need draw this inspiration from no illusive fountains; for the more earnestly and honestly we look at the situation, the more grounds of hope we find. Some of these grounds can be briefly set down:

1. The body of the rebellion is moribund. Gen. T. Seymour, whose critical habit of thought and conservative temper, add a prodigious weight to any declarations he makes on this head, states as the result of his three months' observation in the interior of the South, that "*the rebel cause is fast failing from exhaustion.*" This is profoundly true, whether it has regard to the material resources in the South, or to the still more vital resources in men, of which the field is now reaped and bare. Every man and every boy is now in the field; there is nothing behind. In a private letter lately written by General Grant, he used the pungent expression that the rebels have "*robbed the cradle and the grave to reinforce their armies.*"

2. It is true, in inflicting on the rebels the immense damage they have received in the great campaigns of Grant and Sherman, we also have lost quite as severely—perhaps even more so; but (if it is lawful to speak thus of so grave a matter) *we can afford it.* We can stand to lose man for man, till every man in the armies of the rebellion is put *hors du combat*, and leave behind untouched a force equal to all we have lost in the war.

3. But I do not believe it will be needful to wade through such an ocean of blood as this. All that is needed is a blow that will disrupt the two main rebel armies. It is worthy of note, that the merciless conscriptions that have swept over the South have even simplified the problem for us. The war has no longer those thousand-fold embarrassments that attend a *national* war, or war on populations. There *is*

no population. Our task is confined to beating the armies at Richmond and Atlanta. For the rest, the southern people are tired of the war, and are sighing for peace.

4. In a military point of view, such is the situation held by Gen. Grant and Gen. Sherman, toward the insurgent forces opposed to them, that the reinforcements they are receiving, will certainly enable them soon to complete their work. Gen. Seymour on this head, says:

"There is but one course consistent with safety or honor. Let the people awake to a sense of their dignity and strength, and a few months of comparatively trifling exertion—of such effort as alone is worthy of the great work—and the rebellion will crumble before us. Fill this draft promptly and willingly, with good and true men; send a few spare thousands over rather than under the call, and the *summer sun of* 1865 *will shine upon a regenerated land.*"

5. The war is really near its close. The present front of the rebellion, menacing though it be, is really nothing more than a mask, concealing the hollowness and rottenness within. The South is literally exhausted—exhausted of that without which it is impossible to carry on war—exhausted of men. The field, in the impressive expression of Napoleon regarding France after her three conscriptions, is reaped down to the stubble. Out of an available fighting population of upwards of three-quarters of a million with which the war was inaugurated, they have saved an effective force of one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand men. The rest are in their graves, in the hospitals, disabled, or prisoners in our hands. These are the forlorn hope of the rebellion.

6. Our territorial conquests have reclaimed three-fourths of the area originally claimed in the limits of the Confederacy. The Confederacy stands now thrice bisected—its great lines of communication cut or in our hands. Besides, its resources of all kinds are all but exhausted. The desperate men at its head may continue the struggle for some time longer—they may for a while oppose a formidable front to our blows—but the rebellion is doomed. Its struggles will be the frantic final efforts of the gladiator before he falls down exhausted and exanimate.

7. The leaders of the rebellion have ceased to see any hope for their cause in the arena of war. *They are looking now to the arena of politics.* A party has been set up whose creed and aims have their entire sympathy and moral support. The platform of that party has nothing but expressions of contumely for the sacred war, the recital of which has been made; for Jeff. Davis and his crew it has nothing but expressions of sympathy and respect. The people of the North have now before them the momentous question of determining by their action whether they will justify all the precious blood shed in this war by carrying it triumphantly through and crowning it with a glorious and honorable peace, or whether by a base surrender they will project it into history as the monument of a nation's folly.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

UNION EXECUTIVE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

Hon. E. D. MORGAN, of New York.
" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.
" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
(*Senate.*)

Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois.
" R. B. VAN VALKENBURG, N. Y.
" J. A. GARFIELD, of Ohio.
" J. G. BLAINE, of Maine.
House of Representatives.

E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman.* JAS. HARLAN, *Treasurer.* D. N. COOLEY, *Sec'y*

COMMITTEE ROOMS, *Washington, D. C., Sept.*, 2, 1864.

DEAR SIR: The Union Congressional Committee, in addition to the documents already published, propose to issue immediately the following documents for distribution among the people.

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3. The Chicago Copperhead Convention, the men who composed and controlled it.
4. Base surrender of the Copperheads to the Rebels in arms.
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Hon. JAMES HARLAN,
Washington, D. C.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,
D. N. COOLEY, *Secretary.*

Printed by Lemuel Towers, for the Union Congressional Committee.

A FEW PLAIN WORDS

WITH THE

RANK AND FILE OF THE UNION ARMIES.

By William Swinton

Published by the Union Congressional Committee.

I.

Napoleon wittily warned governments to "beware when bayonets should learn *to think*;" but with us, far from being a subject of fear, it is our glory and pride that the war for the Union has been upheld by a million of "thinking bayonets." Despots may tremble when the bayonets that sustain their thrones learn *to think*; but when free men rise in arms to defend free institutions, what "thinking" can be more true, more wise, more patriotic than theirs?

It is thinking bayonets that compose our army. It is "thinking" that *inspired* those bayonets; and it is because they are in the grasp of thinking men that they are clothed with all their majesty and power. When dark days have come upon our land, when the sibilant tongue of the copperhead has been heard to hiss his base whispers of surrender, when the wisest could not see their way clear, and the hearts of the most patriotic sunk within them, hope and light and courage have flashed forth from the gleam of those same thinking bayonets.

It is you, Oh million of thinking bayonets, that have led the way, that have shamed our puisillanimity, that have taught the nation what *patriotism* is. If Peace now begins to dawn on our land, it is because through four years of dread war, in bright and dark days, you have carried the Union in your hearts and *on your bayonets*. When peace comes it will be honorable and lasting because your bayonets have *made* it so; and yours will be the glory and the honor. "When the war closes," says the great captain who has led the army of the West from Chattanooga to Atlanta, in a letter lately written to a humble private soldier in his army: "When the war closes I will, if I survive it, make it my study to give full honor and credit to the soldiers in the ranks, who, though in humble capacity, *have been the working hands by which the nation's honor and manhood have been vindicated.*"

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The voice of the nation re-affirms this declaration of General Sherman. History will celebrate as the true heroes of the grand War for the Union not those who have held the high places of command, but those hundreds of thousands of what Kossuth called "nameless heroes"—the rank and file of our armies, who, *shoulder to shoulder and touching elbows*, have carried the war through to results which ensure its glorious consummation.

II.

If ever there was a time when Union bayonets were called on to *think*, it is now. The crisis of the war, when our armies have the rebellion in their grasp and are preparing to deal its death-blow, finds the country precipitated into the turmoil of a Presidential election. This election touches you, because in becoming *soldiers* you did not cease to be *citizens*; but it touches you even more closely than it does those of us who are merely citizens and *not* soldiers: for the issue is presented whether this war for the Union in which you are battling is a delusion and a mockery—whether the priceless blood shed shall go for no more than water spilt on the ground—whether you shall lay down your arms and sue rebels to make on *their* terms the peace you thought your valor had nearly won. That you may see this and no other is the real issue which will be tried on the 8th day of November next—read with all the care you can command the creed of the two candidates claiming your suffrages:

The *Union* platform resolves:

That it is the highest duty of every American citizen *to maintain against all their enemies the integrity of Union*, and the paramount authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that laying aside all differences and political opinions, we pledge ourselves as Union men, animated by a common sentiment, and aiming at a common object, to do everything in our power to aid the Government in quelling by force of arms the rebellion now raging against its authority, and in bringing to the punishment due to their crimes the rebels and traitors arrayed against it.

That we approve the determination of the Government of the United States not to compromise with rebels or to offer any terms of peace except such as may be based upon an "UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER" of their hostility and a return to their just allegiance to the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and that we call upon the Government to maintain this position and to prosecute the war with the utpossible vigor to the most complete suppression of the rebellion, in full reliance upon the self-sacrifice, the patriotism, the heroic valor and the undying devotion of the American people to their country and its free institutions.

That the thanks of the American people are due to the soldiers and sailors of the army and navy, who have periled their lives in defense of their country and in vindication of the honor of the flag; that the nation owes to them some permanent recognition of their patriotism and their valor, and ample and permanent provision for those of their survivors who have received disabling and and honorable wounds in the service of the country: and that the memories of those who have fallen in its defense shall be held in grateful and everlasting remembrance.

The *Copperhead* platform resolves:

That this convention does explicitly declare as the sense of the American people that after FOUR YEARS OF FAILURE TO RESTORE THE UNION BY THE EXPERIMENT OF WAR, during which, under the pretence of a military necessity, or war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that IMMEDIATE EFFORT BE MADE FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, with a view to an ultimate convention of all the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.

There are other declarations made in each; but they do not touch essentials. The vital principle in each case is contained in these utterances.

The former, it need not be said, is the platform on which it is proposed

Abraham Lincoln shall continue for another term the administration of the government. The latter is the platform on which George B. McClellan comes forward to claim your suffrages and those of the nation.

The issue is here drawn in such clear and palpable lines that no man—far less any *soldier*—can mistake it. It is not a personal issue. It is not a question whether Abraham Lincoln or George B. McClellan shall be President. It is a question whether or not we shall have a Constitution and a country left us.

The prime points in the Chicago copperhead platform—those which give its distinctive character—are these:

1. The assertion of our "*failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war.*"

2. The demand that "*immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities.*"

The copperhead creed very properly joins these assertions in the relation of logical sequence: that is, "immediate efforts should be made for a cessation of hostilities" *because* "the experiment of war" has been a "failure." The premises granted, the conclusion naturally follows.

But suppose you do *not* grant it—suppose a voice, which is already audible in the air, mingling the fierce protests of indignant men with the dread clamor of triumphant artillery and vollied thunders along the line, rolls up from Petersburg to Atlanta and from Atlanta to Mobile Bay, to hurl back the slander that dares thus belittle your matchless achievements. We tell you, soldiers, that voice is echoed back by a nation that thinks with you that a war which in three years has reclaimed from the rebels three-fourths of a territory as large as all Europe, has driven their armies from point to point, beaten them in scores of the greatest battles on record, reduced their whole fighting material from more than three-quarters of a million to between a hundred and a hundred and fifty thousand, captured their chief cities, destroyed their great lines of communication, and now holds their whole coast in strictest blockade, will need some other word than "*failure*" to sum up its swelling content and result. "Failure in the *experiment* of war," forsooth! It is an insult to your glorious deeds and your glorious dead, and could only have been used by men with whom the *wish* of "failure" was father to the *thought.*

In what magnificent contrast with the slanderous falsehoods of these miserable men stand the declarations lately made by the Lieutenant General commanding the armies of the United States! Standing on an eminence whence he surveys the whole continental field of battle, whence his eyes take in all the elements that enter into the dread problem of war, he affirms that the rebellion is doomed, that the rebel armies are all but used up, and that *the one thing needed to "secure an early restoration of the Union is a determined unity of sentiment at the North.*" "The rebels," says he, "have now in their ranks their last man. The little boys and old men are guarding prisoners, guarding railroad bridges, and forming a good part of their garrisons or intrenched positions. A man lost by them cannot be replaced. They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force. Besides what they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles, they are now losing from desertions and other causes at least one regiment per day. With this drain upon them, *the end is not far distant, if we will only be true to ourselves. Their only hope now is in a divided North.*" It is in this state of facts, when the life-blood of the rebellion is ebbing away, when our victorious columns are marching on from victory to victory, when the soul of the nation is stirred and vivified with a breath of the old-time patriotic fire, when the Government finds the revival of the volunteer spirit such (reaching from five to ten thousand recruits per day) that it can afford to dispense with the operations of the draft as a slower recruiting agent than the spontaneous patriotism of the people presents,—it is amid this inspiring present

ment of material and moral elements that the resolutions of a great convention propose that "*immediate* efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities"! Is this the sober utterance of men claiming to control the destinies of a great nation, or is it only a piece of hideous and untimely irony? You are to turn back, you victorious columns that have pushed the lines of imperial conquest from Chattanooga to Atlanta and driven the army of the rebellion in rout and demoralization to the borders of the Gulf; you are to loose your hold on the vital communications of the enemy, you, veterans of Virginia, that have fought your way to where you stand in a campaign that makes historic wars a plaything and marks your path from the Rapidan to the James in characters of blood and flame,—all, all are to retire and allow copperheads and conspirators to settle, over the graves of Union soldiers fallen in a useless war, the terms of surrender to Jeff. Davis and his crew. *Such* are copperhead principles, such is the copperhead platform.

III.

In the sad total of "failure in the experiment of war," which you will first learn from the creed of Chicago sums up the history of four years, you are invited by its framers to accept their—"*sympathy.* You have, according to the doctrines and declarations of these men, not only *failed*, but you have been *fooled.* Your love of the old flag, your determination to defend it, your hatred of treason, your deathless patriotism are mere fancy and fustian, the great army of martyrs that have offered up their lives a willing sacrifice on the altar of the Union were poor simpletons, the tens of thousands of your comrades who pine in rebel prisons, and the hundreds of thousands who bear about in their bodies the insignia of glorious wounds are deluded victims—and in this unhappy predicament you are offered their profound "sympathy." Sympathy—it is a precious quality; but there are times when it is the most stinging of insults. We can fancy the feelings with which the war-worn veterans of Grant and Sherman will receive this gushing tender of copperhead "sympathy." From the enemy in your front you have won something more than *sympathy:* you have extorted *his respect*, and you rightly regard this as much more valuable than the hollow commisseration of copperheads. For *their* sympathy, the Chicago resolutions sufficiently show where *that* goes. Men who have nothing but contumely for the government you are defending, and whose declaration of principles contains not a word against treason and rebellion, not a syllable about the infernal treatment of our prisoners by the rebels, not a whisper of reproof for the crime of those southern politicians which has desolated half a continent, show their hands too plainly to blind you as to the real drift of their "sympathy." You will indignantly tell them to take it where it will be better appreciated and not awaken that disgust which it must stir in the breast of every patriotic soldier.

IV.

The Copperheads know your sentiments. They know that the army is sound and incorruptible. They know that there has been no time during the past three years that you would not as lief fight them as fight rebels—no time that you would not willingly leave the enemy in your front to attend to the equally base, but far less brave, enemy in your rear.

It is for this reason that they will court you, and try to wheedle you. They know that their doctrines are a stench in your nostrils They will try to hide this by pretence and palaver. They are huckstering for the army vote. The Copperheads at Chicago carried the platform, nominated Pendleton, one of

their rankest members (who has opposed the army and the war in every vote of his in Congress,) as Vice President, and, to blind you, put up McClellan as President. This is a *ruse de guerre*. They care nothing for McClellan—he is with them only "a name to conjure by," a tub thrown to the whale. They calculate that there are many men in our armies who will vote for McClellan *anyhow*. It does not occur to them that you look beneath the surface, that you penetrate the real issue, that this issue is the country's salvation and that you prefer your country's salvation before the fortunes of any man. American soldiers are not the material out of which to make a Pretorian guard on whose bayonets any man can be hoisted into power.

The armies outside of the Army of the Potomac *never* were affected by the McClellan mania. The men who have fought with Grant, campaigned with Rosecrans and marched with Sherman, are not the men to fall in love with McClellan's feeble and fruitless style of warfare. A nation that has shared in the glories of Vicksburg and Stone River and Chattanooga and Atlanta has got a long ways beyond the point of being deluded by bombastic "changes of base" and "masterly inactivity."

But of the old soldiers of the Potomac army, there are still doubtless many left who retain those traditions that time and events have long since effaced from the memories of men. Around the bivouac, in the loll of long summer days, or in the close contact of the winter's tent, you hear these men tell of the "Young Napoleon" and his career. Prejudices and predilections, natural to them but nothing to you, gradually, by force of repetition, steal their way into your minds. Falsehoods, innocently believed by the old men, but of which you have no means of knowing the falsity, are told you—perhaps believed by you. You are told how the Administration thwarted McClellan's plans, withheld promised troops, threw obstacles in his path, and ensured defeat where he had organized victory.

Under another issue than that to-day presented to the country and to the army, these questions might be in place. It might be in place to inquire whether General McClellan was a great military genius, as some believe, or an incompetent and blunderer, as others believe; whether the men and material needed to make his campaigns successful were withheld from him, or whether he had lavished upon him the generous resources of the nation; whether the Administration is blameable for removing him when it did, or whether it is blameable for not sooner discovering his incompetence. These are interesting questions no doubt, and they will long be discussed with the warmth of partisan affection and the bitterness of partisan hate. But they are not in issue just now. For our individual part, we believe the record of the Administration to be singularly clear on all these points. We believe McClellan to be neither a great general nor an aggrieved man. We see nothing in his career, either of talent, character, or success that fits him to be President of the United States. But let that pass. It is not a question of his merits or his demerits. It is a question of the principles which he represents. McClellan might have the purity of a Washington, the statesmanship of a Pitt, and the generalship of a Napoleon, yet did he not plant himself fair and square on the issue of the life or death of this nation, he and his claims would pass for nothing.

V.

McClellan, after a delay, the length of which showed the extreme unpopularity of the of the platform on which he was nominated, accepted the nomination of the Chicago Convention. His declaration of principles had been anxiously looked for, because he had put himself on record in letters to army his

friends, that he could only consent to run on a war platform. Would he renounce the platform and thereby renounce the candidacy, or would he accept the platform and ruin himself? The solution of this perplexing problem, given by McClellan in his letter of acceptance, only serves to show the insuperable difficulties that attend his position, and the impossibility of securing votes enough to elect him without making dupes of the one or the other faction of the party to which he looks for support.

The issue made by the Chicago platform is clear and unmistakeable, and demanded to be met with downright assent or dissent. On this McClellan palters in a double sense, keeping the promise of patriotism to the ear and breaking it to the heart. Whether he thinks "the experiment of war a failure" or not, is impossible to determine. He expresses the opinion that the war should have been carried on in a different way from what it has been. There is no end of people who think the same way. For a year and a-half we tried *his* way of carrying on war, and we submit how much of the "failure in the experiment" is due to himself. We have since carried on war in a quite *other* way; and so far from seeing "failure," we find all around the horizon of the war the signs and symbols of magnificent and accumulating success. We think your valor will, ere long, carry this succe through to its final consummation in the complete crushing of the rebellion, and the restoration of Union and peace. The Chicago platform declares this impossible. McClellan declares neither the one thing nor the other.

Neither does McClellan pronounce on this question whether "this failure in the experiment of war," as declared by the Chicago platform, should be pushed to the logical result that platform draws, namely the "demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities." His sole utterance on this point is in these words:

> "So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace, upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practiced by civilized nations, and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, re-establish the Union, and guarantee for the future the Constitutional rights of every State."

The platform says "*immediate*," which we understand. The nominee says: "*so soon as it is clear or probable*," which is just saying nothing at all. Who doubts that *so soon as it is clear or probable* that the rebels are ready for peace upon the basis of the Union, we are ready to make such a peace? The expression is an evasive platitude, which McClellan never could have used *had he had in his heart the honest determination to carry through the war to the only point when it will be either "clear or probable" that the rebels will ask for peace.*

How thoroughly are these tortuous windings characteristic of a man who, never instructed by the maxim of the great master of war, that "half measures always fail," gave throughout his military career a lamentable example of its truth, and is destined to add conspicuous confirmation of its verity by his career as a politician.

VI.

From these unintelligible utterances and evasive subtleties, those who seek the rule of action of the party that has set up George B. McClellan as its Presidential candidate are thrown back on the declarations of this party as embodied in its platform. Here we find something we can understand at least. The proposition for a cessation of hostilities on account of the failure of the war, if a lie in its antecedent and an insult in its consequent, is at least intelligible, and leaves plain people in no maze of doubt as to its meaning. And let McClellan refine, and evade, and spout "Union," without any hint of the means

that are to secure Union, *the principles of the platform are the principles by which he would be governed if the disaster of his election should befall this nation.* If he were ten times the patriot he is, he would be drawn by the irresistible gravitation of his associations, his necessities, and the creed of his party, into the *policy* of his party. What that policy is, soldiers of the Union, you know. Is there anything in it but what you, holding a Union musket in your hands, must spit out of your mouth with scorn? Surely there is not, unless you are willing that the heroes shall have died in vain, unless you are willing that the trials and the triumphs of the grandest of wars shall pass for nothing, unless you are willing to break your weapons of war and retire to the ignominy which must come upon men who, fighting the battles of humanity till victory was won, had not the courage to snatch its fruits!

The Copperheads have put up McClellan because they hope your suffrages will enable them to carry through their cherished project of a surrender to Jeff. Davis. *They forget the terrible rebuke that came up from your ranks, like a great Atlantic swell, when their nominee, a year ago in his Woodward letter hinted, in a far feebler way than he now does by running on the Chicago platform, his affiliation with the peace party.* It would indeed be time to despair of the Republic if American soldiers could be the dupes of so base a plot as the Copperheads have laid. But the country is destined to no such humiliation. The voice of the Army will on the 8th of November, proclaim in thunder-tones that the war must be prosecuted till the rebellion is quelled and the Union restored. And as the rebels chose to *secede* from the administration of Abraham Lincoln, you are going to see to it that they swallow that particular pill by *succumbing* to the administration of Abraham Lincoln.

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" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
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Washington, D. C.

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Printed by L. Towers for the Union Congressional Committee.

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WITH THE

RANK AND FILE OF THE UNION ARMIES.

BY

WILLIAM SWINTON,

Washington Editor N. Y. Times.

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Napoleon wittily warned governments to "beware when bayonets should learn *to think*;" but with us, far from being a subject of fear, it is our glory and pride that the war for the Union has been upheld by a million of "thinking bayonets." Despots may tremble when the bayonets that sustain their thrones learn *to think*; but when free men rise in arms to defend free institutions, what "thinking" can be more true, more wise, more patriotic than theirs?

It is thinking bayonets that compose our army. It is "thinking" that *inspired* those bayonets; and it is because they are in the grasp of thinking men that they are clothed with all their majesty and power. When dark days have come upon our land, when the sibilant tongue of the copperhead has been heard to hiss his base whispers of surrender, when the wisest could not see their way clear, and the hearts of the most patriotic sunk within them, hope and light and courage have flashed forth from the gleam of those same thinking bayonets.

It is you, Oh million of thinking bayonets, that have led the way, that have shamed our puisillanimity, that have taught the nation what *patriotism* is. If Peace now begins to dawn on our land, it is because through four years of dread war, in bright and dark days, you have carried the Union in your hearts and *on your bayonets*. When peace comes it will be honorable and lasting because your bayonets have *made* it so; and yours will be the glory and the honor. "When the war closes," says the great captain who has led the army of the West from Chattanooga to Atlanta, in a letter lately written to a humble private soldier in his army: "When the war closes I will, if I survive it, make it my study to give full honor and credit to the soldiers in the ranks, who, though in humble capacity, *have been the working hands by which the nation's honor and manhood have been vindicated.*"

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The voice of the nation re-affirms this declaration of General Sherman. History will celebrate as the true heroes of the grand War for the Union not those who have held the high places of command, but those hundreds of thousands of what Kossuth called "nameless heroes"—the rank and file of our armies, who, *shoulder to shoulder and touching elbows*, have carried the war through to results which ensure its glorious consummation.

II.

If ever there was a time when Union bayonets were called on to *think*, it is now. The crisis of the war, when our armies have the rebellion in their grasp and are preparing to deal its death-blow, finds the country precipitated into the turmoil of a Presidential election. This election touches you, because in becoming *soldiers* you did not cease to be *citizens*; but it touches you even more closely than it does those of us who are merely citizens and *not* soldiers: for the issue is presented whether this war for the Union in which you are battling is a delusion and a mockery—whether the priceless blood shed shall go for no more than water spilt on the ground—whether you shall lay down your arms and sue rebels to make on *their* terms the peace you thought your valor had nearly won. That you may see this and no other is the real issue which will be tried on the 8th day of November next—read with all the care you can command the creed of the two candidates claiming your suffrages:

The *Union* platform resolves:

That it is the highest duty of every American citizen *to maintain against all their enemies the integrity of Union*, and the paramount authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that laying aside all differences and political opinions, we pledge ourselves as Union men, animated by a common sentiment, and aiming at a common object, to do everything in our power to aid the Government in quelling by force of arms the rebellion now raging against its authority, and in bringing to the punishment due to their crimes the rebels and traitors arrayed against it.

That we approve the determination of the Government of the United States not to compromise with rebels or to offer any terms of peace except such as may be based upon an "UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER" of their hostility and a return to their just allegiance to the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and that we call upon the Government to maintain this position and to prosecute the war with the utpossible vigor to the most complete suppression of the rebellion, in full reliance upon the self-sacrifice, the patriotism, the heroic valor and the undying devotion of the American people to their country and its free institutions.

That the thanks of the American people are due to the soldiers and sailors of the army and navy, who have periled their lives in defense of their country and in vindication of the honor of the flag; that the nation owes to them some permanent recognition of their patriotism and their valor, and ample and permanent provision for those of their survivors who have received disabling and and honorable wounds in the service of the country: and that the memories of those who have fallen in its defense shall be held in grateful and everlasting remembrance.

The *Copperhead* platform resolves:

That this convention does explicitly declare as the sense of the American people that after FOUR YEARS OF FAILURE TO RESTORE THE UNION BY THE EXPERIMENT OF WAR, during which, under the pretence of a military necessity, or war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that IMMEDIATE EFFORT BE MADE FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, with a view to an ultimate convention of all the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.

There are other declarations made in each; but they do not touch essentials. The vital principle in each case is contained in these utterances.

The former, it need not be said, is the platform on which it is proposed

IN EXCHANGE

JUN 5 1917

Abraham Lincoln continue for the army and, to for another term the administration of the government. That is the platform on which George B. McClellan comes forward to claim your suffrages and those of the nation.

The issue here drawn in such clear and palpable lines that no man—far less any *soldier* can mistake it. It is not a personal issue. It is not a question whether Abraham Lincoln or George B. McClellan shall be President. It is a question whether or not we shall have a Constitution and a country left us.

The prime points in the Chicago copperhead platform—those which give its distinctive character—are these:

1. The assertion of our "*failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war.*"

2. The demand that "*immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities.*"

The copperhead creed very properly joins these assertions in the relation of logical sequence: that is, "immediate efforts should be made for a cessation of hostilities" *because* "the experiment of war" has been a "failure." The premises granted, the conclusion naturally follows.

But suppose you do *not* grant it—suppose a voice, which is already audible in the air, mingling the fierce protests of indignant men with the dread clamor of triumphant artillery and vollied thunders along the line, rolls up from Petersburg to Atlanta and from Atlanta to Mobile Bay, to hurl back the slander that dares thus belittle your matchless achievements. We tell you, soldiers, that voice is echoed back by a nation that thinks with you that a war which in three years has reclaimed from the rebels three-fourths of a territory as large as all Europe, has driven their armies from point to point, beaten them in scores of the greatest battles on record, reduced their whole fighting material from more than three-quarters of a million to between a hundred and a hundred and fifty thousand, captured their chief cities, destroyed their great lines of communication, and now holds their whole coast in strictest blockade, will need some other word than "*failure*" to sum up its swelling content and result. "Failure in the *experiment* of war," forsooth! It is an insult to your glorious deeds and your glorious dead, and could only have been used by men with whom the *wish* of "failure" was father to the *thought.*

In what magnificent contrast with the slanderous falsehoods of these miserable men stand the declarations lately made by the Lieutenant General commanding the armies of the United States! Standing on an eminence whence he surveys the whole continental field of battle, whence his eyes take in all the elements that enter into the dread problem of war, he affirms that the rebellion is doomed, that the rebel armies are all but used up, and that *the one thing needed to "secure an early restoration of the Union is a determined unity of sentiment at the North.*" "The rebels," says he, "have now in their ranks their last man. The little boys and old men are guarding prisoners, guarding railroad bridges, and forming a good part of their garrisons or intrenched positions. A man lost by them cannot be replaced. They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force. Besides what they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles, they are now losing from desertions and other causes at least one regiment per day. With this drain upon them *the end is not far distant, if we will only be true to ourselves. Their only hope now is in a divided North.*" It is in this state of facts, when the life-blood of the rebellion is ebbing away, when our victorious columns are marching on from victory to victory, when the soul of the nation is stirred and vivified with a breath of the old-time patriotic fire, when the Government finds the revival of the volunteer spirit such (reaching from five to ten thousand recruits per day) that it can afford to dispense with the operations of the draft as a slower recruiting agent than the spontaneous patriotism of the people presents,—it is amid this inspiring present-

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ment of material and moral elements that this doe resolutions of a convention propose that "*immediate* efforts be made for a cessation of the grossation of hostilities"! Is this the sober utterance of men claiming to control the destinies of a great nation, or is it only a piece of hideous and untimely irony? You are to turn back, you victorious columns that have pushed the lines of imperial conquest from Chattanooga to Atlanta and driven the army of the rebellion in rout and demoralization to the borders of the Gulf; you are to loose your hold on the vital communications of the enemy, you, veterans of Virginia, that have fought your way to where you stand in a campaign that makes historic wars a plaything and marks your path from the Rapidan to the James in characters of blood and flame,—all, all are to retire and allow copperheads and conspirators to settle, over the graves of Union soldiers fallen in a useless war, the terms of surrender to Jeff. Davis and his crew. *Such* are copperhead principles, such is the copperhead platform.

III.

In the sad total of "failure in the experiment of war," which you will first learn from the creed of Chicago sums up the history of four years, you are invited by its framers to accept their—"*sympathy*. You have, according to the doctrines and declarations of these men, not only *failed*, but you have been *fooled*. Lour love of the old flag, your determination to defend it, your hatred of treason, your deathless patriotism are mere fancy and fustian, the great army of martyrs that have offered up their lives a willing sacrifice on the altar of the Union were poor simpletons, the tens of thousands of your comrades who pine in rebel prisons, and the hundreds of thousands who bear about in their bodies the insignia of glorious wounds are deluded victims—and in this unhappy predicament you are offered their profound "sympathy." Sympathy—it is a precious quality; but there are times when it is the most stinging of insults. We can fancy the feelings with which the war-worn veterans of Grant and Sherman will receive this gushing tender of copperhead "sympathy." From the enemy in your front you have won something more than *sympathy:* you have extorted *his respect*, and you rightly regard this as much more valuable than the hollow commisseration of copperheads. For *their* sympathy, the Chicago resolutions sufficiently show where *that* goes. Men who have nothing but contumely for the government you are defending, and whose declaration of principles contains not a word against treason and rebellion, not a syllable about the infernal treatment of our prisoners by the rebels, not a whisper of reproof for the crime of those southern politicians which has desolated half a continent, show their hands too plainly to blind you as to the real drift of their "sympathy." You will indignantly tell them to take it where it will be better appreciated and not awaken that disgust which it must stir in the breast of every patriotic soldier.

IV.

The Copperheads know your sentiments. They know that the army is sound and incorruptible. They know that there has been no time during the past three years that you would not as lief fight them as fight rebels—no time that you would not willingly leave the enemy in your front to attend to the equally base, but far less brave, enemy in your rear.

It is for this reason that they will court you, and try to wheedle you. They know that their doctrines are a stench in your nostrils They will try to hide this by pretence and palaver. They are huckstering for the army vote. The Copperheads at Chicago carried the platform, nominated Pendleton, one of

their rankest members (who has opposed the army and the war in every vo his in Congress,) as Vice President, and, to blind you, put up McClella President. This is a *ruse de guerre*. They care nothing for McClellan—he is with them only "a name to conjure by," a tub thrown to the whale. They calculate that there are many men in our armies who will vote for McClellan *anyhow*. It does not occur to them that you look beneath the surface, that you penetrate the real issue, that this issue is the country's salvation and that you prefer your country's salvation before the fortunes of any man. American soldiers are not the material out of which to make a Pretorian guard on whose bayonets any man can be hoisted into power.

The armies outside of the Army of the Potomac *never* were affected by the McClellan mania. The men who have fought with Grant, campaigned with Rosecrans and marched with Sherman, are not the men to fall in love with McClellan's feeble and fruitless style of warfare. A nation that has shared in the glories of Vicksburg and Stone River and Chattanooga and Atlanta has got a long ways beyond the point of being deluded by bombastic "changes of base" and "masterly inactivity."

But of the old soldiers of the Potomac army, there are still doubtless many left who retain those traditions that time and events have long since effaced from the memories of men. Around the bivouac, in the loll of long summer days, or in the close contact of the winter's tent, you hear these men tell of the "Young Napoleon" and his career. Prejudices and predilections, natural to them but nothing to you, gradually, by force of repetition, steal their way into your minds. Falsehoods, innocently believed by the old men, but of which you have no means of knowing the falsity, are told you—perhaps believed by you. You are told how the Administration thwarted McClellan's plans, withheld promised troops, threw obstacles in his path, and ensured defeat where he had organized victory.

Under another issue than that to-day presented to the country and to the army, these questions might be in place. It might be in place to inquire whether General McClellan was a great military genius, as some believe, or an incompetent and blunderer, as others believe; whether the men and material needed to make his campaigns successful were withheld from him, or whether he had lavished upon him the generous resources of the nation; whether the Administration is blameable for removing him when it did, or whether it is blameable for not sooner discovering his incompetence. These are interesting questions no doubt, and they will long be discussed with the warmth of partisan affection and the bitterness of partisan hate. But they are not in issue just now. For our individual part, we believe the record of the Administration to be singularly clear on all these points. We believe McClellan to be neither a great general nor an aggrieved man. We see nothing in his career, either of talent, character, or success that fits him to be President of the United States. But let that pass. It is not a question of his merits or his demerits. It is a question of the principles which he represents. McClellan might have the purity of a Washington, the statesmanship of a Pitt, and the generalship of a Napoleon, yet did he not plant himself fair and square on the issue of the life or death of this nation, he and his claims would pass for nothing.

V.

McClellan, after a delay, the length of which showed the extreme unpopularity of the of the platform on which he was nominated, accepted the nomination of the Chicago Convention. His declaration of principles had been anxiously looked for, because he had put himself on record in letters to army his

friends, that he could only consent to run on a war platform. Would he renounce the platform and thereby renounce the candidacy, or would he accept the platform and ruin himself? The solution of this perplexing problem, given by McClellan in his letter of acceptance, only serves to show the insuperable difficulties that attend his position, and the impossibility of securing votes enough to elect him without making dupes of the one or the other faction of the party to which he looks for support.

The issue made by the Chicago platform is clear and unmistakeable, and demanded to be met with downright assent or dissent. On this McClellan palters in a double sense, keeping the promise of patriotism to the ear and breaking it to the heart. Whether he thinks "the experiment of war a failure" or not, is impossible to determine. He expresses the opinion that the war should have been carried on in a different way from what it has been. There is no end of people who think the same way. For a year and a-half we tried *his* way of carrying on war, and we submit how much of the "failure in the experiment" is due to himself. We have since carried on war in a quite *other* way; and so far from seeing "failure," we find all around the horizon of the war the signs and symbols of magnificent and accumulating success. We think your valor will, ere long, carry this success through to its final consummation in the complete crushing of the rebellion, and the restoration of Union and peace. The Chicago platform declares this impossible. McClellan declares neither the one thing nor the other.

Neither does McClellan pronounce on this question whether "this failure in the experiment of war," as declared by the Chicago platform, should be pushed to the logical result that platform draws, namely the "demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities." His sole utterance on this point is in these words:

> "So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace, upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practiced by civilized nations, and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, re-establish the Union, and guarantee for the future the Constitutional rights of every State."

The platform says "*immediate*," which we understand. The nominee says: "*so soon as it is clear or probable*," which is just saying nothing at all. Who doubts that *so soon as it is clear or probable* that the rebels are ready for peace upon the basis of the Union, we are ready to make such a peace? The expression is an evasive platitude, which McClellan never could have used *had he had in his heart the honest determination to carry through the war to the only point when it will be either "clear or probable" that the rebels will ask for peace.*

How thoroughly are these tortuous windings characteristic of a man who, never instructed by the maxim of the great master of war, that "half measures always fail," gave throughout his military career a lamentable example of its truth, and is destined to add conspicuous confirmation of its verity by his career as a politician.

VI.

From these unintelligible utterances and evasive subtleties, those who seek the rule of action of the party that has set up George B. McClellan as its Presidential candidate are thrown back on the declarations of this party as embodied in its platform. Here we find something we can understand at least. The proposition for a cessation of hostilities on account of the failure of the war, if a lie in its antecedent and an insult in its consequent, is at least intelligible, and leaves plain people in no maze of doubt as to its meaning. And let McClellan refine, and evade, and spout "Union," without any hint of the means

hat are to secure Union, *the principles of the platform are the principles by hich he would be governed if the disaster of his election should befall this ation.* If he were ten times the patriot he is, he would be drawn by the irreistible gravitation of his associations, his necessities, and the creed of his party, nto the *policy* of his party. What that policy is, soldiers of the Union, you know. Is there anything in it but what you, holding a Union musket in your hands, must spit out of your mouth with scorn? Surely there is not, unless you are willing that the heroes shall have died in vain, unless you are willing hat the trials and the triumphs of the grandest of wars shall pass for nothing, nless you are willing to break your weapons of war and retire to the ignominy hich must come upon men who, fighting the battles of humanity till victory as won, had not the courage to snatch its fruits!

The Copperheads have put up McClellan because they hope your suffrages ill enable them to carry through their cherished project of a surrender to Jeff. avis. *They forget the terrible rebuke that came up from your ranks, like a great Atlantic swell, when their nominee, a year ago in his Woodward letter hinted, in a far feebler way than he now does by running on the Chicago platform, his affiliation with the peace party.* It would indeed be time to despair of the Republic if American soldiers could be the dupes of so base a plot as he Copperheads have laid. But the country is destined to no such humiliaon. The voice of the Army will on the 8th of November, proclaim in thun-tones that the war must be prosecuted till the rebellion is quelled and the on restored. And as the rebels chose to *secede* from the administration of raham Lincoln, you are going to see to it that they swallow that particular ll by *succumbing* to the administration of Abraham Lincoln.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 186

UNION CONGRESSIONAL COMMITT

Hon. E. D. MORGAN, of New York.
" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.
" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
(*Senate.*)

Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE, of I
" R. B. VAN VALKENBUI
" J. A. GARFIELD, of Ohi
" J. G. BLAINE, of Maine.
(*House of Representatives*)

E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman.* JAS. HARLAN, *Treasurer.* D. N. COOLEY

COMMITTEE ROOMS, *Washington, D. C., Sept.* 2, 18

DEAR SIR: The Union Congressional Committee, in addit the documents already published, propose to issue immed the following documents for distribution among the people

1. McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed.
2. George H. Pendleton, his Disloyal Record and Antece
3. The Chicago Copperhead Convention, the men who com and controlled it.
4. Base surrender of the Copperheads to the Rebels in arn
5. The Military and Naval Situation, and the Glorious Acl ments of our Soldiers and Sailors.
6. A Few Plain Words with the Private Soldier.
7. What Lincoln's Administration has done.
8. The History of McClellan's "Arbitrary Arrest" of the land Legislature.
9. Can the Country Pay the Expenses of the War?
10. Doctrines of the Copperheads North identical with the the Rebels South.
11. The Constitution Upheld and Maintained.
12. Rebel Terms of Peace.
13. Peace, to be enduring, must be Conquered.
14. A History of Cruelties and Atrocities of the Rebellion.
15. Evidences of a Copperhead Conspiracy in the Northwe

The above documents will be printed in English and Ge in eightor sixteen page pamphlets, and sent postage free ac ing to directions at the rate of one or two dollars per hu copies. The plans and purposes of the Copperheads having disclosed by the action of the Chicago Convention, they s at once be laid before the loyal people of the country. Th but two months between this and the election, and leagues, and individuals should lose no time in sending in their o Remittances should be be made in Greenbacks or drafts on York City, payable to the order of James Harlan.

Address— Free.

Hon. JAMES HARLAN,
Washington, D. C.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,
D. N COOLEY, *Secreta*

Printed by L. Towers for the Union Congressional Committee.

THE CONSTITUTION UPHELD AND MAINTAINED.

SPEECH

OF

HON. JAS. HARLAN,

OF

THE UNITED STATES SENATE.

In this country every patriot reverences the Constitution and the laws. Every wanton violation of either stirs his indignation. As in Rome the voice of the people was said to be the voice of God, so in this country the law is our only sovereign which all, from the President to the humblest among the toiling millions, must implicitly obey. Whoever wantonly tramples the Constitution and the laws under his feet, is properly held to be an enemy of the people, and at war with their dearest interest.

Relying on this reverence for the law of the land, the rebels of the South and their allies in the North, have sought to justify their treason, and secure a diversion in favor of their wicked purposes, by denouncing the President as a usurper and tyrant, and his administration as unconstitutional. So persistently have they pursued this course, as to convince many honest and patriotic citizens of its truth. So that many of the President's warmest admirers, and consistent and ardent friends of the Union, justify these supposed violations of the Constitution on the ground of "military necessity," and the duty of the President to preserve the Government. Nor will I dispute the potency of this defense of what would otherwise be the unlawful act of a nation or an individual. For the right to self-preservation is the first law of nations as well as of nature. This principle underlies every national code, and every system of legal casuistry. None are so foolish as to insist that a nation may not disregard its own laws to avoid destruction: and none except rebels steeped in crime could desire our Government to tamely submit to annihilation.

But having carfully observed the administration of public affairs by President Lincoln, and as carfully examined the charges of unconstitutionality preferred against it, I fearlessly pronounce them groundless.

Let us examine for a few minutes some of the gravest of these charges.

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CALL FOR MILITIA.

1. The rebels South and North denounced the first belligerent act of President Lincoln—his call for some seventy-five thousand militia, as unconstitutional and tyranical.

And yet the Constitution provides in so many words that Congress shall have power

"To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection and repel invasion." (Art. 1, Sec. 8.)

And Congress had, under this provision of the Constitution, many years before provided by law for the use of the militia by the President, whenever it might become necessary for the purposes named. And the necessity had arisen; a gigantic insurrection existed; it had made open and flagrant actual war on the Government both by land and sea. And the President in pursuance of his oath to execute the laws, made the call for troops to assist him.

2. *The copperheads denounce the President for the "conscription" or "draft" of soldiers to fill up the depleted ranks of our armies.*

And yet none will seriously deny that all able bodied male citizens owe their services to the republic when needed for its defense, or to aid in the enforcement of its laws: and that if they do not voluntarily spring to arms when the necessity arises, they may be compelled to serve: and that without the right to coerce the services of its citizens to aid in the common defense, and to enforce the laws, all civil government would prove a total failure. Hence sheriffs, and constables, and marshalls, in every State in the Union, when resisted in the execution of process, are authorized by law to call "by-standers," all in their reach, for assistance, and it is declared to be a crime to refuse the requisite aid. So it is now, and ever has been, and must ever continue to be when the national authorities are resisted by internal or external foes. The proper officers must have the right to require the aid of all the people, or abandon the Government. But if the services of all are not needed in any given case, there is no fairer mode of making the selection of the requisite number than by "casting lots," which is but another name for "Draft" or "Conscription."

And all know that the President did not commence raising troops in this mode until Congress enacted laws requiring it to be done. That Congress had the power to enact those laws none can dispute. For the Constitution provides that Congress shall have power

"To raise and support armies." (Const. Art. 1. Sec. 8.)

The power, therefore, is plenary—it is without restriction: the m[illegible] them, the material, pay, government, length of service, character, a[illegible] nationality are all left to the discretion of Congress. And Congress dir[illegible] President should call for volunteers, and if the quotas of the several S[illegible] thus filled, he should select the residue from the people of the delinq[illegible] lot or draft. Hence the President, so far from violating the Constit[illegible] ing men to be drafted, has simply obeyed the law. And the law is [illegible] with the plainest and most explicit provisions of the Constitution.

3. *They denounce the President for violating the Constitution in arming negroes.*

And yet all know that he did not do so until Congress had enacted a law requiring this to be done. And the power of Congress to pass such a law will hardly be questioned after reading the clause of the Constitution above cited which declares that "Congress shall have power to raise and support armies." Here is no limitation. The troops raised may be black or white, red or yellow, and of any nationality; they may be natives or foreigners, minors or adults, slaves or owners, apprentices or masters; and so far as the question of power is concerned, may be required to serve with or without pay. Nor is this a new policy. Colored troops were employed in this country during the revolutionary war and the war of 1812—and have been, and are still used by every nation on earth controling colored citizens or subjects. If authorities were wanting to prove this, they might be piled up by the volume.

But I will only mention in passing that Senator Johnson, once Attorney General of the United States, a gentleman of great legal learning, and heretofore not a friend of this Administration—who has neglected no opportunity to reprimand it for every supposed weakness, error, or oversight, said in a speech on the floor of the Senate at it its last session,

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"Mr. President, a word or two more on this subject before I leave it. I have had occasion more than once during the session to say (and that opinion I confidently entertain) that although by the laws of the States Africans are made property, they are also under the Constitution of the United States, with reference to the war power of the Government, to be considered as persons, and may be used as persons and brought into the field to maintain the authority of the Government to which as persons they owe allegiance. If this opinion be sound, if they are persons subject to our military control, if they are persons increasing our military power, they are for the same reasons persons under the military control of the rebels, and may increase their military power, and as such it is as much the right of the United States to take them from the rebels or to use them against the rebels, as it is to take from and use against the rebels anything else that may be used by the rebels against the United States.—(*Cong. Globe.*

4th. *The President is accused of having interfered with the freedom of speech and of the press.*

There is a difference between *freedom* and licentiousnes. The *liberty* of all to *acquire* property does not include the right to *steal* and *rob*. *Freedom* of *locomotion* does not include the right to *trespass* on another's premises. Freedom to *love*, and to be *loved*, does not include the right to disturb your neighbors domestic happiness. So "freedom of the press" does not include the right to print and circulate counterfeit bank notes; nor freedom of speech, the right to slander your neighbor, or "to give aid and comfort" to the public enemy in time of war. And if any one, under the pretense of a right to freedom of speech or of the press, commits treason, he may and ought to be restrained and punished. To pretend the contrary, would indicate extreme mental obtuseness or unpardonable and criminal wickedness.

If the President has in any case suppressed a newspaper, or arrested any one for words spoken, in which the parties were not intentionally and ostentatiously encouraging the rebels to continue the war, and stimulating their northern sympathizers to obstruct and embarrass the Government in its efforts to suppress the rebellion, it has never come to my knowledge. But whether he has or has not erred in any given case, in relation to the guilt or innocense of the party, is not the real question. All admit that his intentions are pure. The real question is one of constitutional right to prevent publishers of newspapers and stump speakers from committing treason—from giving aid and comfort to the public enemy.

And the right to suppress a newspaper used in the interest of treason is as clear and indisputable as the right to take a dagger from the hand of the assassin, tools from the counterfeiter, or muskets from the hands of the rebels. The freedom of speech and of the press is not more explicitly guarantied by the Constitution than "the right to bear arms."

But before leaving the subject, I propose to prove, from the official record, that the copperheads themselves do not believe their own statements on this subject.

Immediately preceding the last presidential election, Jefferson Davis offered for the consideration of the Senate, a series of resolutions declaratory of the principles which should control in the administration of the affairs of the National Government. When the second resolution of the series, which made a covert attack on the freedom of discussion, was under consideration, I offered the following as an amendment:

"But the free discussion of the morality and expediency of slavery should never be interfered with by the laws of any State or of the United States; and the freedom of speech and of the press, on this and every other subject of domestic and national policy, should be maintained inviolate in all the States."

The question being taken on this amendment, by yeas and nays, resulted yeas 20, nays 36—every Democratic Senator voting in the negative, including Bright, of Indiana, Gwinn and Latham, of California, Lane, of Oregon, Pugh, of Ohio, and Thompson, of New Jersey, all representing northern States, and all from border slave States, as well as those from the extreme South.—(Cong. Globe, 1st session, 36th Congress, pages 1937–2321.)

On the 8th of April last, when Senator Powell, of Kentucky, was denouncing the President for interfering with what he styled "freedom of speech," I called his attention to the foregoing, reminding him that *he* and *all* his Democratic associates in the Senate voted *against* free speech. He replied that the scope of the amendment would have been to send persons down South to preach insurrection to their slaves. "I would vote nay again on that resolution. I voted right."—(Cong. Globe, 1st session, 38th Congress, page 1487.) That is, according to his admission, "the freedom of speech and of the press" may be suppressed *to prevent the insurrection of negroes and to preserve slavery!* Then may not its *licentiousness* be restrained to suppress the rebellion of white men, and *to preserve the Government.*

5th. *The copperheads denounce the administration for the confiscation of the property of rebels and the liberation of their slaves.*

And yet the Constitution says:

"The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason."—(Art. 3, sec. 3.)

And Congress, in pursuance of this provision provided by law, that unless these traitors should lay down their arms and return to their allegiance within a time to be fixed by the President, they should be punished by the confiscation of all their property, including slaves.

And why should they not be thus punished? Heretofore the punishment of treason was death. This is the usual penalty for this offence in every civilized country on earth. If you may hang for treason why may you not inflict a less punishment —the loss of property? And if you may proscribe the loss of property as the punishment of treason, why may you not include slave property? Is property in slaves any more sacred than property in cattle and lands? The power conferred by the Constitution is plenary. They may declare it to be the loss of lands, cattle, mules, horses, negroes, or franchises, such as the right to vote, hold office, or bear arms. There is no limitation whatever except that the punishment declared shall not be inflicted on the children of the traitor. You shall not deprive the child of the right to vote, hold office, bear arms, or to acquire property on account of the parents treason.

6th. The President is denounced for issuing a proclamation liberating the slaves of rebels within the rebellious districts.

And pray why not? We have just seen that "Congress may declare the punishment of treason:" that in pursuance of this provision of the Constitution, Congress did declare that all traitors who should not lay down their arms by a time to be fixed by the President, should forfeit all their property of "every kind," including slave property. The President had taken a solemn oath to take care that this and and all other "laws should be faithfully executed." Within the rebellious districts this confiscation act could not be enforced by the courts. But it was believed that if not impeded by the army and navy, it would to some extent execute itself, that many thousands of the slaves if protected would abandon their rebel masters. And to secure this result the President issued his proclamation, declaring that within the rebel districts, all persons, irrespective of their former status, should be considered and treated by the United States Government as freemen; and requiring the officers of the army and navy to recognize their right to maintain their liberty. And if it is admitted to be right to punish rebels within our lines by the confiscation of their property, including slaves, pray can it be wrong to do the same thing beyond our lines so far as the effort can be made effective?

It is objected, however, that the proclamation if enforced would liberate the slaves of Union citizens as well as of rebels. And it is clear that the emancipation of slaves of Union citizens who had not aided the rebellion could not be justified, under the clause of the Constitution authorizing Congress to declare the punishment of treason; and to that extent the proclamation would be void, unless justified by the public necessities; and in that case the parties thus losing slaves would have the same right to just compensation as if other proper had been taken for a similar purpose. And this would be a question for the courts to adjudicate when the supremacy of the Constitution and laws shall have been restored.

7. *It is avered that the President violated the Constitution by suspending the writ of habeas corpus.*

And yet the Constitution says:

"The priviledge of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." (Constitution Art. 1st., sec. 9.)

This is what is styled by lawyers a negative pregnant; and is equivalent to saying that "The priviledge of the writ of *habeas corpus* may be suspended when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." And as a rebellion *does* exist, the priviledge of the writ *may* be properly suspended if the public safety requires it. There can be no question of the right to suspend it: the only question that can arise, is, "who can judge of the necessity?" On this question a large majority of the best legal minds of the country who have expressed an opinion on this point, conclude that the President is the proper party to exercise this judgment, as he is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies and Navies of the Republic, and is at the same time the chief executive officer entrusted with the enforce-

ment of the laws. Others, however, conclude that Congress should decide when the public safety requires its suspension. Hence, to silence cavil, Congress enacted a law, formally directing its suspension, during the continuance of the rebellion, whenever, and wherever the President might find it necessary to secure the enforcement of the laws. And this ought to be an end of the controversy.

8. The President is denounced for violating the Constitution by the "arbitrary arrests" of suspected parties and offenders in cases not founded on "information" or "indictment,"—and for authorizing their imprisonment without a trial and conviction by a jury.

These charges are usually vindictive and malicious, and are in the first instance uttered for partizan effect,—and are doubtless repeated by the shallow minded and unreflecting under a belief that no arbitrary arrest is legal and constitutional. Noting could be farther from the truth. Any citizen has a perfect inherent right to arrest a criminal without process and to restrain him until process can be secured. And any citizen has a right without process to arrest a party to prevent the commission of crime, and to restrain him until the danger has passed. This is done every day and every night in the great cities. Men are discovered apparently on the point of committing crime, as an assault and battery, a burglary, a robbery, or a murder, and are seized and incarcerated or otherwise restrained of their liberty, to prevent the commission of the offence. In all such cases, even in times of profound peace, it is idle to insist that the arrest must be preceded by a formal "information" or "indictment," or that a "jury trial" must precede an imprisonment. There would be no time for this—the delay would be fatal: instant action is necessary to prevent the crime. Such arrests are therefore not only right—but a refusal to make them would be a crime against society.

The President, when convinced that persons were about to commit treason—the gravest crime known to the laws, has caused their arrest and restraint as in the case of Vallandigham, of Ohio; and Jones, of Iowa, until the danger had passed, when they have been set at liberty.

I am not here undertaking to justify any specific case of arrest made without process. Some of them may have been unnecessary, and may have worked great personal hardship. The President may not have been correctly informed, and may have erred in any given case. He could not be everywhere in person and must, necessarily rely on others for information. All I claim here is that he intended to do right, and that in principle he had a perfect right to make arrests without process to prevent the commission of crime. If not, why not? We have seen that a private citizen may do this—yea, more that it is his duty to do so—and a wrong akin to a crime to refuse when he has the power May not the President do what a private citizen may do to prevent the commission of offences!

In the case of an arbitrary arrest by a private citizen without process, if the restraint were to be protracted, the party could serve out a writ of *habeas corpus*, and secure his discharge by the judge of any court of competent jurisdiction. But if made by the President in times of "invasion or insurrection" he could, if he deemed that the public safety required it, as we have seen suspend the priveledge of this writ and retain the party in custody.

If any doubt might otherwise exist on this point, it ought to be settled in the minds of those who reverence the courts, by their decisions in the case of the arrest and restraint of Vallandigham by Geneneral Burnsides. While still in custody, application was made to Judge Leavitt, of the United States Court for the Southern District of Ohio, for a writ of *habeas corpus*. Vallandigham was fully heard in an able and exhaustive argument, delivered by his personal and political friend, ex-Attorney General of Ohio, George E. Pugh, who for six years was a representative of the Ohio Democracy in the United States Senate, and Judge Leavitt refused to issue the writ, This was, in effect, deciding that the arrest was constitutional; for no other question could legitimately arise than the power of the President to make the arrest without process, and the constitutionality of the restraint. In applying for this writ the party must allege that he has been illegally arrested and restrained of his liberty, setting forth the pretended grounds of restraint, if known. When brought before the court or judge, according to the principles of the common law, the question of guilt or innocence is never tried. The legality of the restraint is the only question that can be put in issue. But the judge or court would not, of course, issue the writ and bring the party before the court for a hearing unless, according to his own showing, his arrest was illegal. As Judge Leavitt refused the

writ, it is, in effect, an affirmation of the legality of the restraint. Nor can this decision be justly attributed to political bias. For this judge was appointed by President Jackson, many years before the existence of the Republican party; and he has never been accused or suspected during his long official career of the slightest divergence from the line of judicial rectitude.

An appeal was however taken in the Vallandigham case to the Supreme Court of the United States, in an application for a writ of *certiorari*, or an order on the Judge Advocate General to send the case to the Supreme Court for re-hearing. This application was refused after a full hearing in open court. In other words, the decision of Judge Leavitt was sustained by the Supreme Court; and the question practically settled by the court of the last resort, that during a rebellion or invasion the President may legally arrest suspected persons without process, and when in his opinion the public safety requires it, may suspend the right to the use of the writ of *habeas corpus*, and retain them in custody until the danger has passed. This right is therefore affirmed by every department of the Government, by Congress, by the President, and by the Courts. And finally the Copperhead National Convention at Chicago has stultified all that Copperhead senators, and members, and newspapers, and stump speakers, have said in denunciation of "arbitrary arrests," by the nomination of Major General McClellan for the Presidency, after his "arbitrary arrest" of the members of the Maryland legislature.

9th. But, it is demanded, "why are not these parties put on trial?" "Admitting the necessity and legality of the arrests and restraint, surely they have a right to trial by a jury of their countrymen, and to be confronted with the witnesses who testiy against them."

This is more specious than sound. In the class of arrests made to prevent the commission of crime, how would it be possible to put the parties on trial? How could you try a party for an offense not committed? The utmost that could be demanded would be the release of the suspected parties, on giving bond and satisfactory security to keep the peace. And this has been done in every case where, in the opinion of the President, it was compatible with the public safety. But putting a party under bonds is but another mode of restraint substituted for imprisonment. It is the same in principle. The right to do the former involves the right to do the latter.

In cases of arrest, after the commission of the crime, what authority has the President to try, condemn and punish, the offenders? The Constitution says:

"No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger."—(Article 5, Amendments to the Constitution.)

Hence, the President and all his Cabinet, the Congress, and all the Courts combined, have not the constitutional power to put a man on trial for an alleged crime, except in the nature of a preliminary examination for the purpose of eliciting facts to justify restraint of the suspected party. This can be done only by a grand jury. The President has the constitutional right to arrest and restrain during the continuance of the rebellion any offender, or person about to commit a crime, so long as the public safety may require it. To deny this right is to deny the validity of the Constitution. But he has no right to try in the judicial sense, or to convict, condemn, or punish, any one; this is the province of the jury, the court, and the sheriff. Nor has the President put on trial, in the judicial sense, or punished any one not in the land or naval forces. When restrained of their liberty by placing them under guard, or within the walls of fortifications, the confinement was not in the nature of *punishment*, nor considered or intended to be considered infamous. They would be liable afterward as much as before such restraint to indictment and punishment by the civil authorities.

It follows, therefore, that the President has proceeded as far as he has the right under the Constitution, and not one hairs-breadth farther. The "Copperheads condemn him as a violater of the Constitution, for doing what the Constitution clearly authorises; and condemn him for not doing what the Constitution as clearly prohibits."

But it is needless to pursue this subject. All these cavils and charges of unconstitutionality are as empty as the wind. They are without a decent pretext, They all vanish under a candid, impartial, analysis. No one can carefully examine them and avoid the conclusion that the measures of the existing Administration are in strict accordance with the Constitution and laws.

I, therefore, conclude with the declaration that, in my opinion, a more pure-minded, disinterested, self-sacrificing, generous, humane, patriotic, laborious, and God-fearing man never administered the affairs of a great nation than ABRAHAM LINCOLN. And that no living man, whose name has been mentioned in that connection, could be more safely trusted in the presidential office for the next four years. And that no one more richly deserves the second office in the gift of the American people than ANDREW JOHNSON, of Tennessee. And that if all who believe as I do perform their duty resolutely and faithfully, their triumphant election is as certain as the succession of day and night.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

UNION CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

Hon. E. D. MORGAN, of New York.
" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.
" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
(*Senate.*)

Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois.
" R. B. VAN VALKENBURG, N. Y
" J. A. GARFIELD, of Ohio.
" J. G. BLAINE, of Maine.
(*House of Representatives.*)

E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman.* JAS. HARLAN, *Treasurer.* D. N. COOLEY, *Sec'y.*

COMMITTEE Rooms, *Washington, D. C., Sept.* 2, 1864.

DEAR SIR: The Union Congressional Committee, in addition to the documents already published, propose to issue immediately the following documents for distribution among the people.

1. McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed.
2. George H. Pendleton, his Disloyal Record and Antecedents.
3. The Chicago Copperhead Convention, the men who composed and controlled it.
4. Base surrender of the Copperheads to the Rebels in arms.
5. The Military and Naval Situation, and the Glorious Achievements of our Soldiers and Sailors.
6. A Few Plain Words with the Private Soldier.
7. What Lincoln's Administration has done.
8. The History of McClellan's "Arbitrary Arrest" of the Maryland Legislature.
9. Can the Country Pay the Expenses of the War?
10. Doctrines of the Copperheads North identical with those of the Rebels South.
11. The Constitution Upheld and Maintained.
12. Rebel Terms of Peace.
13. Peace, to be Enduring, must be Conquered.
14. A History of Cruelties and Atrocities of the Rebellion.
15. Evidences of a Copperhead Conspiracy in the Northwest.

The above documents will be printed in English and German in eight or sixteen page pamphlets, and sent postage free, according to directions at the rate of one or two dollars per hundred copies. The plans and purposes of the Copperheads having been disclosed by the action of the Chicago Convention, they should at once be laid before the loyal people of the country. There is but two months between this and the election, and leagues, clubs, and individuals should lose no time in sending in their orders.

Remittances should be made in Greenbacks or drafts on New York City, payable to the order of James Harlan.

Address— Free.

Hon. JAMES HARLAN,
Washington, D. C.

Very respectfully yours, &c.,
D. N. COOLEY, *Secretary.*

Printed by Lemuel Towers, for the Union Congressional Committee.

LB D '05

SPEECH

OF

HON. HENRY G. STEBBINS,

OF NEW YORK.

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 4, 1864.

The following speech was delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States, on the 4th day of March, 1864, by the Hon. Mr. Stebbins, Member of Congress from the city of New York. Mr. Stebbins is Presidents of Board of Brokers of New York, and was elected to Congress by the Democracy. His position therefore as a business man and a politicians alike recommends his views to the careful consideration of every unprejudiced mind, and the general circulation of the speech, it is believed, must have a wholesome influence in allaying any apprehension as to the financial ability of the Government in present crisis.

The House having under consideration the bill (No. 37) to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to sell any surplus gold in the Treasury—

Mr. STEBBINS said:

Mr. SPEAKER: When the proposition was introduced into this House to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to sell the surplus gold which had accumulated and which was accumulating in the Treasury of the United States beyond the amount demanded by the wants of the Treasury and the requirements of the law, I took the occasion to declare that I could not regard the question from any other point of view than its bearing upon the great interests of the Government and of the people. I felt constrained to forget my hostility to a paper-money system, and was only willing to remember the circumstances supposed to have compelled its introduction during the period of the war Great wars have always been carried on under such a system, judgment and experience seemed to concur that this country could not hope to be an exception to the rule. I do not, therefore, now propose to discuss the system itself, nor attempt to point out its imperfections. I desire to see nothing but the great facts that we are in the midst of a civil war; that men and money are necessary for its prosecution; that the national life must be preserved, the honor of our arms sustained, and the integrity of the laws of the United States vindicated. A financial system, the offspring of this great necessity, has grown up. It has been in operation for the past three years. It is interwoven in every part of our industrial system. We cannot abolish it if we would; we ought not to do so if we could. We must wait for peace to prevail before we undertake to pull down the structure and build up another. To undermine and destroy it now is to bury the nation under its ruins.

The introduction of this perfectly legitimate and necessary bill gave rise to a very remarkable debate. The bill was opposed because it conferred fresh and enlarged powers on the Secretary of the Treasury. The injurious effects of the rapid accumulation of gold in the Treasury, as shown in its advance and price, and the consequent advance in the prices of all the necessaries of life, were not denied; but these evils were not considered so important as the consequences which might flow from increasing the Secretary's powers. The Government was actually the unwilling instrument of the speculators on the seaboard, and was in the position of the capitalist who is lending money upon gold to advance its value; was hoarding gold beyond its requirements, making it daily more and more scarce in the market, was itself depreciating the currency and feeding speculation; and yet this House was disposed to consider the passage of a bill directing the sale of the surplus on hand as the greater evil of the two. I did not so regard the subject. I felt that the national credit was endangered by this action on the gold market, and I was in favor of instructing the Secretary to sell, at his discretion, all the s

lions of mineral wealth folded in its vast embrace. They believe in the construction of the Pacific railroad; in an exodus of millions of men to the Rocky mountains, prepared with their machinery to grind them to powder, and produce from their prolific sides huge volumes of treasure. They believe in the iron, the coal, the copper, the lead, the silver, the cinnabar, and all the valuable metals which they know to exist in unlimited quantities within that vast region of seven hundred million acres; and if they are willing to buy the funded debt of the nation on this security, how can you reconcile it that the $400,000,000 currency, based in reality on the same security, should sell at thirty-three and a third to forty per cent. discount? "There is more in this, if our philosphy could but find it out." Let us examine some of the reasons why this confidence should exist. Sir, in the very remarkable and highly valuable report of Hon. Samuel B. Ruggles, made in September of last year, to the International Statistical Congress at Berlin, on the resources of the United States—a paper that should be circulated all over the country—I find the following valuable statistics on the subject of the increase of the population of the United States when compared with other countries.

The population of France increased thirty-seven per cent. in sixty years, from 1801 to 1861; of Prussia, seventy-nine per cent. in forty-five years, from 1816 to 1861; of England and Wales one hundred and twenty-one per cent. in sixty years, against an increase in the United States of five hundred and ninety-three per cent. in the same length of time.

The increase of the national wealth within the last ten years is thus presented in the same report; assessed value of property actually taxed in 1850, leaving out the assessed value of slaves, was $6,174,780,000, and in 1860, $14,223 618,068; leaving an increase in the decade of $8,048,825 840. Mr. Ruggles thus distributes this vast increase of the national wealth: to New England $735,754,244; the middle Atlantic or carrying and commercial States, from New York to Maryland, inclusive, $1,834,911,579, and to the food producing interior itself, embracing the eight great States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri, $2 810,000.

Now, sir, at this rate of increase, in 1870, six years hence, we shall have $35,000,000,000 of national wealth, and in 1880, in only sixteen years, 80,000 000,000.

Sir, the legal tender currency of $400,000,000, if divided equally among these States, to be paid by them out of this increased wealth, would have been extinguished in the first six months of the year 1860, and the balance remaining on hand of the increase of this wealth of the ten years preceeding would have been the enormous sum of $7,500 000,000.

These figures are presented, Mr. Speaker, in order to show how unimportant is this amount of currency when regarded or examined in connection with the nation's ability to pay it. And yet we are told that the country is on the verge of hopeless ruin. No, sir. Let the Secretary only adhere to the principles and to the language of his report. In the language of the poet, the nation

> "Is far as the farthest from ruin;
> The fields seem to know what their master is doing;
> And pasture and orchard and cornfield and lea
> All catch the infection, as generous as he."

In this connection, or in connection with that vast section of this country which stretches away from the Missouri to the Pacific, so forcibly alluded to in the report to which I have referred, let me request my colleague from New York, who is filled with apprehension of coming woe in the shape of national ruin growing out of the creation of $400 000,000 of paper money, to pass for a few moments from this hall to the foot of the great marble staircase that leads to the upper story of this building. His attention will be arrested at the foot of the steps by a magnificent work of art illustrating the declaration of the distinguished Bishop Berkeley—for I believe this country is indebted to him for that brief but expressive sentence—"Westward the course of empire takes its way."

Sir, we all know my colleague to be a man of fine imagination and of quick perceptions. As he will gaze on this effort of the gifted artist, he will in spite of himself find his heart swelling under the inspirations that will sweep unbidden over his kinder nature and his gentler judgment. Sir, he will acknowledge that in the truths of to day the prophetic declarations of the writer of that sentence have been already realized. The course of empire has been westward. Hundreds of thousands of men have surged over to the shores of the Pacific like a flood, and now, like the tidal pulses of the sea, are rolling backward again east to the Rocky Mountains to meet the still rolling western waves at the same point. On the sides of those mountains, and in the basins and valleys which they create, an empire of millions of human souls are destined ere long to concentrate their mighty enegies, struggling with the seaboard for the supremacy in material wealth. Sir, they will be indorsers of this $400,000,000. Twenty-five millions of people living to day have made these bonds or obligations. Forty-two millions of people will guarantee them in 1870. Why, sir, that is only six years hence, and according to the census of 1860, fifty-six millions will look after the debt if it is not paid in 1880, only sixteen years hence, backed up by $82,000,000,000 of capital or national wealth. Sir, no comment is necessary in the face of these wonderful figures!

But, Mr. Speaker, let us for the sake of argument suppose, what I will admit is hardly supposable, that this Government should, in the course of its struggles, overwhelmed with new embrassments, find itself unable to pay its interests on its funded debt for one or more years, what would be the result? Viewed in the light of history it might bring national concern and mortification, but not national disgrace. Nor would it retard our national growth for a single hour. The soil would still produce its teeming

millions of grain; the Pacific slope its immense treasures of gold and silver. The tide of population would still sweep in in hundreds of thousands. Our industry would still flourish, our people labor, and the country, in all its greatness and its glory still remain. Sir, we have already seen in our own brief history that which will serve as an illustration as to what may be seen again upon a larger scale.

There are two memorable instances on record which are worth more than a passing thought for the splendid lessons that they teach.

The western States, led on by a spirit of enterprise far in advance of the actual development in material wealth and in population, contracted debts for their internal improvements. In a dark financial hour they failed to pay their interest, and their obligations declined from a premium of twenty per cent. down to eighty per cent. below par. The great State of Ohio trembled to her centre at the time for her apprehensions and fears. And powerful Pennsylvania with all her wealth saw her securities sixty per cent. below par. Some years elapsed before the western States responded. But, sir, they did respond, nobly responded, paid every dollar, and so vindicated the judgment of the pioneers who marked out the system of internal improvements. They vindicated the judgment of the investers in their securities who bought as men now buy the funded debt of the United States on what they see and believe in the future of this country.

Hence, I would urge upon the Secretary of the Treasury the great importance of acting with promptitude upon the clear and comprehensive language contained in his report; to borrow in the open money market, and at the market price, every dollar hereafter demanded by the wants of the Government. I would advise a sale of the funded debt to any extent necessary; and I would urge upon this House to exhaust its ingenuity in showing the magnitude of the security offered by the nation, and the great and growing power of the Republic, in order to facilitate the Secretary in the most effective manner in all his future negotiations.

The States of Indiana and Illinois are worthy of especial mention as affording the evidence of the wonderful recuperation of our people within the State limits. It is within the recollection of many members of this House, indeed all of them, how the realization of the financial disasters that broke over those young States of the West, and swept the sensibilities of both hemispheres. Europe was largely interested in these obligations, and very large amounts of them were held in this country. These States were covered with ignominy and reproach, and they were compelled to endure the base charges of repudiation and bankruptcy. Sir, they were never for one moment bankrupt, nor did they even for one moment falter in the resolution to repair the disasters of that fearful period by an early liquidation of all their indebtedness. Sir, the example of these States to their brethren of this country will live in all coming time, and it stands out, and will ever stand out, as the most incontrovertible testimony that the nation of which they form so magnificent, so illustrious and so distinguished a part, will pay every dollar, both principal and interest, be it funded debt or legal tender—every dollar expended to perpetuate the structure of this Government in all its splendid proportions, in all its graceful outlines.

The other instance to which I would refer is the railroad crisis. Railroad stocks and bonds passed in public estimation from a high premium almost to zero. Thirty-three thousand miles had been built, costing $1,300,000,000, or an amount equal to the present national debt; miles of railroad built by the enterprise of our people, and more than all Europe besides. Sir, when the hour came, and these securities were unsalable; when these corporations did not pay their interest, and when men who held them seemed in despair, what did it accomplish for the system itself? It did not destroy the railways; it did not diminish traffic; it did not stay the strong arm of the agriculturist; it did not retard the growth of our population. No, sir, the system was bound to live; it belonged to this, the nineteenth century; it was conceived in great foresight and wisdom, and it survived through new economies and the introduction of wiser and more prudent counsels in its management.

Who suffered by this remarkable crisis? Not the owners of the property, for they saved their money in the revival of the prices of both bonds and stocks; nor the country, for it remains teeming with prosperity, productiveness, and power, stimulated and strengthened by this gigantic system of internal improvements.

Now, sir, where is the difference between the funded debt of a great community and the funded debt of a smaller community, or the debt and obligations of incorporated companies? Show me the difference in the character of the calamity that would befall the Government if we should fail to pay interest for a single year, and the calamity that befell the State of Illinois under the like circumstances or the circumstances to which I have referred.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this, Mr. Speaker, I take to be simply that the only thing which the country has to fear is the continued depreciation of the $400,000,000 of legal tender, which the people sell at thirty three to forty per cent. discount under the influence of the marvelous fears generated and encouraged by those who are utterly ignorant of the power and resources of the nation. To my understanding all our trouble lies with the legal tender. It is a matter of no consequence to the people of the country as a nation, as to what the funded debt may sell at in the mutations of the future. The Government has only to look after the interest upon the debt and the principal at its maturity. With the currency, which every man is bound by law to receive for his property, it is another affair. There is no time fixed for its final extinguishment, and our enemies seek to discredit and destroy it both at home and abroad. Peo-

ple who take it hasten to invest it in real property, while speculation lives and flourishes by holding it up to public odium and contempt.—The more speculation can discredit it, the more speculation thrives.

Speculation is sleepless in its efforts to discredit it; and yet, sir, there is a way to remedy the difficulty. It is by familiarizing the people with the power, resources, and wealth of the nation; and this in my judgment is the duty of every Representative in this House, and of every intelligent and reflecting citizen out of it. If this $400,000,000 of currency were secured to be paid to morrow, if the nation could begin to see it expire by the establishment of a sinking fund of ten per cent. per annum, which would destroy it all in ten years, or if, by legislation, the Secretary was directed to burn $100 000 of it per day until the whole $400,000,000 were destroyed, do you imagine that you would hear anything more of a rise in gold? Sir, it would be the death of the speculators on the sea-board, and the nation would rise from its apprehensions full of fresh power and energy. So small an effort as this, in my opinion, would reduce the expenses of this Government thirty-three and one-third per cent. per annum. If, sir, I am right in this conclusion, why should the people be inflamed with fresh fears by the dark predictions of impending bankruptcy and ruin? And why are we not bound to present, in contradiction to statements such as I have referred to, facts that lead the mind to an entirely different judgment?

Sir, I repeat with all the emphasis I am capable of expressing, that in advocating every measure for strengthening our financial system; by encouraging the Secretary of the Treasury to persevere in carrying out the ideas distinctly presented in his annual report; by pointing out, to the extent of my humble ability, the way to roll back the current that has set in in such irresistible force against the public credit; by pointing out in even so feeble a manner the vast resources of our country, and showing that an issue of $400,000,000 of currency, which, after all, is only a substitute for the gold and bank circulation it has displaced, I fulfill my duty as a Representative. The people, who are to be swept away in case of so fearful a calamity as national bankruptcy, will sustain me in my efforts, and will sustain all those who take the same course in the midst of the emergencies of this fearful contest.

In the course of the debate, Mr. Speaker, the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts who advocated the proposition to empower the Secretary of the Treasury to anticipate the interest on the public debt, and so dispose of the surplus gold in the Treasury, and avoid its accumulation hereafter by the same means, declaring that, disguise or conceal it as we might, the currency had depreciated to the extent indicated by the price of gold.

Sir the quotation daily made for gold in the New York market is certainly an indication for the day of the positive depreciation of the currency. Any one who owns gold can certainly sell it at the New York quotation for paper. No one can deny the truth of this proposition; but I submit to that gentleman, and to those who concur with him in opinion, whether there are not many good grounds for the belief that there are causes operating to produce this depreciation unknown before in the history of paper money, and whether some of them may not be regarded as wholly artificial, and capable of being easily exposed and dispelled? Sir, I think there are artificial means constantly being used to influence the price of gold. These means have been employed since the suspension of specie payments. They have increased from month to month for the past year, just in proportion to the growth of speculation, which to day exceeds in volume anything ever known before in the history of civilization. It has become necessary for the safety of this huge structure of illegitimate traffic that the price of gold should continue to rise in respect to the currency; and, sir, it will not be permitted to decline if human ingenuity and human effort can prevent it. Such a state of things must give birth to every species of device and to every kind of artificial process. They will come in the form of misrepresentations of the military situation of the country and exaggerated statements of any defeats in the field; they will be in the shape of extensive combinations for the temporary purchase of the floating gold in the market; in the false statements as to the character and condition of the public debt, and in the objects and designs of the Government; and all this is rendered more easily available by the ignorance that is permitted to prevail as to the resources and power of the nation.

To illustrate my view more fully as to "causes hitherto unknown" now operating to the prejudice of the currency, I would ask the House to regard New York city the great commercial and financial center, connected by the electric wires with every city and every town of any importance in every State not in rebellion, away to the far off Pacific. The opinions of representative men are solemnly uttered in this House that national bankruptcy and repudiation are surging at our feet to ingulf us in its formidable waves. The lightning that carries this fearful verdict to the people of the country flashes the tidings to the city of New York almost instantly from innumerable points in the shape of positive orders to buy gold, to buy merchandise, to buy commodities. Thousands of orders reach that great mart in an hour, and through all hours of the day, and hence a traffic, boundless in extent, and all in one direction, all to purchase property at the market prices, without limit, is carried on in that city by a frightened and phrenzied population. Has the currency depreciated because of these transactions? Is national bankruptcy really here because of such declarations? I cannot so regard it. The truth is that this modern instrument, electricity, is playing a new and most important part in the affairs of men, and for the first time in the greatest drama in the history of civilization. It so concentrates and so intensi-

fies the incidents of human life, so entirely controls and governs them, that those who measure the present by the past utterly fail to arrive at proper or just conclusions. Sir, I look for the moment when the people of the United States, moved by different impulses, influenced by calmer counsels, led by wise judgments, and enlightened by the spirit of truth, will see with a clear vision the actual condition of their country, and be overwhelmed with shame and mortification at their own folly.

Suppose, Mr. Speaker, the existence of some vast building or theatre crowded with thousands of human beings, all intent upon the enjoyment of some great dramatic spectacle; and suppose that in the midst of their engrossment of the play, in obedience to a concerted signal, a few voices should raise the appalling cry of fire, and rush through the narrow outlets toward the street. Does it need any one to foretell the fearful disasters that might follow the efforts of that frenzied multitude in their attempts to escape through the contracted and crowded corridors? Sir, hundreds might be crushed to death, while thousands were being robbed by those who had precipitated the calamity. Sir, will any one undertake to declare that the building is really on fire because of the infuriated cry of fire? I think not, sir; and yet *such* is the condition of the people of this country on the great question of the national currency. Hundreds have been crying fire for the past three years, while multitudes have been endeavoring to escape the fearful calamity which is said to threaten the paper system. It is to be entirely demolished, say our enemies: and while the cry continues, and every imaginable auxillary is being used to magnetize the nation into such a belief, and while the people are rushing out of the building in mad disorder, a system of pillage is going forward that defies description, and human ingenuity is taxed to its utmost capacity to keep up the alarm, that the spoils of the enterprise may augment, and the opportunities for plunder survive a little while longer.

I regard, sir, the depreciation of the currency of the United States from thirty-three to forty per cent. discount for gold as a monstrous crime or a fearful delusion; I regard every man as guilty of crime who does anything to assist that depreciation. While the few are benefiting by it, while the capitalists are rejoicing over their advantages, the masses of our countrymen are suffering tearfully, and must continue to suffer still more, unless we awake to the magnitude of the crisis, and use the great facts that God has furnished us with to counteract the trouble and restore the public confidence in all classes of our securities.

Sir, it may be urged that the most gifted intellects and the most profound wisdom have been exerted on the side of truth for the benefit of the nation, and that no good reason can be assigned for the declaration that which is false has been the most extensively circulated through the modern machinery of the telegraph. answer, that during the whole of this war, certainly during the existence of the Thirty-Eighth Congress, the talent of this House has not been exerted on the side of those questions which are operating so powerfully on the interests of the people apart from the war. The war itself, the measures for its prosecution and final settlement, have engrossed its entire attention, while for the want of practical legislation the solid industry of the country is being subordinated by wild speculation, and the currency rotting away daily, to the almost irreparable damage of the national interests.

But, sir, I look hopefully into the future. I cannot but believe that there is a great change approaching. The Secretary of the Treasury has indicated the policy which he designs hereafter to persue. He asks no more legal-tender money from this Congress. He marks out for himself a well defined line in the direction of a sound and stable state of things, along which he is resolutely determined to pass. A man reads with no understanding who does not detect such a resolution in his report to this Congress. Sir, this policy will have the effect to check the speculative madness of the present hour; it will have the effect to re-establish public confidence in the power of the nation and in the soundness of its obligations; it will restore to sanity those who are mad, and bring about a reaction of public sentiment in favor of the currency which so many have been dishonoring, and which, for a time, is indispensable to the safety and life of the nation.

When this moment arrives, as arrive it assuredly will, we shall again realize the influence of electricity. The current of disorder will as suddenly subside; it will be rolled backward to its source with an impetuosity of terrible strength. The wires will again be in requisition, and flash from all parts of the United States to the great centre of traffic; but conveying very different tidings from what they have so long been used as the instrument. Sir, on that day I commend New York to the especial notice of this House. With the decline in gold hugh values will disappear, from thirty-three and one third to fifty per cent., in a single day, and the masses of our people begin to find the proceeds of their labor again equal to their necessities.

Sir, it is our solemn duty to assist in bringing about such a state of things. The first step we are bound to take is to relieve the Government from the fearful position of being a hoarder of gold. It cannot afford to be an instrument in the hands of its enemies, a participator in the depreciation of its currency, a party to the speculators of the seaboard. It cannot be auxiliary to that without precipitating its own ruin.

The second step should be to allay the public fears as to the value and extent of the legal-tender issue. The amount is but $400,000,000, not $1,000,000,000. Instead of an unlimited issue hereafter, not one dollar more is to be added; but, on the contrary, the amount in circulation is to be reduced and a more enlarged system of taxation established. Such, from the

language of the Secretary's report, is to be the future policy of the Government.

The third is to exhibit and keep before the people the absolute resources and power of the nation, and show the difference between its ability to meet the formidable emergencies of this war and the ability of other nations at other periods to meet the emergencies of their revolutionary and other contests, because of the comparison that is constantly being instituted; to show that no parallel whatever can be drawn between the struggles been nations in the Old World. Comparisons are frequently instituted between the condition of the currency of the United States and that of the French assignats during the period of the Revolution. Why, sir, France issued $9,000,000,000 of that kind of paper within about the same time that we have issued $400,000,000, or less than five per cent. of that of France. Sir, there can be no parallel between the cases, certainly none when we regard the question in connection with the resources of the two Powers. The increases of the population of this country over that of France for the past ten decades is a plain answer to the question.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, we must instruct the people as to the difference between currency and funded debt, a thing that seems to be so little understood. If we keep constantly before the public view the vast security afforded for the final extinguishment of our debt, and show our abundent resources to meet the continued demands of the war for a long time to come, in case it should be necessary to continue it, there need be no fear of bankruptcy or repudiation.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

UNION EXECUTIVE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

Hon. E. D. MORGAN, of New York.
" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.
" I. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
(*Senate.*)

Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois.
" R. B. VAN VALKENBURG, N.
" J. A. GARFIELD, of Ohio.
" J. G. BLAINE, of Maine.
(*House of Representatives.*)

E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman*, JAS. HARLAN, *Treasurer*. D. N. COOLEY, *Sec'y*

COMMITTEE ROOMS, *Washington, D. C., Sept.* 2, 1864.

DEAR SIR: The Union Congressional Committee, in addition to he documents already published, propose to issue immediately he following documents for distribution among the people.

1. McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed.
2. George H. Pendleton, his Disloyal Record and Antecedents.
3. The Chicago Copperhead Convention, the men who composed and controlled it.
4. Base surrender of the Copperheads to the Rebels in arms.
5. The Military and Naval Situation, and the Glorious Achievements of our Soldiers and Sailors.
6. A Few Plain Words with the Private Soldier.
7. What Lincoln's Administration has done.
8. The History of McClellan's "Arbitrary Arrest" of the Maryland Legislature.
9. Can the Country Pay the Expenses of the War?
10. Doctrines of the Copperheads North identical with those of the Rebels South.
11. The Constitution Upheld and Maintained.
12. Rebel Terms of Peace.
13. Peace, to be Enduring, must be Conquered.
14. A History of Cruelties and Atrocities of the Rebellion.
15. Evidences of a Copperhead Conspiracy in the Northwest.

Address— Free.
Hon. JAMES HARLAN,
Washington, D. C.

no. 10

THE WAR COMMENCED BY THE REBELS.—COPPERHEADS OF THE NORTH THEIR ALLIES.

SPEECH

OF

JOHN D. DEFREES,

IN

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

MONDAY EVENING, AUGUST 1, 1864.

PUBLISHED BY THE UNION CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

We are soon to exercise the elective franchise, secured to us by our admirable form of government.

Every citizen should desire to use it so as to produce the greatest good to the country. To do so he ought to seek every possible means of forming a correct judgment; and when his mind is made up, his own conviction of the right ought to control him, unawed by partizan prejudice or by the clamor of those who assume to be party leaders.

To aid in forming a correct judgment it is well to bring to our recollection many historical facts, which cannot be contradicted or perverted.

Directly after the American Revolution the States entered into articles of confederation for their government. The experiment proved a failure. The subsequent formation and adoption of the federal Constitution was for the purpose of "securing a more perfect Union;" of constituting the United States one nation—a Republic—or, in the language of Washington, of "consolidating the Union."

So complete a system of government never before existed, and it became the admiration of the lovers of liberty throughout the world. The prayers of its founders, as they passed from earth, were for its perpetuity. It was received by their children and cherished as an inheritance above all price. With them the man who dared to lisp of its destruction was branded as a traitor and an enemy of mankind.

L. Towers, printer.

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In time, bold, bad men, disappointed in their ambitious aspirations, began to conspire for its overthrow. They knew that their designs could only be accomplished through the means of party organization. The democratic party, which then had the ascendency, was selected for that purpose. They became its leaders and began insidiously to poison the minds of their followers.

It would require more time than allowed in an ordinary address to give the progress of their plans, but the result is to be seen in the present condition of our country.

Notwithstanding the efforts of the conspirators favorably to prepare their followers for the event, when their treason culminated in their attack upon Fort Sumpter, the whole people of the free States declared that they would put down the rebellion at all hazards. Their mighty uprising for this purpose was the grandest and most glorious spectacle ever presented to the contemplation of mankind, whilst the fact that so many of the same people have since shown themselves lost to the feelings of patriotism which then controlled them, is the most melancholy event on the page of history.

Then, they determined to stand by the President in his efforts to enforce the laws and to maintain the integrity and supremacy of the Goverment.

Now, many of the same men denounce all his efforts with a bitterness equalled only by the denunciations of the traitors in arms against that Government.

Why this change and how produced? The answer is apparent —by assumed leaders of the Democratic party, who are now acting in concert with the enemies of their country in the vain hope that they may thus achieve political power.

Relying on arousing the partizan feelings of the past, they resort to the most glaring falsehoods to accomplish their purpose. They now tell their followers that the war was commenced by the people of the free States against their innocent and inoffensive brethren of the South, when they know that they utter an untruth.

The people cannot be thus deceived. They remember but too well the action of the conspirators immediately after the election of Mr. Lincoln and previous to the expiration of Mr. Buchanan's term of office.

Look at the record:

December 20,1860.—Capture of Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney by the South Carolina troops.

January 3, 1861.—Capture of Fort Pulaski by the Savannah troops.

January 3.—The United States arsenal at Mount Vernon Alabama with 200,000 stand of arms seized by the Alabama troops.

January 4.—Fort Morgan in Mobile Bay taken by Alabama troops.

January 9.—The United States steamer Star of the West was fired into and driven off by the rebel batteries on Morris Island when attempting to furnish Fort Sumter with supplies.

January 9.—Mississippi seceded; vote of the convention, 84 to 39.

January 10.—Fort Jackson, Fort Phillip, and Pike, near New Orleans, captured by the Louisiana troops.

January 11.—Alabama seceded; vote of convention, 62 to 29.

January 11.—Florida seceded.

January 14.—Capture of Pensacola navy-yard and Fort McRea by Alabama troops.

January 18.—Surfender of Baton Rouge arsenal to Louisiana troops.

January 19.—Georgia seceded; vote of convention, 203 to 87.

January 26.—Louisiana seceded; vote of convention, 113 to 19. New Orleans Mint and Custom House taken.

February 1.—Texas seceded; vote of convention, 166 to 7. Submitted to a vote of the people February 23 and took effect 2d of March.

February 2.—Seizure of Little Rock arsenal by Arkansas troops.

February 4.—Surrender of the revenue cutter Castle to the Albama authorities.

February 5.—The Southern Congress met at Montgomery, Alabama.

February 8.—The provisional constitution adopted.

February 9.—Jeff Davis and Alex. Stephens were elected President and Vice President of what they call the southern confederacy.

February 17.—Twiggs transferred the United States property in Texas to the rebels.

February 18.—Jeff Davis was inaugurated President of the conspirators.

March 2.—The United States revenue cutter was seized by the rebels in Texas.

Mr. Lincoln was sworn into office on March 4, 1861, *after* all

the above treasonable acts had taken place. Before taking the oath required by the Constitution, "to execute the office of the President of the United States, and to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States," he read his inaugural address, in which he said:

"Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States that by the accession of a Republican Administration their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There never has been any serious cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in all the public speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from those speeches when I declare that "I have no power directly, or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful power to do so and I have no inclination to do so."

The Congress, whose term had expired the day on which Mr. LINCOLN was inaugurated, had done every thing in its power to disarm the apprehensions of the southern States on the same question. It had passed a resoluion submitting an amendment of the Constitution so as to make any interference with slavery impossible. It created governments for three new Territories, Nervada, Dacotah, and Colorado, and passed no law excluding slavery from any of them.

The conspirators, however, continued their efforts for the overthrow of the Government:

March 5. Beauregard assumed the command of the troops besieging Fort Sumpter.

March 13. Alabama ratified the constitution of the traitor States: vote of the convention, 87 to 6.

March 16. Georgia ratified the constitution of the rebel States, and, previous to the first of April, all the States in rebellion had done the same thing.

The attack on Fort Sumpter was commenced on the 12th of April, 1861, and after thirty-four hours bombardment it surrendered.

All this took place before Mr. LINCOLN asked for troops to enforce the laws.

In view of these facts, no honest man can or will say that the war was commenced by the present Administration. To do so would be a proclamation of his own infamy.

Those of the North who are co-workers with the conspirators some times say, in justification, that the South had suffered wrong at the hands of the Northern people. The assertion is as false as the charge that the present Administration commenced the war. Let Mr. Stephens, the Vice President of the rebel States, be heard on that point. He, certainly, with them is good authority. In a speech made in convention against secession, he said:

"Pause, I entreat you, and consider for a moment what reason you can give that will even satisfy yourselves in calmer moments—what reasons can you give to your fellow-sufferers in the calamity that it will bring upon us? What reasons can you give to the nations of the earth to justify it? They will be the calm and deliberate judges in this case? and to what cause or *one* overt act can you point on which to rest the plea of justification? What right has the North assailed? What interest of the South has been invaded? What justice has been denied? and what claim founded in justice and right has been withheld? Can either of you to-day name one governmental act of wrong deliberately and purposely done by the Government at Washington of which the South has a right to complain? I challenge the answer! While, on the other hand, let me show the facts (and believe me, gentlemen, I am not here the advocate of the North, but I am here the friend, the firm friend and lover of the South and her institutions, and for this reason I speak thus plainly and faithful to *yours, mine*, and every other man's interest, the words of truth and soberness,) of which I wish you to judge, and I will only state facts which are clear and undeniable, and which now stand as records authentic in the history of our country.

When we of the South demanded the slave trade or the importation of Africans for the cultivation of our lands, did they not yield the right for twenty years? When we asked a three-fifths representation in Congress for our slaves, was it not granted? When we asked and demanded the return of any fugitive from justice, or the recovery of those persons owing labor or allegiance, was it not incorporated in the Constitution? and again ratified and strengthened in the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850?

Do you reply that in many instances they have violated this compact, and have not been faithful to their engagements? As individuals and local communities they may have done so, but not by the sanction of Government, for that has always been true to Southern interests. Again, gentlemen, look at another fact: when we have asked that more territory should be added, that we might spread the institution of slavery, have they not yielded to our demands and given us Louisiana, Florida, and Texas, out of which four States have been carved, and ample territory for four more to be added in due time, if you, by this unwise and impolitic act, do not destroy this hope, and, perhaps, by it lose all, and have your last slave wrenched from you by stern military rule, by the vindictive decree of a universal emancipation which may reasonably be expected to follow?

But, again, gentlemen, what have we to gain by this proposed change of our relation to the General Government? We have always had the control, and can yet if we remain in it, and are as united as we have been. We have had a majority of the Presidents chosen from the South, as well as the control and management of those chosen from the North. We have had sixty years of Southern Presidents to their twenty-four, thus controlling the Executive Department.

No man has controverted, or can controvert these facts. Who then so base as to justify the rebellion?

While the Government is using every possible effort to maintain its existence, an organization has been entered into by many persons at the North to co-operate with the conspirators in its destruction. To accomplish their object, assuming the specious name of the "Peace Democracy," they resort to the meanest acts of the most grovelling demagogue to prejudice the people against the Administration. Read the following extracts from speeches and newspapers, made and written in the North in aid of the conspirators.

Speaking of President Lincoln, the Sellingrove (Pa.) *Times* says:

"He is a bloody monster. He is hell's Pandora box brought to earth and reopened for the destruction of this foolish people, who hug him to their bosoms until, like an Egyptian adder, he stings them to death. By his elevation to power,

every mean principle in the man's composition has been brought out and fanned into a blaze of destruction. He is a liar, a thief, a robber, a brigand, a pirate, perjurer, a traitor, a coward, a hypocrite, a cheat, a trickster, a murderer, a tyrant, an unmitigated scoundrel, and an infernal fool. In less than one year he has, by the force of circumstances, certainly not by his wisdom, became absolute monarch over a race of imbeciles, who, because they deserve it, have become willing slaves and vassals. He commenced the present war with dishonest motives; he has carried it on under false pretences; and, in the end, he will so effectually cheat the people out of their liberties that they cannot recover them unless through bloody revolution."

A Mr. J. D. Murphy, a "Peace Democrat" of New Hamshire, on the 22d January last, emitted *his* poison, as follows:

"The Democrats have submitted to the despotic sway of Abe Lincoln for three years, thinking it better to endure wrong for a short time than to risk all by a last appeal to arms. But now the time is coming when we can change our rulers. Rather than submit four years longer to Abe Lincoln, and be overrun by the hordes of his hireling soldiery, let us ring out the cry of old, 'To your tents, O Israel!' Democrats should arm and organize, and drill clubs, companies, battalions, regiments and brigades, for these blood thirsty abolitions and shoddyite thieves, and traitors are a wind broken, spavined, dyspeptic race, and one regiment of Democrats could whip three of them."

This man is for "peace" with the conspirators, but for war with the freemen of the North, his neighbors! Shame!

Read still further extracts—the outpouring of impotent wrath and vileness:

"There has never been anything called for by the South, and there never can be, that I would not willingly consent to."—*Speech of State Senator Clark, of Wisconson, March*, 1862.

"History will relate that we (the North) manufactured the conflict, forced it to hot-bed precocity, nourished and invited it.—*Detroit Free Press, April* 16, 1862.

"We tell them (Congress) that a Cromwell will rise in their midst before they progress too far, who will bring their heads to the block without delay or mercy."—*Free Press, March* 24.

"I say to you, my constituents, that, as your representative, I will never vote one dollar, one man, or one gun to the administration of Abraham Lincoln to make war upon the South."—*D. W. Voorhees*, M. C., Seventh District, Indiana, April, 1861.

"The Democracy will yet teach Abe Lincoln and his co-usurpers that the way of the transgressors is not easy."—*Hon. A. C. Dodge*, of Iowa.

"This is a damned abolition war. We believe Abe Lincoln is as much of a traitor as Jeff. Davis."—*Ashland* (Ohio) *Democratic Union*.

"The President and his cabinet were never worthy of the confidence of the nation. The Democratic party should never have given its assent to the appeal to the sword after the affair ot Fort Sumter."—*Detroit Free Press*.

'The *Ahsland* (Ohio) *Union*, a Democratic organ, speaking of our soldiers, calls them hired Hessians going to the sunny Southern soil to butcher by wholesale, not foreigners but good men, as exemplary christians as any of our men.'

"The *Crawford County Forum*, referring to our soldiers, says:

"It (the Administration) has put arms in the hands of outlaws, thieves, murderers, and traitors.,'

"The *Democratic Press*, Taylorsville, Ill., speaking of the Republican party and the army, says:

"In power less than a year it has spent millions of the people's money, and five hundred thousand men are employed to steal negroes from their Southesn masters."

"If the North and South are ever re-united, we predict it will be when the Confederate States North shall adopt their new constitution, (of Jeff. Davis,) or some-

thing very near like it. There's a good time coming, boys."—*Van Buren County Press*, at Paw Paw, Michigan.

"Why this expenditure of more blood and treasure in a hopeless enterprise—why blame men for being traitors. We cannot see why."—*Detroit Free Press.*

'There, sir, is the damnable abolitionist who administers the Government. The people ought to rise up and by physical force, hurl him from the chair of the Government. In the eyes of God and men, the people would be justified. They should do it; and I will go with them."—*Judge Pratt's Speech* in the Michigan Legislature, Feb. 12, 1863.

"Geo. W. Peck, of Ohio, in a speech before the Lansing Democratic Association, March 1863, said:

"You Black Republicans began this war. You have carried it on for two years. You have sent your hell hounds down South to devastate the country,—and what have you done? You have not conquered the South. You never can conquer them. And why? Because they are our brethren."

"John H. George, N. H., Democratic nominee for Congress, declared:

"I won't do anything to sustain the President, Congress or any of the piratical crew that have control of this Government. I won't do anything that can, in any way, be interpreted as supporting this war."

Mr. Charles Reeves was the leading member of the convention in aid of the conspirators, recently held in the ninth congressional district of Indiana, to select a candidate to run against Schuyler Colfax. On that occasion he delivered himself of a violet speech, advocating unconditional peace and reconstruction, condemning the Administration. He said that if the election was carried by fraud he should advocate immediate rebellion. He also advocated the doctrine of State Rights as enunciated by his Southern brethren, and advised an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the South. He said the idea of putting down the rebellion had long since become impracticable, and advised the delegates to frown down all attempts to raise soldiers or men to prosecute this infernal war. He was loudly applauded.

At the convention which nominated the State ticket in Indiana D. H. Colerick, a prominent member from Allen county, said:

"Nine hundred and ninety-nine men of every thousand whom I represent, breathe no other prayer than to have an end of this hellish war. *When news of our victories comes there is no rejoicing. When news of our defeat comes there is no sorrow.* There is a feeling which tells of an intense desire for peace, and we ask that some resolution be passed that is in union with the prayers of the heart of the Democracy of the country, that this horrible and bloody war must cease."

That the Southern portion of the conspirators fully appreciate the services of their Northern co-laborers is shown in the following article, copied from the Atlanta (Ga.) Register, of recent date;

"Ex-President Pierce, Seymour, of Connecticut, Vallandigham, Reed, Wood, Richardson, and hundreds of others, are as hostile to the war as they are to black republicanism. These men are doing us an indirect service. They are not openly and avowedly our friends, nor could we reasonably ask this of them. But they are not our bloody enemies. *United against Mr. Lincoln and his wicked policy*, breasting the power of an overwhelming majority, firm to the traditions and precedents of constitutional liberty, the noble band of patriots is striving to erect a breakwater that shall arrest the surges of the unloosed deluge. If they did no more than re-

ainst the centralization of Mr. Lincoln, that far they are worthy of our respect and sympathy. If they hold up the banner of State rights, that far they are advocating a sentiment entitled to our admiration.

"Such is the course they are pursuing, and such a course ought to have our cordial approbation. Step by step the same convictions and the same temper that have braced them in compact unity and fiery valor to denounce ultra Federalism and New England fanaticism, will inevitably bring them upon the right ground as it respects our independence. We confess our faith in their political principles We confess our confidence that eventually these men will see the whole truth and embrace all its conclusions.

"We can gain nothing by denouncing them. We may lose much by presenting a hostile front to their peace movements. Live with them under the same government we never will. *But, meanwhile, if they will use the ballot-box against Mr. Lincoln, while we use the cartridge box, each side will be a helper to the other, and both co-operate to accomplish the greatest work which this country and the continent have witnessed.*"

The Register is right. The men in Indiana and elsewhere in the North, banded together, by secret oaths, to aid the conspirators in the overthrow of the Government, deserve, and ought to receive, the "cordial approbation" of their Southern friends.

The expectation of the conspirators to enlist the whole Democratic party of the North in their treasonable scheme will fail. Thousands and tens of thousands have already denounced them, and other tens of thousands will do it as the infamous nature of those schemes become fully known. Their love of country will not yield to the party behests of assumed leaders.

As the election approaches, in the vain hope of securing a few votes, the leaders of the Northern portion of the conspiracy are beginning to praise the soldiers while they denounce the war! This hypocracy will not avail them. Our soldiers are as well informed as those attempting to deceive them. They know that these very men have denounced them as "Lincoln's hirelings," as "hell hounds," hired to cut the throats of the Christian gentlemen of the South who are only indulging in the innocent amusement of destroying the Government!

They know that, in our State, when a proposition was made in the Legislature to secure the right of soldiers in the field to vote it was opposed by some of these now pretended friends.

It is true, as an electioneering trick, the conspirators on the State ticket, understanding that Governor Morton had asked for the return of the soldiers so as to recruit and vote, very *magnanimously*, proposed to join him in doing that which he had already done! The object is too apparent to deceive!

If this is an infernal war on the part of the Union army, as they charge, how can they expect the vote of those engaged in that war? The war cannot be denounced without, at the same time, denouncing those engaged in it. No sophistry, no decla-

mation, no yelling about abolitionism, can blind the eyes of sensible men to any other conclusion.

From the commencement of the rebellion to the present time the acts of cruelty and barbarity perpetrated by the rebels are more horrible than have ever occurred in any age of the world. The barbarity of Indian warfare bears no comparison to it.

A rebel, Colonel Eastman, has written a book, entitled "First year of the War." In that book he says:

"Like a thunderbolt, Kirby Smith fell upon the foe; our men fought desperate. and in a moment the Federal troops, who had felt certain of victory, were everywhere driven back. Scarcely had they commenced retiring when it became impossible to restrain our troops. A giant Texan, throwing away his rifle, took out his bowie-knife, with one blow he split the skull of a wounded man who had fallen to the ground, and this began the signal for a general butchery. Like wild beasts the incensed soldiery fell upon their victims, hewing, stabbing, slashing like mad men!

"A fearful panic seizes upon the Federal troops. Even the bravest fly before such an onslaught—they give way, and, in mortal fear, officers and men run for their lives like startled deer. * * * The savage spirit of our soldiers now almost bordered on the horrible. Beauregard took advantage of this vengeful mood; he ordered his whole army forward, and with wild exultant cheers fell upon the broken enemy. Stuart had collected all his cavalry together and swept across the plain like a whirlwind, clearing everything before him.

"The enemy was now at full flight at every point, and so quick was our advance that all order in our ranks was lost. A rumor suddenly spread that Kirby Smith had fallen. A cry of anger and horror passed through the ranks of the whole army. Our troops, now maddened with rage, fell mercilessly upon their opponents and a fearful massacre commenced. Scenes of horrible cruelty too fearful for description ensued. Our men were no longer human beings; covered with blood, and dust, and gunpowder, they fell upon their flying opponents with ungovernable fury!"

The butchery thus described by a rebel witness was followed by acts still more fiendish, rivaling the Scandinavians of a barbarous age, who, it is said, drank wine from the skulls of their slaughtered foe. The skulls of many a patriot, who had given his life to his country, were thus used by the rebels at their drunken carousel in commemoration of their achievements at the first Bull Run battle.

If their treatment of the dead be such as to receive the execration of mankind, what *can* be said of the horrible cruelty inflicted upon the living when in their power. The fortunes of war gave them a number of prisoners at Fort Pillow. Hundreds of these men, wounded and helpless, were butchered in cold blood—many of them on the day subsequent to the fight.

Any man in the rebel States daring to avow himself in favor of the Government of the United States is butchered by the "Peace Democrats" of that region.

In Randolph county, Alabama, recently, a Union man was

dragged from his house by the "peace Democracy" and taken to a thicket:

"After consultation it was determined to put him in the tory's yoke, but, first of all, to try to make him acknowledge to having done and said certain things of which he was innocent.

"After trying some time to accomplish their object, by questioning and threatening, they resorted to more severe measures. Untying him, they took off his clothing, laid him down upon a log, lashed him firmly to it, and with large hickory sticks commenced lacerating him. Four let in on him at once, and the numbers soon increased to six. They continued to beat him there for a long time, pausing occasionally and asking him if he would confess, and upon his refusing would let in on him more vigorously.

"The blood trickled from his back in streams. His piteous appeals in behalf of mercy were totally disregarded. Nature finally yielded, and the poor man swooned and was lost to conciousness for several minutes. As soon as he revived these hellish tormentors resumed their tortures. They split the ends of green sticks and twisting them in his hair and pulling violently, caused the most excruciating pain. This and other fiendish operations were continued for some time. They then cut off his fingers at the second joint, as also his ears close up to his head.

"The next step was to cut off his arms at the elbows, and the legs at the knees. After this operation the wretched victim fainted, and failing to recover for several minutes the murderers pronounced him dead and began to prepare to leave, but at this moment their victim showed signs of life. They now tied a rope around his neck, and hung him to a limb near by, and instantly decamped."

Who that has read of the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition—the rack, and the other modes of punishment there adopted—without a feeling of utter detestation for its founders?

The cruelties inflicted on the soldiers of the Republic at Libby Prison and Belle Island, are more horrible than those perpetrated in the secret cells of the great engine of hell, as the Inquisition has been called.

A history of those horrors would fill volumes; but we can only now glance at them.

Andrew J. Munn, of Company A, in the 100th Ohio Regiment, thus speaks of facts occurring under his own observation at Belle Island:

"The next morning we were parcelled and sent to that hell on earth, Belle Island where I witnessed sights of suffering for months that were horrible—awful—positively indescribable, and chill the blood and rend the heart with an agony of pity to remember. Day after day I have been forced to witness the slow, fearful death by starvation, of scores of our noble fellows, and to hear their agonizing moans and incoherent ravings, and pleading for something to soothe the pains of hunger. They would sometimes, when in this half-crazed condition, ask for something to save their lives, which they could feel slipping away. And their brutal jailor would drag them from their suffering couches, declaring that they would show them how to address gentlemen, and, despite their weak and emaciated condition, buck and gag the poor fellows, and force them to lie for hours beneath the scorching rays of the sun, and many times when they went to release the sufferers they would find a stiffened corpse, with the sunken eyes glazed in death, their fiendish trestment having snapped the frail thread of life, and the poor victim being at last beyond the reach of their persecution.

"One poor fellow, being reduced by starvation and ill-usage to a mere skeleton, and could scarcely stand, crawled one day up on a bank near his tent to get a little fresh air, his face burning with fever; but no sooner had he gained the summit of the bank and sat down trembling with extreme exhaustion that the exertion had

cost him, when the sentinel leaped upon the bank and harshly ordered him to get down or he would shoot him. The poor boy staggered to his feet at once, knowing full well what would be the consequence of hesitation, and attemptad to get out of sight; but before he could turn round the rebel demon raised his gun and fired, the ball passing through the poor boy's side, who rolled down the bank and expired without a groan, his heart's blood spirting in jets from the ghastly wound.

"Another time a lot of our boys were crowded in a close, narrow, and filthy cell, scarce ten feet wide, with but one small, grated window for light and air, and some being sick were obliged to lie down, and, in consequence, the men were huddled and the air foul and oppressive; and one young fellow, who was almost suffocated, arose and put his face up to the window to get breath, when the guard upon the outside, without the slightest provocation, shot him through the head, his blood and brains bespattering his comrades inside of the cell, who, with a low, thrilling cry of horror, contemplated this brutal and cold-blooded murder of their unfortunate comrade without the power of even a remonstrance, for fear of sharing a like fate."

The testimony taken before the Committee on the Conduct of the War is of similar character. The surgeon who had charge of many returned prisoners at Baltimore thus speaks of them:

"Wett's Buildings Hospital,

"Baltimore, Md, *May* 24, 1864.

"Dear Sir: I have the honor to enclose the photograph of John Breinig, with the desired information written upon it. I am very sorry your committee could not have seen these cases when first received. No one, from these pictures, can form a true estimate of their condition then. Not one in ten was able to stand alone; some of them so covered and eaten by vermin that they nearly resembled cases of small pox, and so emaciated that they were *really* living skeletons, and hardly *that*, as the result shows, forty out of one hundred and four having died up to this date.

"If there has been anything so horrible, so fiendish, as this wholesale starvation, in the history of this satanic rebellion, I have failed to note it. Better the massacres at Lawrence, Fort Pillow, and Plymouth than to be thus starved to death by inches, through long and weary months. I wish I possessed the power to compel all the northern sympathizers with this rebellion to come in and look upon the work of the *chivalrous* sons of the *hospitable* and sunny South when these skeletons were first received here. A rebel colonel, a prisoner here, who stood with sad face looking on as they were received, finally shook his head and walked away, apparently ashamed that he held any relations to men who could be guilty of such deeds.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"A. CHAPEL.

"Hon. B. F. Wade,
Chairman of Committee on the Conduct of the War."

Photographs were taken of a few of these victims of the *humane* treatment by our *innocent Southern brethren*, and printed in the report of the committee. A portion of these are here presented. Look at them on the last page, and remember that the perpetrators of these damnable cruelties are the "Peace Democrats" of the South, whom Jo. McDonnald, Dan Voorhees, and Vallandigham are so anxious to hug to their affectionate bosoms, and the fathers and brothers of those who have suffered by starvation and death are called upon to elect *such* men to office.

These men say they want peace, and, to accomplish it, they are willing to let their co-conspirators prescribe the terms.

The only conditions yet offered them are the following, published in the Richmond *Examiner* of the 16th of last October. Read them:

"Save on our own terms, we can accept no peace whatever, and must fight till doomsday rather than yield one iota of them; and our terms are:

"Recognition by the enemy of the Confederate States.

"Withdrawal of the Yankee forces from every foot of Confederate ground, including Kentucky and Missouri.

"Withdrawal of Yankee soldiers from Maryland until that State shall decide, by a free vote, whether she shall remain in the old Union or ask admission into the Confederacy.

"Consent on the part of the Federal Government to give up to the Confederacy its proportion of the Navy as it stood at the time of the secession, or pay for the same.

"Yielding up all pretensions on the part of the Federal Government to that portion of the old Territories which lies west of the Confederate States.

"An equitable settlement, on the basis of our absolute independence and equal rights, of all accounts of the Public Debt and Public Lands, and the advantages accruing from foreign treaties.

"These provisions, we apprehend, comprise the minimum of what we must require before we lay down our arms. That is to say, *the North must yield all; we, nothing.* The whole pretension of that country to prevent by force the separation of the States must be abandoned, which will be an equivalent to an avowal that our enemies were wrong from the first; and, of course, as they waged a causeless and wicked war upon us, they ought, in strict justice, to be required, according to usage in such cases, to reimburse to us the whole of our expenses and losses in the course of that war."

These are the terms of peace; and the *Enquirer* says further:

"As surely as we completely ruin their armies—and without that is no peace nor truce at all—*so surely shall we make them pay our war debt, though we wring it out of their hearts.*"

Are the people of Indiana willing to get down into the dirt and accept such terms!

These men cry "peace, peace." If they want peace why not say to their co-conspiritors, "you made the war and you can make peace. Disband your armies—go to your homes—obey the laws—maintain the union of all the States and their authority, and you can have peace." Why do they not do so?

No man more earnestly desires peace than he whose sworn duty it is to make every possible effort to maintain the Union; but he wants that peace which can only be secured and perpetuated by the overthrow of the rebellion and return of the people to their allegiance to the Government. This, under God, and by the assistance of the loyal portion of the people, he will accomplish.

In the last speech made by Judge Douglas on the rebellion, he said:

"The conspiracy is known. Armies have been raised, war is levied to accomplish it. There are are only two sides to the question. Every man must be for the United States or against it. Their can be no neutrals in this war, *only patriots* and *traitors.*"

Judge Douglas was right. That is the only issue; all others are raised to deceive the people. Let no man, by his act, sub-

ject himself to be pointed at in after times as a traitor to his country; nor let him do anything, in this dread hour, which shall cause his children to blush for shame when he shall have left the land of the living.

The rebellion in favor of extending and perpetuating slavery, brought the continuance of that institution directly in issue. To aid in putting the rebellion down it was determined to liberate the slaves, as far as possible, and to use them in our armies. Availing themselves of the existing prejudice against the negro, the northern aiders and abetors of the rebellion have proclaimed that the only object of the war is to place the negro upon a social equality with the whites!

The only answer to which such trash is entitled is, to give the leaders of the "peace Democracy" assurances that no law shall be enacted to prevent *their* associating with negroes on as perfect equality as they may desire, *provided* the consent of the negroes themselves be first obtained!

It may be that Providence has permitted the rebellion for the purpose of forever settling the slavery question. It may be that the prayers of the slaves for deliverance, which have ascended to God for two hundred years, have been heard at last; and it may be, that, in His Divine Wisdom, the present is the time selected for the last shackle to be wrested from the lacerated limbs of humanity; and if so, who will not joyfully exclaim, "Let God's will be done!"

In its consummation behold the grand and glorious spectacle! Instead of a government founded on the sighs and groans of men and women, as contemplated in the establishment of the southern confederacy, we shall have a free and united Republic, whose happiness and prosperity, and all the elements of greatness shall be far greater than ever before known in history.

No other man than he who now fills the Executive Chair of the nation ever had so great a responsibility resting upon him. Called to his position by the suffrages of the people, he dare not shrink from the performance of his duty. That amid all the cares and terrible anxieties of his position, he has honestly and faithfully endeavored to perform that duty none can reasonably doubt. That he has always done what subsequent events have shown to be the wisest thing to be done, no one pretends. It is not given to man to see into futurity, nor to any one an infaliable judgment; and yet, when the pen of impartial history shall record the events of the present time, all honor will be awarded to the man who

has so faithfully stood by his country in her hour of greatest peril, and against whose sagacity and statesmanship so little can be justly said.

The life of that country depends on his re-election. Defeated, and an ignominious peace will surely follow. The constitution of the slave confederacy will be adopted by all the States, and this continent will become a vast slave empire, to be ruled over by the most hated aristocracy that ever cursed mankind.

Are the people prepared for such an ending to the present struggle? Is it for this that they have been pouring out their life's blood for the last three years? Are they willing now to bow their necks in abject submission to the yoke of those who have been murdering their neighbors, friends and sons, in cold blood, or starving them to death in infernal prisons?

If not, then go to the polls in October, as preparatory for the Presidential conflict in November, and sustain those who are upholding the Government, and all will be well. The Republic *will* live and go on increasing in prosperity and happiness from age to age.

PHIL.
VANINGEN-SNYDER


PHIL.
VANINGEN-SNYDER

U. S. GENERAL HOSPITAL, DIV. No. 1,
ANNAPOLIS, MD.

Private **FRANCIS W. BEEDLE,**

COMPANY M, 8TH MICHIGAN CAVALRY,

Was admitted per Steamer New York, from Richmond, Va., May 2, 1864. Died May 3, 1864, from effects of treatment while in the hands of the enemy.

WEST'S BUILDING HOSPITAL,
BALTIMORE, MD.

Private **JOHN BREINIG,**

COMPANY G, 4TH KENTUCKY CAVALRY,

Admitted April 18, 1864. Improved a little for two weeks, then gradually failed and died on the 12th instant.

THE CONSTITUTION UPHELD AND MAINTAINED.

SPEECH

OF

HON. JAS. HARLAN,

OF

THE UNITED STATES SENATE.

In this country every patriot reverences the Constitution and the laws. Every wanton violation of either stirs his indignation. As in Rome the voice of the people was said to be the voice of God, so in this country the law is our only sovereign which all, from the President to the humblest among the toiling millions, must implicitly obey. Whoever wantonly tramples the Constitution and the laws under his feet, is properly held to be an enemy of the people, and at war with their dearest interest.

Relying on this reverence for the law of the land, the rebels of the South and their allies in the North, have sought to justify their treason, and secure a diversion in favor of their wicked purposes, by denouncing the President as a usurper and tyrant, and his administration as unconstitutional. So persistently have they pursued this course, as to convince many honest and patriotic citizens of its truth. So that many of the President's warmest admirers, and consistent and ardent friends of the Union, justify these supposed violations of the Constitution on the ground of "military necessity," and the duty of the President to preserve the Government. Nor will I dispute the potency of this defense of what would otherwise be the unlawful act of a nation or an individual. For the right to self-preservation is the first law of nations as well as of nature. This principle underlies every national code, and every system of legal casuistry. None are so foolish as to insist that a nation may not disregard its own laws to avoid destruction; and none except rebels steeped in crime could desire our Government to tamely submit to annihilation.

But having carefully observed the administration of public affairs by President Lincoln, and as carefully examined the charges of unconstitutionality preferred against it, I fearlessly pronounce them groundless.

Let us examine for a few minutes some of the gravest of these charges.

CALL FOR MILITIA.

1. The rebels South and North denounce the first belligerent act of President Lincoln—his call for some seventy-five thousand militia—as unconstitutional and tyranical.

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And yet the Constitution provides in so many words that Congress shall have power

"To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion." (Art 1, Sec. 8.)

And Congress had, under this provision of the Constitution, many years before provided by law for the use of the militia by the President, whenever it might become necessary for the purposes named. And the necessity had arisen; a gigantic insurrection existed; it had made open and flagrant actual war on the Government both by land and sea. And the President in pursuance of his oath to execute the laws, made the call for troops to assist him.

THE CONSCRIPTION.

2. *The Copperheads denounce the President for the "conscription" or "draft" of soldiers to fill up the depleted ranks of our armies.*

And yet none will seriously deny that all able bodied male citizens, owe their services to the republic when needed for its defense, or to aid in the enforcement of its laws; and that if they do not voluntarily spring to arms when the necessity arises, they may be compelled to serve; and that without the right to coerce the services of its citizens to aid in the common defense, and to enforce the laws, all civil government would prove a total failure. Hence sheriffs, and constables, and marshalls, in every State in the Union, when resisted in the execution of process, are authorized by law to call "by-standers," all in their reach, for assistance, and it is declared to be a crime to refuse the requisite aid. So it is now, and ever has been, and must ever continue to be when the national authorities are resisted by internal or external foes. The proper officers must have the right to require the aid of all the people, or abandon the Government. But if the services of all are not needed in any given case, there is no fairer mode of making the selection of the requisite number than by "casting lots," which is but another name for "Draft" or "Conscription."

And all know that the President did not commence raising troops in this mode until Congress enacted laws requiring it to be done. That Congress had the power to enact those laws none can dispute. For the Constitution provides that Congress shall have power

"To raise and support armies." (Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8.)

The power, therefore, is plenary—it is without restriction; the mode of raising them, the material, pay, government, length of service, character, age, color, and nationality, are all left to the discretion of Congress. And Congress directed that the President should call for volunteers, and if the quotas of the several States were not thus filled, he should select the residue from the people of the delinquent States by lot or draft. Hence, the President, so far from violating the Constitution in causing men to be drafted, has simply obeyed the law. And the law is in accordance with the plainest and most explicit provisions of the Constitution.

ARMING NEGROES.

3. *They denounce the President for violating the Constitution in arming negroes.*

And yet all know that he did not do so until Congress had enacted a law requiring this to be done. And the power of Congress to pass such a law will hardly be questioned after reading the clause of the Constitution above cited, which declares that "Congress shall have power to raise and support armies." Here is no limitation. The troops raised may be black or white, red or yellow,

and of any nationality; they may be natives or foreigners, minors or adults, slaves or owners, apprentices or masters; and so far as the question of power is concerned, may be required to serve with or without pay. Nor is this a new policy. Colored troops were employed in this country during the revolutionary war and the war of 1812—and have been, and are still, used by every nation on earth controlling colored citizens or subjects. If authorities were wanting to prove this, they might be piled up by the volume.

But I will only mention in passing that Senator Johnson, once Attorney General of the United States, a gentleman of great legal learning, and heretofore not a friend of this Administration—who has neglected no opportunity to reprimand it for every supposed weakness, error, or oversight, said in a speech on the floor of the Senate at its last session—

"Mr. President, a word or two more on this subject before I leave it. I have had occasion more than once during the session to say (and that opinion I confidently entertain) that although by the laws of the States Africans are made property, they are also under the Constitution of the United States, with reference to the war power of the Government, to be considered as persons, and may be used as persons and brought into the field to maintain the authority of the Government to which as persons they owe allegiance. If this opinion be sound, if they are persons subject to our military control, if they are persons increasing our military power, they are for the same reasons persons under the military control of the rebels, and may increase their military power, and as such it is as much the right of the United States to take them from the rebels or to use them against the rebels, as it is to take from and use against the rebels anything else that may be used by the rebels against the United States.—(*Cong. Globe.*

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.

4th. The President is accused of having interfered with the freedom of speech and of the press.

There is a difference between *freedom* and licentiousness. The *liberty* of all to *acquire* property does not include the right to *steal* and *rob*. *Freedom* of *locomotion* does not include the right to *trespass* on another's premises. Freedom to *love*, and to be *loved*, does not include the right to disturb your neighbor's domestic happiness. So "freedom of the press" does not include the right to print and circulate counterfeit bank notes; nor freedom of speech, the right to slander your neighbor, or "to give aid and comfort" to the public enemy in time of war. And if any one, under the pretense of a right to freedom of speech or of the press, commits treason, he may and ought to be restrained and punished. To pretend the contrary, would indicate extreme mental obtuseness or unpardonable and criminal wickedness.

If the President has in any case suppressed a newspaper, or arrested any one for words spoken, in which the parties were not intentionally and ostentatiously encouraging the rebels to continue the war, and stimulating their northern sympathizers to obstruct and embarrass the Government in its efforts to suppress the rebellion, it has never come to my knowledge. But whether he has or has not erred in any given case, in relation to the guilt or innocence of the party, is not the real question. All admit that his intentions are pure. The real question is one of constitutional right to prevent publishers of newspspers and stump speakers from committing treason—from giving aid and comfort to the public enemy.

And the right to suppress a newspaper used in the interest of treason is as clear and indisputable as the right to take a dagger from the hand of the assassin, tools from the counterfeiter, or muskets from the hands of the rebels. The freedom of speech and of the press is not more explicitly guarantied by the Constitution than "the right to bear arms."

But before leaving the subject, I propose to prove, from the official record,

that the Copperheads themselves do not believe their own statements on this subject.

Immediately preceding the last presidential election, Jefferson Davis offered for the consideration of the Senate, a series of resolutions declaratory of the principles which should control in the administration of the affairs of the National Government. When the second resolution of the series, which made a covert attack on the freedom of discussion, was under consideration, I offered the following as an amendment:

"But the free discussion of the morality and expediency of slavery should never be interfered with by the laws of any State or of the United States; and the freedom of speech and of the press, on this and every other subject of domestic and national policy, should be maintained inviolate in all the States."

The question being taken on this amendment, by yeas and nays, resulted yeas 20, nays 36—every Democratic Senator voting in the negative, including Bright, of Indiana, Gwinn and Latham, of California, Lane, of Oregon, Pugh, of Ohio, and Thompson, of New Jersey, all representing northern States, and all from border slave States, as well as those from the extreme South.—(Cong. Globe, 1st session, 36th Congress, pages 1937–2321.)

On the 8th of April last, when Senator Powell, of Kentucky, was denouncing the President for interfering with what he styled "freedom of speech," I called his attention to the foregoing, reminding him that *he* and *all* his Democratic associates in the Senate voted *against* free speech. He replied that the scope of the amendment would have been to send persons down South to preach insurrection to their slaves. "I would vote nay again on that resolution. I voted right."—(Cong. Globe, 1st session, 38th Congress, page 1487.) That is, according to his admission, "the freedom of speech and of the press" may be suppressed *to prevent the insurrection of negroes and to preserve slavery!* Then may not its *licentiousness* be restrained to suppress the rebellion or white men, and *to preserve the Government.*

CONFISCATION.

5th. *The Copperheads denounce the administration for the confiscation of the property of rebels and the liberation of their slaves.*

And yet the Constitution says:

"The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason."—(Art. Sec. 3.)

And Congress, in pursuance of this provision provided by law, that unless these traitors should lay down their arms and return to their allegiance within a time to be fixed by the President, they should be punished by the confiscation of all their property, including slaves.

And why should they not be thus punished? Heretofore the punishment of treason was death. This is the usual penalty for this offence in every civilized country on earth. If you may hang for treason why may you not inflict a less punishment—the loss of property? And if you may proscribe the loss of property as the punishment of treason, why may you not include slave property? Is property in slaves any more sacred than property in cattle and lands? The power conferred by the Constitution is plenary. They may declare it to be the loss of lands, cattle, mules, horses, negroes, or franchises, such as the right to vote, hold office, or bear arms. There is no limitation whatever except that the punishment declared shall not be inflicted on the children of the traitor. You shall not deprive the child of the right to vote, hold office, bear arms, or to acquire property on account of the parents treason.

EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION.

6th. The President is denounced for issuing a proclamation liberating the slaves of rebels within the rebellious districts.

And pray why not? We have just seen that "Congress may declare the punishment of treason:" that in pursuance of this provision of the Constitution, Congress did declare that all traitors who should not lay down their arms by a time to be fixed by the President, should forfeit all their property of "every kind," including slave property. The President had taken a solemn oath to take care that this and all other "laws should be faithfully executed." Within the rebellious districts this confiscation act could not be enforced by the courts. But it was believed that if not impeded by the army and navy, it would to some extent execute itself, that many thousands of the slaves if protected would abandon their rebel masters. And to secure this result the President issued his proclamation, declaring that within the rebel districts, all persons, irrespective of their former status, should be considered and treated by the United States Government as freemen; and requiring the officers of the army and navy to recognize their right to maintain their liberty. And if it is admitted to be right to punish rebels within our lines by the confiscation of their property, including slaves, pray can it be wrong to do the same thing beyond our lines so far as the effort can be made effective?

It is objected, however, that the proclamation if enforced would liberate the slaves of Union citizens as well as of rebels. And it is clear that the emancipation of slaves of Union citizens who had not aided the rebellion could not be justified under the clause of the Constitution authorizing Congress to declare the punishment of treason; and to that extent the proclamation would be void, unless justified by the public necessities; and in that case the parties thus losing slaves would have the same right to just compensation as if other property had been taken for a similar purpose. And this would be a question for the courts to adjudicate when the supremacy of the Constitution and laws shall have been restored.

SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

7th. *It is avered that the President violated the Constitution by suspending the writ of habeas corpus.*

And yet the Constitution says:

"The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."—(Constitution, Art. 1st, sec. 9.)

This is what is styled by lawyers a negative pregnant; and is equivalent to saying that "the priviledge of the writ of *habeas corpus* may be suspended when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." And as a rebellion *does* exist, the priviledge of the writ *may* be properly suspended if the public safety requires it. There can be no question of the right to suspend it: the only question that can arise is, "who can judge of the necessity?" On this question a large majority of the best legal minds of the country who have expressed an opinion on this point, conclude that the President is the proper party to excercise this judgment, as he is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies and Navies of the Republic, and is at the same time the chief executive officer entrusted with the enforcement of the laws. Others, however, conclude that Congress should decide when the public safety requires its suspension. Hence, to silence cavil Congress enacted a law formally directing its suspension during the continuance of the rebellion, whenever and wherever the President might find it necessary to secure the enforcement of the laws. And this ought to be an end of the controversy.

ARBITRARY ARRESTS.

8. The President is denounced for violating the Constitution by the "arbitrary arrests" of suspected parties and offenders in cases not founded on "in-

formation" or "indictment,"—and for authorizing their imprisonment without a trial and conviction by a jury.

These charges are usually vindictive and malicious, and are in the first instance uttered for partizan effect,—and are doubtless repeated by the shallow minded and unreflecting under the belief that no arbitrary arrest is legal and constitutional. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Any citizen has a perfect inherent right to arrest a criminal without process and to restrain him until process can be secured. And any citizen has a right without process to arrest a party to prevent the commission of crime, and to restrain him until the danger has passed. This is done every day and every night in the great cities. Men are discovered apparently on the point of committing crime, as an assault and battery, a burglary, a robbery, or a murder, and are seized and incarcerated or otherwise restrained of their liberty to prevent the commission of the offence. In all such cases, even in times of profound peace, it is idle to insist that the arrest must be preceded by a formal "information" or "indictment," or that a "jury trial" must precede an imprisonment. There would be no time for this—the delay would be fatal: instant action is necessary to prevent the crime. Such arrests are therefore not only right—but a refusal to make them would be a crime against society.

The President, when convinced that persons were about to commit treason—the gravest crime known to the laws, has caused their arrest and restraint as in the case of Vallandigham, of Ohio, and Jones, of Iowa, until the danger had passed, when they have been set at liberty.

I am not here undertaking to justify any specific case of arrest made without process. Some of them may have been unnecessary, and may have worked great personal hardship. The President may not have been correctly informed, and may have erred in any given case. He could not be everywhere in person and must necessarily rely on others for information. All I claim here is that he intended to do right, and that in principle he had a perfect right to make arrests without process to prevent the commission of crime. If not, why not? We have seen that a private citizen may do this—yea, more, that it is his duty to do so—and a wrong akin to a crime to refuse when he has the power. May not the President do what a private citizen may do to prevent the commission of offenses?

In the case of an arbitrary arrest by a private citizen without process, if the restraint were to be protracted, the party could sue out a writ of *habeas corpus*, and secure his discharge by the judge of any court of competent jurisdiction. But if made by the President in times of "invasion or insurrection" he could if he deemed that the public safety required it, as we have seen suspend the privilege of this writ and retain the person in custody.

If any doubt might otherwise exist on this point it ought to be settled in the minds of those who reverence the courts by their decisions in the case of the arrest and restraint of Vallandigham by General Burnside. While still in custody, application was made to Judge Leavitt, of the United States Court for the Southern District of Ohio, for a writ of *habeas corpus*. Vallandigham was fully heard in an able and exhaustive argument, delivered by his personal and political friend, ex-Attorney General of Ohio, George E. Pugh, who for six years was a representative of the Ohio Democracy in the United States Senate, and Judge Leavitt refused to issue the writ. This was, in effect, deciding that the arrest was constitutional; for no other question could legitimately arise than the power of the President to make the arrest without process, and the constitutionality of the restraint. In applying for this writ the party must allege that he has been illegally arrested and restrained of his liberty, setting forth the pretended grounds of restraint, if known. When brought before the court or judge, according to the principles of the common law, the question of guilt or

innocence is never tried. The legality of the restraint is the only question that can be put in issue. But the judge or court would not, of course, issue the writ and bring the party before the court for a hearing unless, according to his own showing, his arrest was illegal. As Judge Leavitt refused the writ, it is, in effect, an affirmation of the legality of the restraint. Nor can this decision be justly attributed to political bias. For this judge was appointed by President Jackson, many years before the existence of the Republican party, and he has never been accused or suspected during his long official career of the slightest divergence from the line of judicial rectitude.

An appeal was, however, taken in the Vallandigham case to the Supreme Court of the United States, in an application for a writ of *certiorari*, or an order on the Judge Advocate General to send the case to the Supreme Court for re-hearing. This application was refused after a full hearing in open court. In other words, the decision of Judge Leavitt was sustained by the Supreme Court; and the question practically settled by the court of the last resort, that during a rebellion or invasion the President may legally arrest suspected persons without process, and when in his opinion the public safety requires it, may suspend the right to the use of the writ of *habeas corpus*, and retain them in custody until the danger has passed. This right is therefore affirmed by every department of the Government, by Congress, by the President, and by the Courts. And finally the Copperhead National Convention at Chicago has stultified all that Copperhead senators, and members, and newspapers, and stump speakers, have said in denunciation of "arbitrary arrests," by the nomination of Major General McClellan for the Presidency, after his "arbitrary arrest" of the members of the Maryland legislature.

TRIAL OF ACCUSED.

9th. But, it is demanded, "why are not these parties put on trial?" "Admitting the necessity and legality of the arrests and restraint, surely they have a right to trial by a jury of their countrymen, and to be confronted with the witnesses who testify against them."

This is more spacious than sound. In the class of arrests made to prevent the commission of crime, how would it be possible to put the parties on trial? How could you try a party for an offence not committed? The utmost that could be demanded would be the release of the suspected parties, on giving bond and satisfactory security to keep the peace. And this has been done in every case where, in the opinion of the President, it was compatable with the public safety. But putting a party under bonds is but another mode of restraint substituted for imprisonment. It is the same in principle. The right to do the former involves the right to do the latter.

In cases of arrest, after the commission of the crime, what authority has the President to try, condemn, and punish the offenders? The Constitution says:

"No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger."—(Article 5, Amendments to the Constitution.)

Hence, the President and all his Cabinet, the Congress, and all the Courts combined, have not the constitutional power to put a man on trial for an alleged crime, except in the nature of a preliminary examination for the purpose of eliciting facts to justify restraint of the suspected party. This can be done only by a grand jury. The President has the constitutional right to arrest and restrain during the continuance of the rebellion any offender, or person about to commit a crime, so long as the public safety may require it. To deny this right is to deny the validity of the Constitution. But he has no right to try in

the judicial sense, or to convict, condemn, or punish any one; this is the province of the jury, the court, and the sheriff. Nor has the President put on trial, in the judicial sense, or punished any one not in the land or naval forces. When restrained of their liberty by placing them under guard, or within the walls of fortifications, the confinement was not in the nature of *punishment*, nor considered or intended to be considered infamous. They would be liable afterward as much as before such restraint to indictment and punishment by the civil authorities.

It follows, therefore, that the President has proceeded as far as he has the right under the Constitution, and not one hairs-breadth farther. The "Copperheads condemn him as a violator of the Constitution for doing what the Constitution clearly authorizes; and condemn him for not doing what the Constitution as clearly prohibits."

But it is needless to pursue this subject. All these cavils and charges of unconstitutionality are as empty as the wind. They are without a decent pretext. They all vanish under a candid, impartial analysis. No one can carefully examine them and avoid the conclusion that the measures of the existing Administration are in strict accordance with the Constitution and laws.

I therefore conclude with the declaration that, in my opinion, a more pure-minded, disinterested, self-sacrificing, generous, humane, patriotic, laborious, and God-fearing man never administered the affairs of a great nation than ABRAHAM LINCOLN. And that no living man, whose name has been mentioned in that connection, could be more safely trusted in the presidential office for the next four years. And that no one more richly deserves the second office in the gift of the American people than ANDREW JOHNSON, of Tennessee. And that if all who believe as I do perform their duty resolutely and faithfully, their triumphant election is as certain as the succession of day and night.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

UNION CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

Hon. E. D. MORGAN, of New York.
" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.
" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
(*Senate.*)

Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois.
" R. B. VAN VALKENBURG, N. Y.
" J. A. GARFIELD, of Ohio.
" J. G. BLAINE, of Maine.
House of Representatives.

E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman.* JAS. HARLAN, *Treasurer.* D. N. COOLEY, *Sec'y.*

COMMITTEE ROOMS, *Washington, D. C., Sep.* 2, 1864.

DEAR SIR: The Union Congressional Committee, in addition to the documents already published, propose to issue immediately the following documents for distribution among the people:

1. McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed.
2. George H. Pendleton, his Disloyal Record and Antecedents.
3. The Chicago Copperhead Convention, the men who composed and controlled it.
4. Base surrender of the Copperheads to the Rebels in arms.
5. The Military and Naval Situation, and the Glorious Achievements of our Soldiers and Sailors.
6. A Few Plain Words with the Private Soldier.
7. What Lincoln's Administration has done.
8. The History of McClellan's "Arbitrary Arrest" of the Maryland Legislature.
9. Can the Country Pay the Expenses of the War?
10. Doctrines of the Copperheads North identical with those of the Rebels South.
11. The Constitution Upheld and Maintained.
12. Rebel Terms of Peace.
13. Peace to be Enduring, must be Conquered.
14. A History of Cruelties and Atrocities of the Rebellion.
15. Evidences of a Copperhead Conspiracy in the Northwest.

Printed by L. Towers for the Union Congressional Committee.

James Frazier Jaques

REBEL TERMS OF PEACE.

VISIT OF REV. DR. JACQUES (COLONEL SEVENTY-THIRD REGIMENT ILLINOIS VOLUNTEERS) AND J. R. GILMORE (EDMUND KIRKE) AT REBEL CAPITAL.

WHAT JEFF DAVIS SAID.

THE NORTH MUST YIELD ALL—THE SOUTH NOTHING!

CORRESPONDENCE.

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., *Sept.* 5, 1864.

Col. JAMES F. JAQUES:

SIR: My attention has been called to two somewhat conflicting narratives of what purports to have been an interview between you and Jefferson Davis at the city of Richmond, on the subject of *peace*. One of these narratives seems to have been prepared by a Mr. Gilmore for a popular magazine; the other appears in the newspapers over the signature of Judah P. Benjamin, the rebel Secretary of State. The people feel a very deep interest in the subject named as the occasion of your visit to the rebel capital, and are, of course, anxious to have a correct statement of the character of the interview and its results, if it did in fact occur, which some deny.

My long and intimate acquaintance with you, commencing in your boyhood, when we were members of the same college class, and our uninterrupted friendship, justifies me, I think, in requesting you to be good enough to inform me under what auspices you made the visit, its object and result; including a statement of any suggestions on either side, proposing an armistice or terms of a permanent peace, and the responses.

I am the more anxious to obtain this information from you, because I cannot doubt that your high personal character, connected with the various positions of trust in church and state, in civil pursuits as well as in the field, which you have filled with so much credit to yourself, and so much satisfaction to the public, will justify all in placing implicit confidence in your statements.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

JAMES HARLAN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *Sept.* 6, 1864.

Hon. JAMES HARLAN:

VERY DEAR SIR: Your communication to me, of the 5th instant, is received. I have up to this time declined making any report of my recent visit to Richmond in the public prints, for the reason that I believe the time had not arrived for such statement from me. The facts of the interview with Mr. Davis having been laid before the proper authorities at Washington.

The facts to which you refer, viz: "that other parties have made statements somewhat at variance with each other," induces me to change my purpose.

As to the *fact* of the *trip* to Richmond, and the interview with Mr. Davis, it is presumed no one can doubt it. As to the motives that prompted and the policy that guided me in the prosecution of the mission, I may be permitted to say a word.

I have been in the army for three years, and have participated in a number of the severest and most bloody battles that have been fought during the war. I have witnessed the immense slaughter of men, and distruction of property incident to such a war. My heart has grown sick at the sight; and I have felt that, under God, some effort should be made to stop it if possible. Under a conviction of duty to my country, and to my fellow men, I started with my life in one hand, and the olive branch of peace in the other to go to our enemies, knowing that my life was at their mercy.

As to results, I believe that good would be accomplished what ever might result to me. I had no authority from the Government except permission to go; this was all I wanted. Anything else would have defeated me in my objects.

As to the danger, poetry or romance connected with the enterprise, I have no desire to speak. I have performed my duty, and am unconcerned as to what judgment others shall pass upon me or my work. God and the future will provide for and take care of that.

The interview between Mr. Davis and myself was in substance as follows: * * * * (see report.) Yours, very truly,

JAMES F. JAQUES,
Col. 73d Regiment Ill. Vols.

REPORT.

Most of the reasons for our visit to Richmond having been enumerated by another, and most of the facts and incidents of our journey having been detailed by him in a magazine article, I will not repeat them here, but proceed at once to the interview, which was substantially as follows:

I said, "Mr. Davis, I am here in an unofficial capacity. My reason for seeking an interview in that capacity is this: I have believed that our troubles when settled, and however settled, will be settled by negotiation, and that that negotiation will have to be brought about in an unofficial way. I am here in an unofficial capacity, in full possession, however, of the policy of the Government of the United States, and of the feelings of the people of the North. I come to you as a christian gentleman, understanding that I am to meet a christian gentleman. I feel that such parties can meet and talk over the most delicate matters without harm, and that great good may result from such an interview. You have made *three* unsuccessful attempts to open negotiations with the United States. If President Davis of the Confederate States of America should appoint a given number of commissioners to meet a corresponding number appointed by President Lincoln of the United States, President Lincoln would not listen to President Davis, and President Davis would not listen to President Lincoln, and if, by chance, your commissioners should get together, they would only quarrel, widen the breach, increase our troubles, and go home. I have believed that our troubles had to come—not that God had decreed them or that they were a part of His plan concerning us, but that we had reached a point in the history of the country beyond which it was impossible for us to pass and live in peace without learning important lessons.

In the North, when gentlemen rose in the Congress of the United States, the professed representatives of the southern people, and talked about dividing the country, seceding by States, or taking up arms in defence of their rights, we had to learn that you meant something. We did not believe that you meant it. We believed that you were simply attempting to frighten us into measures. We had to learn in the North that there was something there that it was necessary for us to look after. In the South you had to learn an important lesson. You had to learn that one southern man could not whip from four to six northern men. We have met in the same school—the school of experience—a dear school; there is a certain class of men that will learn there and nowhere else. We have learned in this school, and now, Mr. Davis, I feel that we are prepared to live in peace. We had also reached a point in the history of this country, where it was impossible for us to go another year without teaching the world an important lesson. We could not send our commerce upon every sea, into every port, and bring the products of every clime to our coast without exciting the jealousy of other nations, and it became absolutely necessary that we should teach them that the American people can't be whipped. Unite us and the world cannot whip us."

To these remarks Mr. Davis made this reply: "We have done our own fighting other nations have not helped you; they have not helped us."

"I have felt, Mr. Davis," I continued, "that you misunderstand us at the North in two important particulars. First, in reference to the prosecution of this war. Upon that subject with us there is but one opinion. There may be two or more candidates for the Presidency, but the principal plank in the platform of each of those candidates will be a vigorous prosecution of the war, and the only point upon which we differ is as to which party can do it most successfully. There are other persons upon the outskirts who claim to sympathize with your cause, and are long and loud in their professions of friendship for you, but they are parties in whose judgment and opinions you repose no confidence.

I represent truly the sentiments and feelings of the masses of the people of the North; and we feel that the question we are called upon to decide is, whether you shall crush the Government of the United States, or we shall crush your army; and you may rely upon it, Mr. Davis, we are not long in deciding as to which we shall do. We have reached a point in the history of this war to which I had hoped we never should come—the annihilation of one or the other of the parties.

To talk about annihilating the South or crushing the southern people, makes my blood run cold, for I allow no man to sympathize with the southern people more deeply than I do, and I am here to talk with you because I sympathize with your people.

The question that we feel to be now pressing us, is this: you and I are engaged in an individual combat; I consider you the aggressing party; it becomes evident that one of us must die. You will take my life if I don't take yours. The laws of God and man make it my privilege to take your life to save mine. I had hoped that we never should reach this point in the history of the war, and I wish to see if there cannot be some plan adopted by which this shedding of blood may be stopped.

Another point, Mr. Davis, upon which I feel you misunderstand the northen people is this: there is toward the people of the South upon the part of the people of the North a feeling of respect and of friendship, and I may say of affection, which is undying and unyielding; and if the contest in which we are engaged were ended there are millions of dollars in the North that would be poured out immediately to feed your people. Those engaged in arms might go to their cotton fields, their sugar plantations, their rice farms, and make themselves independently rich in producing those articles before they fall in price, and the northern people will feed them while they are doing it. Such is the feeling of the people of the North toward the people of the South that if this contest were once ended public sentiment would justify Mr. Lincoln in issuing a proclamation of universal amnesty, including Jefferson Davis and every man in the Confederacy."

At this point Mr. Davis spoke, and said: "We feel, Colonel, that you have a very strange way of showing your affection for us in your mode of prosecuting this war and in invading our country. You have made a great many enemies in the South.

We are not out now, Mr. Davis, I responded, making friends, we are engaged in putting down rebellion, and when we get through with that, we intend to go to work to make friends."

Again Mr. Davis spoke and said: "Colonel I foresaw the immense river of blood which is now flowing; I labored for twelve years as an honest man in the Congress of the United States to prevent it, and if I were, in the presence of my God, to be judged this moment, I could say of all the blood that has been shed not one drop of it is upon my skirts." He then proceeded to speak at length upon the subject of State Rights, State Sovereignty, the Independence of States, their right to secede, and the right of revolution; to which, however, I made no reply except to give him to understand that whilst his arguments looked plausible from his own stand point, from the position we occupy at the North these things looked very different. I did not feel, however, that I was called upon to enter into a discussion with him upon those points. He knew the northern view, and knew well that it was definitely settled.

He said further: "To talk about peace upon any other terms than the acknowledgment of our independence would be to confess that we had made a mistake. We have made no mistake, sir; we have committed no blunder; we have only assumed to do what your Constitution guarantees to you the privilege of doing. The Declaration of Independence enunciates the principle that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed; we are only following out the instincts of our nature and assume to do what the God of nature has made it our privilege to do—namely, to govern ourselves, and hence *there is no use of talking about peace on any other terms than the acknowledgment of our independence.* You talk about amnesty to Jeff. Davis and all his people. Sir, amnesty or pardon applies to the guilty, not to the innocent I have committed no wrong; my people have committed no wrong, sir; hence pardon does not apply to us it applies to the guilty."

I then by side issues attempted to get him from the position he had taken, that there was no use in talking about peace on any other terms than the acknowledgment of their independence; but every effort only caused him to set his stakes deeper, and take his position stronger on that point until he reached the ultimatum, "*our independence we will have or we will have annihilation.*" This was the great thought that seemed to possess him, to which all he said tended, and which he seemed profoundly anxious to impress upon my mind.

Our interview lasted, I suppose, three hours at least, and in the course of the conversation many things were said that were irrelevant, really, to the subject under consideration.

My friend, Mr. Gilmore, made this proposition: "Suppose we leave this question to the people North and South, let Mr. Lincoln be the Union candidate for the Presidency, and Mr. Davis the secession candidate, let the people vote North and

South for those candidates and let their decision be final." Mr. Davis replied, "that would do so far as your government is concerned; you can reach the will of the majority there; with us we cannot; our States are soverign and independent in themselves; I should have no right to ask them to vote upon such a question; we have no means by which we can reach the will of the majority on a question of that kind."

I made three attempts to leave. At the first as I rose, I said, "Mr. Davis, after closing this interview shall we meet again when this cruel war is over?" "I hope so," he replied, and proceeded to speak in friendly terms in reference to the future. After some minutes conversation I rose a second time remarking to him, "Mr. Davis some of your friends, and I may say admirers, have asked me this question, 'Do you know that you look precisely like Jeff Davis?'" He blushed like a girl, the only emotion he manifested during the interview, and replied, "Colonel, if I were in your place I should not consider that a compliment by any means; you are a better looking man than Jeff. Davis."

I said, "Mr. President, I do not consider it a compliment, 'over the left,' by any means, as our boys say in the northwest." We then had a few minutes conversation in reference to my own history, and to our having met before. After which I indicated my desire to leave, and said to him, "Mr. Davis when may I come to see you again?" He rose from his seat, and coming close to me, replied, "Colonel, when you can come to tell me that your people have concluded to allow us to do just what you claim to do for yourselves, namely, to govern ourselves in our own way, I shall then be most happy to see you; until then I do not know that it is necessary for you to call again;" and taking my right hand in both of his and shaking it most cordially, he said, "I have the highest respect for your character, for your frankness, and your honesty; and separate and apart from the contest in which we are engaged you have my highest regard and my most fervent prayers for your future welfare;" and thus we parted, I to go to my duties upon the battle field, and Mr. Davis to take care of the Southern Confederacy.

As to Mr. Davis's health I will say that with the pressure now upon him he will live a thousand years if other causes than his present labors do not undermine his constitution Those who knew Mr. Davis in former times may imagine him with his iron will, his unbending and unyielding determination to succeed, but they fall far short of the true Jefferson Davis with the Southern Confederacy upon his shoulders. He is as determined and as independent as it is possiple for man to be, and when he says he "*will have independence or annihilation*," he means what he says—*the whole of it.*

When during our conversation I stated to Mr. Davis that I believed if there was an armistice for thirty or sixty days, such was the feeling of our people North and South in reference to the war, that it would be impossible to get them to engage afresh in the conflict, he replied, "I would accept an armistice of thirty, sixty, or ninety days provided it were understood that at the expiration of the armistice you proposed to acknowledge our independence. Unless this is your design an armistice is unnecessary." And in relation to the future prosecution of the war, Mr. Davis took this position: that there were yet four million of people to be slain, and before we subjugated them we would have to pass over the dead bodies of those four million of people.

In the course of the conversation, the question of slavery came up. I told Mr. Davis that the South did not understand Mr. Lincoln, that they ought to have waited until he had been inaugrated, that he would have secured to them all their rights under the Constitution, that he would have executed the fugutive slave law to the letter, even if he had been compelled to call out a great army to accomplish it. And I here took occasion to ask Mr. Davis, whether or not he would consent to the reconstruction of the Union provided slavery had secured to it all the rights it possessed at the commencement of the war. Mr. Benjamin, who was present, replied, "That if the throat of every slave in the Confederacy were cut it would not change their determination to secure their freedom." Mr. Davis sanctioned Mr. Benjamin's remarks, and said further: "We are not fighting for slavery; I had a few slaves, they were of no use to me, I was of some service to them. You have forcibly emancipated them—taken them away contrary to their will—but we are not contending for slavery, we are contending for our independence."

In reply to my remark that there was but one opinion with us in reference to the prosecution of the war, that while there might be two candidates for the Presidency, the principal plank of the platform of each would be the vigorious prosecution of the war, for that was the real sentiment of the people, he replied: "I can very readily see that a third party attempting to occupy the mean between those two

extremes would be like a man sitting down between two stools, he would find himself upon the ground."

I had two objects, especially in view, in my conversation with Mr. Davis, one was to impress strongly upon his mind the unanimity of our people in their purpose to put down the rebellion; the other to make known the disposition of the loyal States to treat the rebels kindly, and even magnanimously, if the struggle was once ended.

After he had taken his position, and declared his unalterable resolution to accept nothing short of independence for his Confederacy, my next effort was, by additional considerations, if possible, to drive him from that position. But the result of each argument was only to draw from him a more or less formal repetition of his cherished sentiment—"*Independence or annihilation.*"

Whatever, therefore, may be the result of my mission to Richmond, it has at least served one most important purpose—it has given to the country *rebel terms of peace*, and that from the mouth of Jeff. Davis himself. It has given additional proof of what rebel fighting, and rebel newspapers, and rebel barbarity had shown before, namely, that the Richmond government will listen to no peace that does not disrupt the Union and concede rebel independence. To Mr. Davis, amnesty was nothing, slavery was nothing, armistice was nothing, and separation and independence everything. Upon independence he had staked all of the South, and he would have it or leave no soul of their surviving four and a half million to tell the tale of southern ruin and overthrow.

Mr. Davis sees his own fate blended intimately with that of his Confederacy. Its failure is his failure; the Union restored is at once death to it and him. The most perfect prostration of northern manhood before him, such as would satisfy Vallandigham, and the Woods, and the Seymours, if it involved the restoration of the old Government, would be failure and shame to him, while independence would give him a kingdom and make him the founder of a new nation.

His control of his people is absolute, his government an unquestioned despotism. He has his army perfectly in hand, and with his bayonets behind it, pushes it into the jaws of death. While his military power remains unbroken he will have no armistice and will spurn all offers of pardon with ineffable contempt. If we get the Union back we must wrench it from his grasp by force, we must liberate his servile army, we must subdue the proud aristocracy of which he is the culmination and the hope. Jeff. Davis says there is no use in an armistice unless it be understood beforehand that it is to prepare the way for the acknowledgment of southern independence. And we agree with him as things now stand. An armistice will only be in place when the great rebel is brought to feel his need of amnesty by the crumbling of his armies. He wants an armistice to be followed by southern independence, we want one which shall follow rebel overthrow; one in which loyal men shall dictate terms of peace, and traitors shall present themselves as suppliants.

Mr. Davis tells us that slavery is no longer an element in the war. He is mistaken. Even supposing that the south regard their peculiar and idol institution as wrecked past the power of earthly carpentry, yet the old hate of abolition and the old aristocratic pride and contempt of labor, the essential outgrowths of slavery, still survive in their full force. If, in the language of Mr. Benjamin, "the throat of every slave in the confederacy were cut," slavery would still live in the southern blood. But though Mr. Davis is mistaken in eliminating slavery from the southern view of the war there is still some truth, at least for himself, in the assertion. To him, with the southern armies in his grasp, with the fame of founder and father of the Southern Confederacy gleaming before his eyes; to him with the shame and humiliation of failure before him; to him with fame and shame thus trembling in opposite balances, slavery, considered as a southern institution, is no doubt of but little account. It is his interest to prove to the southern people that the necessity for a southern government does not pass away with slavery. He must tremble as he thinks of the possibility that the death of slavery might naturally be regarded as making a new nation unneccessary. He will hold on to slavery, but his policy is to say, "Separation is essential even without slavery. My associate in power, Mr. Stephens, was in error when he called it the corner stone of the new government." The upshot of the whole matter is, that Mr. Jefferson Davis will make no peace, will have no armistice, will listen to no negotiations, except on the admitted basis of separation. He will sacrifice not only his own life but even slavery, and require our victorious arms to march over the slain bodies of the four and a half million of the seceded population. This is his expressed purpose, and the veins and sinews, souls and bodies of the people he represents are in his hands; he will dare what he threatens, and do what he dares unless the war for the Union prevents him. It is my deliberate conviction that if the Chicago convention, headed by the Woods, the

Seymours and Vallandigham, could lead the loyal States into the presence of Jeff. Davis, and if all the people should then humbly kneel and ask him to allow the Union to be restored, he would not only reject but utterly spurn the prayer. There is therefore nothing left us but to fight. And whoever counsels an opposite course is either deceived or a deceiver. He knows not with whom he has to deal. He is, whether consciously or otherwise, leading the nation to the altars of a deceitful peace to be sacrificed. War, war alone, wisely, bravely, unitedly waged, will save the country. We cannot meet the spear with the pruning hook. Peace platforms, constructed by well known traitors, are not the implements with which to oppose the man who will have either *independence or annihilation*. His chief army now confronts us at Richmond, that broken, he is in our power, and the war ended. Let us strike.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

UNION CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

Hon. E. D. MORGAN, of New York.
" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.
" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
(*Senate.*)

Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois.
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" J. A. GARFIELD, of Ohio.
" J. G. BLAINE, of Maine.
House of Representatives.

E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman.* JAS. HARLAN, *Treasurer.* D. N. COOLEY, *Sec'y.*

COMMITTEE ROOMS, *Washington, D. C, Sep.* 2, 1864.

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14. A History of Cruelties and Atrocities of the Rebellion.
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Address— Free.
Hon. JAMES HARLAN,
Washington, D. C.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,
D. N. COOLEY, *Secretary.*

Printed by L. Towers for the Union Congressional Committee.

Republican congressional committee, 1862-1870

PEACE,

To be Enduring, must be Conquered.

CAN any man doubt the truth of the above heading who knows the past history of the country? We think not. The men who began this war, and others of their spirit, now in their graves, for many years past have shown a persistent, an unfaltering purpose to rule the country or to ruin it. Nothing has been allowed to stand in the way of their passion for power and control. The history of the debates in Congress has shown the country but little else than pro-slavery truculency, bluster, and domineering on the one part, and meek submission or tame resistance on the other. Hectoring airs of assumed superiority, backed up by trenchant and scolding declamation, by threats, by challenges to mortal combat, by the display of bowie-knives and pistols, and by the occasional use of the bludgeon in the halls of the National Legislature, have given us a fair view of the prevailing type of Southern civilization, as well as abundant warning of what was coming. But the North was both blind and deaf. We tried to persuade ourselves that these manifestations had no depth of meaning—that they were personal to the parties committing the disorders, and not a genuine representation of the ruling Southern mind.

We have found, however, that our charity controlled our judgment; that the rage of slaveholding Congressmen was truly representative; that the sense of their own superiority, and the purpose to rule, were genuine traits of the whole Southern aristocracy.

Printed for the Union Congressional Committee by John A. Gray & Green, New-York.

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South-Carolina, when she presented a cane to Bully Brooks, in honor of his brtual assault upon Senator Sumner, expressed well-nigh the universal sentiment of leading Southern men. No genuine Southern newspaper condemned it — nearly every one defended and gloried in it. Brooks and South-Carolina held the club, and inflicted the blows; but the whole slaveocracy accepted the responsibility, and envied South-Carolina and Brooks their leadership. This was the temper of the slaveholding class as such. Their estimate of Southern blood and Southern prowess, and Southern gentility and refinement, allowed of no comparison between them and the North, and entitled them, in their own view, to regard us, with their own landless and slaveless class, as "mudsills," and to reduce us to order, if need be, at the mouth of the pistol or under the blow of the bludgeon.

Now these are the people who have brought war upon the country. These are the parties from whom, and with whom, we are to secure peace. Is there any thing in the temper of their class, in the modesty of their conduct, in their peculiar recognition of Northern rights, or the rights of labor anywhere, in their Congressional history, to induce the belief, in any sane mind, that they can ever be coaxed into terms? Can any one who knows history believe in the cure of these men by "peace" nostrums, to be administered by such doctors as Seymour, Vallandigham, and the Woods? Will any thing short of a sound and thorough whipping produce political regeneration in such men as these? We trow not.

But let us look further in the same general direction. This proud, insurgent aristocracy is not a caste created by wealth, or by learning, or by legalized nobility. It rests upon a distinct system of labor, in which the capital owns the laborer, and in which the laborer's condition is so deeply degraded as to carry labor down to the abyss of the profoundest disgrace. The working-man is a chattel; his manhood is denied; he has no lawful marriage, no control of his children, no right to learn his A, B, C; he owns no property—not even his own body or his own soul. To so foul a thing, made nevertheless of God's image, is the destiny of labor bound. This treatment of men and of labor, besides making slaveholders proud braggarts, as we have seen, turns against them the instincts of humanity all over the world. It arrays in opposition to them the horny-handed sons of toil at home and abroad. It brings upon them the reprobation of true Christians,

and disinterested philanthropists everywhere. Now, the horror of all good men for slavery is the measure of rebel elevation to it. Slavery is rooted in the rebel heart, and taints the rebel blood; *it is* rebel wealth and rebel pride; it has made its supporters dictatorial and fierce. When it was threatened, they were alarmed and maddened, and when, at the election of Mr. Lincoln, it was beaten at the ballot-box, they rushed to arms.

Mr. Jefferson Davis may say they are not fighting for slavery. He utters a falsehood. There never was any thing else to fight about. Slavery made the South what it was before the war, and the rebel animus in every battle has been intense hate of abolitionists. This hate of abolitionists is only the negative side of the love of slavery. The miser hates the man who carries off his ingots precisely as much as he loves the ingots. His heart is with the lost treasure and his curse with its new possessor. But negroes to a rebel aristocrat are more than wealth; they are aristocracy, they are caste. Without them, he is a cripple without his crutch, an unhorsed cavalryman, or rather is he the man-part of a centaur, cut loose from the animal to whose back he had grown fast. When the severance takes place between master and slave, the present structure of Southern society tumbles into ruins; its peculiar civilization comes to an end; the plough stands still in the furrow; the cotton, and sugar, and rice, rot in the fields, and the border States lose their market for their crops of biped cattle.

Following such results must come the hated system of free labor which has enriched the North. Slaves must become men, choosing their employment and employers; laboring white men will be emancipated from the vile shackles of prejudice; free schools must spring up, fostered and protected by a free press and a free pulpit, and the pride and arrogance of Southern knighthood and Southern chivalry must die the death. The nation will then become homogeneous, and patriotism take the place of sectionalism.

Now is it possible to get a permanent peace until this tap-root of the rebellion, slavery, is destroyed? If we stop fighting now, and leave slavery where it is, and the Southern people go to work to tinker up "the corner-stone" of their system, so scaled and split by the blasts of war, can we expect an enduring peace? Will the bloodshed of the conflict have reconciled the two opposing systems of civilization? Will our churches and schools cease to denounce slavery as "the sum of all villainies"? Will

Northern politicians cease to make it a party issue? Will the anti-slavery presses accept the gag for the purpose of maintaining peace? Will Southern statesmen, politicians, and preachers cease to resent Northern interference with their "institutions"? Never. A peace that leaves slavery still in existence is hollow. It is healing the wound with the bullet still in it. It is deliberately setting the broken limb crooked, so as to insure the necessity of breaking it again.

If, therefore, we would have an enduring peace, we must destroy slavery, root and branch. And now allow us to ask the reader whether or not a peace on the basis of the President's emancipation policy, on the basis of human bondage dead and buried, can be secured in any other way than by conquest? Must not universal emancipation be conquered? Will the rebels give up slavery, and thus the whole struggle, until their military power is completely overthrown? We know they will not. We must crush the power of the foe by force of arms in order to remove the causes of future war.

This view is fully confirmed by the course pursued by the pro-slavery party in the free States. Fernando Wood recently declared, in his place in Congress, that "the normal condition of the black man in this country is slavery." In this cry the smaller fry, with their weaker voices, heartily join. They want a peace which shall *not* be conquered. They would save the Southern *idol*, in order to propitiate and use their fellow-devotees. They would bring back the rebels with power as little diminished by their crimes as possible. They would reëstablish the old pro-slavery partnership between North and South, and yield their faces of dough once again to the old, familiar manipulation of Southern fingers; all, of course, in hope of the spoils of office.

These men of Chicago ought to understand the ultimate effect of their schemes. And we suppose they do, but they are willing to sacrifice the future and permanent peace of the country to their own present power. If they can patch up a peace at once, and save slavery, the only ligature which holds them and their rebel allies together, they will let the future take care of itself. Their feeling is: "Our allies must not be conquered, even if we should be obliged to fight them again." They would make a bad, a wicked peace now, and trust their skill to corrupt the public conscience so as to make the peace enduring. But they miscalculate; the virtue and patriotism of the people are not the supple

and plastic things they fancy. A wheedling peace, a peace of compromise with armed traitors, would speedily result in another war. It is not in the power of the Chicago Convention, united with the whole Copperhead faction, permanently to corrupt, or for any great length of time to hoodwink, the American people.

If we now, in conclusion, look at the history of the rebellion itself, our argument for a *conquered peace* will find its most direct and powerful confirmation. Have the rebels fought any of their battles in a spirit of compromise? Have they conscripted their population? Have they fed our prisoners? Have they applied to foreign courts for recognition? Have they pillaged and burned our commerce at sea? Have they treated our colored troops in a manner to indicate the possibility of peace this side of complete conquest? Let the whole male population of the South, from beardless boys to trembling and hoary-headed grandfathers, forced into their army, answer. Let Belle Island, with its starvation, its out-door sleeping apartments, and its rows of frozen Union soldiers, answer. Let Fort Pillow make reply, with its murdered colored soldiers, burnt and chopped up in cold blood.

No, no; the rebels have burned every bridge in their rear. They intended to leave, and have left, no open door of retreat. They have staked their all upon the sword, and no man in authority among them has ever uttered one word or syllable, or made even a gesture, that hinted at peace, except on the ground of Southern independence. They assert over and over again the impossibility of living under one Government. They must be free, they tell us, or not *be* at all; and we have no path left open to us but to subdue them. Brought back, conquered, they may be obedient, but returning unsubdued they would keep the country in perpetual turmoil. We can only, therefore, follow the example of Algernon Sidney, and "pursue gentle peace with the sword."

We now ask our reader to go back a single moment and ponder our argument. We have shown, in the first place, that the character of slave civilization is such that even before the war it could brook no opposition, no freedom except for itself; that our Congressional history, for the last twenty years, has been marked by pro-slavery truculency, bullying, blustering, and bragging, by the use of bludgeons, pistols, and bowie-knives; that this was not exceptional or confined to a few, but was accepted, defended, and even complimented by the many, both in and out of Congress; the

pulpit did not reprove it, and the press magnified it; and finally, that the men who controlled Southern opinion had come to the conclusion that their right of domination over the country was innate. From chastising us with whips, they proceeded to scorpions, waxing daily madder and madder, until their chronic sense of dignity and masterhood broke out into open violence against the Union. Now, will it be possible again to live in peace with such people until they are conquered—until the inordinate conceit is taken out of them? We believe not.

We have further seen that slavery, the bone of contention in the present strife, is the foundation, the life, the soul of Southern society; that so long as *it* lives, the real and only cause of war continues; that if we heal over our troubles with this element still extant, we have only an apparent, and hence only a temporary, peace; that, therefore, slavery must perish, if peace, when it comes, is to last; and that such is the hold of slavery on the Southern mind, that we must absolutely cut our way with the sword through all the military power of the enemy, before we can reach and demolish the inner sanctuary in which slavery is worshipped. The last thing the South will give up is slavery. They will yield it only when they must—when the weapons of war are wrenched from their clutch—and not before.

We have also shown that the so-called peace party, the pro-Southern, pro-slavery party, of the North, are working in harmony with the Southern rebels; that if, by giving countenance and hope to traitors, they make them more difficult to conquer, they also make their conquest the more necessary. For if Northern peacemen dictate the settlement with rebellion, the spirit that fired on Sumter will still survive, and must soon repeat the horrors of war.

We have shown, finally, that the war now raging has been conducted on the rebel side in a manner to show that compromise is impossible; that Jeff Davis himself, with all his satellites in the Southern aristocracy, prefers extermination to the Union in the best shape in which it could be restored. If the Union comes, therefore, it comes by the sword; its terms must be dictated by our victorious armies. Whatever McClellan may have done while in command of the army, however "easy" he may have "touched off" his guns, however gently he may have waved his peaceful sword, the rebels have indulged in no such shams; they have tried to strike home to the heart of the nation at every blow. Nor

have they, at any period of their terrible struggle for independence, ever shown the slighest wavering in their purpose—the slightest sign that they would settle for "half a loaf." Their whole course says: "The whole or none." It says to Chicago: "We thank you for fighting our battles, but you are fools for your pains. Whip your Government for us, or help us to do it, and then let us alone." No, there is no hope of patching up a peace; and if there were, it would only be "putting new cloth into the old garment and making the rent worse." We must fight till "the last armed foe expires," we must whip the rebels, even if we have to fight their Northern allies into the bargain. Once conquered, they will be easy to settle with; until then, any settlement must be disgraceful, ruinous, and temporary.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

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" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.
" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
(*Senate.*)

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E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman.* JAS. HARLAN, *Treas.* D. N. COOLEY, *Sec.*

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15. Evidences of a Copperhead Conspiracy in the Northwest.
16. Seward's Auburn Speech.
17. Schurz's Speech.
18. Copperhead Votes in Congress.
19. "Leave Pope to get out of his Scrape."
20. Shall we have an Armistice?
21. Barnard's Peninsula.
22. Sherman, Hooker, and Grant.
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HON. JAMES HARLAN,
Washington, D. C.

Very respectfully, yours, etc.,
D. N. COOLEY
Secretary.

Republican Congressional Committee, 1864-65
Publications
Campaign of 1864

A BRIEF HISTORY.

OF THE

CRUELTIES AND ATROCITIES

OF THE REBELLION.

COMPILED FROM THE MOST AUTHENTIC SOURCES, BY THOS. L. WILSON.

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."—*Peace and Disunion Platform of the Chicago Copperhead Convention.*

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

The rule formerly was, to slay without mercy, or reduce to a state of abject bondage, the unfortunate captive of war. The men who perpetrated such cruel and bloody deeds, even in the darkest age, and places of the world, have been written in all history as barbarous, and their memory branded with infamy. Modern civilization and Christianity, amongst *most* nations, have induced a better method. How far their influence has been manifested, under the auspices of the rebel Government, the brief, well-authenticated statements of *actual* occurrences, recorded in the following pages will show:

Surgeon Honiston was taken prisoner at the first battle of Bull Run. He begged to be allowed to remain upon the field to take care of our wounded, but in vain. He stated that Dr. Dailey, of South Carolina, was sent to the field by Gen. Beauregard to take charge of our wounded, but would not allow us (Federal Surgeons) to perform operations upon our own men, but had them performed by his Assistants, young men—some of them with no more knowledge of what they attempted, than an apothecary's clerk; "they performed the operations in a most horrible manner, some of them absolutely frightful;" there was no attention paid to the wounded, and, it was impossible for them to get anything to eat; they lay through a drenching rain on Monday, the battle having occurred on Sunday, and a sultry sun on Tuesday, until Wednesday, before they were permitted to be removed, when their "wounds were completely alive with *larvæ*;" some lay on the field for five days. Let it be remembered, that this was at the outset of the contest, before repeated collisions had whetted the passions of the contending parties.

"*Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities.*"

Surgeon Swalen testifies, that he was on the battle-field ten or twelve days after the battle, and saw some of our men still unburied and entirely naked, having been robbed of their clothing by the rebels; (it seems unnatural that "HIGH-MINDED GENTLEMEN," chivalry, would actually *steal*, unless driven to it by necessity, which could not have been the case so early in the history of the Confederacy;) some of our men were buried face downward—an intended disgrace. Some of the graves had been opened by pushing rails beneath the bodies to get the tops of the skulls to make drinking cups. One of these cups was found by a member of a New Jersey regiment, after our army advanced upon the forts, defended by "wooden guns," and which had kept McClellan at bay for eighteen months.

"*Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities.*"

Dr. Ferguson, of New York, was fired upon when attending the

wounded, and after he told them who he was, they brutally shot him in the leg. When he was carried off the field the jolting of the ambulances so hurt him, that he involuntarily groaned, whereupon a rebel officer rode up to him and threatened to blow his brains out if he repeated "his noise."

"*Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities.*"

General Ricketts testifies that when he lay on the field wounded, the passing rebels called out, "knock out his brains, the d——d Yankee." He heard of many of the prisoners, who were bayoneted, and two or three shot after they arrived in Richmond.

"*Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities.*"

Senator Sprague, who went to recover the bodies of Col. Slocum and Major Ballou, testified that he was told, when searching the battle-ground, that the Colonel's body had been dug up, his head cut off, and his body burned. After thorough and repeated investigations, the Senator became fully satisfied that both of these gallant men did indeed suffer this unhallowed and barbarous rite of sepulchre at the hands of their own countrymen, who boast themselves gentlemen, *par excellence*, their chivalry, and that their's is the only genuine type of manhood on the face of God's green earth. The Senator corroborates the statement that many of our men were buried face downward, and similar outrages unheard of and unthought of, save among the unsanctified rites of pagan and savage nations. Heaven save us and the rest of mankind from such Christianity, and such civilization, if their's is the only genuine. An official report of Judge Advocate General Holt, dated March 27, 1863, gives a heart-rending picture of the barbarities of the rebels upon twenty-two Federal prisoners, captured near Chattanooga, Tenn. One of them was stripped, tied down to a stone, and whipped until life was nearly extinct. After whipping him, they brought a rope to hang him, but his life was finally spared. Eight of these men were hung, after having been tried by a court-martial and acquitted. But the authorities at Richmond over-ruled the court, and ordered them hung. From the breaking of the rope, after being sometime suspended, two of these unhappy victims were restored to consciousness; they begged for one hour for prayer and preparation for death, which was peremptorily refused, and the execution proceeded. What better is this than cowardly butchery? The remaining prisoners, reduced to fourteen, closely confined in jail at Atlanta, accidentally learned that it was determined by the Richmond government to hang them, and they laid a plan of escape. Eight succeeded, six entered our lines, two were never heard from. The following brief dispatch tells the story of the remaining six: "At the end of eleven months terminated their pitiless persecutions in the prisons of the South—persecutions begun and continued amid indignities and sufferings on their part, and atrocities on the part of the barbarous foe, which illustrates far more faithfully than any human language could express, the demoniac spirit of a revolt, every throb of whose life is a crime against the very race to which we belong."

"*Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities.*"

LIBBY PRISON.

At a meeting of Surgeons of the United States Army and Navy, a

report was prepared, November 26th, 1863, and sent to the President, which contained the following facts. About one thousand officers of all grades, and from both branches of the service, are confined in Libby prison, whose walls are unplastered, thus open to the full sweep of the winter winds, or closed with boards—rendering the place dark, dreary, and loathsome in the extreme. None of the private soldiers are furnished with bedding of any kind. Belle Island contains six thousand three hundred prisoners, whose condition is wretched beyond all description. An insufficient number of tents to protect the men from the cold and rain, no blankets nor bedding given them by their captors. Only one Surgeon was assigned to the Island, who makes but one visit a day, and then does not enter the enclosures of the men. Such as are too sick to walk, never see him; they are hurried off to the hospital when their condition is absolutely helpless. An officer of high standing, who visited the Island, says the men followed him in crowds, and in the most eager tones begged of him for bread; many literally starved to death. Some days as high as fifty died, and from no other apparent cause. Officers, for the most trivial offences, were confined for weeks in dark, damp dungeons. Men were shot by the guards for standing near and looking out of the windows. Some were shot, others wounded, by the wanton wretches, who stood their guns on the floor beneath and fired through the floor overhead. To such extremities were these unfortunate men driven, that in one instance a dog was killed and eaten; and the prisoners on the Island were known to hunt the gutters for bones, to suck from them nutriment to appease the terrible gnawings of hunger. These are facts, derived from personal observation, transpiring in a Christian community, among "high-toned *gentlemen*," but written right across the rebel Confederacy, dark as midnight and revolting as despair.

"*Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities.*"

FORT PILLOW.

The most revolting of all barbarities was that of Fort Pillow. The War Committee, after thorough inquiry into the conduct of Forest, and his murderous associates, report that the atrocities committed were not the result of passions excited by the heat of the conflict, but of a policy deliberately decided upon and unhesitatingly announced. When the women and children were crossing the river by the aid of the Union gunboats, the rebel sharpshooters, mingled with and shielded by them, fired upon the officers and men. Like incarnate fiends as they are, they placed women in front of their lines as they moved upon the fort. They rushed into the fort during the time the flag of truce was flying, which is held sacred even by Turks and savages, and commenced an indiscriminate slaughter, sparing neither age nor sex, white nor black, soldier nor civilian, men, women nor children; of the latter, those not over ten years of age were made to face their murderers, and thus shot. The sick and wounded, while lying in their beds in the hospitals, were dragged out and butchered without mercy. Numbers of men were collected into groups or lines, and deliberately shot down, and those of the wounded near the river bank were brutally kicked into the river, where they were drowned, heaping insult and torture upon the vic-

tims of their diabolical cruelty. No barbarity which the most fiendish malignity could devise, was omitted by these incarnate demons. A mere child, which an officer had taken up behind him on his horse, was ordered to be put down and shot, which was done. The tents where the wounded lay were set on fire, and many of their occupants were consumed in the flames; those who escaped were shot down or had their brains beaten out by the cowardly ruffians. One man was deliberately nailed down to the floor of a tent, the tent fired, and he perished in the flames. Another was nailed to the side of a building, and it set on fire, and he also perished in the flames. These deeds of unutterable cruelty closed at night, only to be renewed next morning, when these brutes, for they cannot be called men, carefully sought among the dead in all directions for the wounded that were still alive.

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

TREATMENT OF LOYAL MEN, AND THEIR SUFFERINGS FOR OPINION'S SAKE.

September 18, 1863, twenty or thirty rebels went in the night to the house of Marshal Glaze, a loyal man of Spring Creek, Virginia, and murdered John McMullen, Marshal Glaze, and a discharged Union soldier while asleep, three others making their escape. The same gang then visited the dwelling of a Mr. Noyes, a Union man near by, and attempted to pursuade, finally to force, a young girl to accompany them for a vile purpose; upon refusal, they immediately shot her dead.—*Authority, Mr. McWater, Member House of Delegates, West Va.*, 1861.

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

In January, 1863, James Keith, with the 65th N. C. regiment, was ordered to arrest some men at Laurel Hill for seizing salt at Marshal, N. C. Before the regiment arrived, those engaged in the seizure fled, and the innocent had to suffer. Twelve persons were arrested, varying in their ages from seven to sixty, who protested their innocence and plead for a trial, which was promised. They were marched off, but had proceeded but a few miles when they were taken into a mountain gorge, and five of them ordered to kneel; a file of soldiers was drawn up in front of them, when, deaf to the agonizing cries for mercy, the protestations of their perfect innocence, of the promise of trial, and entreaties for a brief time for prayer and preparation for death, the order was given to "fire," which the soldiers hesitated to obey. Keith told them peremptorily to obey or he would exchange places with the prisoners. Again the order was given, and five men fell; five others were ordered to kneel, and of the number a little boy of twelve years, who plead with his executioners, "You shot my father in the face, please don't shoot me in the face," and covered his face with his hands. Five more fell at the order to fire, and among them was this child, wounded in both arms, and three of his brothers, dead; the little hero, at the feet of the inhuman officer, implored to be spared to his mother, who was deprived of a husband and three sons at his hands, but in vain. He was dragged back to the place of execution, and was sacrificed, pierced with eight balls; those in whom life was not extinct, were dispatched with pistols; the bodies were tumbled into one grave or hole, into which they were jammed by the feet of these godless wretches, who danced and shouted in their sacrilegious work as if at a carnival of devils. They then returned to Laurel Hill, and commenced torturing the wives of loyal men in order to discover where the salt was concealed. Mrs. S. Skelton and

Mrs. E. Skelton were whipped until the blood ran down their persons to the ground, then hung until life was almost extinct, then taken down. Martha White, an idiotic girl, was whipped, then tied to a tree by the neck, and left all day. Mrs. Riddle, aged eighty-five years, was inhumanly whipped, then robbed. Mrs. Sallie More, aged seventy, was whipped until blood ran to the ground. One woman, name forgotten, who had a child five or six weeks old, was tied to a tree in the snow, and her child placed in the open door in her sight, and she was told they both should perish.—*On the authority of Col. Crawford, Tenn.*

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

After the battle of Gettysburg, the Unionists of North Carolina began to speak more freely, and revolt was feared; in consequence, a regiment of soldiers was sent to Randolph county to preserve order. The kind of order that was preserved may be known by the following atrocity, one of many committed upon the unprotected loyalists of that region: These soldiers decoyed a one-armed man, under pretence of employing him as a guide, into a piece of woodland, where his body was found several days after, completely riddled with bullets; he was heard a long distance begging and imploring for his life; from the marks of blood and foot-prints, it was believed that he was compelled to run round his tormentors, they shooting at him as he ran to see how many times they hit and not kill him.—*Authority, Bryan Tyson, Esq., author of "Ray of Light."*

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

Champ Ferguson, the prince of fiends, and his gang, captured three white men and a negro in Fentress County, Tennessee, and tieing them together, drove them to Wolf Run. On the way, these wretches gratified their savage propensities by thrusting sharpened splinters of wood into the flesh of their helpless victims, and cutting them off close to their bodies. To make them travel faster they pitched their bowie knives into them. When arrived at the run, the unfortunate men were put to slow torture by bayonets stuck into them, and cutting off pieces of their flesh, until the work of death was well nigh complete. Finally, gorged with this disgusting work, Ferguson dispatched one of the men by actually hacking him into pieces with his knife, and his comrades in guilt put an end to the torments of the remainder by the same means. This same man, Ferguson declared in a speech at Sparta, Tennessee, that he had already killed sixteen Lincolnites, and intended to kill enough to make twenty-five, then he was willing to die.—*Authority, Gen. J. B. Rogers, Tennessee.*

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

In April, 1862, a man named Bright, sixty years old, living in Johnson County, Tennessee, with two sons and two nephews, was arrested by Col. Foulke's cavalry and marched into Ash County. There a grocery-keeper, a brother murderer, proposed to treat this band of "chivalry" with eight gallons of brandy, if they would hang the prisoners without trial. The proposal was eagerly accepted, and the company of five were hung to the first tree without ceremony.—*By authority of Col. Crawford, Tenn.*

In the later part of 1862, and early in 1863, the rebels in Mississippi conscripted all the men they could find between the ages of 18 and 60: the Unionists fled to the woods to escape the conscription, and the fiends set blood hounds on their track; by this inhuman method, many were captured and many nearly torn in pieces by these dogs before they could be rescued.

In Alabama the conscription was prosecuted with still greater severity. During the winter of 1862, a young girl, while carrying food to her father, hidden in a cave, was attacked by one of these dogs, and literally torn to pieces. Also two women, who were making their way to Tuscumbia, Franklin County, Alabama, were torn to pieces in the same way. In reference to the outrages committed in the above named States, General Dodge, in a letter to a friend, says: "That while their leaders, from the President down, boast of their carrying on this war in accordance with the laws that govern nations, a few simple facts will put them to the blush. Men and women are hung and shot, and hunted down and captured by blood hounds; fathers and husbands in the presence, and in spite of the tears and prayers of their wives and daughters, and many times with them, are hung or shot. Houses were burned over the heads of their inmates, and women and children turned out of doors, and the community solemnly warned not to receive or harbor them, at their peril." The General says that "hundreds of men, women, and children, gray haired men, and cripples on crutches, were constantly fleeing from the tender mercies of these 'high-toned gentlemen' into his lines—Corinth, Mississippi—for life and protection, simply and only for opinion's sake." Will "sympathizers" any longer doubt, or dare deny, that Union men, under the conscription, were hunted or captured and mangled by blood hounds! Talk about "arbitrary arrest" and "illegal imprisonment!"

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

In May, 1861, a rebel command under Debrell and Jenkins, natives of Tenn., went from Austin, Texas, to destroy a German settlement near El Paso, of that State, consisting of two hundred and fifty souls. From eighty to one hundred of these ruffians, without the slightest provocation, attacked this peaceful, prosperous, and thoroughly loyal community, and it is not known that three persons escaped. Fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, and helpless infants constituted one common scene of indiscriminate carnage, and houses, barns, and crops were burned and trampled from the face of the earth. *Authority, Gen. J. B. Rogers.* "Sympathizers" are horrified at any attempt to stop such work by "coercion." Will the American public endorse such doctrines, and their application?

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

In March, 1863, Capt. Montgomery was kidnapped, and taken to a rebel camp on the Rio Grande, Texas. Here he was informed that he was to be hung, and mockingly ordered to say his prayers; a rope was placed about his neck, and he commanded to tell what he knew of the Federal forces. He refused—whereupon, he was hung up to a branch of a tree until nearly dead, then let down; when consciousness was restored, the same question was put, with the same result. He was then hung, where he remained until taken down, and buried by a friendly Mexican. When these cowardly murderers found it out, they disinterred the body, declaring that it should lay unburied, and thus rot. Capt. Bruin, of S. C., commanded this band of outlaws, and for this act of "bravery and good conduct," in hanging a defenceless man, was promoted, and now rejoices in the title of Major of the 1st Texas Cavalry. Why not call upon such men and their friends to guide the destinies of this great country for the next four years, and for all time? Why not?—*Colonel Stanley, of Texas.*

A letter dated Monterey, Mexico, Nov. 1862, from Vice Consul M. M. M. Kemmey, states, on the authority of an eye-witness, that twelve Unionists of Western Texas, provided with passports from the rebel Provost Marshal, were all massacred on the Neuces river, by a body of Texas rangers, but a short time previous to the above date. Also, a party of Germans were all killed, with one exception, who escaped wounded, by the same party. The Consul remarks—"You cannot imagine how Union men are treated in Texas; they are hung on the slightest suspicion."

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

An official letter from Maj. Gen. Blunt, Oct. 7th, 1863, in reference to the massacre at Baxter Springs, Mo., says: "The body of Major Curtis, the son of Maj. Gen. Curtis, was found where thrown from his horse, shot through the head, evidently having been murdered after being taken prisoner." The same was the case with all the wounded, the members of the band, the officers' clerks and the teamsters. The murderers were a portion of Coppey's and Quantrell's command, disguised by Federal uniforms. About seventy were thus butchered by these worse than fiends.

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

An official letter from Col. W. R. Penick, dated Independence, Mo., January 11th, 1863, says: "Private Johnson, of the artillery, was brought in dead to-day, the fifth murdered the last week. They were all wounded and killed afterwards, in the most horrible manner that fiends could devise. All were shot in the head, several had their faces fearfully cut, evidently with boot-heels; powder was exploded in one man's ear, and both ears cut off close to the head."

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

In April, 1862, a party of rebel soldiers—if highwaymen can be thus dignified—on a tour of collecting conscripts, shot and instantly killed a poor deranged woman, Mrs. Ruth A. Rhea, on Lick Creek, in Green County, Tenn., because she attempted to drive them from her premises with a stick, when conscripting her only son and support.—*Authority of Col. Crawford.*

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

In a letter to the Mayor of New Orleans, April 26th, 1862, Admiral Farragut says: "I shall speedily and severely punish any person or persons who shall commit such outrages as were witnessed yesterday—armed men firing upon helpless women and children, for giving expression to their pleasure at witnessing the old flag." These are the "gentlemen" soldiers we read of, formed out of the raw material called "chivalry."

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

Mr. St. Clair, mate of the steamboat McRay, states that "in August, 1850, while his vessel was lying at the wharf near New Orleans, a German pedlar, who could scarcely understand or utter a sentence in English, was caught and hung to a lamp-post by a mob, for simply having in his possession photographs of Mr. Lincoln, then candidate for the Presidency, and not the least opposition was made by the police, nor any notice taken of it by the city authorities."

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

During the engagement between the Federal gunboats and the rebel

batteries on White River, in Arkansas, a shot from one of their batteries exploded the boiler of the Mound City. To avoid death by scalding, the crew leaped overboard, for whose rescue small boats were immediately sent. The rebels fired large guns and musketry upon the struggling, drowning men, and upon the crews of the boats sent to their aid, as they did under similar circumstances in the harbor of Mobile, upon the crew and officers of the unfortunate Tecumseh. This was done under the eye of Admiral Davis, who distinctly saw the cowardly act, and remarks in his report, "that the country will contrast these barbarities of a savage enemy with the hundred efforts made by our own people to rescue the wounded and disabled, under like circumstances, in the engagement of the 6th.".

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

Rev. Mr. Angesey, of Miss., states that "he was seized by the rebels, heavily ironed, and, with eighty others, placed in a dungeon; my crime was that I defended the Union cause. While I was in prison, numbers were led out and shot. At first those in charge provided coffins; but the great number of executions exceeding the supply, they dug a trench, and made the man sit down on the brink, when a file of soldiers advanced and fired three balls into the head and three into the hearts of their victims; this was the mode of execution." He further states, that "he was himself hunted by bloodhounds, as were other Union men in that State."

"Immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities."

A full history of all these atrocities would fill volumes. But why continue the recital? Sufficient has been recounted in these brief pages to stamp these perfidious rebels as the most cruel and blood-thirsty wretches that ever disgraced mankind. The mind recoils in horror from the contemplation of the barbarities they have practiced upon our citizens and soldiers for no other crime than that of loving their country and their flag. But the civilized world will stand aghast at the fact that the recent Copperhead convention at Chicago was composed of men in full and shameless sympathy with the bloody and brutal tyrants at Richmond, who inspired and commanded the commission of the crimes and atrocities herein exposed and held up to the execration of civilization. The platform of Peace and Disunion there erected will forever stand out in history as the foulest blot upon our escutcheon, and will make our latest posterity to blush with shame and humiliation. This shame must be wiped out as far as possible by the loyal people by burying, in one common political grave, that atrocious platform of an ignominious and degrading peace, and the candidates who stand upon it, repudiating its infamy and its disloyalty.

"Down with the traitor, up with the star!"

NEW BOOK—Entitled, "Sufferings for a Free Government; or, a History of the Cruelties and Atrocities of the Rebellion."

This work has been carefully compiled and collated from official documents and other reliable sources, by Thomas L. Wilson, clerk in the Fourth Auditor's Office, Treasury Department, and embodies a thrilling history of the cruelties, tortures, and savage barbarities inflicted upon Union men, women, children, and Union soldiers in the Rebel States, since the first inauguration of the Rebellion by the Secessionists, who, as a people, lay claim to all the chivalry, refinement, and gallantry of the human race, (to let them tell it;) but whose savage propensities and extreme cruelties have never yet had a parallel in the history of savage warfare, much less in civil Christian strife.—*Daily Morning Chronicle, D. C., Sept.* 1, 1864.

Orders may be sent to Thomas L. Wilson, Fourth Auditor's Office, or to C. Storrs, Chief Clerk, same office. The Book will contain about 300 pages. Price $1.50.

Mr. Thomas L. Wilson has compiled a mass of valuable and interesting information on the subject of rebel barbarities and the suffering and oppression of Union citizens in the insurgent districts. The facts presented are drawn from authentic sources and worthy of credence.

Hon. J. M. EDMUNDS, *Commissioner of General Land Office.*
C. STORRS, Esq., *Chief Clerk Fourth Auditor's Office.*
Hon. D. P. HOLLOWAY, *Commissioner of Patents.*
Hon. GREEN ADAMS, *Sixth Auditor of the Treasury.*
Hon. GEORGE W. McLELLAN, *Second Ass't Postmaster General.*
Hon. W. P. DOLE, *Commissioner of Indian Affairs.*

August 29, 1864.

Printed by McGill & Witherow, for the Union Congressional Committee.

COPPERHEAD CONSPIRACY

IN THE

NORTH-WEST.

AN EXPOSÉ OF THE TREASONABLE ORDER OF THE "SONS OF LIBERTY."

VALLANDIGHAM, Supreme Commander.

THE more effectually to aid the Southern traitors in their efforts to destroy the Government, many of the leaders of the Democratic party in the North, who are in sympathy with such efforts, determined to form secret, oath-bound, treasonable associations throughout the Northern States to act in concert with those already existing in the States in rebellion.

In 1863 this order existed in the State of Indiana, under the name of "Knights of the Golden Circle," and became subject to judicial investigation, as is shown in the following statement of the Clerk of the United States District Court for that State:

I, Watt J. Smith, Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Indiana, do hereby certify that the records of said Court establish the following facts:

On the eleventh of February, 1863, the following persons of Morgan County were indicted for conspiracy to resist by force of arms the arrest of deserters, namely:

Samuel Dillman, William Dillman, Jacob Groseclose, Andrew J. Perry, John Coldwill, Madison Flake, Mitchel Perry, were tried at the March term, 1863, by jury, convicted, and each fined five hundred dollars. The proof established the fact that the defendants were members of a secret, oath-bound organization, then known as the Knights of the Golden Circle; that they fired upon United States soldiers who had in charge two deserters who were members of the same order.

On the seventh of July, 1863, the following persons of Boone County were indicted for obstructing the draft, namely: Patrick Lee, Patrick White, Jeremiah Nichols, John Nichols, Jacob Hill, Jeremiah Gleeson, John Doglass, Eli Goodwin, Conrad Hill, Nathan Curtis, James M. Lucus, Wright Sims, William George. Each pleaded guilty, and were fined.

July eleventh, 1863, the following persons of Putnam County were indicted for conspiracy, to oppose the draft, namely: William Randell, John Ford, George Ford, Isaac Ford, Alexander Siddons, William Hornmill,

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George Hanks, George N. Coffman. These men alleged that they were a committee appointed at a meeting to wait upon the enrolling commissioner and demand that he proceed no further. The District Attorney dismissed the charge of conspiracy, and a verdict of guilty was returned on the charge of obstructing the draft, and each were fined.

Also the following persons, of the same county, were indicted on same charge: Joseph Ellis, William Ellis, Isaac Day, William McNary, Francis Allen, Conrad Cook. Joseph Ellis was tried on the charge of conspiracy, found guilty, and fined five hundred dollars. Verdicts of guilty were rendered against the others on charge of obstructing the draft. The proof clearly established the fact that between seventy-five and one hundred armed men (many of them blackened their faces) went to the house of the Enrolling Commissioner about midnight and demanded his enrollment papers, and obtained and destroyed them.

The following persons of Monroe County were indicted for obstructing the draft: Elmore J. Walker, Joel Morgan, John Graves, John Morgan, Sen., Richard J. Walker, Elijah Conder, Henry Crumb, Washington Sares, John Butcher, John Morgan, Jr., Abraham May, Peter Fossett, Alexander Smith, Drury Kirk, Michael Kirk, Lemuel Sexton, William Whitaker, Preston May, Wesley Carter, Thomas Oliphant, John Whitaker; a verdict of guilty was returned against each.

The defendants, in connection with others, met and surrounded the Enrolling Officer, and by force obtained possession of the enrollment papers.

There have been a great many other convictions and pleas of guilty of persons residing in various parts of the State on charges of obstructing the Draft.

The proof, in almost every instance, connected the defendants with a secret organization whose objects were shown on the trials to be opposition to the execution of the laws of the United States, to the prosecution of the war, and friendly to the cause of the rebellion.

The records of the Court further show that three witnesses who were taken before the Grand Jury and refusing to testify, a presentment of the facts in each case was made to the Court signed by the foreman of the Jury. In answer to a rule entered against each to show cause why they did not answer the questions propounded to them by the Grand Jury, they and each of them testified before the Court that they could not answer the questions proposed without criminating themselves and rendering themselves liable to a criminal prosecution for a violation of the laws of the United States, that they were members of this secret order, and could not disclose its objects and purposes for the above reasons, and were shielded by the Court on the ground that they could not be required to criminate themselves.

The existence of a wide-spread secret order whose purposes are disloyal, and at war with the peaceful execution of the law, has been established beyond all question by the trials and convictions in this Court, as conclusively shown by the records.

In witness of the truth of which, I, as Clerk of the said Court, have hereunto set my hand and the seal of the said Court, at Indianapolis, this twelfth day of September, A.D. 1864. WATT J. SMITH, Clerk.

It became the duty of General Carrington, the Commander of the District of Indiana, to find out the doings of this treasonable association; and, for that purpose, resort was had to the detective system, so effectual in the discovery of crime. The result of his investigation is given in the following report made by him to Governor Morton:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF INDIANA,
NORTHERN DEPARTMENT,
INDIANAPOLIS, IND., June 28th, 1864.

GOVERNOR: In compliance with your request, I place in your hands a partial outline of the nature, work, and extent of a disloyal society or order now operating in the State of Indiana, under the name of "SONS OF LIBERTY."

I. NATURE OF THE ORDER.

1st. It is both *civil* and *military*. In its first relation, it declares principles of ethics and politics, for adoption and dissemination, that are hostile to the Government of the United States. In the latter relation, it assumes to organize armies for "actual service" in support of those principles, treating the United States Government as their *enemy*, and that of the rebellion as their *friend*.

2d. It is *secret* and *oath-bound*.

3d. It is despotic and absolute. The penalties of disobedience to its officers are unlimited, including the death-penalty itself.

II. PRINCIPLES OF THE ORDER.

1st. Absolute, inherent, State Sovereignty.

2d. The Union of the States as but voluntary and temporary, and revocable at the will of any individual State, so far as concerns that State.

3d. Denies to the General Government the power to enforce its laws, if it be the choice of a State to reject them.

4th. Recognizes the existing rebellion as legitimate, legal, and just.

5th. Holds revolution against the present Government as not only a right, but a duty.

6th. Holds obligations to the order as paramount, to those due a single State, or the United States.

7th. Declares its purpose to stop this war, treat with rebels, and make a treaty based upon the recognition of grades of civilization and race.

8th. Declares a law of races, one of Caucasian supremacy, and one of African servitude.

9th. Pledges a crusade in favor of all peoples attempting to establish new governments of their own choice, as against existing rulers or authorities.

10th. Accepts the creed of the rebellion, its logic, its plans, and its principles, as the normal theory of Democracy, and its own bond of coherence and ultimate success.

III. EXTENT OF THE ORDER.

Exhibits are furnished as follows:

Exhibit A. "Constitution of Supreme Council of the States," that is, of all States that may join, recognizing the primary independence of each State. "The Supreme Commander of this Council," is "Commander-in-Chief of all military forces belonging to the order, in the various States, when called into actual service."—See Sec. 8.

OFFICERS FOR 1864 AS REPORTED.

C. L. Vallandigham, of Ohio, Supreme Commander.
Robert Holloway, of Illinois, Deputy Supreme Commander.
Dr. Massey, of Ohio, Secretary of State.

Exhibit B. Constitution of Grand Council of S. L. of Indiana.

OFFICERS.

H. H. Dodd, Indianapolis, Grand Commander.
H. Heffren, Salem, Deputy Grand Commander.
W. M. Harrison, Indianapolis, Grand Secretary.

"The members of this Council, additional to the regular officers, include, *ex officio*, the Grand Commander's staff, and all military officers above the rank of Colonel."—Sec 3, Art. 2.

Exhibit C. Constitution of the County Parent Temples, subordinate to which Branch County Temples may be organized.

This order, during 1863, was variously named, but popularly known as "K. G. C.," KNIGHTS OF THE GOLDEN CIRCLE, with whose ritual, oaths, etc., I furnished you in the spring of 1863. The penalty of disclosure was then death, and this penalty was specified in their obligations.

During the fall of 1863, the order changed name and ritual, and became the "O. A. K.," ORDER OF AMERICAN KNIGHTS; the ritual, signs, passwords, etc., of which are in my possession.

At the meeting of this Order, February 16th and 17th, 1864, the Grand Commander for the State of Indiana communicated the purposes of the Order, as well as the views of C. L. Vallandigham, claimed by the Order as its Head and Supreme Commander.

For said address, the proceedings of the Indiana Grand Council, and so much of the official proceedings as it was deemed best to publish for the private information of the Order, please see Exhibit D, hereunto annexed. This Report gives the following States as organized:

New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, New-Hampshire, Connecticut, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Delaware, Maryland, and Missouri.

Besides the Constitutions of the "S. L." referred to there is a formal Ritual for the Degrees, the same being a slight modification of the work of the "O. A. K.," which was abandoned only in May last.

These consist of the "V.," Vestibule of the Temple, and first, second and third Temple Degrees or Conclaves.

The organization of the "Society of the Illini," or Democratic Clubs, does not involve full membership in the Order; for thus far comparatively few in each Temple are advanced to the Chapters or Councils of the higher degrees, but the lower and subordinate bodies, and that of the "Illini," is educational and probationary, looking to full acceptance of the general principles of the order, before the advancement of the "Neophyte," to the higher degrees.

As appears from the official report of February 17th, there were, then, only twelve thousand members in this State, and a recent report from a portion of the State would hardly triple this number, that is, of initiates, though they claim for some counties full battalions, and in a few cases full regiments.

EXHIBITS F, F, G, AND H give the Ritual of said degrees.

It will be observed that the fundamental password is CALHOUN, transposed for use thus—Nu-oh-lac.

The unwritten work and lectures of this Order vary in different States and counties, and in Temples of the same county, though not in essentials. This is accounted for from the fact that organizing agents, in installing officers, could not take time to fully post and instruct them, and the work was imperfectly committed to memory.

While the penalties of disclosure are formally declared to be such as the officers of this Order shall direct, these penalties are specifically given in the verbal lectures and instructions. The oaths of 1863 specifically affixed the death-penalty. The same is enjoined in the present Order. Instructions to execute this penalty upon at least one supposed informer have been issued within the last two months. Injunctions to arm, and much of the detail of subordinate military features of the Order are also given in verbal lectures. Concurrent testimony from different sources confirms the above. Many of the documents you have already seen, and they are not necessary in this report.

IV. OPERATIONS OF THE ORDER.

A few facts, derived from many concurrent sources, give significance to passages in the Constitutions and Rituals. Of some you were advised at the time—thus:

1st. The outbreaks in Eastern Illinois were mainly checked by leaders of this Order, on the ground that such outbreaks were premature. This information comes from Canada, Michigan, Illinois, and other quarters.

2d. A fews days before the attack of Forrest upon Paducah, I was informed that the Temples of the O. A. K. in Northwestern Illinois expected such an attack, and that Forrest would cross into Illinois, and raise the standard of revolt. He came to Paducah, but was repulsed.

3d. On the day that Morgan first entered Pound Gap, I was informed at Indianapolis, in the morning, that Morgan was about to enter Kentucky, of which you were at once advised. At three P.M. you showed me a telegram from General Burbridge, that Morgan was in the Gap. This information, derived from you, was communicated to the secret Order with my permission. Upon this, two members of the Order, both prominent—one Colonel W. A. Bowles, of Buena Vista notoriety, and the other Judge J. F. Bullitt, of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Kentucky—were soon reported to have stated that "Morgan must be stopped; he was too soon—the Order was not ready for him." Judge Bullitt, who had come to receive the new Ritual, (S. L.,) took the first train for Kentucky that day. The fact was, that Morgan *was* stopped. The incidents following and attending the visit of Major-General Lindsay from Kentucky you are familiar with, and the circumstances under which Morgan threw part of his force into Kentucky, when General Burbridge moved toward Virginia.

4th. Information was given you of the visit of Vallandigham to Detroit, his projected trip to Chicago, of the meeting of the Grand Council of Indiana, June 13, of the proposed adjournment and meeting at Hamilton, June 15, and that Vallandigham's immediate recall was subject of debate, and the prospect of his being at that time at Hamilton. At least one rebel officer left Windsor, C. W., and visited Hamilton four weeks before, in the confidence of disloyal persons, of which I was advised at that time by telegraph through General Noble.

5th. Five days before Morgan attacked Mount Sterling, and the L. and L. R. R. was severed, written report was sent by disloyal persons, of which I have the originals, that the road was quiet, that "no mules" (U. S. soldiers) were on the line, and that a glorious work would begin the coming week.

6th. A courier intercepted between Frankfort and Louisville, who reported to me at Louisville, as I was starting for Indianapolis, claimed that Forrest was moving upon Southwestern Kentucky, and that a portion of Buckner's command would join the fragments of Morgan in Western Virginia. Two days after, Forrest defeated Sturgis; Buckner, however, was west of the Mississippi. I give these among many facts to show that there is a close correspondence of design and feeling between traitors North and the rebels South. The whole plot of the Order herein referred to is in harmony with forcible interruption of the war.

W. A. Bowles, before referred to, has made no close secret of his disloyal purposes, and his sympathy with the South.

He is reported as one of the four Major-Generals of the Order in Indiana. The remaining three are L. P. Milligan, of Huntington, Major Walker, of northwestern part of Indiana, vice Yeagle removed, and Andrew Humphreys, of Green county. The Grand Commander has already been named.

Although the new work, S. L., was obtained at Indianapolis, by R. Barrett, for Missouri, it is understood that the Order is so far organized in that State as to run a risk of disappointment by a change, and that the work of

the O. A. K. will retain its usage, as it differs only in non-essentials. Among the persons reported as at the conference with Judge Bullitt and Barrett, were J. J. Bingham, Dr. Anthon, and Mr. Ristine, of Indianapolis. I will also give the names of a few other members for your information, to enable you to watch the movement of this Order in Indiana, namely, Dr. Gatling, (associated with the Gatling Gun,) Mr. Evert, of Vanderburgh, Mr. L. Leach, Mr. Otey, Myers of Laporte, Dr. Lemons, A. D. Raga, Mr. McBride, of Evansville, John G. Davis, and Lassell, of Cass county. Several of the above are delegates to the State Grand Council of Missouri; and besides, H. H. Dodd, to the Supreme Grand Council, to be held at Chicago, the first of July next, preparatory to the political convention of July 4.

V. PURPOSES OF THE ORDER.

It seems that the main purpose is political power, by union with the South, regardless of men or measures. The Eastern and Western Council leaders differ as to means to this end; and, again, the radicals and conservatives differ, at the West.

Men like Dr. W. A. Bowles seem indifferent to any presidential canvass, and to prefer an early armed rupture and positive union of the Northwest with the South.

Such men are ready and anxious for such an armed invasion as will give them a nucleus for open defiance of the United States. This is not speculation; but proof is ample. I have adverted to some facts already, and will advise you, as I have the Government and General Heintzelman, as events progress.

Very respectfully yours,
HENRY B. CARRINGTON,
Brigadier-General, Com'd'g Dist. Indiana.

His Excellency Gov. O. P. MORTON,
Indianapolis, Indiana.

Two months after the above report was made, Governor Morton was advised that a number of arms and a quantity of fixed ammunition had been shipped from New-York to the head of the Order at Indianapolis. Notice of the fact was given to the public authorities. Mr. Russell, the Deputy Marshal for the city of Indianapolis, discloses, in the following affidavit, what afterwards took place in relation to the matter:

STATE OF INDIANA, } ss.
MARION COUNTY. }

Before me, James N. Sweetser, a Notary Public within and for the county of Marion, State of Indiana, personally appeared John S. Russell, who, being first duly sworn, upon his oath, says he is now, and has been for more than two years last past, the Deputy Marshal of the city of Indianapolis, State of Indiana; and further says, that on the twentieth day of August, A.D. 1864, he was sent for by O. P. Morton, Governor of the State of Indiana, and was informed that there was a lot of arms and ammunition on the road to Indianapolis addressed to the care of J. J. Parsons, whose place of business is in the building occupied by H. H. Dodd, and known as the *Sentinel* Office; that upon the request of the Governor, he proceeded to search, and went to two railroad depots and the office of the Merchants' Despatch, and learned that on the fifth day of August, ten boxes, marked Hardware by Merchants' Despatch, addressed to Parsons, had already been taken away from the Bellefontaine Depot, and charges paid; the gross weight was two thousand four hundred and five pounds; they were receipted for on August the twelfth; on further investigation he

learned that twenty-two boxes, addressed to the same party, weighing four thousand two hundred and sixty pounds, marked Hardware, were then in the Bellefontaine Depot, which fact was immediately reported to the Governor, and the Governor reported to Col. Warner, commanding the Veteran Réserve Corps at this place, who thereupon detailed one company to go with said Russell and seize said boxes; in pursuance of which the boxes were taken by Russell and said company from the building in which said H. H. Dodd & Co. and Parsons were doing business. We proceeded first to the Bellefontaine Depot, but the boxes were gone; but on finding the drayman, whose name is Henry Ankenbrook, he stated that the boxes were delivered at the house above mentioned. We found the twenty-two boxes in the press-room; four more in the same room, supposed to be of the first lot, in one corner of the room, covered up with old tables and boards; and six boxes were found in the second story, piled up behind a lot of other boxes filled with waste-paper and books thrown over them, and Parsons name scratched off the boxes. There were three hundred and ninety revolvers and one hundred and forty thousand rounds fixed ammunition in said boxes, which were taken to military headquarters at the Soldiers' Home. The brand of the revolvers was Northway's patent, or some similar name, purporting to be made at Middletown, Connecticut.

JOHN S. RUSSELL,
Deputy Marshal.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this tenth day of September, A.D. 1864.

JAMES N. SWEETSER,
Notary Public.

[Five-cent Revenue-stamp affixed.]

The above shipment was made as "Stationery," as shown on the bill of lading, in order to conceal the true contents of the boxes!

Twenty-two additional boxes of arms, addressed to the same person, were subsequently seized in New-York.

These arms were to have been used by the oath-bound traitors for the purpose of driving Union men from the polls at the approaching election in Indiana. How far similar desperate arrangements have been made to control the election in other States, is yet unknown.

That the deliberations of the Chicago Convention were controlled by the Order of the "Sons of Liberty" no well-informed man will deny. During its session, Dr. OLDS, a leading member of the Order, an out-spoken traitor, boldly announced that the "Sons of Liberty" were in session in the city, and might have a communication to present to the Convention before its adjournment.

Vallandingham wrote the platform, which was adopted almost unanimously, and it was upon his motion that MCCLELLAN was declared the nominee of the Convention. The essential portions of the platform had been previously adopted by the Grand Council of the Order at a meeting held at Indianapolis on the sixteenth of February, 1864, as is shown by the following resolution found on the secret records of that Order, in the safe of Dodd, the Grand Commander for Indiana:

5. That whatever the theory of the powers of the Federal Government to coërce a State to remain in the Union may be, war as a means of restoring the Union is a delusion, involving a fearful waste of human life, hopeless bankruptcy, and the speedy downfall of the Republic. Therefore we *recommend a cessation of hostilities upon existing facts, and a convention of the sovereign States to adjust the terms of a peace with a view to the restoration of the Union, entire if possible; if not, so much and such parts as the affinities of interest and civilization may attract.*

Now read the following corresponding portion of the Chicago Platform:

Resolved, That this Convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretence of a military necessity, or war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made *for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of all the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.*

Compare these resolutions, and no man can doubt their paternity —they each emanated from the brain of Vallandingham, the Grand Commander of the secret and oath-bound conspirators.

Should the nominee of this secret Order be elected to the Presidency, his administration will be controlled by the men who controlled the Convention, as a consequence certain to follow. They will demand, in the language of the platform of their Order, "a cessation of hostilities upon existing facts, and a convention of all the sovereign States to adjust the terms of peace, with a view to the restoration of the Union, *entire if possible; if not, so much and such parts as the affinities of interest and civilization may attract.*" The demand will be acceded to by *their* President, notwithstanding the fustian about "a preservation of the Union at all hazards," put into his letter of acceptance for the purpose of catching votes. *That* is well understood, or else the oath-bound traitors would not now be making every possible effort to attain power through his election.

Are the people willing that such a result, so revolting to every feeling of manhood and patriotism, shall thus be accomplished?

Every patriot is against it. Every soldier in the field is against it. The blood of the thousands slain by rebel hands cries from the ground against it, and, we fervently believe, the Great Ruler of the Universe is against it.

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SPEECH

OF

WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

ON THE OCCASION OF

THE FALL OF ATLANTA,

AT AUBURN, SATURDAY, SEPT. 3, 1864.

My Dear Friends: It is so that I like to see you come marching to the time of national airs, under the folds of the old national flag. I thank you for this hospitable and patriotic welcome. It proves that though you deal rigorously with your public servants, exacting reasons for their policy, energy in their conduct of affairs, and explanations for failures and disappointments in their administration, yet you are, nevertheless, just, because you willingly allow them to rejoice with you, when you have successes, victories, and triumphs to celebrate.

The news that brings us together is authentic. (A voice—Do you think it is reliable?) Yes. Here is a telegram which I received this morning from the Secretary of War: "Van Duzer reports that Sherman's advance entered Atlanta about noon to-day. Particulars not yet received. Edwin M. Stanton." (Three cheers were given for Atlanta.)

Now this news comes in a good shape. It is pleasant to have a grand result at the first, and it protracts the interest of the thing to have particulars coming in afterwards. (Yes, yes; we can wait for the particulars.)

This victory comes in the right connection. It falls in with the echoes of the capture of Forts Gaines and Morgan, which I understand to be the *particulars* of Farragut's glorious naval battle in the bay of Mobile, a battle equaled by no other in American history, but the naval achievements of the same veteran admiral at New Orleans and Port Hudson, and all these have no parallel in naval warfare but the battles of the Nile and Trafalgar. (A voice—I wish we were all Farraguts.) Well, my friend, I know the Admiral well, and I confess that we all can't be Farraguts. Indeed, very few of us can. But we may take this comfort to ourselves, that as a whole people, we can appreciate the veterans. We can also appreciate Sherman, who has performed the most successful and splendid march through a mountainous and hostile country recorded in modern history, and in doing this we show ourselves inferior in virtue to no other nation.

By the way, everybody admired Farragut's heroism, in climbing the topmast to direct the battle. But there was another "particular" of that contest that no less forcibly illustrates his heroic character. "Admiral," said one of his officers, the night before the battle, "won't you consent to give Jack a glass of grog in the morning, not enough to make him drunk, but just enough to make him fight cheerfully." "Well," replied the Admiral, "I have been to sea considerable, and have seen a battle or two, but I never found that I wanted rum to enable me to do my duty. I will order two cups of good coffee to each man at two o'clock, and at eight o'clock I will pipe all hands to breakfast in Mobile Bay." (Hurrah for Farragut.) And he did give Jack the coffee, and then he went up to the masthead and *did it*.

The victory at Atlanta comes at the right place. The rebellious district is in the shape of an egg. It presents equal resistance on its whole surface. But if you could break the shell at either of the two ends, Richmond and Atlanta, the whole must crumble to pieces. While Sherman, under Grant, has been striking the big end, Meade, under Grant, has been striking just as hard blows upon the lesser end. The whole shell will now be easily crushed, for it has grown brittle with the exhaustion of vitality within.

This glorious victory comes in good time for another reason. Just now we are calling upon you for three hundred thousand more men—volunteers, if you will, drafted men if we must—to end the war. You were getting a little tired of long delays and disappointed expectations. In Indiana, a portion of the people, instigated by rebel plotters at the Clifton

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House, in Canada, were importing British revolvers in boxes which passed the Custom-house as stationery, under pretense of arming to defend themselves, but really to resist the draft and bring the Government down to ruin through a subordinate and auxiliary civil war in the West. True, no arms have been imported here. Yet delegates went out from among you, and sat down in council at Chicago, with those Indiana conspirators, and agreed with them not only that this importation of arms should be defended in the election canvass, but also to demand the cessation of the war, upon the ground that success in restoring the Union is unattainable. Already, under the influence of the cheering news from Atlanta, all this discontent and this despondency have disappeared. We shall have no draft, because the army is being reinforced at the rate of five or ten thousand men per day by volunteers. (Hurrah for the volunteers.) May I not add that this victory at Atlanta comes in good time, as the victory in Mobile Bay does, to vindicate the wisdom and energy of the war administration. Farragut's fleet did not make itself, nor did he make it. It was prepared by the Secretary of the Navy; and he that shall record the history of this war truthfully and impartially, will write, that since the days of Carnot no man has organized war with ability equal to that of Stanton. (Cheers for Stanton, cheers for the Secretary of the Navy.)

But auspicious as the occasion is, it has, nevertheless, failed to bring out some whom we might have expected here. Why are they not here to rejoice in magnificent victories that will thrill the hearts of the lovers of Freedom throughout the world. Alas, that it must be confessed, it is party spirit that holds them aloof. All of them are partisans. Some are Republicans who cannot rejoice in the national victories, because this war, for the life of the Nation, is not, in all respects, conducted according to their own peculiar radical ideas and theories. They want guarantees for swift and universal and complete emancipation, or they do not want the nation saved. Others stay away because they want to be assured that in coming out of the revolutionary storm, the ship of state will be found in exactly the same condition as when the tempest assailed it, or they do not want the ship saved at all; as if anybody could give such guarantees in the name of a people of thirty millions. Others are Democrats. They received from their fathers the axiom that only Democrats could save the country, and they must save it by Democratic formulas and combinations which the progress of the age has forever exploded. They cannot come up to celebrate achievements which condemn their narrow and hereditary bigotry.

Others, of both the Republican and Democratic parties, are willing that the nation shall be saved, provided that it shall be done by some of their chosen and idolized chiefs, which chiefs they mutually denounce and revile. They cannot honor Grant and Sherman and Granger and Farragut and Porter and Winslow, because by such homage they fear that Fremont's and McClellan's fame may be eclipsed.

Nevertheless, there are enough here of the right sort, (Yes—that's true,) enough of men who once were Republicans, but who, taking that word in a partisan sense, are Republicans no longer, and men who once were Democrats, but who, taking that word in its narrow application, are Democrats no longer. All of these are now Union men, because they found out at the beginning of this tremendous civil war, or at some period in its progress, that no man—no party—no formula—no creed could save the Union, but that only the people can save it, and they can save it only by ceasing to become partisans, and becoming patriots and Union men. (Cheers for the Union.)

Yes, my friends, when this war shall have ended in the restoration of the Union, no man then living will exult in the recollection that during its continuance he was either a Radical or a Conservative, a Republican or a Democrat, but every man will then claim to have been throughout an unreserved and unconditional Union man.

But why should party spirit, especially at this juncture, divide the American people? And why should I, a member of the Executive Administration, allude to it on such an occasion as this? The answer is at hand. The Constitution of our country commands that Administration to surrender its powers to the People, and the People to designate agents to asume and exercise them four years. You receive the Executive Government in a condition very different from what it was when committed to our care, and highly improved. We found it practically expelled from the whole country south of the Delaware, the Ohio, and the Missouri, with the most of the army and navy betrayed or fallen into the hands of the insurgents, and a new and treasonable Confederacy with the indirect but effective co-operation of foreign Powers, establishing itself on the Gulf of Mexico. We cheerfully give the Government back to you with large and conquering armies, and a triumphant navy, with the hateful Confederacy falling into pieces, and the rebellious States, one after another, returning to their allegiance.

Regarding myself on this occasion, therefore, not as a Secretary, but simply as one of the people, I, like you, am called by my vote to determine into whose hands the precious trust shall now be confided. We might wish to avoid, or at least to postpone that duty, until the present fearful crisis is passed. But it cannot and it ought not to be avoided or adjourned. It is a Constitutional trial, and the nation must go through it deliberately and bravely.

I shall, therefore, cheerfully submit, for your consideration, the course which I have concluded to adopt, and the reasons for it.

First, I beg you to remember, that the present is no common or customary Presidential

election. It occurs in the midst of civil war, arising out of a disputed succession to the Executive power. Disputed successions are the most frequent causes of civil wars, not only in Republics, but even in Monarchies. A dispute about the succession of the President, periodically begets an abortive or a real revolution, in each one of the Spanish and American Republics. So the disputed succession of the Spanish throne, begot the memorable thirty years' war, which convulsed all Europe. A dispute whether Juarez was the lawful President, brought on the present civil war, with the consequence of French intervention in Mexico. A dispute whether the present king of Denmark, who succeded to the throne last winter, is lawful heir to the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, brought about the civil war in that country, which, through German intervention, has just now ended with the dismemberment of the Danish kingdom. It is remarkable also, that civil wars produced by disputed successions, invariably begin with resistance by some one or more of the States or provinces which constitute the kingdom, empire, or republic which is disturbed. It was so with the united States of Mexico. It was so in the united States of Columbia, and the case was the same in the united States of Venezuela. Now it is certain that in 1860 we elected Abraham Lincoln, lawfully and constitutionally, to be President of the whole United States of America. Seven of the States immediately thereon rushed into disunion, and, summoning eight more to their alliance, they set up a revolutionary government. They levied war against us to effect a separation and a distinct sovereignty and independence.

We accepted the war in defense of the Union. The only grievance of the insurgents was that their choice of John C. Breckenridge for President was constitutionally overruled in the election of Lincoln. They rejected Lincoln, and set up a usurper. The executive power of the United States is now, therefore, by force, practically suspended, between that usurper, Jefferson Davis, and that constitutional President Abraham Lincoln. The war is waged by the usurper to expel that constitutional President from the Capital, which in some sort is constantly held in siege, and to conquer the States which loyally adhere to him. The war is maintained on our side to suppress the usurper, and to bring the insurgent States back, under the authority of the constitutional President. The war is at its crisis. It is clear, therefore, that we are fighting to make Abraham Lincoln President of the whole United States, under the election of 1860, to continue until the 4th of March, 1865. In voting for a President of the United States, can we wisely or safely vote out the identical person whom, with force and arms, we are fighting into the Presidency? (No, No.) You justly say, No. It would be nothing less than to give up the very object of the war at the ballot-box. The moral strength which makes our loyal position impregnable, would pass from us, and when that moral strength has passed away, material forces are no longer effective, or even available. By such a proceeding we shall have agreed with the enemy, and shall have given him the victory. But in that agreement the Constitution and the Union will have perished, because when it shall have once been proved that a minority can by force or circumvention, defeat the full accession of a constitutionally chosen President, no President thereafter, though elected by ever so large a majority, can hope to exercise the Executive powers unopposed throughout the whole country. One of two things must follow that fatal error. Either a contest between your newly-elected compromise President, and the same usurper, in which the usurper must prevail, or else a combination between them, through which the usurper or his successor, subverting your Constitution and substituting his own, will become President, King, or Emperor of the United States, without foreign aid, if he can, with foreign intervention if necessary. (That's so.) To be sure it's so; nothing is more certain than that either the United States and their Constitutional President, or the so-called Confederate States, and their usurping President, must rule within the limits of this Republic. I therefore regard the pending Presidential election as involving the question, whether, hereafter, we shall have our Constitution and our country left us. How shall we vote, then, to save our country from this fearful danger? (Vote Lincoln in again.) You have hit it exactly, my friend. We must vote Lincoln in again, and fight him in at the same time. If we do this, the rebellion will perish and leave no root. If we do otherwise, we have only the alternatives of acquiescence in a perpetual usurpation, or of entering an endless succession of civil and social wars. Upon these grounds, entirely irrespective of platform and candidate, I consider the recommendations of the Convention at Chicago, as tending to subvert the Republic. (It's so, that's a fact.)

It will seem a hard thing when I imply, that a party, like the Democratic party, can either mediate or inconsiderately adopt measures, to overthrow the Republic. All experience, however, shows that it is by the malice or the madness of great parties that Free States have been brought down to destruction. You often hear alarms that a party in power is subverting the State, and it sometimes happens so. But nine times out of ten, it is a party out of power, that in its impatience or its ambition overthrows a Republic.

The Democratic party, of course, leaving off the Loyal Union Democrats, opposed the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860. In doing so, they divided and organized in three columns. One a treasonable column of State-Rights-Disunion Democrats under Breckinridge. A second, a loyal northern column, under Douglas. The third a loyal but conciliatory flying column, under John Bell, who has since joined the insurgents. We thereupon invited the two loyal columns to combine with the Republican party to oppose the disunion Democratic column.

They declined. On the eve of the election of 1860, I told the followers of Douglas and of Bell, that when the election should have closed, they would find they had inadvertently favored disunion and rebellion. They persisted, and the attempted revolution came. Disunion then presented itself, in the practical form of preventing Abraham Lincoln from assuming the Executive authority, (and it stands before us in exactly the same form now.) Thus the Democratic party produced that calamity, the Southern Democrats acting from design, the Northern Democrats passive through inadvertence. The disputed succession still remains unadjusted. A new election has come on. For a time, the Northern Democrats, with notable exceptions, gave a more or less liberal support to the Government against the Democratic insurgents of the South. But the same Democratic forces which operated in the election of 1860, now appear in the political field, with positions and policy unchanged since that time, as I think, except for the worse. The Southern Democracy is still in arms under the usurper at Richmond. The Douglas and Bell columns consolidated, are found at Chicago, and all three of the parties are compassing the rejection of Abraham Lincoln, the constitutional President of the United States. They agree not only in this attempt, but they assign the same reasons for it—namely, that Abraham Lincoln is a tyrant.

They agree, also, that the real usurper at Richmond is blameless, and pure, at least the Richmond Democracy affirm it, and the Chicago Democracy do not gainsay it. To me, therefore, the Democracy at Richmond and the Democracy at Chicago, like Cæsar and Pompey, seem to retain all their original family resemblance. They are very much alike—especially Pompey. But it is not in mere externals that their similarity lies. They talk very much alike, as I have already shown you. When you consider that among the Democrats at Chicago, the Indiana Democrats were present, who have imported arms to resist the national authority and defeat the national laws, and that all the Democrats there assembled agreed to justify that proceeding, I think you will agree with me that the Richmond Democrats and the Chicago Democrats have lately come to act very much alike.

I shall now go further and prove to you that they not only have a common policy, and a common way of defending it, but they have even adopted that policy in concert with each other. You know that when the Chicago Convention was approaching in July last, George N. Sanders, Clement C. Clay, and J. P. Holcombe appeared at the Clifton House, on the Canada bank of the Niagara river, fully invested with the confidence and acquainted with the purposes of Jefferson Davis and his confederates at Richmond. You know, also, that Chicago Democrats resorted there in considerable numbers, to confer with these emissaries of Jefferson Davis. Here is the fruit of that conference, and no one can deny the authenticity of my evidence. It is extracted from the London *Times*, the common organ of all the enemies of the United States. The New York correspondent of the London *Times*, writing from Niagara Falls, under date of August 8, says:

> Clifton House has become a center of negotiations between the Northern friends of peace and Southern agents, which propose a withdrawal of differences from the arbitrament of the sword. The correspondent then goes on to explain that an effort is to be made to nominate a candidate for the Presidency on the platform of an armistice and a convention of States, and to thwart, by all possible means, the efforts of Mr. Lincoln for re-election.

Mark now, that on the 8th of August, 1864, Northern Democrats and Richmond agents agree upon three things to be done at Chicago.

Namely: 1st. A withdrawal of the differences between the Government and the insurgents from the arbitrament of the sword. 2d. A nomination for President of the United States, on a platform of an armistice, and ultimately a convention of the States. 3d. To thwart, by all possible means, the re-election of Abraham Lincoln.

Such a conference, held in a neutral country, between professedly loyal citizens of the United States and the agents of the Richmond traitors in arms, has a very suspicious look. But let that pass. Political elections must be free, and therefore they justly excuse many extravagancies. We have now seen what the agents of Pompey and Cæsar agreed at Niagara that Pompey should do at Chicago. Here is what he actually did:

> *Resolved*, That this Convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretense of a military necessity or war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate Convention of all the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.

The Democracy at Chicago did there just what had been agreed upon with the Richmond agents at Niagara, namely, they pronounced for an abandonment of the military defense of the Union against the insurgents, with a view to an ultimate National Convention, and the defeat of the election of Abraham Lincoln. That is to say, they proposed to eject Abraham Lincoln from the Presidential Chair at Washington, on the 4th of March next, and at the same time leave the usurper, Davis, unassailed, secure and unmolested in his seat at Richmond, with a view to an ultimate Convention of States, which that usurper's constitution will allow no one of the insurgent States to enter. What now, if there be no convention at all, or if the convention fail to agree on a submission to the Federal authority? Jefferson Davis then remains in authority, his Confederacy established, and the Union with all its glories is gone forever. Nay, more, if such a thing could happen as that the Chicago candidate, nominated upon such an agreement, should be elected President of the United States on the

first Tuesday of November next, who can vouch for the safety of the country against the rebels during the interval which must elapse before the new Administration can constitutionally come into power? It seems to me that such an election would tend equally to demoralize the Union and to invite the insurgents to renew their efforts for its destruction.

It remains for me now only to give you the proof, that although the way in which the Chicago Democracy did what had been agreed upon in their behalf at Niagara, was not altogether satisfactory, yet what they actually did was accepted as a full execution of the previous compact:

ST. CATHARINES, C. W., *Sept.* 1.

To Hon. D. WIER, *Halifax:*

Platform and Presidential nominee unsatisfactory. Vice-President and speeches satisfactory. Tell Philemore not to oppose.

(Signed) GEO. N. SANDERS.

D. Wier is a Richmond accomplice at Halifax, and Philemore is understood to be the conductor of the insurgent organ in London.

Here, then, we have a nomination and a platform which were made by treaty formally contracted between the Democratic traitors at Richmond, and the Democratic opposition at Chicago, signed, sealed, attested, and delivered in the presence of the London *Times*, and already ratified at Richmond. ("By Heaven, we've got 'em.") Got them, to be sure you've got them, my friends. They say I am always too sanguine of the success of national candidates and of the national arms. But it seems to me that the veriest croaker in all our loyal camp will take new courage, and become heroic when he sees that the last hope of the rebellion hangs upon the ratification of this abominable and detestable compact by the American people.

Yes, you have got them; but how did you get them? Not by any skill or art of the Administration, or even through the sagacity or activity of the loyal people, but through the cunning of the conspirators overreaching itself, and thus working out their own defeat and confusion. They do say that the father of evil always indulges his chosen disciples with such an excess of subtlety, as to render their ultimate ruin and punishment inevitable.

And what a time is this to proclaim such a policy, conceived in treachery, and brought forth with shameless effrontery. A cessation of hostilities on the heel of decisive naval and land battles, at the very moment that the rebellion, without a single fort in its possession on the ocean, or on either of the great rivers or lakes, is crumbling to the earth, and at the same time a dozen new ships of war are going to complete the investment by sea, and three hundred thousand volunteers are rushing to the lines, to complete the work of restoration and pacification.

There is a maxim which thoughtful teachers always carefully inculcate. It is that inconstancy is imbecility, and that perseverance is necessary to insure success. This maxim was set forth in the form of a text in the writing-book, when I was young: "Perseverance always conquers." Even infantile beginners encountered the instruction in the form of a fable in Webster's spelling book. The story was, that after using soft words and tufts of grass, the farmer tried what virtue there was in stones, and by persistence in that application, he brought the rude boy who was stealing apples down from the tree, and made him ask the farmer's pardon. Our Chicago teachers tell us that just as the rude boy is coming down, we must lay down the stones and resort again to the use of grass, with the consequence, of course, that the farmer must beg pardon of the trespasser.

But what makes this Chicago policy more contemptible, and even ridiculous, is that it is nothing different from the policy with which the same parties now contracting actually ushered in disunion in 1861, in the closing hours of the Administration of James Buchanan. Yes, my dear friends, when we of this Administration came into our places in March, 1861, we found there existing just the system which is now recommended at Chicago, namely: 1st, a treasonable confederacy in arms against the Federal authority; 2d, a truce between the Government of the United States and the rebels, a veritable armistice, which was so construed that while the National ports and forts were thoroughly invested along the sea-coast and rivers by the insurgents, they could be neither reinforced, nor supplied even with food, by the Government; 3d, A languid debate with a view to an ultimate National Convention, which the rebels haughtily despised and contemptuously rejected. What were the alternatives left us? Either to surrender ourselves and the Government at discretion, or to summon the people to arms, terminate the armistice, adjourn the demoralizing debate, and "repossess" ourselves of the National forts and ports. All agreed that this course was right then. And now has all the treasure that has been spent, and all the precious blood that has been poured forth, gone for nothing else but to secure an ignominous retreat, and return at the end of four years to the hopeless imbecility and rapid process of national dissolution, which existed when Abraham Lincoln took into his hands the reins of Government.

Every one of you know, that but for that accession of Abraham Lincoln, just at that time, the Union would, in less than three months, have fallen into absolute and irretrievable ruin.

I will not dwell long on the complaints which misguided, but not intentionally perverse men, bring against the Administration of Abraham Lincoln. They complain of military arrests of spies and lurking traitors in the loyal States, as if the Government could justify itself for waiting without preventive measures, for more States to be invaded or to be carried off into secession. They complain that when we call for volunteers, we present the alternative of a draft, as if when the ship has been scuttled, the captain ought to leave the sleeping passengers to go to the bottom without calling upon them to take their turns at the pump.

They are not content with plotting sedition in secret places, but they go up and down the public streets uttering treason, vainly seeking to provoke arrest, in order that they may complain of a denial of the liberty of speech. The impunity they everywhere enjoy under the protection of constitutional debate, shows at one and the same time, that their complaints are groundless, and that the Union in the element of moral stability is stronger than they know.

The chief complaint against the President is, that he will not accept peace on the basis of the integrity of the Union, without having also the abandonment of slavery. When and where have the insurgents offered him peace on the basis of the integrity of the Union? Nobody has offered it. The rebels never will offer it. Nobody on their behalf can offer it. They are determined and pledged to rule this Republic or ruin it. I told you here a year ago, that practically slavery was no longer in question—that it was perishing under the operation of the war. That assertion has been confirmed. The Union men in all the slave States that we have delivered are even more anxious than we are to abolish slavery. Witness Western Virginia, Maryland, Missouri, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas. Jefferson Davis tells you in effect the same thing. He says that it is not slavery, but independence and sovereignty for which he is contending. There is good reason for this. A hundred dollars in gold is only a year's purchase of the labor of the working man in every part of the United States. At less than half that price you could buy all the slaves in the country. Nevertheless, our opponents want a distinct exposition of the President's views on the ultimate solution of the slavery question.

Why do they want it? For the same reason that the Pharisees and Sadducees wanted an authoritative solution of the questions of casuistry which arose in their day. One of those sects believed in a kingdom to come, and the other altogether denied the resurrection of the dead. Nevertheless, they walked together in loving accord in search of instruction concerning the spirit world. "Master," said they, "there was a man of our nation who married a wife and died, leaving six brothers. These brothers successively married the widowed woman, and afterwards died. And last of all the woman died also. In the resurrection, which of the seven shall have this woman to his wife."

Now what was it to them whether one or all should have the woman to wife in Heaven. It could be nothing to the Sadducees in any case. What was it to any human being on this side of the grave? What was it to any human being in heaven except the woman and her seven husbands—absolutely nothing. Yet they would have an answer. And they received one. The answer was that while in this mortal state, men and women shall never cease to marry and to die, there will be in the resurrection neither death nor marrying or giving in marriage.

Although altogether unauthorized to speak for the President upon hypothetical questions, I think I can give an answer upon the subject of slavery at the present day—an answer which will be explicit, and I hope not altogether unsatisfactory. While the rebels continue to wage war against the Government of the United States, the military measures affecting slavery, which have been adopted from necessity, to bring the war to a speedy and successful end, will be continued, except so far as practical experience shall show that they can be modified advantageously, with a view to the same end.

When the insurgents shall have disbanded their armies, and laid down their arms, the war will instantly cease—and all the war measures then existing, including those which affect slavery, will cease also; and all the moral, economical and political questions, as well questions affecting slavery as others, which shall then be existing, between individuals, and States, and the Federal Government, whether they arose before the civil war began, or whether they grow out of it, will, by force of the Constitution, pass over to the arbitrament of courts of law, and to the councils of legislation.

I am not unsophisticated enough to expect that conspirators, while yet unsubdued, and exercising an unrestricted despotism in the insurrectionary States, will either sue for or even accept an amnesty based on the surrender of the power they have so recklessly usurped. Nevertheless, I know that if any such conspirator should tender his submission upon such terms, that he will at once receive a candid hearing, and an answer prompted purely by a desire for peace, with the maintenance of the Union. On the other hand, I do expect propositions of peace with a restoration of the Union, to come, not from the Confederates in authority, nor through them, but from citizens and States under and behind them. And I expect such propositions from citizens and States to come over the Confederates in power, just so fast as those citizens and States shall have delivered themselves or shall have been delivered by the Federal arms, from the usurpation by which they are now oppressed. All the world knows, that so far as I am concerned, and, I believe, so far as the President is concerned, all such applications will receive just such an answer as it becomes a great, magnanimous and humane people, to grant to brethren, who have come back from their wanderings, to seek a shelter in the common ark of our national security and happiness.

The sun is setting. So surely as it shall rise again, so surely do I think that the great events we have now celebrated prelude the end of our national troubles, and the restoration of the national authority with peace, prosperity, and freedom throughout the whole land, from the lakes to the gulf, and from ocean to ocean.

And so I bid you good night; and may God have you, with our whole country, always in his holy and paternal keeping.

Enthusiastic cheers were given at the conclusion of the speech.

THE PLATFORMS.

READ AND CONTRAST.—Note the demand made in the Union platform that the Union must be restored, the Constitution maintained, the Laws enforced and the Ballot-box respected. And observe how, in the hour of Victory, when an unconditional surrender to these just demands is undoubted, if we but remain firm, the Democratic platform demands that we ground our arms and beg of rebels to return to the Union and grant us peace.

The following declaration of principles was adopted by the great National Union Convention which nominated ABRAHAM LINCOLN for President, and ANDREW JOHNSON for Vice-President, at Baltimore, on the 7th of June last.

Resolved, That it is the highest duty of every American citizen to maintain against all their enemies the integrity of the Union, and the paramount authority of the Constitution and Laws of the United States; and that, laying aside all differences of political opinions, we pledge ourselves as Union men, animated by a common sentiment, and aiming at a common object, to do everything in our power to aid the Government in quelling by force of arms the rebellion now raging against its authority, and in bringing to the punishment due to their crimes the rebels and traitors arrayed against it.

Resolved, That we approve the determination of the Government of the United States not to compromise with rebels nor to offer any terms of peace except such as may be based upon an "unconditional surrender" of their hostility and a return to their just allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that we call upon the Government to maintain this position and to prosecute the war with the utmost possible vigor to the complete suppression of the rebellion, and in full reliance upon the self-sacrifice, the patriotism, the heroic valor, and the undying devotion of the American people to their country and its free institutions.

Resolved, That as slavery was the cause, and now constitutes the strength of this rebellion, and as it must be always and everywhere hostile to the principles of republican government, justice and the national safety demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the republic, and that we uphold and maintain the acts and proclamations by which the Government, in its own defence, has aimed a death-blow at this gigantic evil. We are in favor, furthermore, of such an amendment to the Constitution, to be made by the people in conformity with its provisions, as shall terminate and forever prohibit the existence of slavery within the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States.

Resolved, That the thanks of the American people are due to the soldiers and sailors of the army and navy, who have periled their lives in defense of their country, and in vindication of the honor of the flag; that the nation owes to them some permanent recognition of their patriotism and valor, and ample and permanent provision for those of their survivors who have received disabling and honorable wounds in the service of their country; and that the memories of those who have fallen in its defence shall be held in grateful and everlasting remembrance.

Resolved, That we approve and applaud the practical wisdom, the unselfish patriotism, and unswerving fidelity to the Constitution and the principles of American liberty, with which Abraham Lincoln has discharged, under circumstances of unparalleled difficulty, the great duties and responsibilities of the Presidential office; that we approve and indorse, as demanded by the emergency and essential to the preservation of the nation, and as within the Constitution, the measures and acts which he has adopted to defend the nation against its open and secret foes; that we approve especially the proclamation of emancipation, and the employment as Union soldiers of men heretofore held in slavery; and that we have full confidence in his determination to carry these and all other constitutional measures essential to the salvation of the country into full and complete effect.

Resolved, That we deem it essential to the general welfare that harmony should prevail in the national councils, and we regard as worthy of public confidence and official trust those only who cordially indorse the principles proclaimed in these resolutions, and which should characterize the administration of the Government.

Resolved, That the Government owes to all men employed in its armies, without regard to distinction of color, the full protection of the laws of war, and that any violation of these laws or of the usages of civilized nations in the time of war by the rebels now in arms, should be made the subject of full and prompt redress.

Resolved, That the foreign immigration, which in the past has added so much to the wealth and development of resources and increase of power to this nation, the asylum of the oppressed of all nations, should be fostered and encouraged by a liberal and just policy.

Resolved, That we are in favor of the speedy construction of the railroad to the Pacific.

Resolved, That the national faith, pledged for the redemption of the public debt, must be kept inviolate; and that for this purpose we recommend economy and rigid responsibility in the public expenditures, and a vigorous and just system of taxation; that it is the duty of every loyal State to sustain the credit and promote the use of the national currency.

Resolved, That we approve the position taken by the Government that the people of the United States never regarded with indifference the attempt of any European power to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud, the institutions of any republican government on the western continent, and that they view with extreme jealousy, as menacing to the peace and independence of this our country, the efforts of any such power to obtain new footholds for monarchical governments, sustained by foreign military force, in near proximity to the United States.

The Democratic National Convention which gathered at Chicago on the 29th of August, and presented the names of GEORGE B. McCLELLAN for President, and GEORGE H. PENDLETON for Vice-President, agreed on and adopted the following

PLATFORM.

Resolved, That in the future, as in the past, we will adhere with unswerving fidelity to the Union under the Constitution as the only solid foundation of our strength, security, and happiness as a people, and as a framework of government equally conducive to the welfare and prosperity of all the States, both Northern and Southern.

Resolved, That this Convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that, after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretense of a military necessity or war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate Convention of all the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.

Resolved, That the direct interference of the military authority of the United States in the recent elections held in Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri and Delaware, was a shameful violation of the Constitution, and the repetition of such acts in the approaching election will be held as revolutionary, and resisted with all the means and power under our control.

Resolved, That the aim and object of the Democratic party is to preserve the Federal Union and the rights of the States unimpaired; and they hereby declare that they consider the Administrative usurpation of extraordinary and dangerous powers not granted by the Constitution, the subversion of the civil by military law in States not in insurrection, the arbitrary military arrests, imprisonment, trial, and sentence of American citizens in States where civil law exists in full force, the suppression of freedom of speech and of the press, the denial of the right of asylum, the open and avowed disregard of State rights, the employment of unusual test-oaths, and the interference with and denial of the right of the people to bear arms, as calculated to prevent a restoration of the Union and the perpetuation of a Government deriving its just power from the consent of the governed.

Resolved, That the shameful disregard of the Administration to its duty in respect to our fellow-citizens who now and long have been prisoners of war in a suffering condition, deserves the severest reprobation, on the score alike of public interest and common humanity.

Resolved, That the sympathy of the Democratic party is heartily and earnestly extended to the soldiery of our army, who are and have been in the field under the flag of our country; and, in the event of our obtaining power, they will receive all the care and protection, regard and kindness, that the brave soldiers of the Republic have so nobly earned.

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"FOR THE GREAT EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, FORWARD!"

SPEECH

OF

MAJ.-GEN. CARL SCHURZ,

OF WISCONSIN,

DELIVERED AT CONCERT HALL, PHILADELPHIA,

ON

FRIDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 16, 1864.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: In times like these, when the passing events of every day cast ever-varying lights and shadows upon our situation, when our minds are tossed from fear to hope, from despondency to exultation, and back again to doubt, it is necessary that we should now and then fix our eyes firmly upon those things and ideas which, through all the vicissitudes of the hour, must serve as immovable and permanent points of direction.

The affairs of this country have evidently arrived at a crisis. We are engaged in a war for the restoration of the Union. The Union is not yet restored, but we hear the cry of *Peace*. The desire of peace is not peculiar to any social division or political party—it is cherished by all. But the question, What is peace, and how is it to be restored? this is the question to be solved by a vote of the people in November. Upon this question the mind of every conscientious citizen ought to be made up, whatever events to-day or to-morrow may bring. This question once irrevocably answered by the voice of the people, the future of the country is decided for ever.

The advocates of peace we can divide into four great classes:

First. The rebels themselves; they desire peace on the basis of separation and a final dissolution of the Union.

Second. A large number of influential men in foreign countries, especially in England and France, who affect to believe that the war is hopeless on our part, and urge us to consent to peace on the basis of separation; and who also urge foreign governments to intercede for that purpose.

Third. A numerous political party in the loyal States, who advocate, partly, peace at any price; partly, the offering of concessions and compromise to the rebels; but who all express the desire that the war shall cease.

Fourth. The great Union party, who advocate peace on the basis of the restoration of the Union, and a full and complete vindication of the authority of the Government, and the employment of all the means which the object may demand.

It seems, then, that "peace" is a word of wide meaning, and before using it as a political rallying-cry, we ought to be careful to ascertain and define its true significance.

The conditions upon which the rebels offer peace we all know. It is the recognition of their independence; it is the cession of all the States originally belonging to their Confederacy, with the addition of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri and the District of Columbia; the cession of all the Territories west of the Confederate States to the Pacific, and probably some division of the public property in the hands of the Government at the commencement of the war. It may be doubted whether modesty is one of their virtues. They may indeed be expected to yield a point or two. (Applause.) Although our people seem to have made up their minds about those propositions, there are many persons abroad, and a few among us, who believe in the possibility of peace on the basis of disunion. In England there are men who seem quite amazed and indignant that we should refuse to treat upon such reasonable conditions.

Permit me a rapid glance at the two decisive questions—first, Whether a settlement can be

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made on that basis? and second, Whether this settlement would lead to a durable peace?

What shall be the boundary-line? The Rocky Mountains would not be too high, nor the great lakes too broad, as a barrier between two powers exasperated by bitter feuds. But the only natural frontier we can find is the line of the Ohio and Potomac. Can we concede that? South of it there are two States that remained true to the Union during the war, Kentucky and West-Virginia. If we might agree to let the original seceders go, could we be base and treacherous enough to sell our friends, to deliver them helpless to the tender mercies of their mortal enemies?—for the rebels hate the Union people of the slave States more bitterly even than they hate Massachusetts. Can we abandon them? Impossible! What if the rebels do not yield that point? If we are obliged to fight for Kentucky and West-Virginia? Well, then, we can just as well fight for the whole Union, the war may go on, and there is the end of the settlement. (Applause.) But suppose the rebels agree to that territorial arrangement. Then the second question arises, Will this settlement have the necessary elements of stability? To the Confederacy it will be distasteful. As in Kentucky and West-Virginia the majority stood by us, so a strong minority stood by the rebels, and the same moral obligations which bind us to the first bind them to the second. The result will be this: the minority in Kentucky and West-Virginia will unite with the restless and reckless element in the Confederacy to precipitate the latter into warlike enterprises for the recovery of the two States, and the authorities of the Confederacy will not long be able to resist. Does this look like a solid peace? So much for the South.

But can the settlement be satisfactory or even endurable to the North? Remember that the supposed boundary-lines will leave the lower course and the mouth of the Mississippi in the hands of the Confederacy. A foreign power holding the mouth of the Mississippi! In the earlier stages of our history it was regarded as a self-evident truth that such power must be or become our natural enemy. But if at that time, when the great Mississippi Valley was a silently brooding wilderness, it was thought that we must have the mouth of the river, because the foreign hand that held it might choke our future development, what shall we say now when the Mississippi Valley has become the garden of America, the seat of empire? The matter is hardly a fit subject for discussion. The Mississippi is the great harbor of the Gulf of Mexico; it is the Atlantic Ocean ramified thousands of miles into the heart of the Continent. Its great port is not New-Orleans alone; it is St. Louis, it is Cincinnati, and the great cities that will spring up on the upper river and along the course of the gigantic Missouri. And the mouth of the Mississippi in the hands of a foreign power? Let it be so, and half our independence is gone. (Applause.) Indeed, freedom of commerce on the great river might be stipulated by treaty. But what of that? Will not the South, whenever any question of international dispute arises, be able to force us to any concession or to an offensive war merely by suspending the operation of the treaty, and by tightening its grasp upon the great outlet? Is not this as if some person were constitutionally permitted to have his grip upon your throat, able and ready, whenever he wants any thing of you, to stop the circulation of your blood merely by squeezing a little? And this humiliating situation any body expects our active, enterprising, spirited, and brave people to endure? The discussion of this possibility would be a mere waste of words. The people of the United States have bought the mouth of the Mississippi, once with their money and twice with their blood. (Great applause.) To give it away would be merely to produce the necessity of buying it a fourth time. Can the South yield it? No. Can the North do without it? No. And then?

I might go on to show how the proximity of dangerous neighbors immediately on our borders—of neighbors whose guns command our very capital, and who hold the natural outlet of the most productive part of our country—would at once oblige us to be in constant readiness for attack and defence; how large standing armies would swallow up the financial resources we might otherwise devote to the payment of our national debt; how the first success of a secession movement would inevitably draw similar attempts at dismemberment after it; how the minds of the people would be continually agitated by conspiracies and treasonable enterprises; how all this would steadily undermine our liberal institution by producing a centralization of power; how military necessity would become a standing and commanding element in our political life, and gradually transform the republic of peace into an engine of war; but it is enough.

It must be clear to every candid mind, that a settlement on the basis of disunion, far from securing a permanent peace, will be nothing but a mere temporary armistice, and must, after a short trial, produce the strengthened conviction in the minds of our people, that for the peace, liberty, and prosperity of the North-American continent, the restoration of the Union is an absolute necessity. (Great applause.) And what then? The war will be resumed. But under what circumstances! Now we fight the South alone, as a legitimate government fights a rebellious combination; then we shall have to fight a recognized, fully organized, and immensely strengthened Confederacy, with her European cotton allies at her heels. Now we have the Mississippi; we have the most important points on the Atlantic coast; we have the great central position of East-Tennessee; we have the heart of Georgia. We shall give up all this, merely for the privilege of paving every foot of that road again with our dollars and of sprinkling every inch of it again with the blood of our people! (Great applause.) O my good friends in England and France! do you not think, after all, that while we are at it, it will be wisest and most economical for us to go through with it? You, who affect such a holy horror of war and bloodshed, do you not think, after all, that it will be a saving of blood

and calamity if we persevere in a war of which we can see the end, instead of running into one that will be interminable?

Pardon me for devoting so much time to a subject upon which your convictions are settled. Such arguments may also be lost upon the peace-clamorers in France and England. But it might be well, perhaps, for them to know that our people can see no peace but in Union, and that their efforts to persuade us to the contrary will indeed fail of their object, but will certainly confirm us in the suspicion that they may love peace well, but would love the permanent dismemberment of this Republic better. (Applause.)

Peace with disunion being impossible, it is necessary, then, if for the sake of peace alone, that the Union should be restored. And how can it be restored? Either by the voluntary or the forced submission of the rebels to the lawful authority of the Government. This leads us to the third class of peace-makers. There is a party among us which pretends that it can secure the voluntary submission of the rebels, and thus restore peace. Its policy is defined by the following resolution adopted by its National Convention:

"*Resolved*, That this Convention does explicitly declare as the sense of the American people, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretense of a military necessity or war-power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand *that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities*, with *a view to an ultimate Convention of all the States*, or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, *peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States*."

This policy is to be practically carried out if that party should be intrusted with the powers of the Government, of which it seems rather confident, inasmuch as it explicitly declares "that such is the sense of the American people." I apprehend "the American people" will claim the privilege of thinking about this matter, and will explicitly declare their sense in due time. (Great applause and laughter.)

The resolution contains two positive and definite and one rather indefinite proposition. The two definite propositions are these: First, that the experiment of war as a means of restoring the Union is a failure—this is a clear and positive statement—and second, that immediate efforts must be made for a cessation of hostilities. This is positive also, and, as a sequence of the first proposition, can not mean any thing else but that the experiment of war must be stopped and abandoned. Here ends the clear and positive part of the programme. The third, indefinite proposition is, that the war must be stopped "with a view to an ultimate Convention of all the States, or other peaceable means," etc. Mark the words, "with a view to;" this looks to a future period not yet determined, and is rather foggy.

The first two propositions can be carried into effect by the Democratic party, if it should be the sense of the American people to place that party in power. It can declare, and to make good its declaration, it can make, the war a failure; and it can also stop the war. But the carrying out of the third proposition requires the coöperation of Jefferson Davis and the rebellious people of the seceded States. A Convention of the loyal States the Democratic party can have, but a Convention of *all* the States, with a view to the restoration of peace on the basis of the Federal Union, can not be had, unless such be the sense of Jefferson Davis and the States in rebellion. And if such be not the sense of Jefferson Davis and the Southern Confederacy, what then? That the Chicago platform saith not. But this is just the point the American people should like to know. This is no idle question; it is just *the* question upon which the whole matter hinges. For, mark you well, the resolution does not say, "We demand a cessation of hostilities *on condition* that a Convention of all the States, or some other peaceable means, by which the Union can be restored, be agreed to; if not, we shall continue the war;" but the demand of a cessation is positive on the ground that the experiment of war has proved a failure; the war is to be stopped on the demand of justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare, with a view to something that may or may not happen. I ask again, What if it does not happen? What if Jefferson Davis takes your cessation of hostilities with a view to laugh at your Convention and other peaceable means to restore the Union? And this he is most likely, nay, almost certain to do, for peace without the condition of reunion is just what he wants, and a Convention and reunion is just what he does not want. Well, what then? Will you tacitly acquiesce in the establishment of the Southern Confederacy? How can you, since you tell us that you are faithful to the Union? Or will you resume the war? How can you, since you declare that the experiment of war has proved a failure, and that "justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare" demand its cessation? What, then, in the name of common-sense, will you do? Here we look upon a jumble of contradictions so glaring that our heads begin to reel, and we wonder how it could happen to the whole wisdom of a great party in solemn convention assembled to hatch out so bottomless an absurdity. (Laughter and applause.)

The gentlemen who come with so amazing a proposition before the country will, indeed, tell us that Jefferson Davis and his people *may* agree to terms of peace on the basis of the Union. Pray, where did they obtain their information? We have some means of ascertaining the sentiments of the rebel government and of those men who make public opinion in that part of the country. We have the official enunciations of their chiefs; we have the sayings of their public speakers; we have their public papers; we have a large quantity of in-

formation from private sources published in the newspapers of our States. All these things are before the people; every body that has eyes may see, and that has ears may hear them. And now I appeal to any man that has kept the run of the times, did he ever see or hear the least indication of a willingness on the part of the rebel government or their leading men even to consider the proposition of a Convention or other peaceable means looking to the restoration of peace on the basis of reünion? Is it true, or not, that public sentiment in rebeldom, as far as we have means of knowing it, may be fairly summed up in what one of their newspapers said, that, if we presented to them a white sheet of paper with the signatures of our authorities at the bottom of it, on which they, the rebels, might write their own conditions of reunion, they would scorn to accept it? Do we not hear this repeated daily in numberless variations? Did they not ridicule and vilify in the most contemptuous manner certain Northern Democrats who pretended that they could negotiate a reünion on the basis of a compromise?

But this is not the only test of the matter. The rebels know full well that any offer of terms on their part, nay, the mere indication in the press of a willingness on their part to come back, would materially contribute to increase and inflame the divisions now existing among us; they know that a half-way offer of a compromise would be a good stroke of policy for them; and now, did you ever hear any one of their public men who could speak with any thing like authority admit even the idea that such a thing was possible? Why, even the celebrated peace-adventurers at Niagara Falls, who certainly meant mischief and nothing but mischief, said in their final winding-up letter that they had not the remotest intention of entertaining any proposition looking to reünion. And they and their friends in the North might certainly have made capital out of such a thing. And even Mr. Benjamin, in his late dispatch to Mr. Mason, while evidently laboring to give his Northern friends as much comfort as possible, could not refrain from stating most emphatically that the recognition of the independence of the Confederacy was a condition *sine qua non* for all peace negotiations. Why is this? Because a public man of standing in the Confederacy can not afford even to appear friendly to the idea of reünion under any circumstances. And yet, in the face of all this, with all this evidence before them, knowing all this, the men of the Chicago Convention dare to hold out to the American people the promise that the rebels will agree to a Convention of all the States or other peaceable means by which the Union can be restored. And upon an hypothesis so wild, upon an assumption so willful, an assumption so completely without the least shadow of a foundation, they advise us to stop the war with a view to a thing they know they can not effect. They dare to advise you to incur all the disadvantages a cessation of hostilities would involve for a chance which they themselves do not believe in!

This is more than absurdity; or, if you will still call it so, this absurdity is a symptom of something else than a mere confusion of ideas; it speaks of purposes that dare not avow themselves; of designs that need a disguise; of schemes that shun the light. (Applause.) Well might the open allies of the rebellion among us, the Vallandighams, the Longs, the Woods, the Seymours, the Harrises, the Pendletons, cast their votes for such a resolution; for a virtual abandonment of the war without a condition *sine qua non*, only with a view to a thing which, as they must know, will never be effected in this way, what else can it lead to than a tacit recognition of Southern independence? I understand the satisfaction with which open rebel sympathizers look upon their work; they indeed did take a candidate not their first choice, but they endeavored to gag and bind him, mouth and hand and foot, and although they could not defeat him by placing him upon such a platform, they have at least disgraced him. (Applause.) But what I can not understand is, that those men who indeed desire peace, but also sincerely believe in the necessity of restoring the Union, should permit themselves to be taken in by so clownish a juggle, by so transparent a fraud. It is for them that I will discuss the matter in its whole length and breadth.

Suppose, then, the party which passed this resolution is raised to power. The first official act to which it stands pledged by its platform will be to propose to Jefferson Davis an immediate cessation of hostilities. The proud Southron, at once recognizing his old friends, will forthwith remember that they stand pledged to stop the war, because they consider it a failure; to stop it in the name of justice and the public welfare. He will at once feel himself, and in fact be, master of the situation. Knowing all this, he will say: "Certainly, hostilities shall be stopped; you have only to negotiate with me as the head of an independent Confederacy, (see Benjamin's letter;) you have only to withdraw your armies from Southern soil; you have only to take away your navy from Southern ports; you have only to raise the blockade of our coast, and hostilities are stopped. Then you will have to dismiss the negro soldiers from your military service; and as to the matter with a view to which you propose to cease hostilities, we will see about that 'at the first practicable moment.'"

I am at once met by an outcry from the Democratic side: "We shall never do that — never!" You will not? Are you not the same men who pledged yourselves in the Chicago platform to stop the war, because it was a failure — to stop it on the score of justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare, merely with a view to a thing which, as you well know, will never happen, unless the rebels be forced to it — and now cry War! war that is a failure, war that is against justice and what all? But, you say, we did not mean it so. Why, then, did you say it so? (Laughter.) But do you really know what you will do? Let me see who you are, and I will tell you what you are capable of doing. You are the same men who, from 1848 to 1860, went the whole disgraceful way from the Wilmot Proviso to the

Lecompton Constitution, from free soil to the forcing of slavery upon free soil, protesting at every stopping-place, by all that is good and great, that you would not go a single step further. (Laughter and great applause.) And you will have us believe that you are not going to do this or that! Did you know what you were going to do when you went into the Chicago Convention? How many of you are there who would not have sworn upon their sacred honor that they would never vote for a resolution like that which was passed—and did they not do it? I tell you in the face of your protestations and those of your candidate, you permit yourselves once to be infatuated with the idea that you can coax and buy the rebels back into the Union by concession, and whatever they may ask of you, you will do it, for it is only the first step that costs — and surely, Jefferson Davis will not spare you, for his foot is too familiar with the necks of his old Northern friends. (Great applause.) The old silly cry, "Do not irritate the South! do not irritate it by the blockade! do not irritate it by the armed negroes!" (laughter,) will again have its old sway; your desires and delusive hopes will give birth to the most obsequious schemes, and soon you will be in a state of mind of which it will be difficult to say where folly ends and where treason begins.

Still, I will give you the full benefit of your protestations. I might describe the ruinous effect the temporary withdrawal of our armies, or even the temporary raising of the blockade, would have upon the future chances of the war; how hundreds of French and English vessels would fly into Savannah and Wilmington with arms and ammunition and clothing and railroad iron and machinery, and other things handy to have; how those ships would fly out again loaded with cotton; how, upon the value of that cotton, the Confederate loan would find new buyers and their wretched finances would look up; how the whole fighting capacity of the South would receive a new and tremendous impulse. I might describe all that, but I will forbear.

There are two measures which, in case of their accession to power, the Chicago party would most certainly execute. Victims to that most ridiculous of all mental diseases, the negrophobia, they would dismiss our two hundred thousand negro soldiers; and yielding to that most pernicious of all passions, demagoguism, they would give up the idea of a conscription. Will they not? I dare any one of their public men, I dare their candidate, I dare the most bellicose of their partisans—I *dare* them to say that they will not do so. And the consequences? With one hand they will deplete and weaken the army, and with the other they will throw away the means of filling it up and strengthening it. Take two hundred thousand negro soldiers from the garrisons and posts they are guarding, take two hundred thousand white soldiers from Atlanta and Petersburgh to fill the places left vacant by the negroes, and I call upon any military authority in this country to say: Will it, or will it not, be impossible for our two great armies, under Grant and Sherman, to hold the field?

"Retreat! retreat!" would be the cry; and it is, perhaps, with a view to this contingency that the Chicago Convention has selected its distinguished candidate. (Long-continued applause.) Do not speak of rapidly filling the vacuum with new recruits; for you give up the conscription, and I apprehend your friends in Indiana and Illinois and Ohio, your Sons of Liberty and American Knights, will be rather slow to rush to the field with their imported revolvers. (Laughter.) Far from being able to strengthen our army, you will rather weaken, dishearten, and demoralize what remains of it. The soldiers witnessing with disgust these senseless and ruinous proceedings, suspicion and distrust would creep into the ranks, and the brave boys would lose half of their strength by losing their confidence and faith.

And then, indeed, the "cessation of hostilities" would acquire a new aspect. Unable to keep the field, far from being able to offer an armistice, you might find yourselves obliged to approach the rebel chief hat in hand to beg for one; and surely, if he should have the contemptuous magnanimity to grant it, he would hardly spare your feelings with his conditions. Is that the cessation of hostilities you desire? It is certainly the cessation of hostilities the rebels desire. This kind of armistice will at least have one advantage: it will save you the trouble of discussing what conditions you will or will not propose. The rebels will take that trouble off your hands. (Laughter and applause.) But, seriously and soberly speaking, I deem the opposition of the Woods and Vallandighams to the Chicago nominee a most rash and ill-advised movement; for, if they let him only act upon the general idiosyncrasies, the common prejudices and impulses of the party, he will as certainly and safely ruin the prospects of the war as they themselves might have done with their ingeniously devised cessation of hostilities, which offers to the rebels that which they desire, together with the privilege of refusing that which we desire. The one is a military way of doing it, the other a civil one; the one is "strategy," the other diplomacy; and I candidly think the difference is not worth quarreling about. At all events, it would be well for the peace men to set a good example by keeping peace among themselves. (Laughter and applause.)

But I will follow the advocates of the Chicago peace platform into the farthest recesses of their argument, which we find, not in their resolutions, but in their papers.

They tell us, that while the rebel government is for war, the Southern people are for peace; and that we therefore must appeal from the rebel government to the Southern people. Certainly a good idea. But how carry it out? The number of peace men in the South is undoubtedly large. They may fairly be divided into two classes: first, Secessionists on principle, who are for peace only because they are tired of the war; and second, Union men on principle, who are for peace on the basis of reünion. These two classes undoubtedly comprise a large number of people, but probably not strong enough to control the rebel government; for if they are strong

enough to do so, why do they not do it? Our Chicago men say we must strengthen them. Certainly, but how?

Why do the secessionists who are for peace offer no effective opposition to the rebel government? Because, though indeed sick of the war, they would like to have separation along with peace. Then it is evident they are not yet tired enough of the war. The remedy is simple. We must carry on the war with such terrible energy as to make all rebeldom tremble and shake. That will make them so tired of the war, that after a while they will only be too happy to make peace at any price. Is not that clear? (Applause.) Now for the Union men in the rebel States. There are undoubtedly many of them; all the blacks and a large number of whites. Why do they not exercise any decisive influence in rebeldom. Because the rebel government is too strong for them, and keeps them down. What is the remedy? It is simple. We must break the strength of the rebel government by dealing it as heavy blows as we can strike. That will give the Union men air to breathe, and freedom of action. Is not this commonsense? (Applause.)

But how the secessionists who are tired of the war can be made Unionists by stopping the war for humanity's sake; or how we can aid the Union men, who can not stir, because the rebel government is too strong for them, by giving the same rebel government a chance to become still stronger—that, I suspect, it will take the whole logic and eloquence in Chicago Convention assembled to make intelligible to an intelligent people. (Great laughter and applause.)

The whole wisdom of the intricate peace policy of the Chicago party may be fairly summed up as follows: You are struggling with a highwayman who has robbed you of your valuables. You are stronger than he, and about to overcome him. Suddenly you stop, and say: "Now, my good fellow, I will struggle no longer; I see it is a failure on my part; to struggle longer would be against justice, humanity, and our common welfare; I let you go, with a view to meet you again, and to persuade you to give me back, at the most practicable moment, what you have stolen." Is not this Bedlam? (Tremendous laughter and applause.)

But now I arrive at a feature of this business which places its true character in still clearer light. It is well known that some of the leading powers of Europe, with whom we are in most immediate contact, affect to believe in, because they desire, the final dissolution of this Republic. Whatever motives you may assign for this fact—the competition growing from our spirit of commercial enterprise, jealousy of our constantly growing strength, hatred of our republican institutions—call it what you will, the fact is too thinly disguised to escape recognition. Still, I wish you to understand, in speaking of the tendencies of some of the political and commercial interests of England and France, it is far from me to cast a slur upon the noble nations of those countries; for I sincerely believe the cause of universal liberty in this country has no truer friends abroad than they are.

At present, the so-called Confederacy is a mere association of political bodies engaged in a rebellion against their legitimate Government. They are indeed recognized as belligerents, but not admitted into the family of nations as an independent and equal member. Foreign powers, however desirous of making separation permanent, yet hesitate to enter into open relations and coöperation with the Confederacy; first, because our Government maintains with firmness the justice of our cause, and its inflexible resolution to bring back the rebellious States; and secondly, because the stigma of slavery rests upon the rebellion, and European governments have some respect for public opinion in their own countries, and for the enlightened judgment of mankind. But is it reasonable to suppose that they will refrain from doing so when they will have a plausible pretext? They would, no doubt, be most glad to see us do for them what they are ashamed to do for themselves. As you, in times gone by—and I hope gone by for ever—were required to do for the slaveholder the dirty work he deemed below his dignity to do for himself—catch his runaways—so foreign powers would rather like you to perform for them a hardly cleaner work, which they themselves feel much delicacy about—recognize as an independent power a Confederacy founded upon the corner-stone of slavery. (Great applause.) "Oh!" you say, "they will have to wait for that." Will they, indeed? Here is the Chicago platform, declaring explicitly as the sense of the American people that the war is a failure and must be stopped. The war declared a failure in the eyes of the whole world; and not only that, but that it must be stopped on the score of "*justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare.*" And this you cry into the ears of England and France, who merely wait to hear you say so! Have not our enemies in those countries always advocated the recognition of the Confederacy on the ground that the war, on our part, was hopeless, unjust, inhumane, tyrannical, and ruinous? With what delight the London *Herald* and the London *Times* will hail this declaration! With what triumph they will point to it! Is it not admitting all, all they have been contending for—hopelessness, injustice, inhumanity, tyranny, ruin, all? And now, if the American people should be so lost to all sense of shame and decency as to indorse this declaration at a national election, with what face will you stand up before England and France, and ask them not to recognize the Confederacy? If this war is indeed what you affirm—a failure, and hopeless, unjust, inhumane, and ruinous—would it not be an act of mercy, of justice, of humanity, to step in and stop it? And do you not, by this most infamous declaration, invite them to do so? I will prove to you that this is no mere offspring of my imagination. Some time ago, Lord Lyons wrote to his Government an official dispatch, in which the following passage occurred:

"*Several of the leaders of the Democratic party sought interviews with me, both before and after* the arrival of the intelligence of Gen. McClellan's dismissal. The subject uppermost in their minds, while they were speaking to me, *was naturally that of foreign mediation between*

North and South. Many of them seemed to think that this mediation must come at last; but they appeared to be afraid of its coming too soon. It was evident that they apprehended that a premature proposal of foreign intervention would afford the Radical party a means of reviving the violent war spirit, and thus of defeating the powerful plans of the Conservatives. They appeared to regard the present moment as peculiarly unfavorable for such an offer, and, indeed, to hold that it would be essential to the success of any proposal from abroad *that it should be deferred until the control of the Executive Goverement should be in the hands of the Conservative party.*"

So far Lord Lyons.

Foreign powers having at last found and seized upon a pretext for officially meddling with our difficulties, such as your invitation would give them—and, indeed, remembering Lord Lyons's significant dispatch, this seems to be part of the Chicago programme—we shall see the working of a new agency in the affairs of this continent; an agency which, fortunately, was unknown to us as long as the country was one; and that agency is *foreign influence.*

The same reasons for which England and France desired the breaking up of this union, the same reasons will also impel them to do all they can to make separation permanent, and the whole of their influence, powerful as it will be—for the Confederacy will necessarily lean upon her European friends—will be thrown against reünion. That influence will indeed be powerful, for it will not only extend to the Government, but it will at once run through all the channels of trade. And now is there any body credulous enough to believe, that against such fearful odds you can carry out the timid scheme with a view to which you mean to stop the war? Foreign influence, once admittted, as it will be by this policy, will have the casting vote in all that pends between us and the South. We shall not have two great powers on this continent, but four, and all but one bitterly against reünion. Divide and rule, is the old saying; but not those will rule that are divided. (Applause.) Whatever our ultimate decision may be after such developments, whether to resume the war at once, or to acquiesce in separation, and then, after a short breathing spell, launch into the confusion of a new conflict, there is one thing certain: we shall find the South so immensely strengthened, that if for a people like ours any task could be hopeless, this would be hopeless indeed.

And in the same measure as the South will be strengthened by this Chicago policy, so we shall be weakened. I have already alluded to the demoralization and disintegration of our military strength by its effect. But that is not all.

At present the enlightened opinion of the liberal masses of Europe is on our side. That opinion may in a crisis prove strong enough to bridle the action of governments. How can we expect that opinion to be true to us, if we are treacherous to ourselves? With what face can we demand its generous support, if we confess a failure and throw doubt upon the justice and humanity of our own cause? You have heard of the people of Germany pouring their gold lavishly into the treasury of the United States. (Applause.) You have heard of a loan of a thousand millions having been offered, and being now in progress of negotiation. Would those people who are standing by us so generously in our embarrassments, would they have done so, if they did not trust in our ability and determination to carry through the war? And now they are told by a party that boast of being about to grasp the reigns of government, that the war is a failure, and being a failure, and being unjust, inhumane, and ruinous, must be given up. You, who are so clamorous about the condition of our treasury, do you call that raising our credit abroad, do you call that helping our finances out of a distressed condition? Truly, if it were your avowed object to reduce the Government to total impotency for want of means, to render the nation incapable of a vigorous movement, to lay it prostrate in utter helplessness at the feet of its enemies, your means could not be more judiciously chosen, you could not operate with more infernal acuteness. (Great applause.)

We may ask ourselves: How is it possible that a policy so utterly absurb, reckless, and pernicious, should find any supporters among men whose sound sense and patriotism are not completely extinguished? I find the reason in a vague impression, here and there prevailing, that the Union and universal good feeling may be restored by a policy of conciliation and compromise. I find it in the generous impulses of magnanimous hearts, which insist that those who are conquered and brought to terms, should be reättached to us by a kind and forbearing treatment. There is no man in this country who would be less inclined than I to listen to the promptings of vengeance and resentment. But while we are willing to act with a sincere desire to heal all wounds by generous accommodation, do you not see, that before we find a field for that magnanimity in offering terms to the conquered, the rebels must first be conquered and brought to terms? (Applause.) And do you not further see, that if we follow the Chicago policy, the chance is rather, the rebels will be masters of the situation and bring us to terms? Still, as the feeling I speak of is vague and indefinite, and may make itself heard independently of the Chicago platform, I will say a word on compromise in its general aspect.

A compromise with the rebellion offered on our part, would necessarily contain two conditions: first, an abandonment of some essential point determined by the national election of 1860, for that was the occasion on which the rebels seceded; and secondly, the stipulation that the rebels shall give up the struggle and return to their allegiance. Every sensible man who has his eyes open, knows that the rebels will certainly reject a compromise containing the second stipulation, as long as they entertain any hope of achieving their independence. The question arises, Would it be good policy to offer the first, even by way of experiment?

I have already said enough to make it evident, that as long as the rebels have confidence in their ability to win ultimate success, they will

insist on their terms and not think of accepting ours. We must therefore shake that confidence. How shake it? By a display of superior power, and an inflexible determination to carry on the struggle to the bitter end. That will make them count the cost and consider. But what if we show signs of a flagging spirit, of a shaky determination? What if we act as if we had lost our assurance of our ability to achieve success in the game of war? They will take new hope and courage. And is not an offer of a compromise, that is, an offer to abandon some essential point determined in the election of 1860, an indication of a flagging and uncertain spirit? The matter resolves itself into this: The rebels will not think of accepting a compromise, until their prospects are so obscured and their power so reduced, that they would be obliged to submit without it. Thus it will be no more difficult to beat them into submission, than it will be to beat them into a compromise; and that accomplished, the compromise will be superfluous. But the offer of a compromise before that point is reached, will be not only superfluous but dangerous; for by giving evidence of a flagging of our own spirits, it will bring new courage and hope to the rebels, and thus prolong the struggle and postpone the moment when a settlement can be effected. (Applause.)

But this is not all. I contend that a compromise in our case, even if it could be effected, would be utterly inadmissible as a measure of peace. (Great applause.)

The word compromise has acquired a certain traditional prestige in our political history, so that many people pronounce it with a singular superstitional awe, and think nothing is done well that is not done by compromise. It is said that the Constitution is founded on compromise—and so it is. But there is one thing in the Constitution, which is not founded upon compromise, which does not admit of any compromise, which is, in the very nature of things, absolute and imperative. It is the principle, that, when the will of the majority upon a question constitutionally subject to be decided by the majority, is once expressed and proclaimed in a constitutional form, the minority is absolutely and unconditionally bound to submit. (Applause.) There is no cavilling about this principle. It is the very foundation of all republican government; without it the whole republican edifice would at once tumble down as a chaotic, shapeless mass. It is the balance-wheel of the whole machinery. The observance of this principle is the fundamental obligation of the citizen. Every measure of policy may be subject to compromise, but this fundamental obligation is not. It can be bound to no conditions, for if it were, it would cease to be absolute.

Apply this to our case. A constitutional election was held in 1860. All constitutional requirements were strictly fulfilled. Abraham Lincoln received a constitutional majority of the votes; he was made President in a strictly constitutional manner. And because the majority which elected him entertained certain opinions of public policy obnoxious to a minority, that minority rose in rebellion against the Government. You now propose to buy that rebellious minority back by relinquishing some of the principles held by the majority. You do this, because the minority has risen up in arms against the constitutionally expressed will of the majority. In other words, you, the majority, confess yourselves so far conquered as you are willing to surrender part of the decision of the ballot-box to the force of arms. And thus far you declare the fundamental obligation of submission to the constitutional verdict of the majority not binding; the minority, if it please, may force the majority to surrender the whole or part of its will. It may do so, for it has succeeded in doing so. The new principle you introduce into our political life is this: the minority is bound by the constitutional verdict of the majority, unless it be strong enough to force the majority to concessions; then it is not bound, that is to say, elections are not finally decided at the ballot-box, but are afterward open to negotiation; the minority proposes its conditions of submission to the result, and the fighting party wins. Do you know what that means? It means the transformation of the Republic of the United States into something like the old republics of Mexico and South-America; it means the government of revolutionary factions, instead of constitutional majorities; it means the introduction of rebellion as a standing element in our political life. (Great applause.)

Do not accuse me of seeing spectres. Do not indulge in the vain illusion that this first great abandonment of the fundamental obligation will remain an isolated fact. Such precedents are prolific. Let it be once known that the constitutional majority can and may be forced to concessions, and the idea will have an irresistible charm to reckless and restless minds. The composition of our people will no longer be what it was heretofore. The end of the war will throw a fearful number of adventurous spirits upon society, ready, at the call of an audacious leader, at any hour, to overleap the bounds of the accustomed order of things. Warlike habits, added to their warlike tastes, will stimulate them to wild enterprises, and a ceaseless war of factions would be to them an all too welcome field of adventure. This is the material, and you know where to look for the leaders. Already, at this moment, the country is teeming with unscrupulous demagogues, with whom treasonable scheming has become a habit; already we hear of large importations of arms and ammunition, and their distribution among the members of secret organizations; already we see in the papers threats of armed resistance to the loyal majority, in case certain candidates are defeated. And you could be willing to open this flood-gate of disorder by setting aside the only principle, the great fundamental obligation, that keeps democratic government in balance? You would inaugurate a system, which, by compromise and concession, pays and promises a premium to revolt? Is it not astonishing indeed that among men who have such a material stake in social order, as merchants and manufacturers, we should find so many advocates of that fatal policy? And this, they vainly imagine, would lead to peace. The

sanctioned violation of the great principle which alone can maintain internal peace, should lead to peace? Is the peace of Mexico and the South-American republics the peace you want? Is a condition of things which will make a revolt as familiar an occurrence as a national election—is that the peace you desire? This, then, is compromise as a peace measure; if it remains a mere experimental offer, encouragement of the rebels and prolongation of the war; if carried into effect, breaking down the great safeguard of social order, and inaugurating an interminable war of factions, but no peace. (Great applause.) And now give me leave to sum up what I have said about the peace-programme of Chicago.

In proposing that the war shall be stopped without making this proposition depend upon any peremptory condition, merely with a view to a thing which every body knows will not be agreed to, it encourages the rebels to persevere in their resistance.

The result will be, either that the Government, if it falls into the hands of that party, will have to recognize the independence of the Southern Confederacy, or, after a cessation of hostilities, to resume the war.

If it recognizes the independence of the Southern Confederacy, we shall soon have on our hands the complicated and endless wars which, in the very nature of things, must grow out of disunion.

If the Government, after a cessation of hostilities, resumes the present war for the Union, we shall labor under difficulties immensely greater than at present, for three reasons:

1st. From a cessation of hostilities, such as proposed, the rebels will derive such advantages, and we such disadvantages, that the struggle will be almost hopeless; and still, as peace is impossible with disunion, it will be as necessary as ever.

2d. By declaring before the whole world that the war is a failure; by demanding its cessation on the score of justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare; by thus declaring the rebels in the right and our Government in the wrong; and by thus condemning and virtually abandoning the war for the Union, they invite foreign powers to recognize the rebel Confederacy, and to throw their whole influence against an unjust, inhumane, tyrannical, and universally ruinous war.

3d. By making the foregoing declarations, they turn public opinion in foreign countries against us, and discourage the movements now going on to give us financial aid; and all this while it is certain, and they make it more so, that the war must either be continued after a useless cessation, or be resumed at a more or less distant period.

And, finally, by implicitly advocating a policy of concession to armed rebellion, they propose to set aside the fundamental obligation of submission to the constitutional will of the majority, to remove the only guarantee of order in democratic life, to pay a premium to revolt, and thus to open the flood-gates of civil disorder, and a turbulent and endless war of factions.

This is the programme — these its immediate and inevitable results. And the men who thus attempt to create new complications, to increase the difficulties, and thus immensely to aggravate the calamities of war, these men dare to call themselves friends of peace? What! Have they not had bloodshed enough, that they want to make this war interminable? Is not the rebellion strong enough, that they want to add to its strength all the aid in money, arms, and material, that foreign friendship can give? Are not our enemies numerous enough, that they want to engage for them the aid of foreign governments? Is not our financial condition embarrassed enough, that they want to stop those resources which open themselves for us abroad? Have we so many friends in the world, that they want to ruin us in the opinion of mankind? What! are they not satiated yet with ruin and desolation? Will it take the sacrifice of new and countless hecatombs of men, the sacrifice of the fruits of another half-century of sweat and toil, to give them their fill? And these men have the brazen front to demand your votes, pretending that they will give you peace! You have heard of shore-pirates who set out false lights by night on the shore of the ocean when the weather is thick and stormy, to deceive and draw on the distressed mariner into the fatal breakers, and then to plunder the ship in pretending to save it. Take heed, Americans, and beware! Trust not this light of peace! This light is false! There is no harbor behind it, nothing but rocks, reefs, breakers, shipwreck, and ruin!

Such is their cry of peace. But what shall we say of their patriotism? Patriotism and that platform! If the rebel emissaries at Niagara Falls alone had made it—for they certainly had their share in making it—if the friends of the rebels in England had made it—that we might understand. But that American citizens—sons of the great and happy free States—should have made this — can that be conceived by a true American heart?

That platform and patriotism! Show me the man who hates us most, he will like it best! Show me the bitterest enemy of this Republic, he will crave a chance to vote for it! Show me the vilest villain in all rebeldom, who never prayed before; he will sink upon his knees and pray for its success! (Loud cheers and applause.)

When we want to designate all that was humiliating to our patriotic pride, all that was ruinous to the honor and safety of the Union, all that was contemptible and dastardly and treacherous in the conduct of our public affairs; if we want to designate all this with one name, we call it *James Buchanan*. (Laughter and applause.)

We thought the period in our history which is represented by that name, was finally absolved; we thought it might be consigned to oblivion, as it was consigned to shame. But, alas! although Buchanan is dead and buried, those who indulged in the soothing delusion that such a man could leave no progeny, find themselves mistaken. Behold, a whole brood of young Buchanans has risen up and met in convention at Chicago. (Continued laughter.) The laurels of their father

do not let them sleep. I see again the cunning twinkle of the eye, I see the white necktie again, (great laughter;) they try to adjust it like a halter around the throat of the Republic, to throttle her to death. (Continued cheers.) Truly, the sons are greater than the sire. For what he did, we may say he did as a weak old man, whose life had been spent in a constant exercise of his knee-joints; and who, when the rebellion first raised its Gorgon-head, had neither the firmness of a patriot nor the courage of a traitor. But what they do, they do after thousands of noble men have stained the battlefields of their country with their precious blood; after the people have poured out their money like water to save the Republic; after our invincible navy has battered down the Southern forts, and is commanding the Southern waters; they do it when the hero of Vicksburgh is thundering at the gates of Richmond; when our victorious flag waves over the ramparts of Atlanta, and Victory is the cry! (Long-continued cheering.) Ah! poor old man, hide thy head in shame, for thou canst no longer claim such proud preëminence in baseness. There are those that are greater than thou, and whose vaulting ambition laughs thy iniquity to scorn. Those are the men who made that platform! (Tremendous applause.)

And upon that platform they placed a soldier by profession as their candidate—a General who once commanded the armies of this Republic. Was there ever a man more cruelly insulted by his friends? Was there ever irony more cutting? A General nominated for the Presidency for the distinct purpose of trading away other generals' victories! A soldier appointed to make the successes of other soldiers useless! And he did not resent it by flinging platform and nomination into the faces of those who had made it, without losing a single moment! Alas! he did not. He waited. He endured this most outrageous insult—this mortal offence—without saying a word!. Meanwhile murmurs of indignation arose, like a black cloud, from the army, against him who was once their commander—from every corner of the country cries of anger and contempt burst forth against the infamous Chicago surrender. But that was not all. A thrill of joy and enthusiasm flashed through the heart of the nation when the word came: "Atlanta is ours!" And, then, surrender! (Loud applause.)

But now, at least, when the promptings of prudence came to the aid of the voice of just resentment, now, at last, he spurned the platform, and he scorned to be the candidate of the men that made it, and of the party that adopted it? Oh! no. For him, I regret to say, the opportunity for showing the metal of a great character was lost. He chose a middle way. He did not repudiate, nor did he approve, but he ignored the platform and took the nomination. This has, at least, the charm of novelty. The candidate wrote a skilfully worded political letter, showing that the art, How not to say it, can be brought to as high a degree of perfection as the art, How not to do it. (Laughter and cheers.) It is upon record. But that was not the first political letter of his life. The General had written one about a year ago, before he was a candidate. That letter was endorsing the principles and advocating the election of Judge Woodward to the Governorship of Pennsylvania. And that letter is on record too. Who was Judge Woodward? You know better than I can tell you, that he went as far as any of the class called peace-copperheads dared to go; peace at any price, surrender, and all. And when was this letter endorsing his principles written? The circumstances are significant. We had just then suffered a very disastrous defeat at the battle of Chicamauga, our Western army was in a most critical situation, in Virginia the campaign had come to a complete standstill, the affairs of the country looked dark. And then the General endorsed the principles and advocated the election of a peace-man. This is most interesting for the people to remember. Thus we know how he is capable of speaking after a defeat. This gives us the advantage, since he has now somewhat changed his tune after a victory, to conclude with safety how he is likely to speak in case of a defeat again. It is far from me to insinuate that the General was dishonest in writing his war-letter; nor was he dishonest in writing his letter for the peace-man. He means what he says now; he meant what he said then. The General is a gentleman, and I sincerely believe he was honest both times. But this kind of honesty is a fair indication of the policy we may look for from that quarter. While I detest that sort of peace-spirit, I am afraid of that sort of war-spirit. And this is the war-spirit of a party which deemed it necessary to postpone its convention from the fourth of July to the twenty-ninth of August, to give events time to develop themselves, and to shape their policy accordingly.

For peace when the horizon of the country is gloomy, and for war when it is bright! Is that the kind of patriotism we want? This fair-weather patriotism, which is ready to give up the country in the hour of misfortune, although it makes a show of standing by the country in the hour of success? And upon that shifting sandhill you will build the future of the Republic! (Great cheering.) What if to-morrow an untoward accident should overtake our armies; will it stand the test, or will it give up the country again? Remember, that it is in the hour of gloom and despondency that the country stands most in need of the unswerving devotion of her sons! (Loud applause.) Give me the man, who, in storm as well as in sunshine, amidst the cries of distress as well as the jubilee of victory, will stand by the cause of his country with a faith unshaken, with a courage undismayed, with a purpose unbending, and him I will call a patriot; but not those whose firmness depends upon the revolutions of the wheel of fortune! (Enthusiastic cheering.) And this kind of firmness will have to stand a singular test. We shall have the alarming spectacle of an honest but not altogther inflexible character in very bad company.

There is no American who does not know that a President's policy is not made by him alone, but by those who made him; and there is no American who will forget that the strength of the vote which nominated this candidate at

Chicago was far exceeded by the unanimity with which the platform was adopted. And now ignore the platform and take the nomination? In ancient tales we read of men who, in order to enjoy all the good things of the world, pledged their souls to the devil by compact; and they did enjoy the good things of this world, but then played the virtuous in order to save their souls; but at the appointed time, the devil produced the compact signed with blood, and claimed and took the forfeit. And this Presidential candidate thinks he can enjoy the good things of this world, and then, by playing the virtuous, cheat the devil out of his dues? Vain undertaking! This devil will be too much for the man who wrote the Woodward letter, and either the good things of this world will not be enjoyed, or the forfeit will be claimed and taken! (Loud cheers and applause.)

No, no, this is no jest! I am in sober earnest, and mean what I say. Either that party must go to pieces, or it must be held together by bargain and sale. If it goes to pieces, well and good; the smaller the pieces, the better. (Laughter and cheers.) But if it be held together by bargain and sale, what is the price at which the support of the surrender men can be secured? What assurances, what secret pledges must be given? And you know well enough that those old party-leaders are not the men who work merely for the gratification of another man's ambition.

How will it be when the leaders of the surrender party press around the throne and claim the forfeit? Will the new war President then lean for strength upon his brother Pendleton, that most abject and submissive of all surrender Democrats?

How magnificent a combination would be this: Horatio Seymour as Secretary of State and chief of the circumlocution-office; Seymour, of Connecticut, as Secretary of the Navy; Vallandigham as Secretary of War; and Fernando Wood, in consideration of the peculiar lustre which his honesty sheds upon his talents, Secretary of the Treasury. (Peals of laughter.) And would such a combination, if bargain as a last refuge be resorted to, would it be more wonderful than the harmony of the Chicago Convention? Is not the support of all of them necessary?

No, no, I am not jesting. If the party be held together and the Cabinet should be a complete Pandemonium, there would be nothing surprising in it. Such arrangements have been seen before, when things were working smoothly, and when there was no apparent conflict between platform and candidate. How, then, may it be now, when the necessities of the party are so pressing that they must resort to extreme remedies to save it? (Cheers.)

Meanwhile, you will see them walk from voter to voter and say, "Are you for war? So are we, my friend; here is our candidate!" or, "Are you for peace? So are we, my friend; here is our platform!"—only in one thing treating all alike, in deceiving each other and in deceiving all! For when they say, "We are for war," may not the answer be, "You lie, for here is your platform!" Or, when they say, "We are for peace," may not the answer be, "You lie, for here is your candidate!" (Cheers and applause.)

Americans, what a spectacle is this! How sad, how loathsome an exhibition! And it is in this way that a great nation is to decide of its future! In this gulf of deception and duplicity you would sink the fortunes of your country? From my inmost heart, from the very depth of my profoundest convictions, I warn you. Out of this, nothing can grow but a peace that cannot last, or a war that will not end; a peace without honor and solidity, or a war without faith, without nerve, without success, without decision. (Great applause.)

It is with a sense of relief that I turn from this fearful labyrinth of confused contradictions, of dark arrangements, of continually shifting pretences, to another programme of peace policy, which has at least the merit of consistency in its principles, of unyielding firmness in its policy, and of straightforward clearness in its propositions. It is the platform of the great Union party. (Applause.) Let us examine the wisdom of its policy with a view to the restoration of peace. Its first resolution reads thus:

"*Resolved*, That it is the highest duty of every American citizen to maintain against all their enemies the integrity of the Union and the paramount authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States; and that, laying aside all differences and political opinions, we pledge ourselves as Union men, animated by a common sentiment, and aiming at a common object, to do everything in our power to aid the Government in quelling by force of arms the rebellion now raging against its authority, and in bringing to the punishment due to their crimes the rebels and traitors arrayed against it."

This, at least, is clear and definite. There are no "ifs" nor "buts." Starting from the conviction that disunion will bring on interminable conflicts, and that, if, in the interest of fear alone, the Union must, absolutely *must* be restored—and only our enemies abroad and traitors at home doubt that—and that the rebels will not consent to reünion unless the victories of our army and navy bring them to terms—and only fools doubt that—it is affirmed that there is nothing left to us but to seek peace by a resort to arms, by vigor and energy in its prosecution of the war, and by a faithful and devoted support of the Government in its efforts to secure a speedy and decisive victory. This we explicitly declare to be the sense of the *loyal* American people. (Applause.) Not one of the points we have won is given up; not one step is done backward; not one advantage gained is jeopardized by a prevaricative policy; and while the Democratic promise of armistice and premature concession, by exhibiting a flagging spirit and a vacillating purpose, can only serve to encourage the rebels to persevere in their resistance, our inflexible determination will make them count the cost; and if the Southern people are really tired of the war, if they really want peace, they will at last have to make up their minds, once for all, that they cannot get rid of this war, with

its burdens and its sacrifices, unless they buy peace at the only price at which it can be bought, the restoration of the Union.

And, moreover, this declaration will make European governments understand that we do not consider this war a failure, nor that we mean to make it so; and that, if they should conclude to give the rebellion countenance, and aid and comfort, they will never succeed in changing our unalterable determination; but may, indeed, succeed in pressing our resentment beyond the limits of mere remonstrance. And as to our detractors abroad, who are so anxious for peace and the cessation of bloodshed, but still more anxious for the breaking up of this Republic; who, when some disaster has befallen us, so blandly endeavor to persuade us that now it is time to stop, that now we can endure it no longer, that after all separation would be best for both parties, (they omit to speak of third and fourth parties,) and that our own welfare would be best promoted by consenting to it without unnecessary delay, and who, when, in spite of their magnanimous advice, we steadily work on, show their little humor by accusing us of heartlessness and barbarism, flavoring their urgencies from time to time with a dark rumor of foreign intervention; by this declaration we give them to understand, once for all, that they might as well bridle their tender solicitude; that the American people are not acting upon the vast impulse of passion, but upon convictions broad and deep; that, according to those convictions, a lasting peace is impossible with disunion; that, therefore, whatever sacrifice it may cost, the Union must be restored and will be restored; that this is our set purpose, and that they are not smart enough to coax us out of it, and, we humbly suspect, not formidable enough to frighten us out of it. (Great applause).

And, finally, this declaration will give an assurance to our friends abroad, who are generously willing to give us their moral and financial aid, that considerations of justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare urge us not to stop the war and abandon our purpose, but to work on with increased vigor and unbending perseverance; that we have faith in the justice of our cause, and confidence in the final result; that our friends being true to us, we shall be true to them; that they not only will be protected against their aid becoming a sacrifice, but will once have the satisfaction of having contributed to the success of the greatest cause of this country.

And now I appeal to you, Union men, and I appeal to you also, Democrats, is this, or is it not, the only policy worthy of the great American people? Answer!

But here we do not stop. The rebellion being beaten down, the rebels being obliged to keep peace for the present by the utter exhaustion of their forces, peace must be secured for the future. The Union party presents for this object another resolution. It reads thus:

"*Resolved*, That we approve the determination of the Government of the United States not to compromise with rebels, or to offer any terms of peace, except such as may be based upon an "unconditional surrender" of their hostility, and a return to their just allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that we call upon the Government to maintain this position, and to prosecute the war with the utmost possible vigor to the complete suppression of the rebellion, in full reliance upon the self-sacrifice, the patriotism, the heroic valor, and the undying devotion of the American people to their country and its free institutions."

While we all agree that hatred and resentment ought to have no share in the final settlement of our differences, it is declared that the lawful authority of the Government must be vindicated in such a manner as to leave the fundamental obligations of the citizen toward it no longer in doubt. In other words, if you have a matter of principle or of policy to discuss, to defend, to carry, there are the means to discuss, to defend, to carry it. If you succeed, well and good. If you fail, you must try again by the same means or give up. But whoever rises in rebellion against the will of the majority, constitutionally expressed, must be brought to submit to it unconditionally, so that every man, woman, and child throughout this broad land may know that *nothing, nothing at all, can be made* by forcibly resisting that will. This point once sternly, inflexibly established, no man will henceforth be tempted to embark in an enterprise which is so perilous and also so hopeless.

But the peace of the Republic must not rest upon submission alone: it must be placed upon a solid foundation, by securing the hearty cooperation of the now rebellious people in the future development of the restored Union. Then, indeed, peace will be perfect. And this great object is subserved by another proposition submitted by the Union party. It is this:

"*Resolved*, That as slavery was the cause, and now constitutes the strength of this rebellion, and as it must be always and everywhere hostile to the principles of republican government, justice and the national safety demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the Republic, and that we uphold and maintain the acts and proclamations by which the Government, in its own defence, has aimed a death-blow at this gigantic evil. We are in favor, furthermore, of such an amendment to the Constitution, to be made by the people in conformity with its provisions, as shall terminate and for ever prohibit the existence of slavery within the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States." (Tremendous cheering.)

The abolition of slavery was urged upon us, first, as a measure of justice by the great moral laws of the universe; second, as a war measure, by the necessities of our situation; and third, as the great measure of reconciliation, by the necessity of placing our internal peace upon the basis of political, social, and economical harmony. To discuss it as a measure of justice or as a war measure is not my object at present; but discussing it as a peace measure, I boldly assert, that there is nothing that can bring about sincere, hearty, and lasting reconciliation but the abolition of slavery.

First, then, as to harmony in our political

system. Was it not the profound and eternal antagonism between slavery and the fundamental principles of our policy, that brought forth the strife which at last resulted in open rebellion? The friends of despotism in the old world were in the habit of sneering at our democratic experiment, and of predicting its failure; and when the rebellion broke out, they exulted over us and said, that the experiment had already failed. They exulted too soon. The experiment was not in danger of failure because our political system was democratic, but because there was one element in it which was anti-democratic, and that rebelled against the rest. They have indeed exulted over us too soon; for we cast out the unclean spirit, we place the democratic experiment upon the course of a consistent, harmonious, and healthful development, and its success will be surer than ever.

Secondly, as to social and economical harmony. What is it that the non-slaveholders of the South, the overwhelming majority of the Southern people, are fighting for? Not their own interests, but the interests and aspirations of the slaveholding aristocracy. This aristocracy, by its wealth and superior spirit and intelligence, hold the non-slaveholding majority in a moral subjection, little less absolute than that of the slaves themselves. And upon what does that aristocratic superiority rest? Upon the system of slavery. Destroy slavery, and you will emancipate not only the blacks but the whites also. (Loud cheers.) In the place of the great aspiration of slavery, which is dominion, you will place the great aspiration of free labor, which is equality; for the equality of the citizens is nothing but the recognized dignity of free labor. (Great applause.) The yoke once lifted, the Southern people once emancipated, they will not let a broken-down aristocracy think for them, but they will think for themselves, like freemen; they will have the aspirations of freemen, centred in truly free institutions, which are to be found in the Union. Their new dignity and their new aspirations will demand the school-house, and the school-house will make them look back with contempt upon their former wretchedness, and open the charms of new prospects and a new activity full to their view. These new prospects, this future of independence, self-reliance, and self-respect, will make them forget the past, in which there was nothing but degradation. Nor is this all. The downfall of slavery will open the road to property to the poor laboring man. Slavery was a huge insatiable land-eater. Slavery abolished, the great landed estates, based upon and supported by slave-labor, will go to pieces, and the pieces will fall into the hands of the poor laboring man. Instead of the grand palatial mansion, surrounded with miserable negro-cabins, and instead of the wretched hovel inhabited by the poor white, we shall soon see the neat white cottage in the midst of small but flourishing fields, and the interior of that cottage will be adorned not with the bowie-knife and pistol, but with the book-case and every evidence of progressive civilization. This will go quickly as thought, for the Southern people will not be left to work out that development alone. Thousands and thousands of Northern men, who but recently had been roaming over that country with sword and bayonet, and on that occasion had made the discovery of the truth, will invade it again with spade and plough, and machinery, and capital, and knowledge, and a spirit of progressive improvement. These invaders will be the peaceable neighbors of the invaded, and each one will work for the other in working for himself; and all will be one people. Thus Southern people will be reörganized, regenerated by the emancipation of the large majority, also from the rule of a powerful few. Then the acrimony of the rebellion will be blotted out even to the remembrance; the people will no longer have time to think of the differences of an unfortunate past, for they will have to think of the problems of a busy present and a hopeful future. (Cheers.)

But what of the late slave-lord? Will he forget his rancor also? What if he does not? His class was always weak in numbers, and the system which made it powerful in society is gone. Some of the once mighty cavaliers will sullenly sink in the flood, and their fossil remains, flattened and petrified, will be found, like those of the antediluvian mastodon, between the strata of the new social organization. (Cheers.) Curious geologists will dig them out, and the children of the South will wonder how such monstrous animals could ever have existed. (Loud applause.) But others will save themselves in the ark of the free-labor system. They will in time see the wisdom of accommodating themselves to the new order of things, and find out at last that it is better to be an equal among freemen than to be the master and at the same time the slave of slaves. (Applause.) And presently the South will bloom like the bursting bud of a flower. The immense resources of the soil will, as by enchantment, spring to light under the magic touch of free labor, and her riches will be enjoyed by a free, happy, and — who doubts it? — *loyal* people. And then will come the great day when the people of the regenerated South will stretch their hands across the Ohio and the Potomac and say: "Blessed be you, brethren of the North! We were sick and wretched, and you have made us well! Not only our slaves, but we also were in bondage, and you have broken our fetters!" (Loud cheers.)

This will be peace and reconciliation indeed; a reconciliation in obedience to the great moral laws of the universe, and to the progressive spirit of our age; a peace founded upon harmonious coöperation, mutual benefit, and good will to all men. Such must be, and such only can be, the internal peace of the Union.

This, then, is the peace-programme of the Union party: Peace won by force of arms, maintained by an inflexible vindication of the majesty of the people, and fortified in the hearts of the people by the greatest reform of our century, founded upon justice to all.

This settlement will secure order, for it fetters the spirit of rebellion by enforcing the fundamental obligation of the citizen; it will secure liberty, for it will cast out the demon

which attempted its overthrow; it will secure prosperity and happiness, for it will throw open resources, hitherto untouched or wasted, to the unfettered genius of the American people, and extend the benefit of popular education into the darkest corner of the country. But it will do more. *This settlement will prepare this Republic for that power and greatness among the nations of the earth, to which a manifest destiny points its finger.*

Lord John Russell once defined the American war as the South fighting for independence and the North fighting for empire. I accept the word. Aye, the South is fighting for independence; aye, we are fighting for empire, and for empire, too, on the very grandest of scales! (Loud cheers.) It is so, and it cannot be otherwise.

What is the independence the South is fighting for? Look at it. It is the rending asunder of what naturally belongs together; it is the breaking up of a great Republic which promised to throw its peaceful shield over untold millions; it is the establishment of a Confederacy on the corner-stone of the most hideous abomination of the age; it is the introduction of incessant strife and all the desolations of internal war, where there might have been the abode of happy repose and civilizing industry; it is the necessity of turning a large proportion of the social forces, which might have all been devoted to the pursuit of moral and material improvement, to the savage and tyrannical pursuit of attack and defence; it is the destruction of free institutions; it is the interruption of progressive civilization; it is the ceaseless and bloody struggle of factions, instead of the tranquil government of public opinion; it is restless weakness, instead of peaceful national strength; it is the contempt of the world, instead of its admiration; it is the poor and oppressed of the world robbed of their asylum; it is a great young nation robbed of a great and happy future. Such is the breaking up of this Republic, such is Southern independence. (Applause.)

And what is the empire we are fighting for? It is indeed not a state, with an emperor at its head; it is indeed not like the empire of the Romans of old, or of Great Britain in India, who subjugated nations, and coined the sweat and tears of the oppressed into gold; it is indeed not like that of the first Napoleon, who placed his brothers and minions upon the thrones of ruined states, and threw his iron fingers like a vice around the throats of conquered nations. But look at this: here is a country of three million three hundred thousand square miles, nearly two millions of which are capable of a high order of agricultural improvement; a country washed by the two great oceans on the east and west, and intersected by the most magnificent rivers and strings of lakes; a country able to support more than a thousand million of inhabitants. This is the geographical character of the empire we are fighting for. And now as to the people. This country contains over thirty millions to-day, and by an estimate far below the ratio of increase established during the last seventy decades, it will contain one hundred million in fifty years, and five hundred million in a century—and elbow room for many more. And for the untold millions that are to inhabit it, we hold this country as a sacred trust; to them we have to transmit the foundations upon which they can build their peace, prosperity, civilization, and power. We will transmit to them institutions free from the vices and encumbrances of which European nations vainly strive to deliver themselves; free from the necessity of large and dangerous standing armies; free from that pernicious centralization of power which springs from the dangers occasioned by the close proximity of powerful and hostile neighbors; free from the blight of an aristocracy, and free from the curse of slavery. (Loud applause.) We will transmit to them liberty and equal rights, secured by laws respectable and respected; we will transmit to them a social organization in which every human being can enjoy the fruits of his labor with dignity and independence; we will transmit to them a full abundance of the means which promote the untrammelled development of the moral and ideal element in human nature. We will transmit to them an untarnished national honor; we will transmit to them a power under whose shield the oppressed of the world will feel secure, and whose flag no king nor combination of kings will dare to touch. These blessings we will transmit to them in the frame of a Federal Constitution, the rational form of self-government, elastic enough for ever so many hundred millions of citizens, leaving every individual and every community free to work out their own progressive development in their acknowledged spheres, while binding all together in a bond of strength. In one word, we mean to build up a Republic, greater, more populous, freer, more prosperous, and more powerful than any state history tells us of; a Republic having within itself all that can make a people great, good, and happy, and being so strong, that its pleasure will be consulted before any power on earth will undertake to disturb the peace of the world. (Loud cheering.) This, my Lord John Russell, is the empire we are fighting for, and this empire we mean to have. (Great applause.)

The nations of old Europe stand aghast and look with silent terror and amazement at the Titanic grapple, at this life-or-death struggle between the Roundheads and the Cavaliers of America, between the army of the future and the army of the past. They have seen us surprised by a gigantic and well-organized rebellion, as by a thief in the night: we had no army, no navy, no arms, no war-funds in the treasury; they have seen us create army and navy out of nothing in the twinkling of an eye, and the people pouring out their untold millions of money, as if it had not cost a drop of sweat to earn them. They have seen defeat come upon us with such stunning force, that the nation seemed to reel under the blow. And they cried failure, as now the allies of our enemies here are crying failure. But then they saw this nation quietly gather up its strength, and like the silent waves of the ocean roll against the bulwarks of rebellion. Another repulse equally stunning, and "fail-

ure" again, but again the wave rolls on with increased and tremendous momentum. And so they see the fearful game sway to and fro, disaster set at defiance with grim stubbornness, victory wrung from the grasp of an unwilling fortune, until at last the Mississippi is ours, until the Atlantic coast is fringed with our conquests, until the glorious Farragut (great cheering) has battered down the forts of Mobile and swept the Southern waters, until the restless Sherman has dug his bloody way into the heart of Georgia, (continued cheering,) and until the indomitable Grant, whose unbending mind, insensible to disaster, is doggedly clinging to the heels of victory, has laid his iron hand upon the ramparts of Richmond. (Tremendous applause.) And old Europe asks: Are they not tired yet? See here, old Europe; this is the fourth year of the war. All rebeldom is swept clean by a merciless conscription. The President of the United States calls again for half a million of men, and from all hills and valleys resounds the old song, "We are coming, we are coming!" and over five thousand men a day volunteer for the bloody work of achieving their country's destiny. (Great applause.)

Europe does not understand this inexhaustible perseverance, this bull-dog tenacity. Europe does not know the American. She looks upon him as a cold, dry, matter-of-fact creature, whose soul is filled to its full capacity with business calculations and the mean cares of everyday life. Europe is mistaken. There is a profound idealism in the soul of the American, which breaks forth in its full force only on great occasions. The American *believes* in the great destiny of his country, believes in it with that unconquerable, immovable, religious, fanatic faith, to which the greatness of the difficulties to be overcome appears as nothing compared with the greatness of the object to be achieved. This faith lives not only in the head of the man of thought and far-seeing speculation; it hovers over the plough of the farmer, over the anvil of the mechanic, over the desk of the merchant; it is the very milk with which the American mother nourishes her baby. This faith has put our armies into the field and set our navy afloat; as in France, every soldier is said to carry the marshal's baton in his knapsack, so in America the smallest cabin-lad of the fleet, the meanest drummer-boy in the field, carries in his soul the great ideal of his country's destiny. (Great cheering.) This faith knows no failure, and if it be staggered a moment by the blow of unexpected misfortune, it bounds up again the next moment with a wonderful recuperative power. No, this faith knows no failure; for it, no sacrifice is too great, before its onset impossibility yields its stubbornness. The rebellion itself could not shake it; no, by the rebellion it has gained in intensity. The rebellion has suddenly lifted this nation from her childhood. Having gone through struggles, the tremendous shocks of which not many states would have been able to endure, this nation now stands there with the inspiring consciousness of mature strength. She did not know before how strong she was, but now she knows; and whatever trials may be in store for her, fear and weakness will have no seat at her council-board. And with proud confidence she looks forward to the day, when the united power of North and South will rally again under the common banner of liberty, and when it will be a question of first interest to foreign powers, how far, during this war, they have provoked the resentment of the American people. (Tremendous cheering.) Meanwhile, guided by her great faith as by a column of fire by night and a column of cloud by day, the nation marches forth to do or die for the grand republican empire of the future.

And this great republican empire of the future is no idle dream, no mere empty hallucination of a heated brain. The stupendous prospect is opened by potent fact and the demonstrations of reason. This republic cannot but be great, if it is one; but there can be nothing but strife, weakness, and decay, if it be divided. The questions of peace, empire, national existence, liberty, prosperity, civilization—all these questions are one and inseparable. In the very nature of things, this republic must be great or it must die. There is no alternative. The great republican empire is there, it is within your grasp, if you only remain true to the idea.

And now hear me, Americans of to-day, and mark my words: In the peace which you are now struggling for, you will lay the foundation of this future greatness, or you will lay in it the seeds of decay, disease, and death. Whatever you may have achieved, you have done nothing if you will not do more. (Great applause.) This is the turning-point of your development; this is the moment of the final decision; this is the great opportunity. Take care how you use it. It will never, never come back. Woe to the statesman who now conceives a plan or cherishes a sympathy, that is not in accordance with this great development. Woe to the party, that now tries to lure the people from the glorious path. Woe to the people if at this solemn moment they mistake their duty to themselves and to future generations. It is with her life that the nation would have to pay for the fatal error. (Loud applause.)

Not to the rebels will I appeal. The slave lords, fighting for institutions which are condemned by the unanimous voice of enlightened humanity, have set their hearts upon reviving what is dead, and the voice of reason and argument cannot pierce their fatal infatuation; and their retinue follows them like a flock of sheep. Let them fulfil the destiny they have made for themselves. Let the dead bury their dead. (Applause.)

Nor will I appeal to those degenerate sons of the North who have openly allied themselves with the enemies of their country; who rejoice over her disasters and grieve over her victories. They present one of those singular examples of human depravity, which must be seen in order to be believed. That a son should mock a benignant mother, when she is weeping tears of agony and distress, that her smile of pride and happiness should make him sad, that can hardly be explained upon any psychological theory. It shows a depth of moral perversity so deep and dark, that the ordinary understanding cannot sound it, and that even the creative power

of imagination stands baffled. When I see such a man, I feel myself overcome by a feeling of profound pity; pity for a soul that has closed itself against those great and generous emotions which would unite it in joy and grief with so many thousand kindred souls, pity for the sullen miseries of a barren heart. But to reason with them would be in vain, for we cannot follow them into the sombre and tangled mazes of their motives. We must leave them to the infamy they have chosen for themselves. (Loud applause.)

But to you, whose hearts are still open to the entreaties of your hopefully struggling country, but whose eyes are clouded by party spirit, or by the false pride of preconceived opinions, or by little resentments, to you I address this last appeal. There is the great destiny of your Republic; the warmest enthusiasm of your hearts for it cannot be too fiery, your deepest prayers for it cannot be too pressing. You see it before you. The means by which it can be achieved I have pointed out to you; no, not that, I have only reminded you of them, for your own common-sense, your own experience, the unanimous opinion of this century, your own consciences, point them out. These means are powerful, but plain, direct, and simple; and in their grand directness and simplicity worthy of the tremendous object to be achieved. And now you come with your puny trick and shifts of compromise? Now you can find any comfort for your souls in the pusillanimous, dangerous, pernicious expedient of the weak and shaky, to do things by halves? Now you can parade petty grievances before the world and raise the silly cry of despotism, a cry so silly, that those who raise it cannot meet each other in the street without smiling? Now, in the face of this tremendous stake, you resort to your little cunning contrivances to confuse the minds of the people, merely to gain an advantage for a party? Now you cannot set your heel upon the contemptible ranklings of personal disappointment or the groveling animosity of minor differences of opinion? Now insist upon being small when the country expects every one of her sons to rise to the height of her own destiny? Now, when the fate of the Republic stands upon the brink of the most fearful decision, a decision which will be irrevocable for ever? Party! Have you not learned yet that in times of a great crisis there can be only a *for* and *against*, and that all which is half this and half that must be ground to dust as between two millstones? (Loud applause.) Have you not learned that lesson in the contest of 1860? Then you will learn it now, when your organization is crumbling to pieces like a rotten stick, dangerous for him who leans upon it; crumbling to pieces in spite of artful duplicity, in spite of trade and bargain. This is not a mere accident; it is the inexorable logic of things. (Applause.) And out of this disgraceful shipwreck you can hesitate to save the proud privilege of being useful to your country? Not I alone entreat you thus. Hear the voice of him, who leads your sons and brothers on the field of battle: "The end is near; only let the North be true to herself! Unity of sentiment and unity of action, and victory is sure!" And not he alone. Every sigh and moan of the wounded soldier, every drop of blood that stains our battle-fields, every tear that moistens the pale cheeks of our widows and orphans, cries out to you: "Take care that this be not in vain. Unite for the struggle!" (Applause.)

But, believe me, it is not from fear of failure that I appeal to you. I appeal to you that your names may not go down to your children on the suspicious list of the doubtful. I wish that the country might be proud of all her sons.

Indeed, whatever you may do, we fear you not; for, although only glorious New-England has spoken, (great cheering,) I solemnly declare my belief, the people have already decided in their hearts. This nation will not be false to her great destiny. You try in vain to stop her march by throwing yourselves under her feet. Come with her if you will, or she will march over you if she must. (Long-continued and tremendous applause.) In every pulsation of the popular heart, in every breeze, there is victory; and in the midst of the din and confusion of the conflict there stands the National Will, undisturbed, in monumental repose, and gives his quiet command: For the Great Empire of Liberty, Forward! (Long-continued cheers and applause, and waving of hats.)

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THE VOTES OF THE COPPERHEADS

IN THE

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

The following record, carefully compiled from the Journals of the House of Representatives of the last session of Congress, is respectfully submitted to the consideration of the loyal and patriotic voters of the United States, without any regard whatever to party relations.

The name of GEORGE H. PENDLETON, the candidate of the party opposed to the Administration, is printed in capitals wherever it occurs, in order that the attention of all voters may be particularly called to his Congressional record. That is the case with the names of JAMES C. ALLEN, and JAMES C. ROBINSON, of Illinois, the former running as the copperhead candidate for Congressman at large, and the latter as the copperhead candidate for governor of that State.

GREEN CLAY SMITH'S RESOLUTIONS.

The Copperheads favor an armistice before the rebels lay down their arms.

1863—Dec. 17, Mr. SMITH, of Kentucky, offered these resolutions:

1. *Resolved*, That as our country, and the very existence of the best Government every instituted by man, are imperiled by the most causeless and wicked rebellion that the world has ever seen, and believing, as we do, that the only hope of saving this country and of preserving the Government is by the power of the sword, we are for the most vigorous prosecution of the war until the Constitution and laws shall be enforced and obeyed in all parts of the United States; and to that end we oppose any armistice or intervention, or mediation, or proposition for peace, from any quarter, so long as there shall be found a rebel in arms against the Government; and we ignore all party names, lines and issues, and recognize but two parties in this war—patriots and traitors.

2. *Resolved*, That we hold it to be the duty of Congress to pass all necessary bills to supply men and money, and the duty of the people to render every aid in their power to the constituted authorities of the Government in the crushing out of the rebellion, and in bringing the leaders thereof to condign punishment.

3. *Resolved*, That our thanks are tendered to our soldiers in the field for their gallantry in defending and upholding the flag of the Union, and defending the great principles dear to every American patriot.

On a call for a division of the vote on the resolutions, Mr. ANCONA moved to lay the first resolution on the table, which was lost, yeas 60, nays 100.

The first resolution was then adopted—yeas 94; nays 65, as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Alley, Allison, Ames, Anderson, Arnold, Ashley, *Baily*, John D. Baldwin, Beaman, Blaine, Blow, Boutwell, Boyd, Brandegee, Broomall, Ambrose W. Clark, Cobb, Cole, Creswell, Henry Winter Davis, Thomas T. Davis, Dawes, Deming, Dixon, Donnelly, Driggs, Dumont, Eckley, Eliot, Farnsworth, Fenton, Frank, Garfield, Grinnell, Hale, Higby, Hooper, Hotchkiss, Asahel W. Hubbard, John H. Hubbard, Hulburd, Jenckes, Kasson, Kelley, Francis W. Kellogg, Orlando Kellogg, Loan,

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Longyear, Lovejoy, Marvin, *McAllister*, McBride, McClurg, McIndoe, Samuel F. Miller, Moorhead, Morrill, Daniel Morris, Amos Myers, Leonard Myers, Norton, *Odell*, Charles O'Neill, Orth, Patterson, Perham, Pike, Pomeroy, Price, William H. Randall, Alexander H. Rice, John H. Rice, Edward H. Rollins, Schenck, Scofield, Shannon, Sloan, Smith, Smithers, Spaulding, Stevens, Thayer, Tracy, Van Valkenburgh, Elihu B. Washburne, William B. Washburn, Whaley, Williams, Wilder, Wilson, Windom, Woodbridge, *Yeaman*—94.

NAYS—Messrs. *JAMES C. ALLEN*, *William J. Allen*, *Ancona*, *A. C. Baldwin*, *Bliss*, *Brooks*, *Chanler*, *Coffroth*, *Cox*, *Cravens*, *Dawson*, *Dennison*, *Eden*, *Edgerton*, *Eldridge*, *English*, *Finck*, *Ganson*, *Grider*, *Griswold*, *Hall*, *Harding*, *Benjamin G. Harris*, *Charles M. Harris*, *Herrick*, *Hutchins*, *William Johnson*, *Kernan*, *Knapp*, *Law*, *LeBlond*, *Long*, *Mallory*, *Marcy*, *McDowell*, *McKinney*, *Middleton*, *William H. Miller*, *James R. Morris*, *Morrison*, *Nelson*, *Noble*, *John O'Neill*, *PENDLETON*, *Perry*, *Radford*, *Samuel J. Randall*, *ROBINSON*, *Rogers*, *Jas. S. Rollins*, *Ross*, *Scott*, *John B. Steele*, *Wm. G. Steele*, *Stiles*, *Strouse*, *Stuart*, *Voorhees*, *Wadsworth*, *Ward*, *Wheeler*, *Chilton A. White*, *Joseph W. White*, *Winfield*, *Fernando Wood*—65.

YEAS—Union, 90; Democrats, 4.

NAYS—Union, none; Democrats, 65.

THE COPPERHEADS VOTE THAT IT IS *NOT* THE DUTY OF THE PEOPLE TO FIGHT DOWN AND DISTROY THIS ACCURSED REBELLION.

1864—January 18, Mr. SMITH offered the following resolution:

Whereas, A most desperate, and wicked and bloody rebellion exists within the jurisdiction of the United States, and the safety and security of personal and national liberty depend upon its absolute and utter extinction; therefore,

Resolved, That it is the political, civil, moral, and sacred duty of the people to meet it, fight it, crush it, and forever destroy it, thereby establishing perfect and unalterable liberty.

Mr. JAMES C. ALLEN moved to lay the resolution upon the table, which was lost—yeas 26; nays 101, as follows:

The resolutions were then adopted; yeas 112, nays 16, as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Allison, Ames, Arnold, *Daily*, *Augustus C. Baldwin*, John D. Balwin, Baxter, Blanc, Francis P. Blair, Jacob B. Blair, Boutwell, Boyd, Brandegee, Broomall, *James S. Brown*, William G. Brown, Ambrose W. Clark, Freeman Clarke, Cole, *Cravens*, Creswell, Dawes, Deming, Dixon, Donnelly, Driggs, Buckley, *Eldridge*, Elliot, *English*, Farnsworth, Fenton, Frank, *Ganson*, Garfield, Gooch, Grinnell, *Griswold*, Hale, *Harding*, Higby, *Holman*, Hooper, Hotchkiss, Ashael W. Hubbard, *Hutchings*, Janckes, Julian, Kasson, Kelley, Francis W. Kellogg, Orlando Kellogg, *Kernan*, Loan, Longyear, Lovejoy, Marvin, McBride, McClurg, McIndoe, *Middleton*, Samuel F. Miller, Moorhead, Morrill, Daniel Morris, Amos Myers, Leonard Myers, *Nelson*, *Odell*, Charles O'Neill, Orth, Patterson, Pike, Pomeroy, Price, *Radford*, William H. Randall, Alexander H. Rice, John H. Rice, *Rogers*, Edward H. Rollins, *James S. Rollins*, Schenck, Scofield, Shannon, Smith, Smithers, Spalding, Stevens, *Stebbins*, *Strouse*, *Stuart*, *Sweat*, Thayer, Thomas, Tracy, Upson, Van Valkenburgh, *Wadsworth*, Elihu B. Washburne, William B. Washburn, Webster, Whaley, *Wheeler*, Williams, Wilder, Wilson, Windom, *Winfield* and Woodbridge—112.

NAYS—Messrs. *JAMES C. ALLEN*, *Ancona*, *Dennison*, *Benjamin G. Harris*, *Long*, *Marcy*, *McDowell*, *Wm. H. Miller*, *Morrison*, *John O'Neill*,

PENDLETON, ROBINSON, Stiles, Voorhees, Chilton A. White and *Fernando Wood*—16.

YEAS—Union, 87; Democrats, 25.

NAYS—Union, 0; Democrats, 16.

Soldiers in the field and people of the United States, mark it well that GEO. H PENDLESON, the Copperhead candidate for Vice President, voted against this resolution.

COWARDLY PEACE PROPOSITIONS.

The Copperheads vote to appoint three Commissioners to treat with Jeff. Davis for peace, and thus acknowledge his bogus confederacy that has waged a desolating, cruel, and causeless war, and destroyed the lives of untold thousands of our noble soldiers.

1863—Dec. 14, Mr. FERNANDO WOOD, of New York, offered the following resolution:

Whereas, The President in his message delivered to the House on the 9th instant, and in his recommendation to the people to assemble at their places of worship and give thanks to God for recent victories, claims that the Union cause has gained important and substantial advantages; and whereas, in view of these triumphs, it is no longer beneath our dignity, nor dangerous to our safety, to evince a generous magnanimity becoming a great and powerful people by offering to the insurgents an opportunity to return to the Union without imposing on them degracing or destructive conditions; therefore,

Resolved, That the President be requested to appoint three commissioners, who shall be empowered to open negotiations with the authorities at Richmond, to the end that this bloody, destructive and inhuman war shall cease, and the Union be restored on terms of equity, fraternity and equality under the Constitution.

Mr. ELIHU B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois, moved that it be laid on the table, which was agreed to—yeas 98, nays 59, as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Alley, Allison, Anderson, Arnold, Ashley, *Baily*, John D. Baldwin, Baxter, Beaman, Blaine, Jacob B. Blair, Blow, Boutwell, Boyd, Brandegee, Broomall, William G. Brown, Ambrose W. Clark, Freeman Clarke, Cobb, Cole, Creswell, Henry Winter Davis, Dawes, Deming, Dixon, Donnelly, Driggs, Dumont, Eckley, Eliot, Farnsworth, Fenton, Ganson, Garfield, Gooch, Grinnell, *Griswold*, Higby, Hooper, Hotchkiss, Asahel W. Hubbard, John H. Hubbard, Hulburd, Jenckes, Julian, Kasson, Francis W. Kellogg, Orlando Kellogg, Loan, Longyear, Lovejoy, Marvin, McBride, McClurg, McIndoe, Samuel F. Miller, Moorhead, Morrill, Daniel Morris, Amos Myers, Leonard Myers, Norton, Charles O'Neill, Orth, Patterson, Perham, Pike, Pomeroy, Price, William H. Randall, Alexander H. Rice, John H. Rice, Edward H. Rollins, Schenck, Scofield, Shannon, Sloan, Smith, Smithers, Spalding, Stevens, Thayer, Thomas, Tracy, Upson, Van Valkenburgh, *Ward*, Elihu B. Washburn, William B. Washburne, Whaley, *Wheeler*, Williams, Wilder, Wilson, Windom, Woodbridge, *Yeaman*—98.

NAYS—Messrs. *JAMES C. ALLEN, William J. Allen, Ancona, Augustus C. Baldwin, Bliss, Brooks, Chanler, Clay, Coffroth, Cox, Cravens, Dawson, Dennison, Eden, Edgerton, Eldridge, English, Finck, Grider, Harding, Harrington, Benjamin G. Harris, Charles M. Harris, Herrick, Holman, William Johnson, Kernan, King, Knapp, Law, Lazear, Le Blond, Long, Mallory, Marcy, McDowell, McKinney, William H. Miller, James R. Morris, Morrison, Nelson, Noble, Odell, John O'Neill, PENDLETON, ROBINSON, James S. Rollins, Ross, Scott, Stebbins, John B*

Steele, Stuart, Sweat, Voorhees, Wadsworth, Chilton A. White, Joseph W. White, Winfield, Fernando Wood—59.

YEAS—Union, 92; Democrats, 6.

NAYS—Union, 0; Democrats, 59.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH TRAITORS IN ARMS.

The Copperheads vote for three Commissioners, by name, to meet three traitors in arms against our Government to negotiate for peace, and in the meantime have an armistice, thus acknowledging the rebel government.

1864—February 29, Mr. ALEXANDER LONG, of Ohio, submitted the following resolution:

Whereas, History teaches that there never has been a civil war that was not settled in the end by compromise, and in as much as no possible harm can result either to the character or dignity of the United States from an honest effort to stop the effusion of fraternal blood, and restore the Union by the return of the States in rebellion to their allegiance under the Constitution; and *whereas*, the President, with a full knowledge of the lessons taught by history in relation to all civil wars, in his inaugural address said, "suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you;" and *whereas*, we now have an armistice, decreed by the Almighty, and executed for the past two months by the snows and ice of winter, thereby affording time and opportunity for reflection upon the past three years of horrible, relentless and destructive civil war, with all its calamities, and a prospective view of increased horrors in the approaching conflicts; and *whereas*, a preamble and resolutions were on the 7th of February, instant, introduced in the House of Representatives of the Confederate Congress at Richmond, denying the statement of the President of the United States, "that no propositions for peace had been made to the United States by the Confederate States," and affirming that such propositions were prevented from being made by the President of the United States, in that he had refused to hear, or even to receive, the two Commissioners appointed to treat expressly for peace; therefore,

Be it resolved, That the President be, and he is hereby, most earnestly but respectfully, requested to appoint Franklin Pierce, of New Hampshire, Millard Fillmore, of New York, Thomas Ewing, of Ohio, and such other persons as the President may see proper to select, as Commissioners on behalf of the United States, who shall be empowered to meet a commission of like number when appointed for the same object on behalf of the Confederate States, at such time and place as may be agreed upon, for the purpose of ascertaining, before the renewal of hostilities shall have again commenced, whether the war shall not now cease, and the Union be restored by the return of all the States to their allegiance and their rights under the Constitution.

Which was rejected—yeas 22, nays 96, as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. *JAMES C. ALLEN, Ancona, Brooks, Coffroth, Dennison, Eden, Eldridge, Finck, Knapp, Long, McDowell, William H. Miller, Morrison, John O'Neill, PENDLETON, Samuel J. Randall, Rogers, Ross, Stiles, Strouse, Voorhees, Chilton A. White*—22.

NAYS—Messrs. Alley, Allison, Ames, Anderson, Arnold, Ashley, *Augustus C. Baldwin*, John D. Baldwin, Bater, Jacob B. Blair, Blow, Boutwell, Boyd, Brandegee, William G. Brown, Ambrose W. Clark, Freeman Clarke, Cobb, Cole, Creswell, Henry Winter Davis, Dawes, Deming, Dixon, Don-

nelly, Driggs, Dumont, Eckley, Eliot, Farnsworth, Fenton, Frank, *Ganson*, Garfield, Grinnell, *Griswold*, Hale, Higby, *Holman*, Hooper, Hotchkiss, John H. Hubbard, *Hutchins*, Jenckes, Julian, Kelley, Orlando Kellogg, *Kernan*, *King*, Loan, Lovejoy, Marvin, McBride, McClurg, McIndoe, Samuel F. Miller, Moorhead, Morrill, Daniel Morris, Amos Myers, Leonard Myers, *Nelson*, Norton, Charles O'Neill, Perham, Pike, Pomeroy, Price, *Radford*, William H. Randall, John H. Rice, Schenck, Scofield, Shannon, Sloan, Smith, Smithers, Spaulding, Starr, *Stebbins*, *John B. Steele*, Stevens, Thayer, Thomas, Tracy, Upson, Van Valkenburgh, *Wadsworth*, Elihu B. Washburne, William B. Washburn, Whaley, Williams, Wilder, Wilson, Windom, *Winfield*, Woodbridge—96.

YEAS—Union, 0; Democrats, 22.

NAYS—Union, 83; Democrats, 13.

DEGRADING PROPOSITION OF MR. LE BLOND.

The Copperheads voted that there should be no draft of new troops to fill up the broken ranks of our noble soldiers in the field, until the President has degraded the country by requesting "an armstice," and appointing commissioners to negotiate peace with the bloody-handed rebels in arms against the Government, thereby acknowledging the bogus confederacy of Jeff. Davis. Soldiers in the field, the Copperhead candidate for Vice President, GEO. H. PENDLETON, thus voted your ranks should not be filled, except upon conditions that would crimson with shame the cheek of every loyal man in the country.

1864, June 20, on the final passage of the Enrollment Bill, Mr. Le Blond, of Ohio, offered this proviso:

Pvovided, That no levy of troops shall be made under the provisions of this act, except by volunteering, till such time as the President of the United States shall have made a request for an armstice; and shall have made such efforts as are consistent with honor to restore harmony among the States, by the appointment of commissioners empowered to negotiate for peace upon the terms of a restoration of the Union under the Constitution, and until such offer shall have been rejected by the so-called Confederate Government.

Which was rejected—yeas 13, nays 91; as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. *Ancona*, *Bliss*, *Edgerton*, *Eldridge*, *Finck*, *William Johnson*, *Long*, *James R. Morris*, *Noble*, *John O'Neill*, *PENDLETON*, *Chilton A. White*—13.

NAYS—Messrs. Alley, Allison, Ames, Ashley, *Baily*, John D. Bald win Beaman, Jacob B. Blair, Boutwell, Broomall, *James S. Brown*, William G Brown, Cobb, Cole, Cresswell, Dawes, Dixon, Donnelly, Driggs, Eckley *English*, Farnsworth, Fenton, Frank, *Ganson*, Garfield, Gooch, *Griswold* Hale, *Harding*, Higby, Hooper, Hotchkiss, Asahel W. Hubbard, Ingersoll Jenckes, Julian *Kalbfleisch*, Kelley, *Kernan*, Littlejohn, Loan, Longyear *Mallory*, *McAllister*, McBride, McClurg, Samuel F. Miller, Moorhead Morrill, Amos Myers, Leonard Myers, Norton, *Odell*, Charles O'Neill Orth, Patterson, *Radford*, *Randall*, Alexander H. Rice, John H. Rice, Edward H. Rollins, Schenck, Scofield, Shannon, Sloan, Smithers, Spalding Stevens, *Stuart*, *Sweat*, Thayer, Thomas, Tracy, Upson, Van Valkenburgh *Wadsworth*, Elihu B. Washburne, William B. Washburn, Webster, Whaley, *Wheeler*, Williams, Wilder, Wilson, Windom, *Winfield*, Woodbridge—91.

YEAS—Union, 0; Democrats, 13.

NAYS—Union, 75; Democrats, 16.

1864, May 18, these proceedings took place.

MR. GARFIELD—I ask the unanimous consent of the House to report back a bill from the Committee on Military Affairs. It is a measure of very great importance to the army at this time, and will not, I think, occasion debate. It is for the punishment of guerrillas in the lines of the army in a single provision that Commanders in the field shall have final jurisdiction of these cases as they now have in Court-martial, and not be compelled to send such cases to Washington, thus causing serious delay. The bill is asked for by the War Department, and is unanimously recommended by the Committee on Military Affairs.

The bill (H. R. No. 429) was read for information. Is is to provide for the more speedy punishment of guerrillas, and for other purposes. It enacts that the provisions of the 21st section of an act entitled "An act for enrolling and calling out the national forces," approved March 3, 1863, shall apply as well to the sentences of military commissions as to those of courts-martial; and authorizes the Commanding-General in the field, or the Commander of the Department, as the case may be, to carry into execution all sentences against guerrilles for robbery, arson, burglary, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, violations of the laws and customs of war, &c.

The second section enacts that every officer authorized to order a general court-martial shall have power to pardon or mitigate any punishment ordered by such court, including that of confinement in the penitentiary, except the sentence of death, or of cashiering or dismissing an officer, which sentences it shall be competent, during the continuance of the present rebellion for the General Commanding the army in the field, or the Department Commander, as the case may be, to remit or mitigate; and it repeals the 5th section of the act approved July 17, 1862, chapter 201, so far as it relates to sentences of imprisonment in the penitentiary.

The question was taken, and it was decided in the affirmative—yeas 72, nays 37, as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Alley, Allison, Ames, Arnold, Ashley, *Baily*, John D. Baldwin, Beaman, Blaine, Jacob B. Blair, Broomall, Ambrose W. Clark, Cobb, Cole, Creswell, Dawes, Dixon, Donnelly, Driggs, Farnsworth, Fenton, Frank, Garfield, Gooch, Grinnell, *Griswold*, Hale, Hooper, Hotchkiss, Asahel W. Hubbard, John H. Hubbard, Hulburd, Ingersoll, Jenckes, Julian, Kelley, Francis W. Kellogg, Orlando Kellogg, Littlejohn, Longyear, Marvin, McIndoe, Samuel F. Miller, Moorhead, Morrill, Daniel Morris, Amos Myers, Charles O'Neill, Orth, Patterson, Perham, Price, Alexander H. Rice, John Rice, Edward H. Rollins, Scofield, Shannon, Sloan, Smithers, Spalding, Thayer, Tracy, Upson, Elihu B. Washburne, William B. Washburn, Whaley, Williams, Wilder, Wilson, Windom, and Woodbridge —72.

NAYS—Messrs. *JAMES C. ALLEN*, *Acona*, *Bailey*, *Augustus C. Baldwin*, *Bliss*, *Croffroth*, *Cravens*, Henry Winter Davis, *Dawson*, *Denison*, *Eden*, *Edgerton*, *Eldridge*, *Fink*, *Grider*, *Harding*, *Harrington*, *Charles M. Harris*, *Hutchins*, *King*, *Knapp*. *Le Blond*, *Long*, *Mallory*, *Marcy*, *McDowell*, *Morrison*, *Noble*, *PENDLETON*, *Perry*, *ROBINSON*, *Rogers*, *Ross*, *Strouse*, *Voorhees*, *Wadsworth*, *Chilton J. White*, *and Joseph W. White*—37.

COPPERHEADS DON'T WANT THE SOLDIERS AND SAILORS TO HAVE HOMESTEADS FROM LANDS CONFISCATED IN THE INSURRECTIONARY STATES.

1864—May 12.—The House passed a bill to secure to persons in

military or naval service of the United States, homesteads from confiscated States in insurrectionary districts. Yeas 76, nays 65; as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Alley, Allison, Ames, Anderson, Ashley, John D. Baldwin, Baxter, Beaman, Boutwell, Boyd, Brandegee, Broomall, Ambrose W. Clark, Freeman Clarke, Cole, Creswell, Henry Winter Davis, Dawes, Deming, Driggs, Farnsworth, Fenton, Garfield, Gooch, Grinnell Hale, Higby, Hooper, Hotchkiss, Asahel, W Hubbard, John H. Hubbard, Calvin T. Hubbard, Jenckes, Julian, Kelley, Francis W. Kellogg, Orlando Kellogg, Littlejohn, Loan, Longyear, McBride, McClurg, McIndoe, Samuel F. Miller, Moorhead, Morrill, Daniel Morris, Amos Myers, Leonrad Myers, Norton, Charles O'Neill, Orth, Patterson, Perham, Pike, Pomeroy, Price, Alexander H. Rice, John H. Rice, Edward H. Rollins, Schence, Schofield, Shannon, Sloan, Smithers, Spaulding, Stevens, Tracy, Upson, Van Valkenburgh, Elihu B. Washburne, William B. Washburn, Wilder, Wilson, Windom, Woodbridge.—76.

NAYS.—Messrs. *William J. Allen*, *Sydenham E. Ancona*, *Joseph Baily*, *Augustus C. Baldwin*, Jacob B. Blair, *Bliss*, *Brooks*, *James S. Brown*, William G. Brown, *Chanler*, *Coffroth*, *Cox*, *Cravens*, *Dawson*, *Eden*, *Edgerton*, *Eldridge*, *English*, *Finck*, *Grider*, *Griswold*, *Holl*, *Harding*, *Harrington*, *Benjamin G. Harris*, *Herrick*, *Hutchins*, *Philip Johnson*, *William Johnson*, *Kalbfleisch*, *Kernan*, *King*, *Law*, *Lazear*, *Long*, *Mallory*, *Marcy*, *McAllister*, *McDowell*, *McKinney*, *Middleton*, *William H. Miller*, *James R. Morris*, *Morrison*, *Nelson*, *Noble*, *Odell*, *John O'Neil*, *PENDLETON*, *Pruyn*, *ROBINSON*, *James S. Rollins*, *Ross*, *Scott*, *John B. Steele*, *Stiles*, *Strouse*, *Stuart*, Francis Thomas, *Voorhees*, *Wadsworth*, Whaley, *Wheeler*, *Fernando Wood*, *Yeaman*—65.

YEAS—Union, 76; Democrats, 0.

NAYS—Democrats, 61; Union, 4.

COPPERHEADS DON'T PAY THE COLORED MAN WHO IS RISKING HIS LIFE TO SUSTAIN AND UPHOLD OUR GOD-GIVEN GOVERNMENT.

1863—DEC. 21.—During the consideration of the Deficiency Bill.

Mr AARON HARDING, of Kentucky, offered this proviso:

"*Provided*, That no part of the money aforesaid shall be applied to the raising, arming, equiping or paying of negro soldiers."

Which was rejected. Yeas, 41; nays, 105.

The YEAS were as follows:

Messrs. *S. E. Ancona*, *George Bliss*, *James S. Brown*, *Alexander H. Coffroth*, *Samuel S. Cox*, *John L. Dawson*, *Charles Denison*, *John R. Eden*, *Joseph K. Edgerton*, *Charles A. Eldridge*, *William Finck*, *Henry Grider*, *William A. Hall*, *Aaron Harding*, *Henry W. Harrington*, *Benjamin G. Harris*, *Charles M. Harris*, *Philip Johnson*, *William Johnson*, *Austin A. King*, *Anthony L. Knapp*, *John Law*, *Alexander Long*, *Daniel Marcy*, *John F. McKinney*, *Wiliam H. Miller*, *James R. Morris*, *William R. Morrison*, *Warren P. Noble*, *John O'Neill*, *GEORGE H. PENDLETON*, *Samuel J. Randall*, *Andrew J. Rogers*, *Lewis W. Ross*, *John G. Scott*, *John D. Stiles*, *Myer Strouse*, *John T. Stuart*, *Chilton A. White*, *Joseph W. White*, *George H. Yeaman*. All Democrats.

COPHERAEADS DON'T WANT THE ENROLLMENT BILL PASSED AND THE RANKS OF OUR ARMY FILLED UP.

The following is the final vote in the House on the passage of the Enrollment bill:

YEAS—Messrs. Allison, Ames, Arnold, Ashley, John D. Baldwin, Baxter, Beaman, Blair, Boutwell, Boyd, Cobb, Cole, Creswell, Henry Winter Davis, Dawes Deming, Dixon, Driggs, Eckley, Elliot, Farnsworth, Fenton, Garfield, Gooch, Higby, Hooper, Hotchkiss, A. W. Hubbard, Ingersoll,

Jencks, Julian, Kelly, Littlejohn, Loan, Longyear, McBride, McClurg, Samuel F. Miller, Moorehead, Morrill, Daniel Morris, Amos Myers, Leonard Myers, Norton, Charles O'Neill, Orth, William H. Randall, John H. Rice, Schenck, Shannon, Sloan, Smith, Smithers, Spalding, Tracy, Upson, Van Valkenburgh, Elihu B Washburne, William B. Washburn, Whaley, Williams, Wilder, Wilson, Windom, Woodbridge—66.

NAYS—Messrs. *William J. Allen*, Alley, *Ancona*, *Baily*, Blaine, *Bliss*, *Chanler*, *Coffroth*, *Cox*, *Dawson*, *Denison*, *Eden*, *Edgerton*, *Eldridge*, *English*, Frank, *Ganson*, *Griswold*, *Benjamin G. Harris*, *Charles M. Harris*, *Hutchins*, *Kernan*, *Knapp*, *Law*, *Lazear*, *LeBlond*, *Long*, *Mallory*, *Marcy*, *Milton*, *William H. Miller*, *James R. Morris*, *Morrison*, *Noble*, *Odell*, Patterson, PENDLETON, Perham, *Pruyn*, *Samuel J. Randall*, Alexander H. Rice, ROBINSON, Edward H. Rollins, *J. S. Rollins*, *Ross*, Schofield, *John B. Steele*, *W. G. Steele*, Stevens, *Stiles*, Thomas, *Wadsworth*, Webster, *Wheeler*, *Winfield*—55.

YEAS—Union, 66; Democrats, 0.

NAYS—Union, 10; Democrats, 45.

COPPERHEADS DON'T WANT THE ENROLLMENT ACT ENFORCED IN PENNSYLVANIA BUT WANT TO GO TO LAW ABOUT IT.

1863, December 22, Mr. PHILIP JOHNSON, of Pennsylvania, offered the following resolution.

Whereas, The supreme judicial tribunal of the State of Pennsylvania has solemnly decided that the act of Congress, approved March 3, 1863, commonly called the Conscription Act, is, in its provisions, contrary to and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore null and void; therefore,

Resolved, That it is the sworn duty of the Executive Department of the Government to either acquiesce in that decision within that State, or to bring the question involved before the Supreme Court of the United States for final adjudication, to the end that, if Congress shall deem such legislation necessary, a bill may be prepared which shall not be subject to constitutional objections.

Which, on motion of Mr. BRANDEGEE, of Connecticut, was laid on the table—yeas 81; nays 42—as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Alley, Allison, Ames, Anderson, Arnold, Ashley, *Baily*, John D. Baldwin, Beaman, Boutwell, Boyd, Brandegee, Broomall, Ambrose W. Clark, Freeman Clarke, Cobb, Cole, Creswell, Henry Winter Davis, Dawes, Deming, Dixon, Donnelly, Driggs, Dumont, Eckley, Eliot, Farnsworth, Fenton, Frank, *Ganson*, Gouch, Grinnell, Hale, Higby, Hooper, Hotchkiss, Ashael W. Hubbard, Jenckes, Julian, Kasson, *Kernan*, Longyear, Lovejoy, McClurg, McIndoe, Samuel F. Miller, Moorehead, Morrill, Daniel Morris, Amos Myers, Leonard Myers, Norton, *Odell*, Charles O'Neill, Orth, Pike, Price, William H. Randall, Alexander H. Rice, John H. Rice, Edward H. Rollins, Schenck, Scofield, Shannon, Sloan, Smith, Smithers, Spalding, Stevens, Thomas Tracy, Upson, Van Valkenburgh, Elihu B. Washburne, William H. Washburn, Williams, Wilder, Windom, Winfield—81.

NAYS—Messrs. *Acona*, *Augustus C. Baldwin*, *Bliss*, *Brooks*, *Coffroth*, *Cox*, *Dawson*, *Denison*, *Eden*, *Edgerton*, *Eldridge*, *Finck*, *Grider*, *Hall*, *Harding*, *Benjamin G. Harris*, *Charles M. Harris*, *Holman*, *Philip Johnson*, *William Johnson*, *Le Biond*, *Long*, *McDowell*, *McKinney*, *Middleton*, *Morrison*, *Nelson*, *Noble*, *O'Neill*, *PENDLETON*, *Perry*, *Rogers*, *Ross*, *Scott*, *John B. Steele*, *William G. Steele*, *Stiles*, *Strouse*, *Sweet*, *Wheeler*, *Chilton A. White*, *Joseph W. White*, *Fernando Wood*—43.

YEAS—Union, 76; Democrats, 5.

NAYS—Union, 0; Democrats, 43.

Republican congressional committee, 1863-1867
Publications. Campaign of 1864

"LEAVE POPE TO GET OUT OF HIS SCRAPE."

McCLELLAN'S DISPATCHES.

On the 20th day of August, 1862, Gen. McClellan, having terminated his unfortunate campaign, left the Virginia Peninsula and embarked his army at Fortress Monroe, Yorktown, and Newport News.

The entire rebel army was thus free to precipitate itself upon Pope's small command of 35,000 men, and the bulk of its forces had in fact, moved upon Pope several days before.

Fully aware of this and naturally anxious as to the result, Gen. Halleck telegraphed Gen. Pope on 21st August:

Dispute every inch of ground, and fight like the devil till we can reinforce you. Forty-eight hours more and we can make you strong enough! Don't yield an inch if you can help it.

Pope obeyed his instructions, falling back and fighting every inch of ground until he confronted the entire rebel army at Manassas. With what result, the country knows.

But what the country does not know is how it happened that the small army at Manassas should be allowed to be outnumbered, while the large and well appointed force of McClellan lay, during the three days' struggle, within marching distance, almost motionless.

Gen. McClellan prefaced his report of the Antietam campaign by stating that—

The troops composing the Army of the Potomac were meanwhile ordered forward to reinforce the army under Gen. Pope. So completely was this order carried out, that on the 30th of August I had remaining under my command only a camp guard of about one hundred men. Everything else had been sent to reinforce Gen. Pope. In addition, I exhausted all the means at my disposal to forward supplies to that officer, my own headquarter teams even being used for that purpose.

Is this or not one of those specious statements that keep the word of promise to the ear and break it to the sense? Is it true, or is it a delusion and a snare?

Did Gen. McClellan really send troops and rations to Gen. Pope in his sore distress?

Did he send them expecting them to reach him?

Did he desire that they should reach him?

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Did he or not purposely prevent their reaching him?

Now, we shall not answer these vital questions with the testimony of Gen. Pope, or of any his army; nor yet with the inexorable array of facts and crushing logic of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. We propose simply that Gen. McClellan himself, speaking in his official dispatches, shall reply to them.

On the 27th of August, 1862, Gen. Pope, in compliance with his instructions, after fighting the enemy five days on the upper Rappahannock, fell back towards Washington. Halleck, who knew the entire rebel army was upon him, had promised heavy reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac. Upon their reaching Pope depended the safety of his army, and perhaps that of the Capital. No one was more keenly alive than Gen. Halleck to the importance of strengthening Pope, and, accordingly, on the morning of August 27th, 1863, he telegraphed to Gen. McClellan, through whom alone all reinforcements for Pope must pass, to have Franklin's corps march in the direction of Manassas as soon as possible.

The order is clear and definite. If it had been obeyed, Jackson's forces, defeated and driven by Pope on the 27th, would have been met near Centreville the next afternoon by Franklin, and crushed! Now follow the developments of the next three days, and see with what fertility of device, prodigality of invention, and coolness of assumption—with what unyielding tenacity, shameless prevarication, and rank insubordination—Gen. McClellan carried out his steadfast purpose, that Pope should not have a man of these reinforcements—not an ounce of powder, not a loaf of bread, and that with his 40,000, struggling in a death-grapple with that same rebel army that had discomfitted McClellan's 150,000, he might be left to get out of his scrape. This choice phraseology, we hasten to remark, is not ours, but that of Gen. McClellan, who proposed to the President "*to leave Pope to get out of his scrape.*"

Plain enough was Halleck's order, yet it never was executed! Thus it fell out. At 10.40 McClellan replied that he had sent orders to Franklin (*not to march*, but) to prepare to march, and to repair to Alexandria in person, to inform him as to his means of transportation. Singular, that in order that Franklin should march *with* his corps, he should begin by leaving it! Was there no Quartermaster to attend to transportation? At 12 m., Halleck telegraphed to McClellan, "Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions," to which McClellan replies that Franklin had gone to Washington, and that his

aid gave the order to the next in rank; and later that "Franklin's artillery had no horses."

Will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defence. I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Burnside at once take steps to evacuate Falmouth and Acquia, and at the same time cover the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough on hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the valley?

True to himself and sensible to the last! Stay in the works—the front is a dangerous place! Sitting at the feet of such a Gamaliel, is it strange that Porter learned to say, as he told McDowell, pointing to the enemy, "We cannot go in there without getting into a fight." And so the 27th of August passed away, and brought Pope no reinforcements.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 28th, 1862.—On the morning of the 28th Halleck telegraphed directly to Franklin:

On parting with Gen. McClellan, about two o'clock this morning, it was understood that you were to move with your corps to-day toward Manassas Junction, to drive the enemy from the railroad. I have just learned that the General has not returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his order, act on this.

At 1.05 McClellan, not Franklin, answered:

Your dispatch to Franklin received. I have been doing all possible to hurry artillery and cavalry. The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery, he shall go. * * * * * * Please see Barnard, and be sure the works toward Chain Bridge are perfectly secure. I look upon those works, especially Ethan Allen and Marcy, as of the first importance.

Still harping on my daughter. "Be sure the works are perfectly secure!" At 3.30 p. m., Halleck becomes impatient, and telegraphs McClellan:

Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible toward Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope *before the enemy is reinforced.*

The day wears away, and still Franklin does not move; so at 8.40 p. m., Halleck, more impatient, decided, and imperative, tells McClellan:

There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps towards Manassas; *they must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready.* If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no necessity to go at all, *for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid.* If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief.

To which McClellan replies at 10 p. m.:

Your dispatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or artillery here.

And so Gen. Pope is left to get out of his scrape. Gens. McClellan and Franklin sleep comfortable within snug quarters, and the 28th of August, 1862, passes into history.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 29th, 1862.—At 10.30 a. m., General

McClellan resumes the chant of his well-worn refrain, his campaign *Kyrie Eleison!*

Franklin's corps is in motion; started about six (6) a. m. If Sumner moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington; yet Franklin is too much alone. *What shall be done?* I do not think Franklin is in a situation to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders of last night.

"What shall be done?"

Pope, at that moment was not asking such questions, he was up and doing.

"What shall be done"?

Only to think of these horrid rebels offering "strong resistance" to Franklin! Heavens! Gen. Halleck this is not what I intended my army for! Strong resistance!! Good God, sir, somebody will surely get killed, and you are not so unreasonable as to suppose that I am going to sacrifice my future voters to save John Pope and —— my country, he would have added, "but amen stuck in his throat." But with what matchless coolness he tells Halleck that all his promises throughout the two previous days to send Franklin forward, were unvarnished falsehoods! "*I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders last night!*"

Economize your patience, though, gentle reader, and restrain your profanity, if you have any weakness in that direction, for here is something that will sorely try both.

At 12 m., McClellan telegraphs Halleck:

"Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without transportation."

The man who makes himself hoarse vainly calling by the hour for some lazy shirk of a servant who, finally, comes asking with placid ease, "Did you call, sir," may have some faint idea of General Halleck's feelings when he received that despatch.

Pray notice the statement, that Franklin is without transportation. It is a remarkable one in the light of facts well known at the time to McClellan, and which we shall presently develop.

At 12 m., McClellan telegraphs Halleck:

"Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance?"

And again at 1 o'clock.

"Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, who, I really think ought not, under the present circumstances to proceed beyond Anandale?"

The writer of that despatch has solemnly declared in an official report that he "completely carried out the order to reinforce General Pope; that he had sent everything; that

he only retained a camp guard of one hundred men!" Judge for yourself, reader.

At 3 p. m., Gen. Halleck, who must certainly possess an angelic disposition, musters nerve to tell the Young Napoleon:

I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going further; otherwise, he will push on toward Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegrams or through Franklin's scouts. Our people *must* move more actively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses.

"*Our people must find out where the enemy is!*" During the entire days of August 29th and 30th, the thunders of nearly three hundred pieces of artillery shook the ground under McClellan's feet. All Alexandria knew precisely where the enemy was and where the fighting was. But General McClellan could not make the discovery.

There is one grand, overruling and guiding military principle that overrides conflicting orders or supplies their total absence. It is the Napoleonic maxim—"March to the sound of the cannon." The neglect of it by Grouchy, cost the Emperor Waterloo. Has it never been heard of by General McClellan?

Every drummer boy in Franklin's, Sumner's, and Cox's corps knew the situation, knew that the enemy had concentrated, knew that Pope had been fighting them for two days. General McClellan alone, of all his army, did not know it, could not see it; so Halleck's last dispatch remains unanswered.

And now we are about to present the most remarkable—we weigh and emphasize the words—the most remarkable dispatch ever framed by man wearing a soldier's uniform! We pause a moment before doing it, that our readers may prepare for a sensation at once novel and painful—a pang of shame for our country and our humanity—a feeling of profound horror and contempt for the man who could perpetrate it. At 2.45 p. m., Gen. McClellan, in answer to a dispatch from the President asking, "What news from direction of Manassas Junction," telegraphed—

The last news I received from direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This is, by no means, reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First—To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope. Second—*To leave Pope to get out of his scrape*, and at once use all means to make the Capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer.

Comment there can be none. Nothing short of the power of a Macauley would avail here, to do this infamy justice. And we can only feebly indicate—pointing to the "bad eminence" on which it stands—the more striking point of its weakness. The man is satisfied—for what he hopes, he would fain believe—that Pope is or will be defeated. He suggests two courses, which, after all, are substantially one and the same, for he well knows that Lee's junction with Jackson is certain. He can trust Porter for that. In either case, he is sure "*to leave Pope to get out of his scrape.*"

Consider the latter part of the despatch in the light of the previous two days' transactions.

"*Tell me what you wish me to do.*" Why, for two days and a half the wires have not ceased their monotonous throbbings under the reiterated order to send Franklin forward.

"*I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give.*"

He asks for nothing! Oh, certainly not; when just one hour and a half agone he insinuatingly despatches—"*shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity?*"

He appears to have been left entirely without orders too! "*I wish to know what my orders and authority are? No middle course will now answer. It will not do to delay longer.*"

This is the sublime of impudence, and ghastly work as it is, we cannot help smiling at its coolness.

But what "*scrape*" of his own was Pope to get out of? Let us see. Is he a deserter, a straggler, or some incompetent soldier who has rushed into difficulty without or against orders? How came he where he is? Thus: With a small army of 35,000, he threw himself down on the Rapidan—into the heart of the enemy, tearing of his very vitals—to compel him to loose his hold on the once noble and dispirited Army of the Potomac. He did it. McClellan's army of 91,000 effective troops was freed. The entire rebel force was precipitated on the devoted Pope. He fought them for seventeen days in seven large battles, and skirmishes innumerable, and with but small aid of troops and food for his starving men and horses, would have strangled the rebellion at Manassas. He was denied men, rations, and forage. Now we see. That was the "scrape" Pope was left to get out of!

At 7.50 p. m., Halleck discovering that Franklin still loiters, tells McClellan—

You will immediately send construction train and guards to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the facts of this disobedience. That corps *must* push forward, as I directed, to protect the railroad and open our communication with Manassas.

And one hour afterward is answered by him:

It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, under the circumstances until we knew what was at Vienna. Gen. Franklin remained here until about 1 p. m., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow.

And then, placidly, with an air of injured innocence—

In regard to to-morrow's movements I desire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when I have simply exercised the discretion you committed to me.

At ten that night, he advises Halleck that he has a despatch from Franklin, stating that *Pope is very short of provisions, and the country will not support him.*

And so closed Friday, August 29th. Pope had fought the rebel army all that day, had driven them in defeat, and, with any one of the corps of Franklin, Sumner, Cox, or Couch, would have crushed it the next morning. But Franklin, ordered to move on the 27th, with but twenty-four miles between him and the battle-field, had, at the end of three days, advanced six miles! We know of Western regiments, who hearing, thirty miles off, the thunders of Shiloh, stopped not to ask about transportation, but rushed forward, and were grappling with the foe in twenty hours!

Saturday, August 30, 1862, at 5, A. M., Gen. Pope telegraphs Gen. Halleck:

I think you had better send Franklin's, Cox's, and Sturgis' regiments to Centreville, as also forage and subsistence. I received a note this morning from Gen. Franklin, written by order of Gen. McClellan, *saying that wagons and cars would be loaded and sent to Fairfax Station as soon as I would send a cavalry escort to Alexandria to bring them out. Such a request, when Alexandria is full of troops and we fighting the enemy, needs no comment.* Will you have these supplies sent, without the least delay, to Centreville?

Note that he now had a certainty Porter would fail him. Neither Sumner, Franklin, Cox, Sturgis, nor Couch were up. His men and horses were starving, and he had McClellan's assurance that he would send him no relief. Lee had joined Jackson. The bloody struggle of the previous day was to be renewed with thinned ranks against superior forces. Self-reliant and possessed, calm and measured, he means to fight, and, in advance, is confident of his position after the battle. He knew it would be at Centreville. He would hold his ground, but could not pursue the enemy if victorious. "*Have these supplies sent to Centreville.*" And yet there was time, when, at 9.40, Halleck telegraphed McClellan:

I am by no means satisfied with Gen. Franklin's march of yesterday, considering the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in stopping at Anandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the Quartermaster's Department could have given him plenty of transportation if he had applied for it any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with Gen. Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly.

On the 27th, McClellan makes Franklin leave his corps to come to Alexandria, in order that he (McClellan) may inform him as to his means of transportation.

On the 28th, he says Franklin is without transportation; but on the 29th instant, it appears from statement of the Quartermaster's Department, high and indisputable authority, that *neither McClellan nor Franklin ever applied for transportation.*

At 11, A. M., McClellan telegraphs:

Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in the vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest, *via* Columbia Pike, on Annandale and Fairfax Court House, if this is the route you wish them to take. He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move also when he arrives:

With the thunder of battle in his ears, he wishes to know which way they shall move. Halleck's answer is crushing in its retort:

Send them where the fighting is.

And again, at 2.15, P. M., Gen. Halleck telegraphs:

Franklin's and Sumner's corps should be pushed forward with all possible dispatch. They must use their legs and make forced marches. *Time now is everything.*

But why go on? Given the programme, we know the play. "*Leave Pope to get out of his scrape,*" sufficiently announces that General's struggle with enemies in front, around, and in rear, a struggle disgraceful to others, but glorious to him and his noble army! Here is his dispatch to Gen. Halleck on the morning after the three days' fighting at Manasses:

Our troops are all here and in position, though much used up and worn out. I think it would, perhaps, have been greatly better if Sumner and Franklin had been here three or four days ago. But you may rely upon our giving them (the enemy) as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington, should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having in view the safety of the Capital. The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnoissance in our front at Cub Run, whether in advance of an attack to-day I don't yet know. I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose.

Is there any whining here about reinforcements? Any anxiety as to getting behind the fortifications? Are not these the words of a soldier and a patriot?

During the examination of Gen. Hallack before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he is asked this question:

Had the Army of the Peninsula been brought to co-operate with the Army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgment, as a military man, would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat?

His reply was:

I thought so at the time, and still think so.

And so thinks every man who dispassionately reads this statement. Judge ye!

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Republican congressional committee, 1863-1865.

SHALL WE HAVE AN ARMISTICE?

SHALL WE HAVE AN ARMISTICE?

The Democratic party, in Convention at Chicago assembled, have demanded this; it becomes, therefore, one of the distinct issues of the present political campaign. The question has been forced upon us; we cannot escape it if we would; it behooves us, therefore, to give it earnest, dispassionate consideration that in acting upon it we may do so *intelligently*, with an eye single to our country's glory and well being.

Let us look at the resolution which presents this issue. Among other things it declares that

"JUSTICE, HUMANITY, LIBERTY, AND THE PUBLIC WELFARE DEMAND THAT IM-
"MEDIATE EFFORTS BE MADE FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WITH A VIEW
"TO AN ULTIMATE CONVENTION OF ALL THE STATES, OR OTHER PEACEABLE
"MEANS, TO THE END THAT AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE MOMENT PEACE MAY
"BE RESTORED."

This is something *definite*, something tangible—not like McClellan's letter of acceptance, a jargon of "glittering generalities." Here we have a frank, outspoken expression of the sentiments which animated and controlled that Convention. We are told "justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand an armistice." For God's sake look at the absurdity of this thing; and in doing so I charge you do not fail to remember all the history of this bloody war—how it came upon us—how there was no alternative left to us but war or national ruin and dishonor.

Look back again upon the starving garrison at Fort Sumter, besieged, cut off from supplies, and finally bombarded by those who were seeking to wrest from us all we held dear as a nation. It was not until our glorious flag had been insulted, fired upon, and trampled in the dust; not until our forts and and arsenals, our navy yards and mints had been captured or robbed by the rebellious foe, that the slumbering manhood of the free North, was aroused, and she put forth her heroic energies to save the little remnant of liberty and government Buchanan and the rebels had left us.

It was little more than the empty *name* of government they left us. They had sent our navy to distant shores, that the traitors might the better be enabled to seize upon the forts, navy yards, and harbors stretching from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. They had robbed our arsenals of their arms (the accumulations of many years of peace) in order to enable the traitorous hosts

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more effectively to resist the efforts of our heroic men when at last this hideous wickedness and unparalelled infamy should become known. You wil remember too that ever memorable 19th of April, 1861, when the gallant sons of Massachusetts, rushing to the defence of our imperiled capital, were shot down in the streets of Baltimore, by the minions of treason and slavery.

You will remember the history of all these years, and before you vote to "stop the war," to call back our heroic men from the work so nobly commenced, so successfully and bravely prosecuted, you will insist upon some good reason for yielding to this demand for your national humiliation.

These men at Chicago, plotting your dishonor, gave you no warning of the results coming from this "cessation of hostilities." They did not tell you that the rebels would be strengthened and you *weakened* thereby. They did not tell you *what they surely know*, that the exhausted and failing resources of the rebellion needed this "suspension of hostilities."

No, they cunningly and deliberately falsified this thing to you, saying "Justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand it." Had their resolution run thus: "*Whereas*, under the powerful and well dealt blows of Grant "and Sherman, of Farragut and other brave men of our army and navy, the "Rebellion is nearly brought to a close, and whereas, it is expedient that the "Rebels be allowed time to recruit their shattered forces and replenish their "wasted stores, therefore, *Resolved*, that immediate efforts be made for the cessation of hostilities," you would much better have understood its true meaning.

Let us consider this question of an armistice. What is it? What is meant by it?

In Wheaton's "International Law," by Lawrence, page 585, he says:

"An armistice is the suspension of hostilities. This may be either special or general. If it be general in its application to all hostilities and in every place, and endrue for an indefinite period, it amounts in effect to a temporary peace, *except that it leaves undecided the controversies in which the war originated.*"

Again the same author, page 686, speaking of the consequence of an armistice, and the rules by which the parties are bound during its continuance, says:

"The first of these peculiar rules, as laid down by Vattel, is that each party may do within his own territory, what he could do in time of peace. Thus either of the belligerent parties may levy and march troops, collect provisions and other munitions of war, receive reinforcements from his allies, or repair the fortifications of a place not actually besieged."

"It amounts to a temporary peace," says Wheaton, "but it leaves the controversies in which the war originated undecided." Let the people determine whether they desire to leave undecided the controversies in which for the past four years we have been engaged. Let them decide whether we shall fight cover again the battles on land and sea which have added so much of glory and renown to our brave army and gallant navy. You have considered well the meaning of that word armistice—let us analyze it; let us put it in tangible shape so that you may see and know what you give up to the rebellion if you concede to the traitors this boon of an armistice.

1st. It amounts to a *temporary peace.*

2d. It leaves undetermined the controversies in which the war originated.

3d. The rebels may do in their own territory which they might do in time of peace.

4th. They may levy and march troops, collect provisions and other munitions of war.

5th. They may receive reinforcements from their allies and repair their shattered fortifications.

6th. It follows, therefore, as a necessary consequence that the blockade which has shut out the traitors from the commercial world, since the war began, would be broken up, and they again reap the advantages to be derived from an unrestricted trade with those nations that have evinced such active and earnest sympathy with them in their efforts to accomplish our national dissolution.

Why do Copperheads, the friends and advocates of McClellan, demand this? It cannot be because the armies of the Union have been conquered; not because our resources in men and money are exhausted; not because we have not made wonderful progress in the suppression of the rebellion and won imperishable glory for the Union arms both on land and sea. They demand it because they desire the rebellion to succeed and see slavery restored; because the rebel armies have been beaten in the field; because their resources are exhausted, their armies diminished and demoralized, their commerce destroyed, their finances ruined, their strongest forts recaptured, their harbors and ports blockaded by our navy and commanded by our guns, their foreign friends discouraged, their people disheartened, their country laid waste, and their products rendered worthless. They therefore NEED TIME to recuperate, to replenish their depleted treasury, to recruit and drill fresh armies, to build other ships of war, to convey their cotton to market and secure arms and other munitions of war; to strengthen the fortifications now in their possession, and erect others needful for their safety and defence; to form alliances and make negotiations with foreign nations for a recognition of their nationality.

They need time. Without time to recuperate their cause is lost, and they know it. Hence comes this demand from their northern allies for an armistice.

Men of the North! Soldiers of the Republic! do you want such a peace? Are you willing that all your heroic devotion to liberty, and the Union, should result only in this temporary peace? If you want a peace worth having, one that will be *permanent*, a peace that comes to you unstained with national dishonor, then you will trample under your feet this proposition for a "*temporary peace*," which comes to you with the nomination of McClellan.

Do you wish to leave the causes and controversies in which this war originated undetermined?

Some of you, at least, believed that slavery was either the immediate or remote cause of the troubles which these years of self-sacrifice and war have brought to us. You have cherished the hope, that with the end of the war the end of slavery should also come. You remember how, for many years, this curse has troubled the peace of the nation; how it has made freedom of speech and freedom of the press impossible; how it has debased and demoralized the national politics; how it has caused the churches and ministers of religion to be faithless to the teachings of "Him who went about doing good, and who spoke as never man spake;" how at last it broke out in open and violent rebellion, against the Constitution and laws, in order that its insatiate thirst for power might be satisfied; and slavery become "alike lawful in all the States, North as well as South, old as well as new." You, remember all these things, and yet you are asked to blot them from your memory, and restore, and re-esta-

blish the institution which has been the fruitful source of all your woes. These men at Chicago do not say this directly, but they hope to obtain some share of your sympathy and support, by pleading with you in the name of "justice, humanity, liberty, and public welfare." They have not the manly courage to say to you that an armistice would result in the accomplishment of all the rebels have ever desired. They *know* that with the cessation of hostilities, would come negotiations for a permenent peace upon the basis of southern independence, or if not that, at least additional guarantees to slavery.

Let us not give up the advantages, which we have secured, after so many bloody battles, and so much heroic devotion. Let us not smother the old flame, leaving beneath the ashes which cover it the same fuel that kindled the conflagration which has threatened our national destruction for so many weary years.

No, the war and the heroic moral courage of our President, have placed the institution of slavery "where the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate detinction." There let it remain. Let no appeals for an armistice, or a temporary peace divert your attention from the labor of completing the work so gloriously begun. You have this wily serpent of slavery and treason under your feet, and do not, as you value your country's life and honor, allow traitorous appeals for a "cessation of hostilities" to divert you from your purpose to destroy him.

Think of it! The traitors, at the commencement of the rebellion, held undisputed sway in Louisiana, Virginia, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Florida; and also had control of portions of Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri. Do you wish to yield up those States, won back to the Government by so many well contested battles, both by land and sea? Do you wish to throw open those States to the undisputed sway of those from whom they have been conquered? Do you wish to give the enemy an absolute right to raise and equip, and march armies in those States? Do you wish him to enter, unharmed, into the vast grain fields of Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri and replenish his exhausted stores, and gain fresh strength for the contest, which must surely come when the armistice shall end? Do you wish the rebels to again enter and possess the territory, over which Sherman has won his way, after so much labor, and the shedding of so much patriotic blood?

Soldiers of the Army of the West, you who struggled with Grant at Fort Donaldson, at Shiloh, at Vicksburgh; you who won undying renown at Stone River, under the courageous and indomitable Rosecrans; you who have shared the glories of Lookout Mountain with the fighting "Joe Hooker;" you who have labored so patiently and heroicly from Chattanooga to Atlantic, do you wish to give back to the rebellion all that you have gained after such laborious and heroic service? If you do not, then spurn from your very presence these men who come to you with proposals for an armistice or a "cessation of hostilities." During an armistice, says Vattel in his Law of Nations, page 408, "each party may do in his own territory what he may have a right to do in time of profound peace." And on page 410, he says: "During the armistice it is allowable for enemies to pass and repass, to and from each others country, in the same manner as it is allowed in time of peace."

Do you desire the return to the national capitol, of Jeff. Davis, and his associates unrestrained, unharmed? Do you desire to impart in *every way* new hope and strength to the waning life of the rebellion? Then you have but to vote for McClellan, and with him *this armistice*. Remember you cannot have *one* without sooner or later having the other, for however much Mc-

Clellan may *now* seemingly ignore the platform upon which he was nominated should he be elected this delusion would end. He must, and would *necessarily* represent the desires and wishes of the party that nominated and elected him.

We have learned something of the hope that comes to the enemy by this armistice—let us now consider what advantage comes to *us* thereby. In the first place comes national humiliation, for by granting an armistice we confess our inability to compel them by force of arms to yield submission to the Constitution and the laws. You, who have been defending the Union against the assaults of its deadly enemies, believe that you have been doing battle in a holy cause, if you ask an armistice *now*, you give up the right for the wrong. You reward disunion; you punish loyalty; you admit your inferiority; you cry *enough!* and submit. Pause and consider, I pray you, the depth of our national degradation after *such a submission!*

But this is not all we lose, though God knows if it were, it were sufficient to arouse the withering indignation of any loyal man at the thought. For what is this cessation of hostilities proposed? "With a view," say they, "to a convention of all the States for the purpose of making peace." Such a convention must be first called by a two-thirds vote of Congress, and the call afterwards ratified by three-fourths of the States. Now, this is an utter *impossibility.* Do you suppose, as has been eloquently asked by the venerable Dr. Breckenridge, that "after three or four years of war; after spending two or "three thousand millions of dollars; after spilling the blood of a million of our "brothers, and consigning five hundred thousand to their graves; after conquor-"ing an extent of territory fifteen hundred miles in length by six hundred in "breadth; having an army in every State in the Confederacy, and the majority "of them under our control; having taken every stronghold from them except-"ing Charleston and Richmond; that, notwithstanding all this, we will disgrace "ourselves, like a set of poltroons, to the latest generation of mankind, and "sacrifice everything we have fought for, and all that makes a free government "worth living for? No! a thousand times *no.*" Every patriot heart will spurn the thought.

But suppose such a thing possible. Have you thought of the long months that must elapse before such a convention can assemble? Have you thought of the time you would lose, and how your stronghold upon the rebellion would be relaxed? How your armies would become demoralized and impatient by the inaction and delay which such a step involves? Those who ask this of you, are heart and soul in the interest of the traitors. They hope thereby to save them from utter defeat and absolute annihilation, to bring them back into the Union, with the old curse of slavery hanging like a mill-stone about their necks. That you may see that we indulge in no unwarrantable assertions, we ask you to consider who wants this armistice? Not "Honest Old Abe," who, as Commander-in-Chief of our Army and Navy, has been taxing every energy to destroy the rebellion, and effect a restoration of our imperiled Union. Not the heroic and untiring Grant, and the gallant officers and men of the grand old Army of the Potomac. Not Sheridan, who has signaled our successes from the valley of the Shenandoah. Not Sherman who with his heroic self-sacrificing officers and men, have kept untarnished the reputation, and shed additional lustre upon the glorious Army of the West. Not Farragut, nor any of the intrepid officers and men, who have upheld the honor of our flag in many a hard fought battle upon the sea. I ask the men who survive the terrible battles of this glorious war; you who fought at Wilson's

Creek, at Belmont, at Donaldson, at Shiloh, at Corinth, at Stone River, at Arkansas Post, at Port Hudson, at Champion Hills, and Vicksburg; do you want the armistice? You, who at the outset of this wicked rebellion, came at your country's call, and struggled so heroicly and bravely at Bull Run, at Yorktown, at Williamsburg, and in the seven days battles of the Peninsula; you who fought at Centreville, at South Mountain, at Antietam, and the battles before Fredericksburg; you who with Grant, have struggled in all the battles from the Rapidan to Petersburg; you, who with Butler wrested the Crescent City from the hands of traitors; do you want the armistice? From all these brave men, concecrated to the service of their country by so many battles and so much devotion, there comes the same answer. "Let there be no armistice until the last traitor to liberty and good government shall have perished or submitted himself to the wholesome authority of the Constitution and the laws."

Who wants the armistice? Jeff. Davis and all rebeldom want it. The Chicago Convention, and the party supporting the election of George B. McClellan want it. The Pendletons, the Woods, the Valdighams, the Seymours, and the Longs, want it. Every man who has vilified and traduced our brave soldiers, and denounced the war in which they have been engaged want it. The men, who in Congress, have voted against supplies for the army, and tax bills for raising money with which to pay the soldiers want it. Finally, the men who love slavery and hate freedom want it.

Men of the free North! Soldiers of the armies of the Republic! Will you trust such men with power? You desire peace, but is it *such a peace* you want? a peace that is *disunion;* a peace which means separation of the States and endless ruin to our God given Republic! No, from millions of loyal hearts thrills back the answer NO—and on the 8th day of November next, you will thunder it aloud from every hill, from every valley—and the rolling prairies sending back the indignant protest of a loyal people, will consign to eternal infamy and oblivion these men, seeking by, an *armistice* and treason, our national humiliation and ruin.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

UNION CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

Hon. E. D. MORGAN, of New York.
" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.
" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
(*Senate.*)

Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois.
" R. B. VAN VALKENBURG, N.Y.
" J. A. GARFIELD, of Ohio.
" J. G BLAINE, of Maine.
(*House of Representatives*)

E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman.* JAS. HARLAN, *Treasurer.* D. N. COOLEY, *Sec'y.*

COMMITTEE ROOMS, *Washington, D. C., Sept.* 2, 1864.

DEAR SIR: The Union Congressional Committee, in addition to the documents already published, propose to issue immediately the following documents for distribution among the people:

1. McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed.
2. George H. Pendleton, his Disloyal Record and Antecedents.
3. The Chicago Copperhead Convention, the Men who Composed and Controlled it.
4. Base Surrender of the Copperheads to the Rebels in Arms.
5. The Military and Naval Situation and the Glorious Achievements of our Soldiers and Sailors.
6. A Few Plain Words with the Private Soldier.
7. What Lincoln's Administration has done.
8. The History of McClellan's "Arbitrary Arrest" of the Maryland Legislature.
9. Can the Country Pay the Expenses of the War?
10. Doctrines of the Copperheads North identical with those of the Rebels South.
11. The Constitution Upheld and Maintained.
12. Rebel Terms of Peace.
13. Peace to be Enduring, must be Conquered.
14. A History of Cruelties and Atrocities of the Rebellion.
15. Evidences of a Copperhead Conspiracy in the Northwest.
16. Seward's Auburn Speech.
17. Schurz's Speech.
18. Copperhead votes in Congress.
19. "Leave Pope to get out of his Scrape."
20. Shall we have an Armistice?

The above documents will be printed in English and German, in eight or sixteen page pamphlets, and sent postage free, according to directions, at the rate of one or two dollars per hundred copies. The plans and purposes of the Copperheads having been disclosed by the action of the Chicago Convention, they should at once be laid before the loyal people of the country. There is but two months between this and the election, and leagues, clubs, and individuals should lose no time in sending in their orders.

Remittances should be made in Greenbacks or drafts on New York City, payable to the order of James Harlan.

Address— Free.

Hon. JAMES HARLAN,
Washington, D. C.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,
D. N. COOLEY, *Secretary*

Republican congressional committee, 1863-1865.

SHALL WE HAVE AN ARMISTICE?

SHALL WE HAVE AN ARMISTICE?

The Democratic party, in Convention at Chicago assembled, have demanded this. It becomes, therefore, one of the distinct issues of the present political campaign. The question has been forced upon us; we cannot escape it if we would; it behooves us, therefore, to give it earnest, dispassionate consideration, that in acting upon it we may do so *intelligently*, with an eye single to our country's glory and well being.

Let us look at the resolution which presents this issue. Among other things it declares that:

"JUSTICE, HUMANITY, LIBERTY, AND THE PUBLIC WELFARE, DEMAND THAT IM-
"MEDIATE EFFORTS BE MADE FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, WITH A VIEW
"TO AN ULTIMATE CONVENTION OF ALL THE STATES, OR OTHER PEACEABLE
"MEANS, TO THE END THAT, AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE MOMENT, PEACE MAY
"BE RESTORED."

This is something *definite*, something tangible,—not like McClellan's letter of acceptance, a jargon of "glittering generalities." Here we have a frank, outspoken expression of the sentiments, which animated and controlled that Convention. We are told "justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand an armistice." For God's sake, look at the absurdity of this thing; and in doing so I charge you, do not fail to remember all the history of this bloody war,—how it came upon us,—how there was no alternative left to us, but war, or national ruin and dishonor.

Look back again, upon the starving garrison at Fort Sumter, besieged, cut off from supplies, and finally bombarded by those who were seeking to wrest from us all we held dear as a nation. It was not until our glorious flag had been insulted, fired upon, and trampled in the dust; not until our forts and and arsenals, our navy yards and mints had been captured or robbed by the rebellious foe, that the slumbering manhood of the free North, was aroused, and she put forth her heroic energies to save the little remnant of liberty, and government Buchanan, and the rebels had left us.

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You will remember the history of all these years, and before you vote to "stop the war," to call back our heroic men from the work so nobly commenced, so successfully and bravely prosecuted, you will insist upon some good reason, for yielding to this demand for your national humiliation.

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Why do Copperheads, the friends and advocates of McClellan, demand this? It cannot be because the armies of the Union, have been conquered; not because our resources in men and money are exhausted; not because we have not made wonderful progress in the suppression of the rebellion, and won imperishable glory for the Union arms both on land and sea. They demand it because they desire the rebellion to succeed and see slavery restored; because the rebel armies have been beaten in the field; because their resources are exhausted, their armies diminished and demoralized, their commerce destroyed, their finances ruined, their strongest forts recaptured, their harbors and ports blockaded by our navy and commanded by our guns, their foreign friends discouraged, their people disheartened, their country laid waste, and their products rendered worthless. They therefore NEED TIME to recuperate, to replenish their depleted treasury, to recruit and drill fresh armies, to build other ships of war, to convey their cotton to market and secure arms and other munitions of war; to strengthen the fortifications now in their possession, and erect others needful for their safety and defence; to form alliances and make negotiations with foreign nations for a recognition of their nationality.

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Clellan may *now* seemingly ignore the platform upon which he was nominated should he be elected this delusion would end. He would, and must *necessarily* represent, the desires and wishes of the party that nominated and elected him.

We have learned something of the hope that comes to the enemy by this armistice—let us now consider what advantage comes to *us* thereby. In the first place comes national humiliation, for by granting an armistice we confess our inability to compel them by force of arms, to yieldsubmission to the Constitution, and the laws. You, who have been defending the Union, against the assaults of its deadly enemies, believe that you have been doing battle in a holy cause, if you ask an armistice *now*, you give up the right for the wrong. You reward disunion; you punish loyalty; you admit your inferiority; you cry *enough!* and submit. Pause and consider, I pray you, the depth of our national degradation, after *such a submission!*

But this is not all we lose, though God, knows if it were, it were sufficient to arouse the withering indignation of any loyal man at the thought. For what is this cessation of hostilities proposed? "With a view," say they, "to a convention of all the States, for the purpose of making peace." Such a convention must be first called by a two-thirds vote of Congress, and the call afterwards ratified by three-fourths of the States. Now, this is an utter *impossibility.* Do you suppose, as has been eloquently asked by the venerable Dr. Breckenridge, that "after three or four years of war; after spending two or "three thousand millions of dollars; after spilling the blood of a million of our "brothers, and consigning five hundred thousand to their graves; after conquor-"ing an extent of territory fifteen hundred miles in length by six hundred in "breadth; having an army in every State in the Confederacy, and the majority "of them under our control; having taken every stronghold from them except-"ing Charleston and Richmond; that, notwithstanding all this, we will disgrace "ourselves, like a set of poltroons, to the latest generation of mankind, and "sacrifice everything we have fought for, and all that makes a free government "worth living for? No! a thousand times *no.*" Every patriot heart will spurn the thought.

But suppose such a thing possible. Have you thought of the long months that must elapse before such a convention can assemble? Have you thought of the time you would lose, and how your stronghold upon the rebel iron would be relaxed? How your armies would become demoralized and impatient, by the inaction and delay, which such a step involves? Those who ask this of you, are heart and soul, in the interest of the traitors. They hope thereby to save them from utter defeat and absolute annihilation, to bring them back into the Union, with the old curse of slavery hanging like a mill-stone about their necks. That you may see that we indulge in no unwarrantable assertions, we ask you to consider who wants this armistice? Not "Honest Old Abe," who, as Commander-in-Chief of our Army and Navy, has been taxing every energy, to destroy the rebellion, and effect a restoration of our imperiled Union. Not the heroic and untiring Grant, and the gallant officers and men of the grand old Army of the Potomac. Not Sheridan, who has signaled our successes from the valley of the Shenandoah. Not Sherman, who with his heroic self-sacrificing officers and men, have kept untarnished the reputation, and shed additional lustre upon the glorious Army of the West. Not Farragut, nor any of the intrepid officers and men, who have upheld the honor of our flag in many a hard fought battle upon the sea. I ask the men who survive the terrible battles of this glorious war; you who fought at Wilson's

Creek, at Belmont, at Donalson, at Shiloh, at Corinth, at Stone River, at Arkansas Post, at Port Hudson, at Champion Hills, and Vicksburg; do you want the armistice? You, who at the outset of this wicked rebellion, came at your country's call, and struggled so heroicly and bravely at Bull Run, at Yorktown, at William burg, and in the seven days battles of the Peninsula; you who fought at Centreville, at South Mountain, at Antietam, and the battles before Fredericksburg; you who with Grant, have struggled in all the battles from the Rapidan to Petersburg; you, who with Butler wrested the Crescent City from the hands of traitors; do you want the armistice? From all these brave men, consecrated to the service of their country by so many battles and so much devotion, there comes the same answer. "Let there be no armistice, until the last traitor to liberty and good government, shall have perished or submitted himself to the wholesome authority of the Constitution, and the laws."

Who wants the armistice? Jeff. Davis and all rebeldom want it. The Chicago Convention, and the party supporting the election of George B. McClellan want it. The Pendletons, the Woods, the Vallandighams, the Seymours, and the Longs, want it. Every man who has vilified and traduced our brave soldiers, and denounced the war in which they have been engaged, want it. The men, who in Congress, have voted against supplies for the army, and tax bills for raising money with which to pay the soldiers want it. Finally, the men who love slavery and hate freedom want it.

Men of the free North! Soldiers of the armies of the Republic! Will you trust such men with power? You desire peace, but is it *such a peace* you want? a peace that is *disunion;* a peace which means separation of the States, and endless ruin to our God given Republic! No, from millions of loyal hearts thrills back the answer, NO—and on the 8th day of November next, you will thunder it aloud from every hill, from every valley—and the rolling prairies sending back the indignant protest of a loyal people, will consign to eternal infamy and oblivion these men, seeking by an *armistice* and treason, our national humiliation and ruin.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

UNION CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

Hon. E. D. MORGAN, of New York.
" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.
" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
(*Senate.*)

Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois.
" R. B. VAN VALKENBURG, N.Y.
" J. A. GARFIELD, of Ohio.
" J. G BLAINE, of Maine.
(*House of Representatives*)

E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman.* JAS. HARLAN, *Treasurer.* D. N. COOLEY, *Sec'y.*

COMMITTEE ROOMS, *Washington, D. C., Sept.* 2, 1864.

DEAR SIR: The Union Congressional Committee, in addition to the documents already published, propose to issue immediately the following documents for distribution among the people:

1. McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed.
2. George H. Pendleton, his Disloyal Record and Antecedents.
3. The Chicago Copperhead Convention, the Men who Composed and Controlled it.
4. Base Surrender of the Copperheads to the Rebels in Arms.
5. The Military and Naval Situation and the Glorious Achievements of our Soldiers and Sailors.
6. A Few Plain Words with the Private Soldier.
7. What Lincoln's Administration has done.
8. The History of McClellan's "Arbitrary Arrest" of the Maryland Legislature.
9. Can the Country Pay the Expenses of the War?
10. Doctrines of the Copperheads North identical with those of the Rebels South.
11. The Constitution Upheld and Maintained.
12. Rebel Terms of Peace.
13. Peace to be Enduring, must be Conquered.
14. A History of Cruelties and Atrocities of the Rebellion.
15. Evidences of a Copperhead Conspiracy in the Northwest.
16. Seward's Auburn Speech.
17. Schurz's Speech.
18. Copperhead votes in Congress.
19. "Leave Pope to get out of his Scrape."
20. Shall we have an Armistice?

The above documents will be printed in English and German, in eight or sixteen page pamphlets, and sent postage free, according to directions, at the rate of one or two dollars per hundred copies. The plans and purposes of the Copperheads having been disclosed by the action of the Chicago Convention, they should at once be laid before the loyal people of the country. There is but two months between this and the election, and leagues, clubs, and individuals should lose no time in sending in their orders.

Remittances should be made in Greenbacks or drafts on New York City, payable to the order of James Harlan.

Address— Free.

Hon. JAMES HARLAN,
Washington, D. C.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,
D. N. COOLEY, *Secretary*

A HISTORICAL PARALLEL.

Like feelings and sentiments produce like expressions at all times and places. For example see the following:

HORATIO SEYMOUR
against
LINCOLN IN 1864.

[From Horatio Seymour's speeches at Milwaukie and Chicago.]

Three years have rolled away. The young men that responded to that call—where are they? More than five hundred thousand of our brave soldiers now sleep in their untimely graves. Look at the debt! An immense debt! Over two million of men have been called for since that time to bear arms in the struggle. Five hundred thousand more are to-day being called for. The nation is crushed down with taxation, and the war not ended.

Our rights have been infringed upon. The freedom of speech and of the press has been denied us. The sacredness of our homes has been impaired. * * * * * The guaranteed right of the people to bear arms has been suspended up to the very borders of Canada. * * *

Four years ago a convention met in this city when our country was peaceful, prosperous, and happy. * * * * * *

Had wise statesmanship secured the fruits of the victories, to-day there would have been peace in our land.

I will fight to the death to preserve to you these rights that have been denied to us. * * * *

The Democratic party will put down despotism, because it hates the ignoble tyranny which now degrades the American people. * * * * * *

The results of the coming election involve the liberties of the country. * * *

Greater questions, graver questions—questions which come more directly home to the hearts and interests of men—have never been submitted to the people for their arbitration.

Mothers and sisters are in trouble by the family hearth, and when there is trouble there there is no happiness in life. * * *

Now is there no mode by which the people can be protected from these frightful sacrifices and the Union saved?

I implore you, therefore, to turn again to the wisdom of your forefathers. Turn again toward the lights of experience. * * *

American servitude is put in bold contrast with British liberty. * * * *

We propose to elect to the Presidency a patriot, a soldier and a christian—G. B. McClellan.

BENEDICT ARNOLD
against
WASHINGTON IN 1780.

[From Benedict Arnold's proclamation to the citizens and Soldiers of the United States, issued October 2, 1780.]

You are promised liberty by the leaders of your affairs, but is there an individual in the enjoyment of it save your oppressors? Who among you dare to speak or write what he thinks against the tyranny which has robbed you of your property, imprisons your sons, drags you to the field of battle, and is daily deluging your country with blood?

Our country once was happy, and had the proffered peace been embraced, the last two years of misery would have been spent in peace and plenty and in repairing the desolation of the quarrel, that would have set the interests of great Britain and America in a true light and cemented their friendship.

I wish to lead a chosen band of Americans to the attainment of peace, liberty and safety—the first objects in taking the field.

What is America but a land of widows, orphans and beggars?

But what need of argument to such as feel infinitely more misery than tongue can express!

I give my promise of most affectionate welcome to all who are disposed to join me in measures necessary to close the scene of our affliction, which must be increased until we are content with the liberality of the parent country, which still offers us protection and perpetual exemption from all taxes but such as we shall think fit to impose upon ourselves. BENEDICT ARNOLD.

THE

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN

AND

ITS ANTECEDENTS,

AS DEVELOPED BY THE

REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

AND OTHER

PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS.

BY

J. G. BARNARD,

COLONEL OF ENGINEERS AND BRIGADIER GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS, AND CHIEF ENGINEER IN THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC FROM ITS ORGANIZATION TO THE CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

WASHINGTON, D. C.:
PUBLISHED BY THE UNION CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.
1864.

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no.21

PREFATORY REMARKS.

The year of our Lord, 1863, opened upon the darkest period in the history of the momentous struggle in which we are yet engaged. The Army of the Potomac, which had gone forth in April of the previous year, at a period when victory had recently everywhere favored our banners, and it seemed left only to give one vigorous blow, to quell forever the rebellion, had been disastrously driven from Richmond, and called back to Washington, to arrive barely in time to save that city from the grasp of an enemy resuscitated in strength, and with a renewed audacity, assuming everywhere a vigorous offensive action. In the West the course of things had but too faithfully followed the reverses of the East. The renewed hope which followed the repulse of the rebel armies from Maryland had been darkened by the long delays which ensued, and the subsequent disastrous failure at Fredericksburg.

Military calamities, disheartening as they might be, would have been of comparatively little moment, however, had military calamities been all that darkened the aspects of the time The country was rich in men and means, and its resources had as yet been lightly drawn upon. It had put forth its strength, indeed, but not its whole strength. Men did not feel dismayed because they doubted the ability of the nation to carry on the struggle to a successful issue, but because, for the time, the power of the nation was partially paralyzed. Yet there never was a moment when the public safety, and the safety of the common cause more urgently demanded the exertion of all the nation's strength. Why, then, did men doubt? Where was the origin of this paralysis? It was in the charge, audaciously made, impudently persisted in, that to the blunders and incapacity of the Administration, all our disasters were due; that, with such incapacity at the head of affairs, our resources, though they were poured forth like water, would, like water, too, be spilt on the ground. Men will sacrifice much in great emergencies, but they never *will* give their lives or their money merely that such treasures may be ignorantly or wantonly wasted.

"Had McClellan but had *his* way, had *he* not been interfered with, had not his army been reduced and taken away from him, and his movements in a thousand ways hampered and baulked, had he, in short, had the sole control of military affairs, all would have been different. Richmond would have been ours, the rebellion would have been subdued, and, instead of disaster and prolonged war, a triumphant peace might have been our happier lot." To such charges against the Administration which had raised him to his position, and which, through the President, had ever showed him unwearied kindness, and given him all the confidence it *could* give, Gen. McClellan lent the full weight of his name and reputation. Throwing himself into the arms of a *party* bitterly hostile to that Administration, associated with men who loaded the agents of the Government with reproach, and among whom were some so insensible to the honor of the country and the sacredness of the cause as to court foreign mediation and to meditate a disgraceful and humiliating peace, to *him*, and to the erroneous ideas disseminated concerning *his* capacity, merits, and agency, the paralysis of doubt was due, as it was to him were justly ascribable the disasters which brought our military affairs to so low an ebb. * * * * *

It was under such circumstances that, in writing an official report, at the request of General McClellan himself, of the engineering operations of the Army of the Potomac, I deemed it my duty to state what I believed to be the sources of failure of the campaign of the Peninsula. The opinions therein written down were no afterthoughts. Six months before I had formed them, and when I spoke at all, (which I did not do openly,) *expressed them*. I had formed them painfully, reluctantly, at a period when political questions had not become involved with this subject, and no such causes existed to influence in any manner my judgment. It was at a period when for Gen. McClellan I entertained the warmest personal regard—a feeling which I distinctly and sincerely expressed in writing on leaving him in August, 1862. With no man have I ever, with a more absolute freedom from any other feeling than one of personal kindness, been so long closely associated, and if, at any moment, there seemed to me to exist some slight grounds for complaint, they were never such as to be remembered, or to have any abiding place in my breast.

But there are cases in which personal feelings must be allowed little weight. The destinies of nations cannot be trifled with, and in all that affects them, convictions of truth *must* be uttered. The Report of the Engineering Operations of the Army of the Potomac, and the statements of these pages, are the utterances I am constrained to make.

The review which follows was first prepared as a magazine article. It has not been thought necessary to alter the phraseology, though another form of publication is adopted.

J. G. B.

WASHINGTON, *May* 10, 1864.

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

Gen. McClellan had been called to the command of the Army of the Potomac with an unanimity of feeling and lavish bestowal of confidence, which stand almost alone in our history. The army looking upon Gen. Scott as past the age of further active service, and upon most of the officers of rank as superannuated or otherwise incapable of meeting such an emergency, hailed the advent of a new chief, whose juvenile promise, whose thorough military education, and whose already extended reputation, seemed to give assurance of precisely the one thing needed—a capable *leader*.

Under such circumstances, neither the nation, nor the Administration, nor the army, were disposed to exercise—nor *did* they exercise—undue pressure. Every indulgence was extended to one upon whom so heavy a responsibility had been laid, for the acknowledged difficulties of the situation and for his own inexperience and want of preparation.

Now, had Gen. McClellan been a Napoleon, with the prestige of a hundred victories—or even a Scott—old in the regard of the people; old in experience of war, even upon a comparatively limited scale, but rejuvenated in years—had he been either of these, he might, with propriety, if he thought the case demanded it, have drawn heavily upon the indulgence so freely extended. Being neither, it was important that he should make the lightest possible draft; that, at the very earliest moment, he should *do* something to confirm, continue, and justify the nation's confidence. Of all Gen. McClellan's faults and incapacities, nothing—not even his irresolution and mismanagement in face of the enemy, nor his inability ever, in any case, to *act* when the time came—furnishes a clearer proof of the lack of those qualities which make a great general or a great statesman, than his failure to do this.

Let it be granted that it was not best to make any great movement till the winter of 1861-'62 had wholly passed away, (though there were the strongest political reasons* against such delay,) yet Gen. McClellan should have been aware that, unless his prestige, through these long months, should be supported by *some* deeds, he would find himself virtually destitute of the power to carry out his own plans when the moment proper for such a movement should arrive; and so it happened. But, after six long months of omission, he added to his imprudence the positive folly of making an extravagant and senseless draft upon the confidence of the Administration and the public, which in the beginning had been so generously given him, but which he had so lightly permitted to be, in a measure, lost.

Grant, again, that the lower Chesapeake *was* the true line of approach to Richmond, and the sole route by which to attain results of such magnitude as Gen. McClellan predicted from its adoption, yet, it was nevertheless true that this route was strongly disapproved by the President, and by many whose judgment carried great influence, and that it involved, in the minds of not a few, great danger to the capital. Yet, in the face of all this, Gen. McClellan, who had never furnished any adequate evidence of his ability to plan or execute a great campaign, persisted in carrying off his army, at enormous expense, to a distant point, leaving that enemy, to whom he attributes a force of no less than one hundred and fifty thousand men, "well disciplined and under able leaders," confronting Washington, with nothing but the garrison of the place, and its very imperfect system of fortifications, to protect it. The line of forts on the Virginia side of the Potomac had been hastily thrown up, and was really, at that time, considering its great extent, very incomplete and weak; on the Maryland side it was so imperfect as hardly to deserve the name of a fortified line.

Gen. Barnard, in his official report, says: "When the army was to go by Annapolis, I felt confident that one half would be no sooner embarked than the other would be ordered back to Washington." No one could, we think, have spent a week in Washington, at this period, without being convinced that, whether reasonably or not, such would have been the result of a mere demonstration of the enemy against the city.

[Gen. Barnard goes on to say that, as early as the middle of October, 1861, Gen. McClellan had, by his own statements, 76,285 men *disposable for an advance*, (a number constantly

* Alluding to the danger—great at that time—of European intervention.

and rapidly increasing); that for three months thereafter the weather and roads were unusually favorable for field operations; that, too, it was at this very period that the blockade of the Potomac commenced, that the disputable disaster of Ball's Bluff occurred, and that, for six weeks, a comparatively weak enemy had "flaunted his hateful banner in the very sight of the Capitol," and continues:]

In his apology to the President and exposition of his pet scheme of "changing his base" of operations to the lower Chesapeake, Gen. McClellan says:

When I was placed in command of the armies of the United States, I immediately turned my attention to the whole field of operations, regarding the Army of the Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the masses under my command.

I confess that I did not then appreciate the total absence of a general plan which had before existed, nor did I know that utter disorganization and want of preparation pervaded the western armies.

I took it for granted that they were nearly, if not quite, in condition to move towards the fulfillment of my plans. I acknowledge that I made a great mistake.

I sent at once, with the approval of the executive, officers I considered competent, to command in Kentucky and Missouri. Their instructions looked to prompt movements. I soon found that the labor of creation and organization had to be performed there; transportation, arms, clothing, artillery, discipline, all were wanting. These things required time to prepare them.

The generals in command have done this work most creditably, but we are still delayed. I had hoped that a general advance could be made during the good weather of December; I was mistaken.

Take this in connection with the paragraph of page 42,* and we are bound to believe that no sooner did he reach the supreme command than he deliberately deferred all action of the Army of the Potomac, not because it was not *ready to act*, but until "a *general* advance could be made during the good weather of December." Without commenting upon the censure cast upon his illustrious and venerable predecessor, Gen. Scott, for the "total absence of a general plan," &c., "the utter disorganization and want of preparation in the western armies," &c., we remark that if the western armies were unprepared, it was mainly because of his own insatiable demands for everything the nation could furnish, for all that he asked for was granted, as much as if he had been already commander-in-chief; moreover that, though he kept the Army of the Potomac spell-bound, waiting for "disorganized" and "unprepared" armies to move, those very armies actually *did move*, took Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Columbus and Nashville, reached the very southern borders of Tennessee, and fought the battle of Shiloh before the Army of the Potomac had fairly inaugurated its campaign. Indeed, an admirer of Gen. McClellan's strategy of that day entered into a long newspaper argument to show why this great movement of the *right wing* must take place *before* the Army of the Potomac could be released from its compulsory inactivity.

Gen. McClellan cannot assign the mud obstacle, (hitherto so much insisted upon,) as an apology for inaction in a region selected by himself, and where, according to his own most formal statements, now published with his report, he believes that the roads *are passable at all seasons of the year*. Let us therefore accept his apology—he was *waiting* for the "combined" movements of other armies which *actually moved —effected great conquests and fought one desperate pitched battle*, before the campaign of his own Army of the Potomac had commenced!

[The author states that even if mud and weather were adequate causes against inaugurating a great campaign, it was no reason that nothing should be done.

Norfolk might have been captured, and its acquisition was easy after Burnside's capture of Roanoke Island—its possession of vast import nce in connection with Gen. McClellan's meditated campaign.

He also states that the fitting up of the Merrimac as an iron-clad ram, was well known to the Navy Department, which urgently desired the capture of the place, foreboding the disaster which actually befell us.

He then discusses Gen. McClellan's estimates of the rebel forces "on the Potomac," and shows their discrepancy and their improbability.

In an *official statement* to the President, Gen. McClellan estimated those forces in October, 1861, at 150,000 men, *well drilled* and ably commanded. He states in his report, that "from the Report of the Chief of the Secret Service" there were on the 8th March, 1862, 102,500 men on the Potomac, and 13,500 in the Shenandoah Valley, 115,500 in all. Gen. Barnard quotes the "Count of Paris," who was perfectly acquainted, and indeed connected, with the "Secret Service," to show that on the 10th of March the rebel force on the Potomac was but 70,000 men; and again, in a note, he proves that Gen. McClellan himself did not, on the 2d of March, believe that the rebel force on the Potomac, was over 60,000 or 70,000 men, and goes on to say:]

It is next to certain that nothing like the numbers given, even by the lowest estimate were in front of us, from Fredericksburg to Leesburg, at that time, and also that the evacuation commenced several weeks before the 8th of March. Wm. Henry Hurlbert, who certainly had most excellent opportunities of judging, and whose admiration of Gen. McClellan would not cause him to err consciously on the unfavorable side, says:—

I have reason to believe that, when the history of the present war shall come to be written fairly and in full, it will be found that Gen. Johnson never intended to hold Manassas and Centreville against any serious attack; that his army at these points had suffered greatly during the autumn and winter of 1861–2; that from October to March he never had an effective force of more than 40,000 under his orders; that his preparations for an evacuation were begun as early as October, 1861; and that after that time he lay there simply in observation. * * *

Just as the movement to the lower Chesapeake was about to be executed, the appearance of the long-expected Merrimac threw the whole scheme again into uncertainty. Now, though the "power" of the Monitor may have been

*Congressional Edition of General McClellan's Report.

"satisfactorily demonstrated" by the combat which occurred, it never was "satisfactorily demonstrated" that she could neutralize the Merrimac. It was all conjecture. All that the Secretary of the Navy, or Mr. Fox—all that Commodore Goldsborough—could affirm, was that she should not escape from Hampton Roads. The filling of Hampton Roads with transports, under such circumstances, was attended with great risk. The Prince de Joinville says:

These were the circumstances in which I arrived at Fortress Monroe. Soon the Roads were filled with vessels coming from Alexandria or Annapolis, and filled, some with soldiers, some with horses, cannon, and munitions of all kinds. Sometimes I counted several hundred vessels at the anchorage, and among them twenty or twenty-five large steam transports waiting for their turn to come up to the quay and land the fifteen or twenty thousand men whom they brought. The reader may judge how fearful would have been the catastrophe had the Merrimac suddenly appeared among this swarm of ships, striking them one after another, and sending to the bottom these human hives with all their inmates! The Federal authorities, both naval and military, here underwent several days of the keenest anxiety. Every time that a smoke was seen above the trees which concealed the Elizabeth River, men's hearts beat fast. But the Merrimac never came. She allowed the landing to take place without opposition.

Why did she do this?

She did not come because her position at Norfolk, as a constant menace, secured without any risk two results of great importance. In the first place, she kept paralyzed in Hampton Roads the naval forces assembled to join the land army in the attack upon Yorktown; in the second place—and this was the principal object—she deprived the Federal army of all the advantages which the possession of the James would have secured to it in a campaign of which Richmond was the base.

[Gen. McClellan draws strongly upon the credulity of his readers when he asserts that the enemy abandoned Manassas on learning that the movement to the Peninsula was *intended*. With the force he believes them to have had, (115,000 men) and "able leaders," "a serious menace upon Washington, to say nothing of a serious attack," would have frustrated the movement to the Peninsula, by placing Washington itself in great danger. Gen. Barnard says: "The truth is, the enemy abandoned Manassas because his force was too weak to permit him to remain longer where he was. He abandoned it after the President's orders for *an attack upon him where he was* had been given;" and proceeds:]

Having with such affluence of argument demonstrated to the President the superiority of his "plan"—having tenaciously cherished it for four long months—having persisted, even against risks of no ordinary magnitude, and against the settled convictions of the President, in carrying it out, we cannot doubt that at least Gen. McClellan has perfect knowledge of the new theater of war upon which he is entering—or, at least, such knowledge as would justify his assumptions and approve his military judgment. What, then, is our astonishment when we find that he carried his army into a region of which he was wholly ignorant—that the quasi information he had about it was all erroneous—that within twelve miles of the outposts of troops under his command a powerful defensive line had been thrown up during the winter and spring, of which he knew nothing whatever, though it lay across his meditated line of march, and altered the whole character of the problem—that the roads, "passable at all seasons" were of the most horrible character, and the country a wilderness. His own account of his information is given as follows, (p. 74):

As to the force and position of the enemy, the information then in our possession was vague and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtained from the staff officers of Gen. Wool, and was simply to the effect that Yorktown was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks, with strong water batteries on the York River, and garrisoned by not less than 15,000 troops, under command of Gen. J. B. Magruder. Maps, which had been prepared by the topographical engineers under Gen. Wool's command, were furnished me, in which the Warwick River was represented as flowing parallel to, but not crossing, the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, making the so-called Mulberry Island a real island; and we had no information as to the true course of the Warwick *across* the Peninsula, nor of the formidable line of works which it covered.

And again (p. 75):

In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe, serious difficulties were encountered from the want of precise topographical information of the country in advance. Correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, though known in its general features, we found to be inaccurately described in essential particulars in the only maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. This difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of the State of Virginia, through which my military operations have extended.

* * * * * * * *

The withdrawal of the corps of Gen. McDowell from this expedition is the grandest incident upon which have been based the fiercest invectives against the Administration for its "interference," and the charges upon it of responsibility for the failure of the campaign. We shall go no further into the matter here than to say, first, that the decision of the corps commanders (pp. 59 and 60) and the approval of the Secretary of War (p. 60) were the sole points of understanding between Gen. McClellan and the War Department. Notwithstanding that Gen. McClellan was in the vicinity of Washington eighteen days after these conditions were established, he never had, or took pains to have an understanding as to how they were to be executed. The *very day* he sailed (April 1) he sent to the Adjutant General a statement of his dispositions, and this, submitted by the Secretary of War to military advisers and decided by them to be *not* a fulfillment of the conditions, prompted and justified the order withdrawing McDowell. With the Secretary of War and his advisers, it was simply a question whether the conditions which the President imposed in approving, or rather in *permitting*, Gen. McClellan's eccentric movement, had been fulfilled. They had *not* been fulfilled, and the whole thing had been carried on from the beginning in disregard, not only of the President's wishes, but of his positive orders, and of the conditions which he (through a council of war) imposed upon the movement.

Citing the order detaining McDowell, Gen. McClellan resorts to the unworthy subterfuge

of representing it as a *withdrawal of troops* from his command by the President, in violation of his promise "that nothing of the kind should be repeated," (he refers to a previous withdrawal of Blenker's division — a body of troops of which he had more than once expressed his determination to rid himself in some way,) "that I might rest assured that the campaign should proceed with no further deductions from the force upon which its operations had been planned;" whereas it was simply an enforcement of the conditions upon which the President reluctantly sanctioned the plan. He goes on to say:

To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a different, and less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. It was a fatal error.

The very circumstances he here details stultify his conclusions. "Rapid and brilliant operations" *were more than ever imposed upon him.* When Napoleon, with a handful of men, drove the Austrians out of Italy, though twice and thrice placed, by the paucity of his numbers, in almost desperate situations, it was not by admitting that "rapid and brilliant operations" were "impossible," (a word, by the by, which he ever repudiated,) but by recognizing that *in them alone* his hope lay.

[Gen. Barnard goes on to state that, having found himself stopped by an obstacle, the existence of which he ought to have known, but of which he was inexcusably ignorant—having the success of the campaign and his own reputation, and even the safety of his army, jeopardized by this unforeseen impediment—he should have overcome it at once, at all hazards, and states his belief that a well conducted assault would have succeeded. He states, too, that Gen. McClellan, to justify his failure to assault, has quoted a description of the enemy's works, *as they were at the end of the siege, a whole month after we encountered them;* Johnston's army being engaged all that time in strengthening them. Those who have seen what our armies do in a week, or even in a day, in fortifying themselves, can well comprehend the disingenuousness of such a plea. The author proceeds:]

We shall not pause here to dwell upon the battle of Williamsburg. That a fierce battle was fought at a point where there was a strong probability that such a rencontre would occur, (for it was reasonable to suppose that the enemy would require further time to secure his retreat and save his trains, and here was a fortified position perfectly adapted to such a temporary stand,*) that it occurred without foresight, preparation, or orders, and that there was utter confusion with regard to the command and direction of the troops, that the Commanding General himself, though only twelve miles distant, was "completing the *preparation* for the departure of Gen. Franklin's troops by water, *and* making the necessary arrangements with the naval commander for his co-operation," that we lost 2,288 men in an affair in which we gained nothing and which need not have cost us a man, is all now well understood.

Neither shall we dwell on the extraordinary sluggishness of the march from Williamsburg to the Chickahominy, following the Commanding General's boastful declaration that he should "push the enemy to the wall." (A dispatch, by the by, which he has suppressed in this report.) We shall only stop to call attention to the dispatch of the Secretary of War of May 18th, (p. 96,) and to the following comment of Gen. McClellan:

It will be observed that this order rendered it impossible for me to use the James River as a line of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach Richmond from the north.

I had advised and preferred that reinforcements should be sent by water, for the reason that their arrival would be more safe and certain, and that I would be left free to rest the army on the James River whenever the navigation of that stream should be opened.

The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to secure the junction, and as the order for Gen. McDowell's march was soon countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of the campaign.

We here remark that it was at *Roper's Church*, where the army was on the 11th of May, that it was necessary to decide whether we would cross the Chickahominy near that place and approach the James, (then open to us by the destruction of the Merrimac,) or continue on the Williamsburg road to Richmond. The great mistake of not taking the James River route was made eight days previous to the date of this order, and was due to Gen. McClellan's total ignorance of the topography of the country he was operating in, to his want of due appreciation of the superior value of the James as a base, and *not* to an order received eight days later.

In his eagerness to make this grave charge against the War Department, and to manufacture excuses for his oversight, (to use a very mild term,) he has forgotten his own evidence, given under oath, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, as follows:

Question.—Could not the advance on Richmond from Williamsburg have been made with better prospect of success by the James River than by the route pursued, and what were the reasons for taking the route adopted?

Answer.—I do not think that the navy at that time was in a condition to make the line of the James River perfectly sure for our supplies. The line of the Pamunkey offered greater advantages in that respect. The place was in a better position to effect a junction with any troops that might move from Washington on the Fredericksburg line. I remember that the idea of moving on the James River was seriously discussed at that time. But the conclusion was arrived at that, under the circumstances then existing, the route actually followed was the best. I think the Merrimac was destroyed while we were at Williamsburg.

Next to the taking away of McDowell's corps the most important specification against the Administration for interference, has been founded upon the compelling of General McClellan to

* It was also known that there were strong defensive works at or near Williamsburg. (McClellan's Report, p. 74.)

base himself upon the York and Pamunkey rivers, instead of the James, in order to connect with McDowell, and General McClellan himself does not scruple to assert it, though, in so doing, he contradicts himself. The stamp of disingenuous afterthought—so palpable on every page of the report to those who are familiar with the march of events of this campaign—is here made palpable to the general reader.

On the 18th of May our depot was firmly established on the York river. The army was well nigh up to the Chickahominy, the right wing on the New Bridge road, the left wing on the Bottom's Bridge road.

General Barnard has given in his report a concise description of that (now) well-known stream, calling it "one of the most formidable military obstacles that could be opposed to the advance of an army; an obstacle to which an ordinary river, though it be of considerable magnitude, is comparatively slight." Formidable as it was, General B. further remarks, "the barrier of the Chickahominy being left unguarded at Bottom's Bridge, no time should have been lost in making use of the circumstance to turn and seize the passage of New Bridge, which might have been done by the 28th, and even earlier, had measures been pressed for taking it."

In reference *to the same period* and the same obstacle we find in the report before us, (p. 100, 1st par.,) "In view of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy, and the liability of its bottom land to sudden inundation, it became necessary to construct between Bottom's Bridge and Mechanicsville, eleven (11) new bridges, all long and difficult, with extensive log-way approaches."

It may here be remarked that we knew as little of the "peculiar character of the Chickahominy" and "the liability of its bottom land to sudden inundations" as we confessedly did of the topography and roads and physical character of this whole region—nothing at all.

The "eleven new bridges," (including in this enumeration the railroad bridge, Bottom's Bridge, and New Bridge,) are here emphatically mentioned as if *at that date*, (May 24,) it was as "necessary to construct" all these, as if the construction of each and all had been part of the programme, preliminary to any further motion. If this is not asserted, the idea is conveyed by the 1st par., p. 100, and confirmed by the 8th and 9th. ("The work upon *the bridges* was commenced at once," &c., &c.)

By reference to General Barnard's report, (p. 21,) it will be seen that, at this period, *three* points for bridges were selected in front of the right wing of the army near "New Bridge," viz.: one, a half mile above; another, the same distance below the "New Bridge;" and the New Bridge itself. The latter was the crossing of the turnpike, and required no more than an hour or two of work in throwing a pontoon bridge, *when the time of crossing should come.* The other two required corduroy work, which could not be done at all, (at least it was not part of the plan to do it,) until the *same moment should arrive.* All that could be done is stated in General Barnard's report, viz.: to "collect the bridge materials and corduroy stuff;" nor was any very expensive work anticipated, as the bottom lands were quite dry, and no inundation had yet occurred or was anticipated. General McClellan was not waiting for the bridges, but the bridges were waiting for General McClellan. At Bottom's Bridge, (one of the "eleven,") *two* new bridges *had been completed*, approaches and all, on the 23d, (May.) On the 27th the railroad bridge was completely repaired.

Intermediate between Bottom's Bridge and the three points mentioned by General Barnard, (where alone a passage was to be forced,) General Sumner had built two bridges with long corduroy approaches through the swamp; they *were both finished* about the 28th. There was no enemy to oppose their construction.

Gen. Barnard says: "So far as engineering operations were concerned, the whole army could have been thrown over as early as the 28th." And such an operation was daily looked for in the army, and was the avowed intention of Gen. McClellan.

But, (between Gen. McClellan's plans and their execution there is *always* a "but,") "a considerable force on his right flank" caused him to delay and to send off Porter to achieve his 'glorious victories" which so puzzled the President, and of which he is so unable to "appreciate the magnitude."

This really useless expedition was undertaken just at the moment when Gen. McClellan was "ready," (if he *ever* was ready,) to force the passage of the Chickahominy. The last few days of comparatively dry ground, favorable for the execution of this operation, were thus lost. On the 30th, the tremendous rain storm set in which inundated the swamp and bottom lands. On the 31st, the enemy attacked our isolated left wing. Had he delayed the attack twenty-four hours, it would have been fatal to that wing, and put a disastrous period to the campaign; for Sumner could not have crossed, and the two corps assailed would have been crushed without his aid. Man cannot control the elements indeed, and man, perhaps, could not foresee this inundation; but *every* delay, in military affairs, is a *risk*, and such proved to be the risks which this needless delay involved—a delay voluntarily incurred in a false and dangerous position.

The promptness of Sumner, and the intelligent foresight he displayed, enabled him to reach the field, and to turn defeat into victory. His columns were formed and their heads pushed up to the bridges, that, when the expected order should come, he might be at once in motion. Thereafter the battles which ensued took the usual course. Gen. Sumner, the highest officer of the army next to Gen. McClellan, arrived late in the day, with a part of his corps, to meet the enemy on ground he had never

seen—to aid another body of troops the positions of which he knew nothing of. Rightfully, after his arrival, he commanded on the battle-field, but neither he nor Gen. Heintzleman encountered each other, nor could act with intelligent reference to each other's position No supr me h ad, knowing the whole groun d. gave unity to action or cohere. ce to the masses. On the second day, indeed, Gen. McClellan, when the serious work of the day was ended, made his appearance.

The enemy being finally re ulsed, at an early hour on Sunda , (June 1st,) the "only available means" of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Richmond, and thus to obtain some results from our victory, was *not* to march them twenty-three mil s, as described p. 1 2, (a considerable exaggera ion of the necessary average march of the army by the route described,) but to move a force from Sumn r's command to t ke possession of the heights near Garnett's and Mrs. Price's houses, and *then* t bring over our right wing by the New Bridg , (actually made and passable for troops and ar tillery at 8:15 A. M. on the morning of June 1st.) A single division could have cleared those heights.

Gen. McClellan states, (p. 113):

In short, the idea of uniting the two wings of the army in time to make a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only five miles distant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I presume, never for a moment seriously entertained by any one connected with the Army of the Potomac.

An ingenious evasion of the real point at issue. It was not to "overtake the enemy before he reached Richmond," but to *follow him up into Richmond*, that constituted a "taking advantage" of the victory of "Fair Oaks." That we might have entered Richmond, all the information since obtain d goes to prove. Wm. Henry Hurlbert says:

The roads into Richmond were literally crowded with stragglers, some throwing away their guns, some breaking them on the trees—all with the same story, that their regiments had been "cut to pieces;" that the "Yankees were swarming on the Chickahominy like bees," and "fighting like devils." In two days of the succeeding week the provost marshal's guards collected between 4,000 and 5,000 stragglers and sent them into camp. What had become of the c mmand no one knew.

Gen. Heintzleman states that, "after the enemy retired, he gave orders to pursue them;" that he "countermanded" the order on Sunday, in consequence of Gen. Kearney's suggestion and allega ion that "Gen. McClellan would order a general advance in two or three days." The next morning, on learning that the enemy had fallen back in great confusion, he sent his troops "forward, and they got within about four miles of Richmond;" but, on sending word of it to Gen. McClellan, he was ordered to "stop and fall back to the old lines."

Gen. Sumner testifies:

"If we had attacked with our whole force, we should have swept everything before us;" and "I think the majority of the officers who were there think so now."

Gen. Keyes testifies:

After the battle of Seven Pines there was another time when I think, if the army had pressed on after the enemy with great vigor, we should have gone to Richmond; and in connection with this last, I am compelled to state that I think Gen. McClellan does not excel in that quality which enables him to know when to spring.

We have, thus positively, the opinions of the commanders of the three corps engaged in the battle.

The Prince de Joinville says:

Some persons thought, *and think still*, that if, instead of Sumner alone, all the divisions of the right wing had been ordered to cross the river, the order would have been executed. It is easy to see what must have happened if, instead of 15,000, 50,000 men had been thrown upon Johnston's flank. But Sumner's bridge, no doubt, would not have sufficed for the passage of such a force. At midnight the rear of his column was still struggling slowly to cross this rude structure, against all the difficulties of a roadway formed of trunks, which slipped and rolled under the horses' feet, of a muddy morass at either end, and of a pitchy dark night rendered darker still by the density of the forest. But several other bridges were ready to be thrown across at other points. Not a moment should have been lost in fixing them, and no regard should have been paid to the efforts of the enemy to prevent this from being done. *Johnston had paraded a brigade ostentatiously, as a sort of scarecrow, at the points which were most fitting for this enterprise; but the stake was so vast, the result to be sought after so important, the occasion so unexpected and so favorable for striking a decisive blow, that, in our judgment, nothing should have prevented the army from attempting this operation at every risk.* Here again it paid the penalty of that American tardiness which is more marked in the character of the army than in that of its leader. It was not till seven in the evening that the resolution was taken of throwing over all the bridges, and passing the whole army over by daybreak to the right bank. It was too late.

The Prince here labors under that inexcusable confusion of ideas which arises from an amiable unwillingness to carry his own convictions to a logical conclusion. "It was not till seven in the evening *that the resolution was taken*," &c. Now, the army had been waiting for several days for that "resolution" to be taken; the moment it *was* taken the bridge building commenced. The rising flood and the darkness of the night interfered with the progress till daylight dawned; but at eight o'clock the next morning one bridge was finished, and the passage practicable *for all arms;* during the day two other passages became practicable for *infantry.* So far from being too late, the bridges were ready just in time.

The Prince further says:

What might not have happened, if at this moment the 35,000 fresh troops on the other bank of the Chickahominy could have appeared upon the flank of this disordered army, after passing the bridges in safety!

Gen. Barnard states (p. 23 of his "Report") that "at 8.15 A. M., (June 1st,) the pontoon bridge at the site of New Bridge was complete and practicable for infantry, cavalry and artillery. About noon the "upper trestle bridge" was practicable for infantry. It was not till night that a practicable bridge for infantry was obtained at the 'lower trestle bridge.'" He adds, that owing to the overflowed condition of the bottom lands, the two last bridges could not be made practicable for "*cavalry or artillery*" without extensive corduroying. He further remarks: "There was one way, however, to unite the army on the other side; it

was to take advantage of a victory at Fair Oaks, to sweep at once the enemy from his position opposite New Bridge, and simultaneously to bring over, by the New Bridge," (with which, we remark, a raised turnpike communicated,) "our troops of the right wing, which could then have met with little or no resistance. * * * * * *

We have passed through one crisis, and have shown that it was *invited* by the dispositions of Gen. McClellan, by which our army was permitted to be for a whole week divided into two distinct portions, entirely isolated. This arrangement took place at a moment when Gen. McClellan avows his belief that the enemy's numbers "greatly exceeded our own," and that he has every reason to expect desperate work. (p. 98.) The weaker of the two isolated portions was thrust forward to within seven miles of Richmond, with no obstacle whatever between it and the enemy's superior forces, on ground that had no natural strength, and to which little artificial strength could be given, under the circumstances. The position, too, in which our troops were thus risked was never seen by the Commanding General until after the battle of Fair Oaks.

The weakness of the enemy, combined with his blunders, alone saved us. Gen. McClellan did not believe in his weakness—he had no right to count on his blunders. *Such* is the generalship which can do nothing "rapid or brilliant," owing to the alleged numerical weakness, but which, in delay, hesitation, and uncertainty, incurs risks such as the rashest of daring and energetic generals seldom encounter.

The failure of the enemy to crush our left wing, though he unquestionably exerted his whole strength to do it, might well shake Gen. McClellan's credulity with regard to his "superior numbers," and authorize his otherwise illogical statement (see telegram, June 7th, p. 115) that he should be "*in perfect readiness*" to move forward and "*take Richmond* the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery." With "superior numbers" of the enemy and "strong works" around Richmond, it is astonishing with what facility he is always "taking Richmond"—*in his dispatches!*

Again, (June 10,) though he has information that "Beauregard has arrived," and "some of his troops are to follow him," he announces, "I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit;" and he reiterates in the the same dispatch, lest he should not be understood or believed, "I wish to be distinctly understood that whenever the weather permits I will attack with whatever force I may have," &c. (p. 116.)

McCall arrived on the 12th and 13th. The rains of the early part of the month slackened as the month advanced, so that on the 14th the General announces, "weather now very favorable." The ground grew firmer as the June sun continued to act upon it, and by the 20th artillery could operate with facilty. On this date the General telegraphs that he has "no doubt Jackson has been reinforced from here." Now, then, is the time to "move forward" and to "take Richmond." But, instead of "perfect readiness," we hear the "difficulties of the country" expatiated upon—we learn that "by to-morrow night" certain defensive works will be finished—that the construction of these "defensive works" is rendered necessary by his "inferiority of numbers," so that he can bring the "greatest possible numbers into action," &c., &c. Instead of "*attacking with whatever force he has*"—instead of "perfect readiness" to act, (though he learns the enemy has been reduced by detachments,) he is waiting for "defensive works;" and, instead of "taking Richmond," or doing anything toward it, he "would be glad to have permission to lay before the President, by letter or telegraph, his views as to the *present state of military affairs throughout the whole country*"!

Bear in mind that, two months before, Gen. McClellan had been relieved from a position which made the expression of such views a part of his official duty; and now *after* having been so relieved, at *such* a moment as this, when the President is eagerly scanning each telegram to know if the army has really "advanced" and "taken Richmond," he is astounded to find only an offer of "views" on the "present state of military affairs throughout the whole country," coupled with a modest request to know "the numbers and position of the troops not under his command in Virginia or elsewhere." In other words, Gen. McClellan, in a moment so critical to himself, and under circumstances which should concentrate all his thoughts upon the work immediately in hand, asks to be informed of the numbers and positions of all the troops of the United States!

So neither McCall's arrival nor fine weather constituted "perfect readiness to advance." All the "eleven" bridges are finished—even the "defensive works" will be ready "by to-morrow night" (viz., June 21,)—and yet he does not "move forward."

Here is something, at least, that ought to start him. Thus far, "all the information previous to June 24," &c., (p. 119) induced the belief that Jackson was at Gordonsville, receiving reinforcements *from* Richmond. *Now* (June 24,) Gen. McClellan learns that Jackson was moving to Fredericksburg with his own troops and all those "reinforcements" that had gone to him, for the purpose of "attacking my rear on the 28th."

Surely now is the time, if ever, to "move forward;" in two or three days the enemy will receive heavy reinforcements. So, at last, on the 25th, our bridges and intrenchments being "at last completed," (N. B. The bridges were all completed by the 19th, the "defensive works" were announced June 20, as "to be completed to-morrow night," viz., June 21st, and, we remark, they were ready enough *at any time* for an advance.) *something* is really to be done. The reader holds his breath to know what is to

follow—it is "*on advance of our picket lines of the left* PREPARATORY to a general forward movement." One would think that the art of "preparation" had been exhausted, but if so simple as to believe that the time for *preparing* to do a thing ever ends, and the time of executing it ever commences, his military education could not have been acquired under Maj. Gen. McClellan. *This* preparatory operation at any rate must be the *last*. But alas! though "successful in what we have undertaken," the courage which, in the morning, was screwed up to order "an advance of our picket line of the left, preparatory to a general forward movement," has all oozed out by "6.15 P. M." "Several contrabands," (we hope they were intelligent!!) "just in," announce that "Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover C. H.;" that the perpetual bugbear, Beauregard, "had arrived," and that the rebel "force is stated a 200,000 men, including *Jackson* and Beauregard."*

The "general forward movement" of the morning is totally forgotten after the interview with these "contrabands," and we have this feeble announcement: "But this army will do all in the power of men to hold *their position and repulse any attack*." Regretting his "inferiority of numbers," for which he is not "responsible," he "will do all that he can do with the splendid army he has the honor to command," (Oh, that in such a moment surely every reader will aspirate such an army *had but a leader*,) and if destroyed by "overwhelming numbers" "can at least die with it and share its fate." *For once*, however, he feels that "there is no use in *again* asking for reinforcements."

Thus in the morning we are treated with a grand "preparatory movement," (what the particular necessity of losing a whole day, when time was so precious, in this absurd manner, the uninitiated can scarcely comprehend,) for a "general advance," and by sunset we have this feeble wail of despair. Does any one believe that any such sudden and portentous change had come over the state of affairs, as would justify such a change in the spirit of the General, or that the tales of "several contrabands" could so completely turn the tables? If he does not believe this, then the alternative is to believe the report which contains such statements to be a mere vail—transparently thin—with painful labor, drawn over the writer's conscious ignorance of his own plans, intentions, or situation.

He goes on to say, (p. 122,) "on the 26th, the day upon which *I had decided as the time of our final advance*," (it has already been at least six days since the whole category of conditions for moving forward and taking Richmond has been fulfilled, and six days since an additional condition turned up in his favor—the reinforcing of Jackson at Gordonsville, *from Richmond*—it has been two days since he learned that the powerful corps of Jackson, thus reinforced, was but two or three days march off, on his way to join Lee,) "the enemy attacked our right in force, and turned my attention to the protection of our *communications and depots of supply*;" both of which, by the by, were lost, and were *expected to be lost*, since he telegraphs the Secretary of War "not to be discouraged if you learn that my communications are cut off *and even Yorktown in possession of the enemy*."

Now, on the morning of the 26th, Jackson's main body was yet a *full day's march* off. It was noon on the 26th, (p. 124,) before the enemy was discovered to be in motion, and 3 p. m., (p. 125,) before he had "formed his line of battle" to attack McCall, at Beaver Dam Creek. The troops which attacked on the 26th were not Jackson's, but *a part of the very force Gen. McClellan was to have attacked himself*. Thus we learn the curious and astonishing fact that the "general forward movement," or, as styled, p. 122, "our final advance decided upon for that day," was postponed and abandoned *in consequence of an attack of the enemy's which took place at 3 p. m of the same day!*

Now if the case was really hopeless, we would fold our hands in resignation, only asking why the conclusion was not arrived at three weeks earlier; for we affirm that nothing happened up to the 26th to make a "moving forward and taking Richmond" more impracticable than when Gen. McClellan, (on the 7th,) announced that he should be "in perfect readiness" when McCall arrived and the ground dried—conditions all fulfilled as early as the 20th. Even to the 25th nothing that has occurred has daunted the ostensible determination to "advance and take Richmond," and a grand "preparatory" movement to a "general forward movement" was ordered. But man cannot control events, and who could forbode that, almost simultaneously with the order for "an advance of our picket line of the left preparatory," &c., &c., *several contrabands* would be on their way with tidings of Beauregard and Jackson! that a "final advance" for to-morrow, (the 26th,) will be utterly frustrated by a *counter* advance made by a disobliging enemy *at three o'clock in the afternoon of that day!*

Truly "the case is a difficult one," but we need not loose hope, for the General will do his best to "out-maneuver, out-wit, and out-fight the enemy."

With an army of 100,000 men *present for duty*—an enemy divided into two portions, even if "greatly superior in number, we would fancy *something* might be done, even had we not this voluntary pledge of brilliant generalship. Indeed it has been our notion that these were just the circumstances that called for energetic action—a prompt and bold *initative* on the part of a general.

Admitting that the enemy really numbered, (as is stated on the authority of the "secret service,") 180.000 men, and admitting that the "advance" on to Richmond had ceased to be practicable and that a retreat to the James

* As early as June 10, the General has "information that Beauregard had arrived," and "that some of his troops were to follow him." The "contrabands" bring no *news* after all.

River had become the best course, why amuse us in this official *Report* of *past* events with the pretence, kept up till the 25th, nay, to the 26th, of a "general forward movement?" Such a movement was surely more practicable while Jackson was at Gordonsville, or even when only three marches off, than when he arrived Why, *if really intended*, was it not made?

In view of a retreat to the James River it was wise to hold the position at Beaver Dam on the 26th. All Porter's baggage train might have been, (and we believe *was*,) brought over on that day. So might have been the "siege guns." I was a blunder unparalleled to expose Porter's corps to fight a battle by itself on the 27th against overwhelming forces of the enemy. With perfect ease that corps might have been brought over on the night of the 26th, and if nothing more brilliant could have been thought of, the movement to the James River might have been in full tide of execution on the 27th A more propitious moment could not have been chosen, for, besides Jackson's own forces, A. P. Hill's and Longstreet's corps were on the north (left) bank of the Chickahominy on the night of the 26th. Such a movement need not have been discovered to the enemy till far enough advanced to insure success. At any rate he could have done no better in preventing it than he actually did afterwards. The Prince de Joinville, conceding the necessity of the movement says, "there was a vast difference between making this *retreat*," (styling it very properly what it was,) "in one's own time and by a free, spontaneous movement, and making it hastily under the threatening pressure of two hostile armies;" and surely the difference became vaster when, instead of being made merely *under pressure*, it became the necessary result of a decided defeat.

[Gen. Barnard affirms that 180,000, is an absurd over-estimate of the enemy's numbers; that even the "secret service" estimates do not warrant it, since 500 men to a battalion was considered an ample allowance, and the 200 battalions and other organizations would not make over 120,000 men at utmost; that Wm. H. T. Hurlbert, who was in Richmond at the time, makes the number but 120,000; and finally, that the rebel Gen. Stuart, in an interview with one of our general officers, not long after, *pledged his honor*, that Lee's forces did not exceed *ninety thousand*.]

Conceding, however, to Gen. McClellan an adversary which his "secret service," aided by "several contrabands," had conjured up, the passive inactivity with which he met this crisis forfeits for him every claim to generalship even of the most indifferent character. With an enemy 180,000 strong, divided in two distinct portions, we believe that there might have been found some way of displaying generalship; at least, with entrenchments on the right bank of the Chickahominy which 20,000 men could have held against 100,000, he need not have permitted one third of his army to be defeated on the other bank, within sight and cannon range of the other two thirds. But, considering the *real strength* of his enemy, (as we believe it to have been,) a more lamentable failure to fulfill "hopes formerly placed in him," a more striking instance, not so much of being "out-witted" as of destitution of "wit," and of unreadiness in action, is scarcely to be found in military annals.

The enemy having been checked at Beaver Dam Creek in the afternoon of the 26th, no time should have been lost in withdrawing from this position and in bringing Porter over the Chickahominy, as could have been done with the greatest ease on the night of the 26th. If he had been determined, however, to fight on that side, he should have been withdrawn in the night to the position selected, and at the same time reinforced with the whole of our left wing, except 20 000 men to hold the entrenchments and Bottom's Bridge, and to guard the passage of the White Oak swamp. Thirty or forty thousand men should have been sent over to Porter.

Gen. McCall who commanded the force at Beaver Dam Creek which received the rebel attack under A. P. Hill on the 26th, says in reference to the order to withdraw:

> This order, I confess, gave me some concern. *Had it reached me at midnight*, the movement might have been made without difficulty and without loss; but now it would be daylight before the movement which, under fire, is one of the most delicate and difficult in the art of war, could be commenced.

The movement ordered at nightfall of the 26th, could have been executed without risk or damage. Delayed till morning, it involved the risk of the utter destruction of Porter's corps of 27,000 men. Not a *slight* risk merely, such as we must constantly incur in making war, but a serious risk, and, moreover, a totally unnecessary one. Porter acknowledged his hesitation to give the order to withdrawing his force, and even seemed, when morning came, inclined to suspend it, alleging the fear that McCall's division would be *cut to pieces*. Not only McCall's division, but Porter's whole command, were in fearful risk of being "cut to pieces" or captured, by being where they were that morning of the 27th, as we shall show.

Gen. Stoneman, with a small command of infantry and cavalry, had been sent towards "Old Church" to obstruct roads, destroy bridges, and prevent, as far as possible, Porter's right from being turned. Jackson, who, in marching from Hanover C. H., kept well towards the Pamunkey, with the obvious intention of turning Porter's right, on coming in sight of Stoneman's troops near "Old Church," bore off towards Mechanicsville. His troops filed past in full view of Stoneman from 4 p. m. till after dark, and were estimated by him at 35,000 strong. (Jackson *now* had, besides his own troops, those "reinforcements" which we have seen were sent a week or two ago out of Richmond, to join him. Let us suppose that Jackson, instead of being diverted from his course

by the handful of troops of Stoneman, (and it is astonishing that he should have been,) had kept on toward Cold Harbor. Porter's case would have been hopeless.

He bore off towards Mechanicsville, and encamped somewhere near Shady Grove Church. Had he put his troops in motion before dawn, and marched parallel to Porter's line of retreat, he could have attacked his retiring columns, and rendered it difficult, if not impossible, for him to reach the position where he actually gave battle. Finally, that the force of Porter was not utterly destroyed by its defeat, is due simply to the fact (not to have been expected) that the enemy did not commence his attack till 3½ p. m., and did not accomplish his victory until after nightfall. These, it may be urged, were *risks* incidental to war; but they were risks of the gravest character, and we are unable to see what equivalent risks (rather than positive advantages) would have attended the withdrawal of Porter the night of the 26th.

Gen. McClellan announces that "the object we sought for had been obtained." "The enemy was held at bay" (But why incur a disastrous defeat to hold him "at bay" in a position where he could not attack us unless we chose to be attacked.) "Our siege guns and materials *were saved.*" (Everything was brought over on the 26th except the siege guns, and they might have been) "and the right wing now joined the main body of the army," (which it might have done on the night of the 26th.)

Per contra, we lost twenty-two guns, "captured by the enemy," (better have abandoned and spiked the 'siege artillery" than to have lost *in battle* twenty-two guns.) We lost in killed and wounded 9,000 men, when Porter might have been withdrawn without the loss of a man, and we incurred a disheartening defeat besides.

Two defensive battles have now been fought on the Chickahominy, and Gen. McClellan has either blundered into fighting them, or been *compelled*, by the circumstances of his position, to fight them, the first with about one half, the second with less than one third of his force; and now, (not a single offensive action having occurred during this invasive campaign,) with a "splendid army," as he rightly styles it, he is forced, though still superior, or at least equal in numbers, to "change his base," or in other words, to beat a retreat.

He has spent weeks in building bridges, which establish a close connection between the wings of his army, and then fights a great battle with a smaller fraction of his army than when he had a single available bridge, and that remote. He, with great labor constructs "defensive works," in order that he "may bring the greatest possible numbers into action," and again exhibits his ability to utilize his means by keeping 65,000 men idle behind them, while 35,000, unaided by "defensive works" of any kind, fight the bulk of his adversary's forces, and are of course overwhelmed by "superior numbers."

[After stating that, according even to the enemy's own confessions, had Gen. McClellan instead of fighting a useless and disastrous battle with one third of his forces on the 27th, united his army the night of the 26th and marched on Richmond, he would have had a fair chance of success. Gen. B. proceeds to describe the subsequent battles of the "Seven Days."]

On the 30th of June our army stretched across the country from White Oak Swamp Bridge to the James, occupying a line about eight miles long. Franklin held the right at the bridge, Porter and Keyes the extreme left. Further than midway (about five miles) from the James, this long line of battle was intersected by two (the "Charles City" and the "New Market" or "Long Bridge") converging roads. Here was *the decisive point*—if the line should be broken here it would be the destruction of our army. Here, too, the enemy made a desperate effort. Lee commanded in person, and Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's veteran divisions, numbering 18,000 to 20,000 men, made the attack. Jeff. Davis himself was said to be present. (So Gen. McCall, while a prisoner that evening, was informed.) It was an eventful day and an eventful point; central, too, to the general position of the army. Where was the Commanding General during this battle? At the very extreme left, and for a considerable portion of the time *on a gunboat*, (see p. 135,) "having made arrangements for instant communication by signals." Read the report of Gen. McCall, the extracts from those of Sumner, and Heintzleman, and others, and their testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and see how much the control of the Commanding General was needed; his knowledge of the field, and of the positions of the different troops. Then think of the disastrous consequences that would have followed the breaking of our line at that point. (Longstreet informed Gen. McCall that Lee had 70,000 men bearing on it, all of which would arrive before midnight,) and let each one form his own conclusion as to whether the Commanding General had on this occasion any appreciation of his duties, or, if he had, whether he discharged them.

"It was very late at night," says General McClellan, "before my aids returned to give me *the results of the day's fighting along the whole line, and the true position of affairs.*" It may well be doubted whether, in all the recorded reports or "dispatches" of military commanders, a parallel to this extraordinary avowal can be found. We supposed it the especial business of a general to know, at each moment, "the true position of affairs," and to have some agency in ruling it. Here we find the "day's fighting" all done, the results, for better or worse, accomplished, and "very late at night" the Commanding General just learning about them! "Very late at night" General Franklin *concluded* he could no longer hold his position, and retired, sending word to Generals Sumner and Heintzleman. These officers, though they assert they received no such message, heard of

the movement, somehow, and wisely concluded that they must retire, too. Here again was a matter of the gravest importance, which, that it should be decided at the proper time, required the Commanding General to be at hand—to know, promptly, "the situation" and the "results of the day's fighting." General McClellan makes no pretence that he gave any orders to Franklin, nor that he would have given any to the other corps commanders had not Franklin, *without orders*, fallen back. He affirms that on learning of Franklin's withdrawal he *sent orders* to Sumner and Heintzleman to withdraw, but admits that they were both in motion *without his orders*. Now, had *not* this withdrawal taken place that night, the next day would have probably witnessed the destruction of the Army of the Potomac. Lee, as we have seen, was at the very central point, ready to break in, with a force of 70,000 men, as stated by Longstreet to General McCall. The salvation of the army was due, not to McClellan's arrangements or foresight, but to General Franklin's fortunate decision to withdraw. The army was saved *in spite* of General McClellan's ignorance of the "position of affairs" and "results of the day's fighting," and consequent incapacity to give intelligent orders.

Our army is now concentrated on the James; but we have another day's fighting before us, and this day we may expect the concentrated attack of Lee's whole army. We know not at what hour it will come—possibly late, for it requires time to find out our new position and to bring together the attacking columns—yet we know not when it will come. Where, *this* day, is the Commanding General? Off, with Captain Rodgers, to select "the final positions of the army and its depots." He does not tell us that it was on a gunboat, and that this day not even "signals" would keep him in communication with his army, for his journey was ten or fifteen miles down the river; and he was thus absent till late in the afternoon.

This is the first time we ever had reason to believe that the highest and first duty of a general, on the day of battle, was, separating himself from his army, to reconnoitre a place of retreat! However that may be, that night and the day following, the whole army, with the exception of General Keyes' corps, marched into a cul-de-sac from which it could not have been extricated had the enemy been able promptly to follow us up.

We think it will now be understood why "a large number of General McClellan's highest officers—indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me," (see General Halleck's letter, p. 157) are in favor of "the withdrawal from the James." If the enemy *was*, indeed, as General McClellan estimated, (General Halleck's letter, p. 156) 200,000 strong, and daily increasing, a renewal of an offensive campaign from the James was simple madness. *Once*, by his own accounts, he had been foiled and driven back, with no little hazard of the ruin of his army, by "superior numbers," and now he proposes to march again with 120,000 (about what his army would have numbered with the 30,000 reinforcements he asked) against Richmond, held by 200,000 men. No one who has read attentively the report before us, and the dispatches therein contained, will be surprised at the want of logical sequence in any particular plan, statement, or argument, since complete destitution of such a quality is the characteristic of the whole; but any intelligent reader will understand that there were no rational chances of success, particularly after recent experiences, in "advancing on Richmond" defended by an army of 200,000 men inured to battles and elated by success, with but 120,000 men. He can understand, too, that *another* disastrous repulse in this region was likely to result in the loss of the army and the capture of Washington—indeed, the ruin of the cause.

If the enemy had 200,000 men it was to be seriously apprehended that, leaving 50,000 behind the "strong works" of Richmond, he would march at once with 150,000 men on Washington. Why should he not? General McClellan and his eulogists have held up as highly meritorious strategy the leaving of Washington defended by less than 50,000 men, with the enemy in its front estimated to be 120,000 to 150,000 strong, and moving off to take an eccentric line of operations against Richmond; and now the *reverse case is presented*, but with an important difference. The enemy at Manassas, on learning General McClellan's movement, could either fly to the defence of Richmond or attack Washington. *Gen. McClellan says that this latter course was not to be feared.* McClellan on the James, on learning that Lee with 150,000 men is marching on Washington, *can only* attack Richmond; by no possibility can he fly to the defence of Washington. Besides, he is inferior in numbers (according to his own estimate) even to Lee's marching army. Here, in a nutshell, is the demonstration of the folly of the grand strategic movement on Richmond, as given by its own projector.

If the enemy had nothing like 200,000 men—(and a very reliable estimate put his forces in the early part of August at about 55,000 *around Richmond*, and the rest with Jackson confronting Pope, probably not more than 40,000)—if he never had had more than 90,000, or at the utmost 120,000—if Gen. McClellan had been driven away from Richmond by equal or inferior numbers, there were still strong reasons, (which we need not indicate,) after the recent experience undergone, for not permitting him to incur the hazard of another advance.

The critical situation of affairs at this period, the urgent necessity of providing for the safety of Washington and of effecting the reunion into one whole of our shattered and reduced armies in Virginia, demanded imperatively the withdrawal from the James. The great misfortune was that the order was not given immediately on our reaching Harrison's Landing.

Had Gen. McClellan made his "reports" of

the various actions of the Army of the Potomac as they occurred, he would probably have done himself more credit, (though the slight specimen we have in his report made July 15th, of the Seven Days' battles hardly warrants this opinion,) than he has by this laborious but disingenious production. He has, however, done the country and done history a service. In giving so many of his own dispatches he has furnished the truest tests of his actual abilities as a general and a thinker, and in the matter and in the arrangement of it he has given us an illustration of his animus as a historian. In this point of view the Report may be safely recommended to readers of all classes and all parties. In taking leave of the Army of the Potomac he somewhat ostentatiously promised to make himself the historian of its exploits, and we have before us now, in the pages we have just examined, the result of his six months' incubation on such a theme.

"Whoever has committed no faults has not made war" was the remark of one of the great marshals of France when questioned as to the cause of a defeat, and acknowledging it to have been the result of his own mistakes; and there would have been no lack of indulgence and charity for the failure of an inexperienced subaltern suddenly converted into a general, and called upon to plan campaigns and direct armies of such unusual magnitude, under circumstances of no ordinary difficulty, were they presented to us in the spirit of Marshal Turenne's avowal; but when exactly the reverse is the case, when the claim to eminent generalship is arrogantly asserted, when plans which we have shown to be lacking in the essential elements of consistency in themselves, and of concert with those who must be depended upon to carry them out, are held up for our admiration, when all faults are denied and the burden of each particular mishap, and, in the end, of the failure of the whole campaign, is thrown upon the Administration; when, in short, the whole Report is one incessant complaint against the President and the War Department, culminating at length in the outrageous charge addressed to the Secretary of War on the eve of Porter's defeat, (a fit *finale* to the two days' blundering,) "You have done your best to sacrifice this army," we think charity should withdraw her mantle from the errors and inconsistencies and incapacity which we here exhibit.

[In the complete work of Gen. Barnard, the author's statements and opinions are supported by voluminous notes containing extracts from the evidence given before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, of Generals Sumner, Heintzleman, Keyes, McCall, Franklin, Hitchcock, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Fox, Admiral Goldsborough, and others, and by citations from other published documents.]

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN FOR 1864.

UNION EXECUTIVE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

Hon. E. D. MORGAN, of New York.	Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois.
" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.	" R. E. VAN VALKENBURG, N. Y.
" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.	" J. A. GARFIELD, of Ohio.
(Senate.)	" J. G. BLAINE, of Maine,
	(House of Representatives.)

E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman.* JAMES HARLAN, *Treasurer.* D. N. COOLEY, *Secretary.*

COMMITTEE ROOMS, Washington, D. C., Sept. 2, 1864.

DEAR SIR: The Union Congressional Committee, in addition to the documents already published, propose to issue immediately the following documents for distribution among the people:

1. McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed.
2. George H. Pendleton, his Disloyal Record and Antecedents.
3. The Chicago Copperhead Convention, the men who composed and controlled it.
4. Base Surrender of the Copperheads to the Rebels in Arms.
5. The Military and Naval Situation, and the Glorious Achievements of our Soldiers and Sailors.
6. A Few Plain Words with the Private Soldier.
7. What Lincoln's Administration has done.
8. The History of McClellan's "Arbitrary Arrest" of the Maryland Legislature.
9. Can the Country Pay the Expenses of the War?
10. Doctrines of the Copperheads North Identical with those of the Rebels South.
11. The Constitution Upheld and Maintained.
12. Rebel Terms of Peace.
13. Peace, to be Enduring, must be Conquered.
14. A History of the Cruelties and Atrocities of the Rebellion.
15. Evidences of a Copperhead Conspiracy in the Northwest.

The above documents will be printed in English and German in eight or sixteen page pamphlets, and sent, postage free, according to directions, at the rate of one or two dollars per hundred copies. The plans and purposes of the Copperheads having been disclosed by the action of the Chicago Convention, they should at once be laid before the loyal people of the country. There is but two months between this and election, and leagues, clubs, and individuals should lose no time in sending in their orders. Remittances should be made in greenbacks or Drafts on New York City, payable to the order of James Harlan.

Address: Free. HON. JAMES HARLAN, *Washington, D. C.*

Very respectfully, yours, &c., D. N. COOLEY, *Secretary.*

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REPLY OF

MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN

TO THE MAYOR OF ATLANTA,

AND SPEECHES OF

MAJ. GEN. HOOKER,

Delivered in the Cities of Brooklyn and New York, Sept. 22, 1864.

LETTER OF

LIEUT. GEN. GRANT.

ANSWER OF GENERAL SHERMAN.

HEADQR'S MIL. DIV. OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, *Sept.* 12, 1864.

JAMES M. CALHOUN, *Mayor*, E. E. RAWSON *and* S. C. WELLS,
representing City Council of Atlanta:

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statetments of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order, simply because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions, yea hundreds of millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have peace, not only in Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop war we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses, provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose.

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Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that we may have many years of military operations from this quarter, and, therefore, deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here for the maintenance of families, and, sooner or later, want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go now, when all the arrangements are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting till the plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scenes of the past month? Of course I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do not suppose this army will be here till the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot impart to you what I propose to do; but I assert that my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will.

War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know that I will make more sacrifices than any of you to-day to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will go on till we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its authority wherever it has power; if it relaxes one bit to pressure it is gone, and I know that such is not the national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of *Union*. Once admit the Union, once acknowledge the authority of the National Government, and instead of devoting your houses and streets and roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army become at once your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals cannot resist a torrent of error and passion such as swept the South into rebellion; but you can point out, so that we may know those who desire a government, and those who insist on war and its desolation.

You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against the terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop this war, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride. We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or your land, or anything you have; but we do want and will have a just obedience to the laws of

the United States. That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot help it. You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters the better for you.

I repeat, then, that, by the original compact of government, the United States had certain rights in Georgia which have never been relinquished, and never will be; that the South began the war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, &c., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I, myself, have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry, and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you, you feel very different—you deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and moulded shells and shot, to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people, who only asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under the Government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it only can be reached through Union and war, and I will ever conduct war purely with a view to perfect and early success.

But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may call on me for anything. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger from every quarter. Now, you must go, and take with you the old and feeble; feed and nurse them, and build for them in more quiet places proper habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more to settle on your old homes at Atlanta.

Yours, in haste,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major General.

SPEECHES

OF

MAJ. GEN. HOOKER

AT

BROOKLY AND NEW YORK.

GREAT UNION MEETING IN BROOKLYN.

The Brooklyn Academy of Music was overcrowded on Thursday night last by a highly intelligent audience, comprising a large proportion of ladies, assembled to assist the Union cause and do honor to Major General Hooker. Meetings were held outside the Academy. The stands were illuminated. Inside the Academy, R. M. Griswold presided. Stirring resolutions were adopted. They contrasted the principles of the Opposition with those of the Union party, and declared that there could be no hesitation by loyal men in choosing between the National and Secession candidates; pledging the meeting against a humiliating and a foul and treacherous betrayal of the national cause.

Senator Wilson made the first address, urging the duty of the people at this hour. While he was speaking the audience recognized General Hooker. Nearly all the persons present rose to their feet, cheering and waving hats and handkerchiefs; and the scene was of the most thrilling interest. The General bowed his acknowledgments, and in response to loud calls, made the following address:

"Ladies and Gentlemen: I need not tell you that I am totally unprepared for this. I cannot, I do not take this demonstration, or any part of it, to myself. I am not worthy of this reception. ["Yes, yes, you are;" applause.] I am no more worthy than any of you. We are all in the same boat. You have been working in one place; I have been working in another. [Applause.] Your victories are as dear to us in front as the victories in the front are dear to you. The political victories of last fall—I speak from full knowledge—were hailed with as much joy and enthusiasm in the army as though they had been achieved by the army. [Applause.] The victory in Ohio last fall was so hailed and I hope we

may hail many more. I hope that we may have many more, and do not doubt that next November we will have one of which this rebellion has furnished no parallel. I need not tell you that I am rejoiced to find such an assemblage here to-night. It shows it is 'all right' with our cause and our country. No reverse, no misfortune can befall us when our people are animated by the feeling which is evinced here to-night. If the war has been prolonged, it has not been from our weakness, but it has been from our conscious strength. We have not put forward all our energies and all our resources, although we have employed resources that have amazed the world. But the North has not made one great effort to crush the rebellion by a single blow. It could do it, and it can do it any day it moves for that purpose. [Cheers.] The people in the loyal States—and I am glad to say it—the people have been in advance of the authorities in all this rebellion. Let us go on until we reach the end, and the end is not remote. I am rejoiced to meet you, and meet you under such auspicious circumstances. Tidings—glorious tidings—reach us from all of the armies. The work goes bravely on. There are no Copperheads in the army. [Great applause.] The troops will fight well, and they will vote well. More devotion, more loyalty never animated the hearts and the hands of men more brave. [Renewed applause.] I thank you most kindly for the kindness you have received me with to-night. I am unworthy of it. In my humble capacity I have never failed to do my duty, and do not intend to fail now. I wish you all good-night."

There was long-continued cheers after the General retired.

GENERAL HOOKER IN NEW YORK.

General Hooker on the same night visited the Union League Club of New York, and was welcomed by a large number of members. Mr. Jonathan Sturges made the reception speech, as follows:

"GEMTLEMAN: This is not a partisan club, as many suppose, but a club whose declared object is to cultivate a love for our Union, and to sustain the Government in restoring its authority in those States which are in rebellion. We agree with General McClellan in his report, page 442, where he expresses the opinion: "After a calm, impatial, patient consideration of the subject, that a necessary preliminary to the reestablishment of the Union is the entire defeat or virtual destruction of the organized military power of the Confederacy, and that such a result should be followed by conciliatory measures." Believing this, we cannot sustain any man who goes upon an 'immediate armistice' platform, with such men as Mr. Pen-

dleton, of Ohio. We feel it to be more consistent to do honor to those generals who 'propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.' Several of these are with us to-night. I have the honor of introducing to the club that gallant soldier, Major General Joseph Hooker."

General Hooker, in reply, observed that the Loyal League were not aware of the service they had rendered the army. They had formed a good reserve, and for this the army felt strong in front. The fighting is now nearly closed. There will be a few spasmodic plunges, but they are natural manifestations of dying. The Government has been slow; the people have been fast, and have led the Administration; but the latter has come along, and, on the whole, done tolerably well. It is absurd to suppose the soldiers can vote other than one way. They will vote as they have fought, to put down the rebellion. We have not only fought the rebellion, but England. She has furnished the rebels with all their arms and clothing, and for these she holds a mortgage on the whole South. I don't think she will undertake to foreclose it.

General Hooker further remarked that he had at no time felt any doubt of the success of the war for the Union. There has been mistakes and mismanagement in its conduct, yet the Union arms had made steady progress, so that the close of each year had seen the erea of the rebellion narrowed and its relative power materially weakened. He confidently believed that we were now near the end—nearer than most of us believed. But he would have no overtures made to the rebel chief; at the proper time they would signify their readiness to give it up. The time to begin negotiating was when we had finished the fighting.

It is folly to talk of it till we have whipped out our enemies and swept away the cause of the rebellion. The Constitution must be interpreted in accordance with the principles of humanity, nor can we have a permanent peace till we do so. We must not make a peace in such a way that another war will break out again within ten years. We have been generous enough to our enemies—even to a fault—and they invariably construed our lenity into weakness.

LIEUT. GEN. GRANT'S LETTER.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, *August* 16, 1864.

Hon, E. B. WASHBURNE:

DEAR SIR: I state to all citizens who visit me that all we want now to insure an early restoration of the Union is *a determined unity of sentiment in the North.* The rebels have now in their ranks their last man. The little boys and old men are guarding prisoners, guarding railroads and bridges, and forming a good part of their garrisons for intrenched positions. A man lost by them cannot be replaced. *They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force.* Besides what they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles, they are now losing from desertion and other causes at least one regiment per day. With this drain upon them the end is not far distant, *if we will only be true to ourselves.* Their only hope now is in a divided North. This might give them reinforcements from Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland and Missouri, while it would weaken us. With the draft quietly enforced, the enemy would become despondent, and would make but little resistance. I have no doubt but the enemy are exceedingly anxious to hold out until after the Presidential election. They have many hopes from its effects. Thay hope a counter revolution. They hope the election of the peace candidate: in fact, like Mickawber, they hope for "something to turn up." *Our peace friends, if they expect peace from separation, are much mistaken. It would be but the beginning of war,* with thousands of Northern men joining the South, because of our disgrace in allowing separation. To have peace on any terms, the South would demand the restoration of their slaves already freed. They would demand indemnity for losses sustained, *and they would demand a treaty which would make the North slave hunters for the South.* They would demand pay, or the restoration of every slave escaping to the North.

Yours, truly,

U. S. GRANT.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

UNION CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

Hon. E. D. MORGAN, of New York.
" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.
" L. M. MORRILL, of Maine.
(*Senate.*)

Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois.
" R. B. VAN VALKENBURG, N. Y.
" J. A. GARFIELD, of Ohio.
" J. G. BLAINE, of Maine.
(*House of Representatives.*)

E. D. MORGAN, *Chairman.* JAS. HARLAN, *Treasurer.* D. N. COOLEY, *Sec'y.*

COMMITTEE Rooms, *Washington, D. C., Sept.* 2, 1864.

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20. Shall we have an Armistice?

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Address— Free.

Hon. JAMES HARLAN,
Washington, D. C.

Very respectfully yours, &c.,
D. N. COOLEY, *Secretary.*

Republican congressional committee, 1863-1865
No. 23

PEACE,

To be Enduring, must be Conquered.

CAN any man doubt the truth of the above heading who knows the past history of the country? We think not. The men who began this war, and others of their spirit, now in their graves, for many years past have shown a persistent, an unfaltering purpose to rule the country or to ruin it. Nothing has been allowed to stand in the way of their passion for power and control. The history of the debates in Congress has shown the country but little else than pro-slavery truculency, bluster, and domineering on the one part, and meek submission or tame resistance on the other. Hectoring airs of assumed superiority, backed up by trenchant and scolding declamation, by threats, by challenges to mortal combat, by the display of bowie-knives and pistols, and by the occasional use of the bludgeon in the halls of the National Legislature, have given us a fair view of the prevailing type of Southern civilization, as well as abundant warning of what was coming. But the North was both blind and deaf. We tried to persuade ourselves that these manifestations had no depth of meaning—that they were personal to the parties committing the disorders, and not a genuine representation of the ruling Southern mind.

We have found, however, that our charity controlled our judgment; that the rage of slaveholding Congressmen was truly representative; that the sense of their own superiority, and the purpose to rule, were genuine traits of the whole Southern aristocracy.

Printed for the Union Congressional Committee by John A. Gray & Green, New-York.

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South-Carolina, when she presented a cane to Bully Brooks, in honor of his brtual assault upon Senator Sumner, expressed well-nigh the universal sentiment of leading Southern men. No genuine Southern newspaper condemned it — nearly every one defended and gloried in it. Brooks and South-Carolina held the club, and inflicted the blows; but the whole slaveocracy accepted the responsibility, and envied South-Carolina and Brooks their leadership. This was the temper of the slaveholding class as such. Their estimate of Southern blood and Southern prowess, and Southern gentility and refinement, allowed of no comparison between them and the North, and entitled them, in their own view, to regard us, with their own landless and slaveless class, as "mudsills," and to reduce us to order, if need be, at the mouth of the pistol or under the blow of the bludgeon.

Now these are the people who have brought war upon the country. These are the parties from whom, and with whom, we are to secure peace. Is there any thing in the temper of their class, in the modesty of their conduct, in their peculiar recognition of Northern rights, or the rights of labor anywhere, in their Congressional history, to induce the belief, in any sane mind, that they can ever be coaxed into terms? Can any one who knows history believe in the cure of these men by "peace" nostrums, to be administered by such doctors as Seymour, Vallandigham, and the Woods? Will any thing short of a sound and thorough whipping produce political regeneration in such men as these? We trow not.

But let us look further in the same general direction. This proud, insurgent aristocracy is not a caste created by wealth, or by learning, or by legalized nobility. It rests upon a distinct system of labor, in which the capital owns the laborer, and in which the laborer's condition is so deeply degraded as to carry labor down to the abyss of the profoundest disgrace. The working-man is a chattel; his manhood is denied; he has no lawful marriage, no control of his children, no right to learn his A, B, C; he owns no property—not even his own body or his own soul. To so foul a thing, made nevertheless of God's image, is the destiny of labor bound. This treatment of men and of labor, besides making slaveholders proud braggarts, as we have seen, turns against them the instincts of humanity all over the world. It arrays in opposition to them the horny-handed sons of toil at home and abroad. It brings upon them the reprobation of true Christians,

and disinterested philanthropists everywhere. Now, the horror of all good men for slavery is the measure of rebel elevation to it. Slavery is rooted in the rebel heart, and taints the rebel blood; *it is* rebel wealth and rebel pride; it has made its supporters dictatorial and fierce. When it was threatened, they were alarmed and maddened, and when, at the election of Mr. Lincoln, it was beaten at the ballot-box, they rushed to arms.

Mr. Jefferson Davis may say they are not fighting for slavery. He utters a falsehood. There never was any thing else to fight about. Slavery made the South what it was before the war, and the rebel animus in every battle has been intense hate of abolitionists. This hate of abolitionists is only the negative side of the love of slavery. The miser hates the man who carries off his ingots precisely as much as he loves the ingots. His heart is with the lost treasure and his curse with its new possessor. But negroes to a rebel aristocrat are more than wealth; they are aristocracy, they are caste. Without them, he is a cripple without his crutch, an unhorsed cavalryman, or rather is he the man-part of a centaur, cut loose from the animal to whose back he had grown fast. When the severance takes place between master and slave, the present structure of Southern society tumbles into ruins; its peculiar civilization comes to an end; the plough stands still in the furrow; the cotton, and sugar, and rice, rot in the fields, and the border States lose their market for their crops of biped cattle.

Following such results must come the hated system of free labor which has enriched the North. Slaves must become men, choosing their employment and employers; laboring white men will be emancipated from the vile shackles of prejudice; free schools must spring up, fostered and protected by a free press and a free pulpit, and the pride and arrogance of Southern knighthood and Southern chivalry must die the death. The nation will then become homogeneous, and patriotism take the place of sectionalism.

Now is it possible to get a permanent peace until this tap-root of the rebellion, slavery, is destroyed? If we stop fighting now, and leave slavery where it is, and the Southern people go to work to tinker up "the corner-stone" of their system, so scaled and split by the blasts of war, can we expect an enduring peace? Will the bloodshed of the conflict have reconciled the two opposing systems of civilization? Will our churches and schools cease to denounce slavery as "the sum of all villainies"? Will

Northern politicians cease to make it a party issue? Will the anti-slavery presses accept the gag for the purpose of maintaining peace? Will Southern statesmen, politicians, and preachers cease to resent Northern interference with their "institutions"? Never. A peace that leaves slavery still in existence is hollow. It is healing the wound with the bullet still in it. It is deliberately setting the broken limb crooked, so as to insure the necessity of breaking it again.

If, therefore, we would have an enduring peace, we must destroy slavery, root and branch. And now allow us to ask the reader whether or not a peace on the basis of the President's emancipation policy, on the basis of human bondage dead and buried, can be secured in any other way than by conquest? Must not universal emancipation be conquered? Will the rebels give up slavery, and thus the whole struggle, until their military power is completely overthrown? We know they will not. We must crush the power of the foe by force of arms in order to remove the causes of future war.

This view is fully confirmed by the course pursued by the pro-slavery party in the free States. Fernando Wood recently declared, in his place in Congress, that "the normal condition of the black man in this country is slavery." In this cry the smaller fry, with their weaker voices, heartily join. They want a peace which shall *not* be conquered. They would save the Southern *idol*, in order to propitiate and use their fellow-devotees. They would bring back the rebels with power as little diminished by their crimes as possible. They would reëstablish the old pro-slavery partnership between North and South, and yield their faces of dough once again to the old, familiar manipulation of Southern fingers; all, of course, in hope of the spoils of office.

These men of Chicago ought to understand the ultimate effect of their schemes. And we suppose they do, but they are willing to sacrifice the future and permanent peace of the country to their own present power. If they can patch up a peace at once, and save slavery, the only ligature which holds them and their rebel allies together, they will let the future take care of itself. Their feeling is: "Our allies must not be conquered, even if we should be obliged to fight them again." They would make a bad, a wicked peace now, and trust their skill to corrupt the public conscience so as to make the peace enduring. But they miscalculate; the virtue and patriotism of the people are not the supple

and plastic things they fancy. A wheedling peace, a peace of compromise with armed traitors, would speedily result in another war. It is not in the power of the Chicago Convention, united with the whole Copperhead faction, permanently to corrupt, or for any great length of time to hoodwink, the American people.

If we now, in conclusion, look at the history of the rebellion itself, our argument for a *conquered peace* will find its most direct and powerful confirmation. Have the rebels fought any of their battles in a spirit of compromise? Have they conscripted their population? Have they fed our prisoners? Have they applied to foreign courts for recognition? Have they pillaged and burned our commerce at sea? Have they treated our colored troops in a manner to indicate the possibility of peace this side of complete conquest? Let the whole male population of the South, from beardless boys to trembling and hoary-headed grandfathers, forced into their army, answer. Let Belle Island, with its starvation, its out-door sleeping apartments, and its rows of frozen Union soldiers, answer. Let Fort Pillow make reply, with its murdered colored soldiers, burnt and chopped up in cold blood.

No, no; the rebels have burned every bridge in their rear. They intended to leave, and have left, no open door of retreat. They have staked their all upon the sword, and no man in authority among them has ever uttered one word or syllable, or made even a gesture, that hinted at peace, except on the ground of Southern independence. They assert over and over again the impossibility of living under one Government. They must be free, they tell us, or not *be* at all; and we have no path left open to us but to subdue them. Brought back, conquered, they may be obedient, but returning unsubdued they would keep the country in perpetual turmoil. We can only, therefore, follow the example of Algernon Sidney, and "pursue gentle peace with the sword."

We now ask our reader to go back a single moment and ponder our arguinent. We have shown, in the first place, that the character of slave civilization is such that even before the war it could brook no opposition, no freedom except for itself; that our Congressional history, for the last twenty years, has been marked by pro-slavery truculency, bullying, blustering, and bragging, by the use of bludgeons, pistols, and bowie-knives; that this was not exceptional or confined to a few, but was accepted, defended, and even complimented by the many, both in and out of Congress; the

pulpit did not reprove it, and the press magnified it; and finally, that the men who controlled Southern opinion had come to the conclusion that their right of domination over the country was innate. From chastising us with whips, they proceeded to scorpions, waxing daily madder and madder, until their chronic sense of dignity and masterhood broke out into open violence against the Union. Now, will it be possible again to live in peace with such people until they are conquered—until the inordinate conceit is taken out of them? We believe not.

We have further seen that slavery, the bone of contention in the present strife, is the foundation, the life, the soul of Southern society; that so long as *it* lives, the real and only cause of war continues; that if we heal over our troubles with this element still extant, we have only an apparent, and hence only a temporary, peace; that, therefore, slavery must perish, if peace, when it comes, is to last; and that such is the hold of slavery on the Southern mind, that we must absolutely cut our way with the sword through all the military power of the enemy, before we can reach and demolish the inner sanctuary in which slavery is worshipped. The last thing the South will give up is slavery. They will yield it only when they must — when the weapons of war are wrenched from their clutch—and not before.

We have also shown that the so-called peace party, the pro-Southern, pro-slavery party, of the North, are working in harmony with the Southern rebels; that if, by giving countenance and hope to traitors, they make them more difficult to conquer, they also make their conquest the more necessary. For if Northern peacemen dictate the settlement with rebellion, the spirit that fired on Sumter will still survive, and must soon repeat the horrors of war.

We have shown, finally, that the war now raging has been conducted on the rebel side in a manner to show that compromise is impossible; that Jeff Davis himself, with all his satellites in the Southern aristocracy, prefers extermination to the Union in the best shape in which it could be restored. If the Union comes, therefore, it comes by the sword; its terms must be dictated by our victorious armies. Whatever McClellan may have done while in command of the army, however "easy" he may have "touched off" his guns, however gently he may have waved his peaceful sword, the rebels have indulged in no such shams; they have tried to strike home to the heart of the nation at every blow. Nor

have they, at any period of their terrible struggle for independence, ever shown the slighest wavering in their purpose—the slightest sign that they would settle for "half a loaf." Their whole course says: "The whole or none." It says to Chicago: "We thank you for fighting our battles, but you are fools for your pains. Whip your Government for us, or help us to do it, and then let us alone." No, there is no hope of patching up a peace; and if there were, it would only be "putting new cloth into the old garment and making the rent worse." We must fight till "the last armed foe expires," we must whip the rebels, even if we have to fight their Northern allies into the bargain. Once conquered, they will be easy to settle with; until then, any settlement must be disgraceful, ruinous, and temporary.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

UNION CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.

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" JAS. HARLAN, of Iowa.	" R. B. VAN VALKENBURG, N. Y.
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HON. JAMES HARLAN,
Washington, D. C.

Very respectfully, yours, etc.,

D. N. COOLEY
Secretary.

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